Dr. Haroon ur Rasheed Baloch, Academic, Digital Rights Advocate, Founder, The Credible Times

Key Takeaways

• The PRC, primarily through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), has embedded itself deeply in Pakistan’s military, economic, technological, and academic spheres. While this partnership offers economic benefits, it also comes with risks related to national sovereignty, overdependence, and social unrest.
• Following substantial Chinese investments in Pakistan, some media and academic narratives have increasingly reflected PRC talking points that emphasize the brotherhood between the two countries and the importance of their partnership, often with limited critical examination of potential downsides.
• Although China and Pakistan officially deny any military intent, CPEC’s infrastructure projects — particularly the Gwadar Port — are widely viewed as potentially enhancing the PRC’s military and geopolitical presence in the region, raising security concerns among international actors, especially India and the United States.
• CPEC has faced criticism for not benefiting local communities, particularly in Balochistan, where residents see little economic gain and face environmental harm.
• Without effective governance and safeguards for local communities, CPEC risks exacerbating inequality and sparking social unrest, as became evident when militant groups such as the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) targeted Chinese workers associated with CPEC projects.
• The report recommends practical policy actions focusing on governance reforms, peace and security, social inclusion, public narratives, and responsible technology integration to ensure CPEC’s long-term benefits align with Pakistan’s national interests.

China Index Spotlight: PRC’s Soft and Hard Power Influence in Pakistan

Introduction and background

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a centerpiece of the People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). CPEC has been framed as a game changer by the Pakistani government for its economic development, infrastructure modernization, and geopolitical significance (Ashfaq et al., 2024). With an investment package exceeding $65 billion (Shahzad, 2022), the PRC has positioned itself as a strategic partner for Pakistan, directing substantial resources into critical sectors such as energy, law enforcement, transportation infrastructure, agriculture, social and economic development, Gwadar Port, science and information technology (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan, 2024). However, as the years have unfolded, CPEC has increasingly highlighted a complex interplay between economic opportunities and growing PRC influence on Pakistan. Besides, there have been mounting concerns regarding transparency and social equity (Dawn, 2021) of PRC investments in the country.

Doublethink Lab’s China Index, which ranked Pakistan as the country most influenced by the PRC in 2022 and 2024, highlights the growing influence of the PRC on Pakistan’s domestic affairs. Chinese influence and interests are pervasive throughout Pakistan’s national landscape, influencing everything from academia and media to internal politics and law enforcement. A number of areas, including media, technology, academia, social development, and even the military, are witnessing a substantial increase in PRC investments and joint collaborations as the bilateral relationship grows under CPEC (Doublethink Lab, 2022). The cost of this increased cooperation, however, goes beyond just money; it also raises more serious questions regarding transparency and governance, raising pressing concerns about the effects on Pakistan’s democratic institutions and populace.

This report explores these evolving dynamics in an effort to offer a thorough grasp of how Pakistan’s socio-political and economic future is being shaped by PRC investments and loans, and the broader framework of BRI. Although there is no denying that CPEC has many immediate advantages, especially when it comes to foreign direct investments and infrastructure development, there are also substantial risks associated with this partnership that must be carefully considered in order to safeguard Pakistan’s long-term national interests. This report will analyze the PRC’s investments in Pakistan’s infrastructure, law enforcement, defense, energy, and information technology and telecommunication sectors to navigate PRC influence on Pakistan.

The promises and challenges of CPEC

The main goal of CPEC is to improve energy output, strengthen regional connectivity, and address Pakistan’s infrastructural deficiencies in order to improve the country’s economic prospects. New highways and road networks could spur economic development in underdeveloped provinces in Pakistan, particularly in Balochistan and Gilgit-Baltistan. Nevertheless, a number of systemic issues compromise CPEC’s potential advantages, with the lack of transparency in agreements between the PRC and Pakistan being the most significant. Even Pakistan’s elected representatives have not been granted access to many specifics about loan terms, repayment plans, environmental assessments, and cost-benefit evaluations. Local industrialists have expressed their reservations about the fairness of Pakistani business participation in CPEC projects (Siddiqui & Scherzer, 2019), demanding a transparent investment policy to ensure mutual benefits. This lack of transparency restricts public conversation and raises critical concerns about governance and accountability.

In these sectors, a substantial portion of the expenditure has resulted in some progress. Because of CPEC’s emphasis on energy projects, Pakistan’s chronic energy issues, which for decades hampered industry and resulted in severe shortages, have improved in many parts of the country. However, the conditions of the loan agreements that the Pakistani government made with PRC commercial power companies in the energy sector are unclear. Pakistan seeks to postpone the repayment of its approximately $17 billion energy sector debt for a period of eight years and switch the currency of the loan from US dollars to Renminbi. Pakistan has attempted to renegotiate these terms, but the PRC companies have turned down the request (Rana, 2024).

Since 2006, the largest obstacle to Pakistan’s economy has been the energy sector’s circular debt, exacerbated by power losses totaling 2.3 trillion Pakistani rupees (PKR) in 2023. By 2023, the circular debt had exceeded 6 trillion PKR, or equivalent to 3% of the country’s GDP. The government had already injected 342 billion PKR in direct liquidity in 2013, significantly reducing the circular debt from 872 billion PKR to 211 billion PKR; however, it surged again to a record high of 1.88 trillion PKR in May 2023 due to multiple factors. This surge coincides with the period when Pakistan signed energy agreements with the PRC under CPEC. However, the terms and conditions of all agreements, with the exception of a few, are not publicly available. Other factors that significantly contributed to the rise in per-unit electricity prices include scarce cash flows to power generation businesses and the underutilization, or lack of utilization, of existing power generation capacity (Malik & Mustafa, 2024). The PRC has invested a total of $20.63 billion in 42 energy projects in Pakistan. Of these, six are supported by development loans, one by a commercial syndicate loan, and the remaining projects are business-to-business with mixed intentions (AIDDATA, 2024).

The financial burden of CPEC is significant. The majority of the energy projects are funded by mixed Chinese loans, but the overpricing of several projects, particularly coal power projects under the independent power producers (IPPs) category, has contributed to rising electricity tariffs (Mujahid, 2024). This has placed a growing burden on ordinary citizens, who face higher living costs due to higher utility bills (Khattak, 2024). While the elite and politically connected benefit from lucrative contracts (Yousafzai, 2024), poorly negotiated agreements have resulted in greater national debt and few avenues for redress, burdening the common populace (Adeney & Boni, 2021).

National sovereignty and regional concerns

Even though the PRC-Pakistan cooperation is primarily viewed through the framework of CPEC, which is described as an economic endeavor, both countries maintain a long-term understanding to promote and benefit from each other’s military and defense capabilities. For instance, one of the most significant infrastructure projects under CPEC, Gwadar’s deep-sea port, represents the PRC’s larger geopolitical goals in the Indian Ocean (Khan, 2024). The completion of the projects could suggest a stronger military presence, potentially altering the regional balance of power (Aviation Division, 2022). Speculations about a potential PRC naval facility near the Gwadar deep-sea port have raised concerns among international actors, particularly India and the United States, over the PRC’s growing military presence in the Indian Ocean (Gul & Shakir, 2024).

Social justice and public disappointments

Among the issues surrounding CPEC, social justice concerns are among the most urgent. While CPEC’s development initiatives are generally viewed favorably nationwide (Gallup Pakistan, 2024), many local communities, particularly those in resource-rich areas like Balochistan, feel excluded (Morung Express, 2024). They argue that while these mega-projects use their land and resources, they see few financial advantages, and instead face environmental damage (Khan, 2018). In addition, a large portion of CPEC’s labor force consists of workers from the PRC, sidelining local labor and exacerbating unemployment in already underdeveloped areas (Akhtar, 2018).

Inequality is also a concern when economic benefits are concentrated in the hands of a small number of wealthy political and corporate leaders. Without effective supervision and inclusive governance, CPEC risks deepening the societal divides in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces that it aims to address (Ahmed, 2024). In the absence of concrete safeguards to guarantee that local communities benefit from these projects, CPEC could worsen economic disparities and spark social upheaval, especially in Balochistan, where tension with the federal government is already high.

Report’s Objectives

Given the aforementioned context, this report aims to provide a thorough analysis of the evolving Pakistan-PRC relationship under and beyond CPEC, with a particular emphasis on social justice, accountability, transparency, and sovereignty. By closely examining these dynamics, this research seeks to offer practical policy recommendations that help stakeholders, including policymakers, media, academia, and civil society, navigate this complex relationship in a way that ensures long-term, sustainable benefits for the people of Pakistan. The recommendations will be structured around five key areas: governance reforms, peace and security, social inclusion, public narratives, and responsible integration of technology.

This report will use the latest edition of the China Index to provide critical insights into the evolving landscape of PRC influence in Pakistan. It is essential for stakeholders, including government entities, civil society, media, and international donor agencies, to engage with these complex dynamics thoughtfully. Addressing the challenges of social justice, accountability, transparency, and sovereignty within the context of CPEC will empower stakeholders to navigate the complexities of this bilateral relationship, ensuring that it aligns with the long-term interests of Pakistan and its citizens.

Methodological framework

This report builds upon Doublethink Lab’s China Index, a comprehensive assessment of the PRC’s global influence across nine domains: media, academia, foreign policy, domestic politics, economy, society, technology, military, and law enforcement. Each domain consists of eleven indicators, developed by the China Index Committee, which correspond to observable phenomena of PRC influence. Local experts in each country provide factual evidence for these indicators, which are then reviewed, quantified, and normalized to produce country profiles and domain rankings (Doublethink Lab, 2022). For this study, the researcher reviewed and updated the scoring of the indicators to capture the updates up to September 2024. While considering the readily available data both from primary and secondary sources, the author has analyzed PRC influence in Pakistani media, academia, technology, military, and law enforcement domains to examine the transparency of Chinese investment and its broader impact on Pakistani citizens.

This study employed a qualitative research approach to provide a descriptive analysis of the findings. At least two independent Pakistanis with an in-depth knowledge of PRC investments in their country were interviewed to analyze the previously quantified image of PRC influence in Pakistan.

Findings

The PRC exploitation of Pakistani media for soft power ambitions

In Pakistan, several reports have emerged of journalists, media organisations, and online influencers receiving training or assistance from PRC state-owned media or PRC-connected enterprises. Typically, journalists are invited to visit the PRC for week-long, lavish trips. In several cases, they have also been offered non-degree fellowships jointly organized by Chinese universities — such as Renmin University — and media organizations such as China Economic Net, China Global Television Network, and have received scholarships for media degree programs at Tsinghua, Fudan, and other PRC national universities. These programs frequently focus on media collaboration, with an emphasis on positive coverage of the PRC’s position in the region across various topics, including economics, culture, technology, and social issues. These initiatives aim to align Pakistan’s media narratives with Beijing’s geopolitical and economic objectives, particularly regarding projects such as CPEC. By promoting pro-PRC content, these efforts create positive narratives about the PRC’s role in Pakistan’s prosperity and stability. The PRC also funds initiatives like the CPEC Media Forum and directly pays Pakistani media organizations for content-sharing agreements. Outlets such as Dawn and The News have previously participated, while PRC Embassy news is regularly published through state-run wire services like the Associated Press of Pakistan and Independent News Pakistan (Adnan Aamir, personal communication, September 26, 2024).

The CPEC partnership presents a range of challenges. Pakistani media often practice self-censorship when reporting on PRC projects, curtailing public discourse and transparency on the potential ramifications of these investments. The lack of access to agreements and MoUs between the PRC and Pakistani governments further exacerbates the situation, leaving citizens unaware of the terms behind these lucrative deals. This opacity is particularly troubling given the high costs associated with CPEC energy projects, which have led to soaring electricity tariffs that place a heavy burden on ordinary Pakistanis, while mechanisms for government accountability are profoundly lacking.

Dr. Ammar A. Malik, who oversaw AidData’s Chinese Development Financing Program from 2021 to 2024, emphasizes the transparency gap in development financing. He observes that, whereas multilateral institutions such as the AIIB and the World Bank give detailed reports on their projects in Pakistan, including loan terms and environmental assessments, such material is notably absent for PRC bilateral loans. He points out that the lack of openness continues to be a serious concern (Ammar A. Malik, personal communication, September 27, 2024).

There has been a noticeable shift in both the tone and content of media coverage in Pakistan regarding the PRC after CPEC investments began. This shift is particularly evident in reporting on sensitive issues, including the human rights violations of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang. “Pakistani journalists are often taken to Xinjiang province, where they are shown development projects and happy citizens. They then write articles or reports portraying the PRC soft power.” (Adnan Aamir, personal communication, September 26, 2024) Pakistani columnist Yasir Habib Khan stated after a PRC-funded trip, that Islam is thriving in Xinjiang and Uyghurs rights are protected under Chinese law. He argued that:

“Contrary to the Western narrative regarding repression of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang, Islam is flourishing with all its religious customs and traditional practices under the law… The lawful rights and interests of the people of all ethnicities in Xinjiang have been effectively protected. All ethnic groups, regardless of their population size, have equal legal status and enjoy freedom of religious belief and various rights in accordance with the law.” (Khan, 2024)

The changing tone of media coverage is also reflected in the evident positive reporting on CPEC and the PRC (Qianqian & Yijun, 2020). CPEC is often presented as a critical element of Pakistan’s economic development and is frequently framed as a symbol of progress, modernization, and partnership. This portrayal aligns with the PRC’s own narratives of ‘win-win‘ cooperation and long-term economic stability in the region (Ahmed et al., 2021). CPEC is frequently portrayed not only as an infrastructure project but also as a symbol of the growing brotherhood between the PRC and Pakistan (The Express Tribune, 2024). This positive depiction is largely unquestioned in the Pakistani media, reinforcing the notion that the PRC is a benevolent and stabilizing force for Pakistan’s economy and infrastructure development. The depiction of the PRC as a brother and a reliable ally reflects deeper geopolitical alignments between the two nations, positioning their partnership as a counterbalance to Western influence in the region (Afzaal et al., 2019). The continued employment of such friendly discourses demonstrates how Pakistani media has internalized the PRC’s soft power initiatives, which reflect the PRC’s desired image as a peaceful, friendly state committed to mutual growth and collaboration.

While the majority of Pakistani media tends to adopt a pro-PRC tone, occasional critical perspectives can be found, particularly in editorials and opinion articles in publications such as Dawn, The News, and Express Tribune. These critiques often raise concerns about the nature of Pakistan’s relationship with the PRC, especially regarding the implementation of CPEC. Critics question whether Pakistan is genuinely benefiting from the project or if the PRC is disproportionately benefiting from the bilateral cooperation. There are also concerns about transparency, local economic impacts, and the potential environmental costs of such large-scale initiatives. Despite the presence of these critical viewpoints, they are often isolated and do not receive the same level of attention as the positive portrayals of the PRC in mainstream coverage (Hamid, 2016). Pro-PRC narratives, which highlight the benefits of economic cooperation, stability, and brotherhood between the two nations, dominate much of the media landscape. However, the presence of these critical viewpoints demonstrates that the PRC influence is not absolute and a more nuanced conversation about the bilateral relationship could emerge in the future.

The subtle influence of PRC narratives on Pakistani intelligentsia regarding the Uyghur discourse

PRC investments in Pakistan are extensive, ranging from the construction of physical infrastructure, such as highways, coal power plants, and dams, to more subtle but important efforts to shape Pakistani society. The latter investments reflect the PRC’s long-term strategy to strengthen its influence through soft power measures. One critical component of this strategy is the PRC’s extensive involvement in academia and civil society, where it works to shape narratives that are consistent with its geopolitical goals.

The PRC’s soft power strategy in Pakistan is significantly bolstered by its investments in higher education and academia, as demonstrated by initiatives such as the CPEC-Collaborative Research Grant (CPEC-CRG) (Higher Education Commission, 2024). This program is part of a broader collaboration between Pakistani and PRC institutions, known as the CPEC Consortium of Universities (Higher Education Commission, n.d.), which aims to address important socioeconomic concerns associated with CPEC through joint research efforts and scholarship placements in PRC educational institutions.

By establishing academic relationships across a wide range of sectors — including sustainable agriculture, resource management, culture and society, art, design and digital media, technology and innovation, infrastructure and transportation, health, clean drinking water, sustainable cities — the CPEC-CRG not only supports research-driven solutions but also strengthens PRC’s influence within Pakistan’s intellectual and policymaking circles. Furthermore, by encouraging the participation of both junior and senior scholars, the PRC ensures a comprehensive and long-term impact on Pakistan’s academic landscape (Higher Education Commission, n.d.).

The PRC’s soft power aims are reflected in its growing partnership with the Pakistani Higher Education Commission and universities in all provinces. The PRC’s strategy to impact the Pakistani intellectual and cultural landscape is evident through the promotion of academic collaboration, including scholarships, research funding, and the establishment of China Study Centers in 2021 (The News, 2021). These centers aim to promote the Chinese language and enhance cultural understanding, and link young Pakistani students with the PRC’s higher education institutions to promote academic research on CPEC topics. The PRC has invested millions of PKR in establishing and sustaining their operations, as well as commissioning CPEC-specific research grants for at least three years (The News, 2021).

In addition, five Confucius Institutes have been operating at major Pakistani universities, including the National University of Modern Languages (Islamabad), Punjab University (Lahore), Karachi University, the University of Sargodha, and the University of Agriculture Faisalabad. These institutes, along with two Confucius Classrooms, promote Chinese language and culture, with an annual enrollment of up to 38,500 students learning Mandarin at various levels (HSK1 to HSK5) (Xinhua, 2021). Programs such as the Chinese Government Scholarship Program (Higher Education Commission, 2024) and the Chinese Embassy Scholarship Fund (University of the Punjab, 2020) are crucial in attracting a new generation of academics and professionals familiar with Chinese culture, language, and political and economic ideologies. Chinese universities in the PRC host more than 28,000 Pakistani students annually on fully funded scholarships (Notezai, 2024), making Pakistan the third largest source of international students in China after South Korea and Thailand. These academic exchanges have cultivated a network of scholars and researchers who frequently become advocates for strengthening ties between the two countries upon their return to Pakistan, both in the public sector and in policy making spheres (Associated Press of Pakistan, 2024). Through these initiatives, the PRC envisions itself as a crucial partner in Pakistan’s socioeconomic development while also creating a network of Pakistani experts whose perspectives align with the PRC’s objectives in the region.

In addition to academia, the PRC has attempted to leverage civil society to further its soft power objectives in Pakistan. A key area of focus has been the growth of PRC-specific think tanks, an emerging sector that has seen rapid growth. These think tanks are often managed by Pakistani PRC lobbyists — individuals or organizations that advocate for the PRC’s agenda in Pakistan and often receive monetary support in the form of grants, funding, or scholarships — in academia, many of whom have benefited from PRC scholarships in the past. The think tanks often publish materials that echo the PRC’s narrative of development, presenting the PRC as a non-threatening and necessary partner in Pakistan’s growth.

The PRC is also seeking to ensure that these think tanks lobby for stronger ties and emphasize the benefits of PRC investments in Pakistan by providing them with financial support. One prominent example is the Pakistan-China Institute (Pakistan-China Institute, 2024) led by Senator Mushahid Hussain Sayed (Pakistan-China Institute, 2024). Hussain has held significant roles in the past, including Federal Minister for Information, Broadcasting and Media Development, as well as Chairman of the Defense Committee of the Senate. Under his leadership, the think tank has maintained a strong alignment with the BRI agenda in Pakistan, focusing on defense diplomacy, education, energy, economy, and environment. It has also promoted PRC narratives on sensitive topics, including human rights issues in Xinjiang and Tibet. He has consistently stated that Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang “enjoy peaceful lives”, attributing accusations of human rights violations to Western efforts to “destabilize the PRC through fictional narratives.” (South Asia Monitor, 2021)

This viewpoint, championed through the work of the Pakistan-China Institute, has garnered significant support among Pakistani politicians, religious leaders, and academics. Notably, former Prime Minister Imran Khan publicly endorsed the PRC’s stance on Xinjiang when communicating with the media (Al-Jazeera, 2021), and his Minister for Human Rights, Dr. Shireen Mazari (Shehzad, 2022), reaffirmed this position. This growing alignment illustrates how diplomatic connections have contributed to the rising acceptance of PRC narratives within Pakistan’s political and intellectual discourse. The favorable nature of the Pakistani political system towards the PRC makes it difficult to speak critically about the PRC’s human rights violations. This, in turn, restricts the voices of dissent in Pakistan to criticize and question the PRC’s investments. This alignment with PRC narratives and self-censorship has also reached Pakistani civil society. Dr. Ammar A. Malik (Ammar A. Malik, personal communication, September 27, 2024) observed that civil society groups that are not direct beneficiaries of Chinese funding have remained silent on the human rights violations in Xinjiang, while actively speaking out on issues related to the Rohingya, Kashmir, and Palestinian Muslims.

PRC digital technology: Need vs. implications

The PRC’s investments in Pakistan’s IT and technology sectors are becoming increasingly significant, particularly given Pakistan’s large youth population. Approximately 64% of the population is under the age of 30 (Jan, 2023), with over 26% between the ages of 15 and 30 (Pasha, 2023). Recognizing the potential of this demographic, the PRC has focused on Pakistan’s youth as both a valuable resource for economic development and a key partner in advancing its regional initiatives. In turn, Pakistan has positioned its youth population as an asset, promoting it as a source of technological advancement and economic growth while leveraging the PRC’s technological expertise.

A key example of this collaboration is Huawei’s recent announcement to train 300,000 Pakistanis in information and communication technologies. As part of this initiative, the company has pledged to sign a strategic partnership and is expected to invest up to $400 million over the next three to four years to improve the quality of technical education across Pakistan (Ali, 2024), including the establishment of a National Data and Cloud Center (Bhutta, 2024). This investment represents the PRC’s broader role in Pakistan’s technology sector, with other companies from the PRC, such as ZTE and China Mobile Communications, also playing a major role.

Two key initiatives exemplify the dynamics of PRC investments under CPEC in the technology sector. These include the Safe City Projects in Lahore (Handout, 2022) and Islamabad (AidData, 2021), and the construction of an 820-kilometer fiber optic cable (AidData, 2021) that connects to the PEACE (Pakistan and East Africa Connecting Europe) cable system’s Pakistan-Egypt and Pakistan-Singapore legs (PEACE Cable International Network, 2022). Both countries claim that these projects represent significant technological advancements that promise improved security, internet speed, and overall digital infrastructure in Pakistan (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Secretariat, 2024).

However, these corporations have generated serious concerns among civil society, particularly regarding privacy and freedom of expression (Al-Jazeera, 2024). Critics argue that the increased surveillance and data collection could jeopardize civil rights, especially with Huawei’s controversial reputation regarding data security (Porter, 2019). In 2017, the Punjab Safe City Authority raised alarms after discovering the presence of additional modules in its surveillance cabinets, which were purposefully installed to enable remote Wi-Fi connections. The Pakistani authorities had never intended to include them in the tender, while Huawei claimed their installations were merely a “misunderstanding.” (Iqbal & Kelion, 2019)

Further concerns emerged in August 2021 when Huawei was sued by an American IT company, Business Efficiency Solutions. The lawsuit accused Huawei of stealing trade secrets related to the development of a technology solution during their mutual collaboration to overhaul the Punjab Police Integrated Command, Control, and Communication Centre. The same system also allowed Huawei to collect sensitive data from Pakistani residents, prompting questions about the potential security risks posed by foreign companies operating in Pakistan’s critical infrastructure (Calburn, 2021).

The Safe City Projects, which utilize modern surveillance technology, including artificial intelligence and the Internet of Things, seek to improve urban security. Although these projects were promoted as providing benefits such as crime reduction and faster emergency responses, they have largely failed to deliver on their promises (Ali, 2022). Instead, they enable extensive monitoring of residents’ actions, potentially without proper privacy protections (Gilani et al., 2018). Pakistan’s legal framework lacks a comprehensive data protection statute (Saleemi, 2024), as well as mechanisms for redress in cases of sensitive data misuse. The lack of transparency and public scrutiny in the operation of these projects raises concerns about the state’s unchecked authority and the potential use of data for political control and censorship. Moreover, Pakistan’s reliance on PRC technology raises concerns that it may adopt elements of the PRC’s surveillance model (Shahid, 2024), widely condemned for human rights violations, particularly in Xinjiang and Tibet (Amnesty International, 2023). As Dr. Ammar A. Malik noted, balancing security needs with national sovereignty remains a challenge:

“I think it’s a double-edged sword and the Pakistani government must continue to work with China. They need the assistance, the technology, [and] the money that China offers. However, that should not be done in a way that would compromise our own rules. So that’s going to be a challenge for any government and Pakistan is no exception.” (Ammar A. Malik, personal communication, September 27, 2024)

Similarly, the PRC’s growing interest in challenging the West in the domain of submarine internet infrastructure development and management has become an emerging concern in the digital governance ecosystem, given the PRC’s opaque and authoritarian cybersecurity norms. The Pakistan & East Africa Connecting Europe (PEACE) undersea project, initiated by the PRC’s Hengtong Group, was completed recently, with its landing agreement signed in April 2019 between PEACE Cable International Network and Cybernet (PEACE Cable International Network, 2019) in Egypt. While PEACE Cable International Network released the information about this collaboration on its website, there was limited transparency or public disclosure from the Pakistani government.

Recent developments in Pakistan’s e-commerce sector also demonstrate the growing influence of Chinese corporations. In 2018, the largest e-commerce giant in the PRC, Alibaba, acquired Daraz.pk, Pakistan’s leading online shopping platform, indicating the PRC’s growing interest in the local digital economy. This acquisition followed a 2017 MoU signed during former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s visit to Beijing. The MoU saw Alibaba, along with its subsidiary Ant Financial and the Trade Development Authority of Pakistan, commit to developing Pakistan’s e-commerce ecosystem. This strategic collaboration aligns with the PRC’s larger Belt and Road Initiative, which focuses on expanding digital trade.

Additionally, Alibaba announced plans to establish a local presence in Pakistan by the end of 2022, driven in large part by the growing number of Pakistani vendors engaged in cross-border trade (Khan, 2022). Cainiao Technology, Alibaba’s logistics arm, has made considerable investments in Pakistan by automating two smart distribution centers, one in Karachi and one in Lahore, in partnership with Daraz.pk. These facilities are critical for streamlining logistics and improving delivery efficiency, thereby supporting the growth of Pakistan’s e-commerce sector and better connecting it to global supply chains.

Pakistan continues to seek opportunities to leverage the PRC’s advancements in technology. In July 2022, the Special Technology Zone Authority (STZA), in collaboration with the Pakistani Embassy in Beijing, hosted the China-Pakistan Technology Investment Conference, which was attended by 4,500 representatives from the PRC technology ecosystem. The conference focused on the PRC’s expanding influence in Pakistan’s technology sector, particularly in advancing the country’s knowledge economy through strategic investments and collaborations. STZA officials emphasized the need to collaborate with Chinese technology firms in areas such as AI, quantum computing, semiconductors, and IoT smart device manufacturing, and established a dedicated PRC desk to ease future Chinese investments in the technology sector (Special Technology Zones Authority, 2022). Pakistan’s eagerness to tap into the PRC’s expertise reflects its commitment to technological advancement and innovation, positioning both countries as key partners in future R&D and tech infrastructure development.

The PRC’s Strategic Defense Goals and the Strengthening of the PLA-Pakistan Army Alliance

Pakistan’s media often portrays the PRC’s rise in the region as beneficial for Pakistan, particularly in counterbalancing strategic threats (Akram, 2024), especially from India and its partnership with the US in South Asia. The PRC’s military expansion is often depicted as a stabilizing force, with the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) growing capabilities presented as a positive counterweight to India’s power in South Asia (Hussain, 2023). This narrative closely aligns with Pakistan’s own geopolitical interests and reflects the PRC’s ability to shape a discourse that supports its regional ambitions (Jamal et al., 2022). However, such framings downplay concerns about the regional arms race between Pakistan, India, and the PRC, as well as broader apprehensions about the PLA’s military expansion (Honrada, 2024).

The growing defense cooperation between the PRC and Pakistan reflects a broader trend of PRC influence in South Asia, particularly in military and strategic affairs. A joint statement issued following Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s meeting with his PRC counterpart, Li Qiang, in June 2024 underscored: “The two sides agreed to maintain high-level military-to-military visits and exchanges and promote cooperation in areas of joint training and exercises and military technology.” (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United Kingdom, 2024) This highlights both countries’ intentions to elevate their military cooperation to a strategic level.

The PRC and Pakistan have significantly deepened their defense collaboration, particularly through technology transfer, including the co-development of Hangor-class submarines to enhance Pakistan’s naval capabilities in the Indian Ocean (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United Kingdom, 2024). The growing collaboration between the two countries, including the transfer of other military assets, is part of the PRC’s broader strategy to expand its influence through technology transfer and strategic partnerships. For the PRC, the partnership secures a vital ally in the Indian Ocean and supports its BRI by safeguarding critical maritime routes tied to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.

The military cooperation between the PRC and Pakistan has been a subject of scrutiny, particularly from India and the US. A key point of concern is the PRC’s alleged shipment of dual-use equipment to Pakistan, which India claims could contribute to nuclear weapons development (Peri, 2024). Additionally, both India and the United States have also grown wary of the potential military use of Gwadar Port and PRC’s base in Djibouti, viewing them as part of Beijing’s efforts to expand its naval presence in the Indian Ocean and secure direct access to the Arabian Sea (Wooley et al, 2023). Despite these concerns, neither Pakistan nor the PRC has officially announced any plans for a permanent PLA presence in Pakistan (Yousaf, 2024).

The PRC’s growing military interest in Gwadar is driven by more than just trade route security; it is a strategic move to ensure its resilience against potential blockades or sanctions that could cut off its access to critical resources. As competition with the U.S. and India intensifies, the PRC seeks to establish reliable logistical and operational bases in the region. The idea of a PLA naval facility in Pakistan represents what analysts describe as a “threshold alliance,” (Lalwani, 2023) where formal treaty commitments are absent, but consistent military collaboration continues to deepen.

The feasibility of a PLA naval base in Pakistan is closely tied to Pakistan’s economic struggles and its reliance on financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Journalist Adnan Aamir highlights this dynamic:

“A naval base will most likely be established only once Pakistan is completely isolated from Western financial institutions. For example, the IMF’s recent approval of Pakistan’s loan agreement has given the government some financial breathing room for the next three years. However, throughout this time, Pakistan would face intense scrutiny, with the IMF constantly scrutinizing its economic actions and exerting significant control. If, after three years, the IMF refuses to authorize another loan or Pakistan is unable to seek other financing, the government may be forced to increase its dependence on the PRC. In such a case, the PRC may make its funding conditional on the creation of a naval base.” (Adnan Aamir, personal communication, September 26, 2024).

The strengthening of PRC-Pakistan defense ties, combined with Pakistan’s economic vulnerabilities and the PRC’s increasing presence in Gwadar, suggest a growing likelihood of a more permanent PLA naval foothold in the region. This comes amid an ongoing naval arms race in the Indian Ocean, where Pakistan leans on the PRC for military assistance while India strengthens its capabilities through Western partnerships. The expansion of the PRC’s military presence in Pakistan, even informally, has the potential to further destabilize South Asia’s already fragile security environment.

Counterterrorism and private contractors

The growing involvement of Chinese corporations in Pakistan’s law enforcement, particularly in counterterrorism and private security cooperation, demonstrates Beijing’s growing role in building its ally’s security architecture. While frequently presented as strategic collaboration, this influence raises serious concerns about sovereignty, security reliance, and its broader implications for Pakistan’s domestic landscape.

Recent high-level meetings between Pakistan’s Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi and PRC’s Minister for Political and Legal Affairs Chen Mingguo demonstrate the two countries’ growing engagement. Their discussions focused on counterterrorism, cross-border crime prevention, and anti-narcotics efforts, as well as plans for joint training exercises in regions like Gilgit-Baltistan and Xinjiang (The Express Tribune, 2024). These developments are part of a larger trend of the PRC being more directly involved in Pakistan’s security apparatus, largely driven by concerns over the safety of PRC workers involved in CPEC projects.

This trend echoes the PRC’s overall security concerns in Xinjiang, which borders Pakistan’s volatile northwestern areas. Agreements for joint police exercises and training for Pakistani personnel at the Xinjiang Police Academy (The Express Tribune, 2024) indicate a deliberate alignment of counterterrorism activities between the two countries. However, this cooperation risks exposing Pakistan to accusations of complicity in the PRC’s controversial policies in Xinjiang, especially its persecution of Uyghur Muslims, which has been widely condemned by human rights organizations worldwide.

The suicide attack on Chinese engineers at the Dasu dam construction site in 2024 highlights the security challenges associated with CPEC (Hussain, 2024). Despite the PRC’s demand for a thorough investigation and the assurances from Islamabad, such incidents have raised concerns in Beijing regarding the safety of its citizens and assets in Pakistan. As a result, PRC businesses suspended work on major projects including Dasu and Diamer-Bhasha dams (Haider, 2024), slowing development on flagship ventures of the BRI. Repeated insurgent attacks on the dams’ sites by terrorist groups such as Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan — a banned outfit that propagates radical ideologies in the country under the guise of Islamic Sharia — exacerbate the security issues in the region. The dams’ sites have been attacked several times to target PRC engineers engaged in construction work.

As of September 2024, there were reports stating that Pakistan and the PRC were working on an agreement to bring in Chinese security personnel to protect PRC citizens working in Pakistan. (Aamir, 2024) While Pakistani authorities were initially hesitant about the PRC’s proposal, the PRC continues to use its investments as leverage to influence Pakistani authorities, making inroads for private security companies from the PRC to operate in Pakistan. As the journalist Adnan Aamir described it: “The agreement reached between PRC and Pakistan is on establishing a joint security company where the inner security cordon comprises Chinese managers, technical supervisors and administrators followed by Pakistani troops as outer cordon on ground in contact with people.” (Adnan Aamir, personal communication, September 26, 2024) Allowing PRC security services at various levels marks another step in PRC’s participation in domestic law enforcement. This move is driven not only by the perceived inadequacy of local security forces but also by the PRC’s desire to oversee security for its projects. Pakistan’s deployment of over 12,000 special military forces dedicated to protecting Chinese engineers and workers (Siddiqa, 2024) raises concerns about the country’s reliance on external assistance to secure its domestic security. This structure blurs the line between national sovereignty and the protection of foreigners working in Pakistan, as Pakistan’s military is increasingly tasked with defending foreign interests over national interests.

Conclusion and policy recommendations

Overall, the PRC’s growing influence in Pakistan is evident in media, academia, technology, defense, and security, where it is deeply integrated into the country’s strategic framework. The PRC ensures its presence is presented favorably by using positive media narratives that emphasize “brotherhood” and “partnership,” aiming to shape the public’s impression of the PRC. In academia, the PRC’s investments, such as the CPEC-Collaborative Research Grant, influence intellectual discourse and support research aligned with the PRC’s goals. While CPEC technological cooperation helps advance Pakistan’s knowledge economy, it also raises privacy and surveillance concerns. Militarily, the PRC’s defense cooperation strengthens Pakistan’s security infrastructure but also increases reliance, especially as CPEC projects are increasingly protected by special Pakistani military units. Together, these measures strengthen the PRC’s position as a crucial partner in Pakistan, but at the expense of potential threats to Pakistan’s sovereignty and human rights.

After evaluating the growing PRC influence in Pakistan through CPEC and other investments, the following policy recommendations are proposed to mitigate the negative effects of PRC influence on national sovereignty and defense, information and communication technology, media, academia, and the social sectors:

1. Ensuring national sovereignty and neutralizing overdependence on the PRC

• Pakistan must maintain a balance between security cooperation and national sovereignty when leveraging Chinese expertise in the defense sector.
• Policymakers must ensure that counterterrorism and security agreements do not jeopardize national sovereignty.
• Pakistan must establish diverse security alliances with international partners to minimize overdependence on the PRC and implement safeguards to prevent Chinese investments from becoming militarized.
• Pakistan must strengthen diplomatic and economic ties with other regional and global powers, including India, ASEAN states, and Western countries, to counterbalance PRC influence in critical sectors. Diversification will enhance Pakistan’s strategic position and provide greater leverage in negotiations with the PRC.

2. Upholding transparency, accountability, and social justice in legal frameworks

• Pakistan must introduce a comprehensive data protection and technology governance framework to prevent authoritarian practices from influencing its digital ecosystem. The framework must be inclusive, transparent, and aligned with international human rights standards, including the ICCPR and a human rights-based approach to emerging technologies and data. It should uphold principles of accountability, transparency, privacy, security, non-discrimination, and the ‘do no harm’ principle.
• Policymakers must develop transparent and accountable laws for foreign technological investments, notably in AI, cloud computing, quantum computing, and cybersecurity. These regulations are essential to safeguarding privacy, data protection, and civic liberties while preventing excessive dependence on surveillance technology from the PRC.
• Policymakers must ensure that Chinese investments, particularly those under CPEC, benefit local communities, especially marginalized groups, and contribute to sustainable development. This includes enforcing strict labor laws, ensuring that Pakistani workers and businesses gain from technology transfer, and promoting social inclusion in investment projects.

3. Increasing media literacy, independence, and narrative diversity

• Pakistani media must promote greater editorial independence and critical scrutiny of foreign influence, particularly in narratives about the PRC.
• Journalists must receive training on how to report on PRC investments and activities in a balanced manner, critically assessing their broader implications for national sovereignty and civil liberties.
• Media organizations must foster diverse narratives by including voices that question the scope and long-term impact of Chinese investments on Pakistan’s economy, politics, and society.

4. Fostering academic independence and diversifying research funding

• Pakistani academia must guarantee that ties with the PRC do not compromise its independence, even as PRC investment in academia facilitates collaborative research and innovation.
• Academic institutions must expand international partnerships to secure funding from a diverse range of sources, including Western countries and multilateral organizations, to reduce overdependence on the PRC.
• The Higher Education Commission (HEC) must ensure that university research reflects a broad spectrum of interests, rather than being shaped solely by the PRC’s geopolitical objectives.

5. Enhancing civil society’s role in monitoring foreign influence and advocating for human rights

• Civil society organizations must play a more active role in monitoring and assessing the impacts of authoritarian powers, particularly the PRC’s growing influence in Pakistan’s technology, media, academia, defense, and security sectors.
• Civil society must advocate for greater transparency in foreign investment agreements, ensuring that public discourse on these partnerships weighs both their benefits and potential risks. Raising public awareness of the long-term consequences of foreign involvement in critical national sectors is essential.
• Civil society must highlight human rights violations committed by the investing countries, including the PRC, particularly against marginalized groups such as Uyghurs and Tibetans.

China Index Spotlight: PRC’s Soft and Hard Power Influence in Pakistan

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