Adversary Entente Task Force Update, July 16

Authors: Daniel Shats, Grace Mappes, Kelly Campa, and Karolina Hird, with Frederick W. Kagan

Data cutoff: 9 am ET, July 16

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is launching a task force that will examine the strategic interactions between the United States’ main adversaries: Russia, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Iran, and North Korea. The new Adversary Entente Task Force will produce weekly products providing assessments on major developments between these adversaries in order to more holistically examine the evolution of the Entente, assess prospects of cooperation, and determine exploitable vulnerabilities within these adversary relationships. Adversary Entente Task Force publications will supplement the regional expertise in ISW’s existing Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, Iran Update, and China-Taiwan Weekly Update.

Click here to read ISW’s new special edition examining how the Israel-Iran war has rebalanced the Adversary Entente.

Key takeaways:

• Russia may use the deployment of 50 Laotian military engineers to Kursk Oblast to symbolize growing international support for its war in Ukraine.
• The United States sanctioned 18 Hong Kong-based companies that facilitate the sale of Iranian oil to entities abroad, including private PRC-based refineries that are the largest buyers of Iranian oil.
• Russia is encouraging Iran to concede its uranium enrichment in US-Iranian nuclear talks, likely because Russia recognizes that zero Iranian enrichment can serve Russian interests.
• Russia is offering to mediate potential future North Korean–South Korean talks in order to repair its reputation with Indo-Pacific partners, but such talks are unlikely in the near-to-medium term.
• Russia is discussing media cooperation with the PRC in a continuing effort to coordinate messaging on key interest areas and to increase the reach of Russia’s propaganda.

Defense and Military-Technical Cooperation

Russia may be coordinating the deployment of a Laotian military unit for demining operations in Kursk Oblast, which would make Laos the second foreign country after North Korea to directly send military personnel to aid Russia in a combat zone. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on July 5 that Russia has recruited a 50-person engineering unit of the Laotian People’s Army to conduct demining operations in Russia’s Kursk Oblast under the pretext of providing humanitarian aid. GUR reported that Laos agreed to support Russia due to its heavy dependence on foreign aid.[1] Laotian officials denied the GUR report on July 10 and claimed that Laos has no policy of sending military personnel to intervene in foreign conflicts.[2] Russia may be interested in using the alleged Laotian deployment to symbolize growing international support for its invasion of Ukraine, as 50 personnel are unlikely to make a significant difference to the war effort. Russia and North Korea previously denied North Korea’s military deployments to Kursk until April 2025, but now speak openly about North Korean troops’ role in the defense of Kursk Oblast.[3] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov publicly thanked Laos on June 26 for its assistance in “resolving humanitarian issues,” including providing medical care to wounded Russian soldiers on Laotian territory.[4] This is a service that Russia also publicly acknowledged North Korea was providing in February 2025, two months before admitting North Korean participation in military operations in Kursk.[5] Russia and Laos have previously cooperated on military demining operations within Laos under the label of humanitarian aid.[6] Laos may be seeking greater economic cooperation with Russia to diversify its international partnerships away from the PRC, which owns half of Laos’s debt after financing a series of expensive infrastructure projects in the country.[7] Laotian president Thongloun Sisoulith said in 2022 that Laos was trying to diversify its partners because “relying on only one country’s [the PRC’s] resources is not enough.”[8]

Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Cooperation

The Russian DIB continues to reap benefits from Sino-Russian technical cooperation. The United Engine Corporation (UEC), a subsidiary of Russian state defense conglomerate Rostec, signed a strategic partnership agreement on July 9 with the PRC-based NEW JCM Group Co., Ltd. (NEW JCM Group) equipment manufacturer on the development of joint gas turbines for export.[9] The agreement includes provisions for UEC’s manufacture of gas pumping units with NEW JCM Group’s equipment, and also provides for the localization of PRC component production at UEC facilities in Russia. Gas powered turbines are often used in the manufacture of military goods such as jet aircraft and helicopters, ships and submarines, and tanks.[10] Russia’s ability to produce gas powered turbines was constrained with the imposition of Western sanctions on the Russian DIB in 2022 following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and Russia began to look to PRC-based companies for import substitution and the localization of gas turbine production.[11] ISW previously assessed that the PRC’s support for the Russian DIB via component provision and technical production agreements has been critical to the survival of the Russian economy during the war in Ukraine.[12] Agreements between Russian state-owned DIB entities and PRC enterprises are examples of Russia’s increased reliance on the PRC for DIB-related development and manufacturing.

Economic and Financial Cooperation

The United States continues to target Iranian efforts to acquire oil transfer payments through Hong Kong-based entities. The United States sanctioned 18 Hong Kong-based trading companies for their role in facilitating the sale of Iranian oil on behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) on July 9.[13] Hong Kong has emerged as a hub for PRC companies to circumvent sanctions against Iran, Russia, and North Korea, as its lenient regulatory environment facilitates relatively easy concealment of corporate ownership and the rapid creation and dissolution of shell companies.[14] Refineries that purchase Iranian oil pay these shell companies, which then transfer the payments to secondary IRGC-controlled shell companies.[15] Private PRC “teapot” refineries (small, privately owned oil refineries) are the largest buyers of Iranian oil.[16] The PRC’s oil imports from Iran offer a key lifeline for Iran’s economic amid heavy US sanctions. PRC imports of Iranian crude oil rose in June to the highest levels since March 2025 as sellers expedited loadings due to perceived disruptions from the Israel-Iran conflict.[17]

The PRC likely hopes to benefit from Russia’s de facto annexation of Belarus to pursue alternative trade and sanctions-mitigation avenues. Belarus has pursued intensified relations with the PRC following 2022 due to its close integration with the Russian war in Ukraine. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko recently met with CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping in Beijing in June 2025, where Xi praised Belarus as a “true friend” of the PRC.[18] Belarus and the PRC are pursuing various types of economic and logistical cooperation over the backdrop of their respective bilateral relations with Moscow. Belarusian Railways Head Valery Verenich met with Chairman of the Board of Directors of the China Railways State Corporation Guo Zhuxue in Beijing on July 9.[19] The two signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on developing rail transportation logistics, noting that Belarus is an important transit link and trade and logistics partner for the PRC. The PRC likely hopes to gain economically from strengthening its relationship with the Belarusian transportation and logistics industry, while Belarus is likely hoping to build a relationship with the PRC in order to offset some of its reliance on Moscow for basic economic support. Russia also stands to benefit from the Sino-Belarusian relationship—the Kremlin uses Belarus as a key sanctions evasion partner, and PRC investment in the Belarusian economy is likely to strengthen the Kremlin’s ability to continue to leverage Minsk for sanctions-mitigation purposes.[20] ISW previously assessed that Russia’s major international partners, namely Iran and the PRC, have pursued their own relationships with Belarus, taking advantage of Russia’s de-facto annexation of the country in order to expand sanctions evasion efforts and build alternative trade bases.[21]

Political and Diplomatic Cooperation

Russia is encouraging Iran to concede its demand to maintain uranium enrichment abilities in negotiations with the United States. Three European officials and an Israeli official told Axios on July 12 that Russian President Vladimir Putin encouraged Iran to accept a nuclear deal in which Iran cannot enrich uranium.[22] Unspecified sources stated that Russia has said that it will provide Iran with 3.67 percent enriched uranium to support Iran’s civilian nuclear program, presumably in the event that Iran forfeits its domestic uranium enrichment capabilities in a possible nuclear deal.[23] The Iranian regime has defined its uranium enrichment as an absolute right and has maintained this demand through numerous rounds of US-Iran talks, the 12-day Israel-Iran war, and in the weeks since the June 24 ceasefire.[24] Putin likely recognizes that a nuclear deal will require either the United States or Iran to show flexibility on their red lines vis-à-vis enrichment, although neither party appears willing to do so. Another round of conflict between Iran and the United States and/or Israel could risk destabilizing Iran, which is a close strategic partner to Russia, and Russia is likely to take steps to ensure Iran’s stability, as ISW previously assessed.[25] Russia also likely seeks to play a role in influencing Iran to accept zero enrichment in order to help reset US-Russia relations on Russian terms. Iranian agreement to the US demand for “zero enrichment”—as unlikely it may be—is likely to serve long-term Russian interests.

Russia offered to mediate potential future North Korean-South Korean talks, likely in an effort to rebuild Russia's reputation among its Asian partners. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un in Pyongyang on July 12 and stated in response to a question from a journalist that Russia is willing to "intervene" in the North Korean-South Korean relationship but "exclusively in those areas that are acceptable" to North Korea and in which North Korea is "interested."[26] Russia has relied heavily on its relationship with North Korea to sustain its war in Ukraine over the past year, but ties with Pyongyang have somewhat damaged Russia’s reputation amongst Indo-Pacific players. Russia has previously tried to court South Korea in an effort to mitigate and soften the impacts of its growing reliance on North Korea and may see the offer of mediating talks as a way of rebalancing the relationship with a new government in Seoul.[27] New South Korea President Lee Jae-Myung has promised to recalibrate ties with Russia and the PRC, and Russia may be trying to cater to Lee’s new foreign policy approach to insert itself as an effective negotiating partner Indo-Pacific issues.[28]

South Korea would not likely be amenable to any talks with North Korea in the near- to medium-term, however. North Korea and South Korea have not held direct talks since 2019 and each suspended the 2018 Comprehensive Agreement Pact, which aimed to lower bilateral tensions, in 2023.[29] North Korea has intensified its militarization in recent years, including by testing a new destroyer in April 2025 and intends to significantly expand North Korea's naval capabilities in 2026.[30] Russia’s relationship with North Korea has also significantly added to its militarization.[31] Lee Jae-myung campaigned on a "pragmatic" foreign policy agenda and vowed to reduce tensions with North Korea following his election, but direct North Korea-South Korea talks likely remain a long way off and are dependent upon both North Korea and South Korea sustaining efforts to reduce tensions over a prolonged period.[32]

Russia-PRC discussions on media cooperation reflect a continuing effort to coordinate their messaging on key interest areas, especially Russia’s war in Ukraine. Russian ambassador to the PRC Igor Morgulov met with Pavel Negoitsa, the director of the Russian government newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta, on July 11 to discuss prospects for large-scale cooperation between the newspaper and top PRC media outlets, including the CCP’s official newspaper People’s Daily, state-owned English-language tabloid Global Times, state news agency Xinhua, and state TV and radio conglomerate China Media Group. Morgulov and Negoitsa emphasized a desire to promote “an objective information agenda about our countries” and cover Russia’s achievements.[33] PRC and Russian state media have shared cooperation agreements since at least 2015, including content-sharing agreements, joint interviews, joint media projects, personnel exchanges, and coordination on messaging.[34] Both countries have used such agreements to promote their desired narratives in the other country’s media, including PRC state media amplifying Russian disinformation about alleged US “biolabs” in Ukraine shortly before the war and Russian media denying human rights abuses in the PRC’s Xinjiang Autonomous Region.[35] PRC rhetorical and media coverage has aligned with much of Russia’s propaganda throughout the war in Ukraine, including blaming NATO for instigating the war, opposing sanctions on Russia, consistently refusing to call the war a “war,” and increasingly calling for diplomatic solutions that address the “root causes” of the conflict.[36] Russia likely aims to leverage further media cooperation with the PRC to increase the international reach of its propaganda amid Russia’s international isolation due to the war in Ukraine. PRC state media has cooperation agreements in many countries, often under the auspices of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Xinhua alone claimed to have cooperation agreements with over 3,600 institutions worldwide in 2023.[37]

[1] https://gur.gov dot ua/en/content/kreml-namahaietsia-vtiahnuty-laos-v-ahresiiu-proty-ukrainy

[2] https://laotiantimes dot com/2025/07/10/laos-debunks-rumors-of-sending-troops-to-fight-in-ukraine/

[3] https://www.nknews dot org/2025/04/in-a-first-russia-confirms-north-koreas-involvement-in-ukraine-war/

[4] https://tass dot com/politics/1981513

[5] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/12/world/asia/north-korea-russia-soldiers-orphans.html

[6] https://kpl.gov dot la/en/detail.aspx?id=65942

[7] https://www.voanews.com/a/hefty-debt-to-china-stokes-soaring-inflation-in-laos-/7885926.html

[8] https://www.rfa.org/english/news/laos/russia-laos-beareast-12112023122737.html

[9] https://t.me/uecrus_official/1356

[10] https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/science/gas-turbine-technology#:~:text=In%20a%20combined%2Dcycle%20power,diesel%20engine%2C%20increasing%20its%20performance.

[11] https://a-b-i dot ru/2023/07/china-russia-gas-turbine/; https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0838

[12] https://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/The%20Strengthening%20China-Russia%20Nexus.pdf

[13] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0191

[14] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-august-9-2024

[15] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0191

[16] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-03-20/us-sanctions-chinese-refinery-allegedly-linked-to-iranian-oil ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-march-27-2025

[17] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-07-14/china-s-imports-of-iran-crude-at-three-month-high-vortexa-says; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-14-2025

[18] https://www.fmprc.gov dot cn/eng./xw/zyxw/202506/t20250605_11641419.html; https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-xi-meets-with-lukashenko-all-weather-partner-belarus-2025-06-04/

[19][19] https://belta dot by/society/view/belarus-i-kitaj-budut-razvivat-logistiku-zheleznodorozhnyh-perevozok-725409-2025/

[20] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russia%27s%20Quiet%20Conquest%20Belarus.pdf

[21] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/The%20Russia-Iran%20Coalition%20Deepens%20013025.pdf

[22] https://www.axios.com/2025/07/12/putin-iran-nuclear-deal-uranium-enrichment

[23] https://www.axios.com/2025/07/12/putin-iran-nuclear-deal-uranium-enrichment

[24] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-13-2025

[25] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/adversary-entente-task-force-update-june-26-2025

[26] https://tass dot ru/politika/24498969

[27] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-19-2024

[28] https://www.koreaherald.com/article/10487283

[29] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-67504866

[30] https://isw.pub/ChinaTaiwanUpdate050225

[31] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/israel-iran-war-rebalances-adversary-entente; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/adversary-entente-task-force-update-june-18-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061025; https://isw.pub/ChinaTaiwanUpdate051725; https://isw.pub/ChinaTaiwanUpdate050225

[32] https://isw.pub/ChinaTaiwan061625; https://isw.pub/ChinaTaiwan060625; https://isw.pub/ChinaTaiwanUpdate051725; https://isw.pub/ChinaTaiwanUpdate042525;

[33] https://t.me/rusembchina/6998

[34] https://en.people dot cn/n/2015/0627/c98649-8912048.html ; https://english.news dot cn/20250620/e23be1658fee4646870230b31cc23c02/c.html; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/31/close-ties-allow-russia-propaganda-to-spread-through-china

[35] https://tass dot com/society/1591751 ; https://meduza dot io/en/feature/2020/07/28/it-s-so-hard-to-find-good-help ; https://theintercept.com/2022/12/30/russia-china-news-media-agreement/

[36] https://www.uscc.gov/research/chinas-position-russias-invasion-ukraine ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-july-11-2025

[37] https://english.news dot cn/20231202/f2b5b6179da94b07814ffab014228083/c.html