Adversary Entente Task Force Update, July 9, 2025

 

 

Authors: Kelly Campa, Daniel Shats, Grace Mappes, and Karolina Hird, with Nicholas Carl

Data cutoff: 9 am ET, July 9

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is launching a task force that will examine the strategic interactions between the United States’ main adversaries: Russia, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Iran, and North Korea. The new Adversary Entente Task Force will produce weekly products providing assessments on major developments between these adversaries in order to more holistically examine the evolution of the Entente, assess prospects of cooperation, and determine exploitable vulnerabilities within these adversary relationships. Adversary Entente Task Force publications will supplement the regional expertise in ISW’s existing Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, Iran Update, and China-Taiwan Weekly Update.  

Click here to read ISW’s new special edition examining how the Israel-Iran war has rebalanced the Adversary Entente.

Key takeaways:

• PRC Foreign Affairs Minister Wang Yi stated that the PRC does not want Russia to lose in Ukraine, supporting ISW’s assessment that Beijing and Moscow’s fates are intertwined in the war in Ukraine.
• Unspecified Arab officials told Middle East Eye that the PRC has sent surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries to Iran within the past two weeks to replenish Iran’s degraded air defense capabilities, further suggesting that Iran is turning to the PRC its predominant defensive partner due to Russia’s lack of concrete response or support for Iran. PRC officials have since denied this report, however.
• Russia may intend to recruit North Koreans to sign contracts directly with the Russian military.
• North Korea reportedly has already integrated Russian-provided Pantsir air defense systems into its domestic air defense umbrella.  
• The PRC reportedly intends to increase its economic support of North Korea to bolster North Korea's ability to serve as a hub for bilateral PRC-North Korea and trilateral PRC-Russia-North Korea cooperation.
• Differing views and priorities among members of BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) are impeding Russia and the PRC from using these organizations as vehicles to advance their respective geopolitical interests.

Defense and Military-Technical Cooperation

People’s Republic of China (PRC) Foreign Affairs Minister Wang Yi reportedly told the top EU diplomat that the PRC does not want Russia to lose in Ukraine, confirming ISW’s longstanding assessment that Beijing is invested in Russian success in the war. Wang met with Kaja Kallas, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission, on July 2 for the 13th EU-PRC High-level Strategic Dialogue in Brussels.[1] Hong Kong-based outlet South China Morning Post reported that Wang told Kallas that Beijing does not want Russia to lose the war in Ukraine because the United States could then shift its focus entirely to countering the PRC, according to several unnamed “people familiar with the exchange.” Wang reportedly denied that Beijing is financially or militarily supporting Russia’s war effort, however, and implied that Russia would have already won if that were the case.[2] These comments were not present in the official EU and PRC readouts of the meeting.[3] PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Mao Ning neither confirmed nor denied whether Wang made the comments but reiterated standard rhetoric that “China is not a party to the Ukrainian issue” and that Beijing has consistently advocated for peace, dialogue, and an “early political solution to the crisis through diplomatic efforts.”[4] Mao claimed that “the prolongation of the Ukrainian crisis is not in the interests of any party,” contradicting the implication from Wang’s comments that Beijing may seek to use the war in Ukraine to keep the West distracted as long as possible.

Wang’s unusually frank comments to Kallas are consistent with ISW’s assessment that Beijing views a Russian defeat in Ukraine as the worst-case scenario for PRC interests and that the PRC supports Russia in holding NATO at risk.[5] A definitive Russian battlefield defeat that involves pushing Russia out of occupied Ukrainian lands would likely create a severe political crisis in Russia and thus weaken one of the PRC’s most reliable partners. Political turmoil in Russia, the depletion of Russian resources and manpower in the war, and the reputational humiliation of a costly defeat will make Russia less able to threaten NATO in the short to medium term, allowing the collective West to refocus its attention on building security and alliances in the Indo-Pacific. This outcome would also greatly bolster confidence in the strength of US and Western security commitments, which is particularly relevant in the case of potential PRC aggression towards Taiwan. Wang’s comments suggest that Beijing sees Russia’s war in Ukraine as a way to distract the West from the Indo-Pacific, which Russia can achieve either by continuing the war or by decisively winning and threatening NATO from a new position of strength on a more preferable frontline. PRC officials have strongly objected to the expansion of Western-aligned coalitions in East Asia, including NATO.[6]

The PRC has attempted to balance its interests in supporting Russia and in maintaining good trade relations with Western countries. The PRC has echoed some Russian rhetoric in blaming NATO for instigating or prolonging the war in Ukraine, defending Russia’s “legitimate security interests,” and opposing sanctions on Russia.[7] It has also increased its trade with Russia since 2022, providing Moscow with a key economic lifeline amid international sanctions and supplying critical dual-use components and equipment for Russia’s defense-industrial base.[8] Beijing has framed the sale of dual-use goods as “normal trade,” however, and has claimed that it is not sending Russia complete military equipment, instead portraying itself as a neutral party and advocate for peace.[9] Wang’s comments undercut Beijing’s claims of neutrality in the Ukraine war, as do increasing recent reports that Ukraine is finding PRC-origin equipment and components on the battlefield in Ukraine.[10] Wang’s statements make it clear that Beijing and Moscow see their futures as intertwined, which emphasizes the infeasibility of policy premised on splitting Russia away from the PRC for the purpose of focusing on the Indo-Pacific.

Middle East Eye reported on July 9 that the PRC has sent surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries to Iran within the past two weeks to replenish Iran’s degraded air defense capabilities, a report which PRC officials have since explicitly denied. Unspecified Arab officials told Middle East Eye on July 8 that the PRC delivered an unspecified number of Chinese SAM batteries to Iran in exchange for oil shipments after the Israel-Iran ceasefire went into effect on June 24.[11] ISW cannot verify the Arab officials’ claims. The PRC Embassy in Israel denied exporting any weapons to ”countries engaged in warfare” to Israeli media on July 9, and an Iranian security source similarly denied the report to a France24 reporter on July 8.[12] Iran’s acquisition of PRC SAM batteries, if Middle East Eye‘s reporting is accurate, may partly fulfill Iran’s urgent need to replenish its severely degraded air defense systems following multiple rounds of conflict with Israel since 2024. The IDF rendered Iran’s Russian-made S-300 air defense systems inoperable during its April and October 2024 strikes, for example.[13] Russia supplied Iran with these systems in 2016, and the S-300 was the most advanced air defense system that Iran had operated.[14] Israel established air superiority over western Iran and Tehran within the first 24 hours of its air campaign and continued to target Iranian missile launchers, radars, and Iran’s domestic production capabilities for air defense components throughout the 12-day campaign.[15] Iran likely seeks to rapidly replenish its air defenses in the wake of the ceasefire and will have to turn to its foreign partners for support. The Arab officials who spoke to Middle East Eye did not specify which systems the PRC sent to Iran. Chinese HQ-9 long-range SAMs bear similar similarities to Russian S-300s, and the PRC recently sold the HQ-9’s extended-range variant to Egypt.[16]

Iran may be eager to quickly replenish air defense capabilities in preparation for possible renewed Israeli or US strikes in the near term. Israel is reportedly drafting a mechanism to prevent Iran from being able to rebuild its nuclear program that is similar to the US-approved Israeli monitoring mechanism in Lebanon, which allows Israel to conduct preemptive operations against Hezbollah in response to alleged Hezbollah violations of the November 2024 ceasefire agreement.[17] The proposed Iran-focused mechanism would presumably enable Israel to strike Iran preemptively in response to detected threats. US President Donald Trump has also previously suggested that the United States could strike Iran if Iran attempted to rebuild its nuclear program.[18] Iran likely hopes to leverage reported PRC-provided air defense capabilities to defend against future Israeli strikes.

The alleged Iranian acquisition of PRC air defense systems would support ISW’s previous assessment that Iran may be turning to the PRC in the aftermath of the Israel-Iran war due to Iran’s dissatisfaction with the lack of Russian military assistance before and during the conflict.[19] The damage to Iran’s Russian-made S-300 systems in October 2024 prompted Iran to pressure Russia to accelerate the delivery of the S-400 missile system to Iran.[20] Iran also purchased Russian Su-35 fighter aircraft in January 2025.[21] Russia has yet to deliver either of these purchases as of the time of this writing, however, and is unlikely to do so in the near-term. Iranian officials have complained about Russia’s lack of assistance during the war and sent Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi reportedly to request “more help” from Russia on behalf of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, a few days before the ceasefire.[22] Russia has limited its support for Iran to diplomatic platitudes and offers to act as a mediator in negotiations. Russia’s lackluster support reflects both the unreliability of Russia as a partner and the constraints it faces in transferring materiel to Iran while waging a war against Ukraine.

The PRC, conversely, is not using its own equipment to fight a war. The PRC is also one of the few technologically advanced countries that appears to be willing to sell military equipment to Iran. Iranian Defense Minister Aziz Nasir Zadeh’s recent visit to the PRC, his first foreign trip since the Israel-Iran war, suggests that the Iranian regime values its current relationship with China, particularly in the aftermath of the war and in light of its dissatisfaction with Russia. Iran is likely attempting to re-balance its relationship with the PRC in recognition of the fact that Russia will not and cannot provide it with concrete assistance in the near term.

The PRC may be more willing than previously expected to help Iran recover its defensive capabilities from the Israel-Iran war or prepare for possible future Israeli strikes. ISW previously noted that the PRC would likely be unwilling to provide concrete military assistance to Iran because of the PRC’s reservations about directly intervening in the Israel-Iran conflict and the regional ramifications that would entail.[23] The PRC’s sale of SAM batteries to Iran would constitute an inflection in PRC-Iranian strategic cooperation, assuming Middle East Eye's reporting is accurate. The PRC’s reported transfer of SAMs to Iran would mark its first known direct weapons sale to Iran since 2005, though the PRC has sold dual-use equipment and materials, such as drone parts and components of missile fuel, in the years since.[24] Iranian and Arab media speculated that one of the aims of Iranian Defense Minister Aziz Nasir Zadeh's recent meeting with PRC Defense Minister Dong Jun on June 26 was to secure the purchase of Chengdu J-10 multirole combat aircraft, which Iran has reportedly been interested in acquiring for at least a decade.[25] Iranian Armed Forces General Staff-affiliated media Defa Press claimed on June 29 that Iran was “likely” to buy J-10s in order to defend its airspace.[26] The PRC’s reported sale of SAM batteries could suggest that the PRC may intend to sell Iran J-10s in the future, although ISW has not observed any indicators that this is the case as of the time of this writing. PRC Defense Ministry spokesperson Jiang Bin said on July 8 in response to a question about the sale of the J-10s that the PRC is “willing” to sell Chinese equipment to “friendly countries,” though Jiang did not reference Iran by name.[27]

The PRC is likely still unwilling to directly intervene in any conflict between Iran and Israel, even as it helps Iran reconstitute its defensive capabilities. Middle East Eye reported that the PRC sent Iran the SAM batteries after the ceasefire with Israel went into effect on June 24.[28] Iran’s alleged acquisition of Chinese military equipment during the ceasefire would not constitute a direct PRC intervention to change the outcome of the conflict. The PRC may seek to balance its partnership with Iran by supporting Iranian efforts to reconstitute its missile inventories without violating Beijing’s principles of non-interference. The fact that the PRC has reportedly sent Iran systems to bolster Iran’s domestic defensive capabilities rather than systems that Iran could use to attack Israel or the United States further suggests that the PRC seeks to avoid complicating its relations with either country.

Ukrainian military intelligence indicated that Russia has begun training North Korean drone operators and intends to recruit North Koreans to sign contracts directly with the Russian military. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov said on July 1 that Russia has begun training North Korean drone operators in Pyongyang and near the Wonsan Kalma resort (east of Pyongyang on the Sea of Japan coast), including on first-person view (FPV) drones and other strike drones.[29] Budanov reiterated that Russia has already provided North Korea with the technology and infrastructure necessary to produce Iranian-origin long-range Shahed strike drones. ISW previously reported that Russia is bringing North Korean workers to Russia to produce drones, which will also allow the export of technical know-how back to the North Korean defense industrial base.[30] Critical targets in South Korea are well within range of the standard Shahed-136 model (or its Russian Geran-2 equivalent), which has an average range of 2,500 kilometers.[31] Russia may also seek to leverage some North Korean soldiers as drone operators amid reports that North Korea plans to send up to 30,000 additional military personnel to fight alongside Russian forces against Ukraine.[32]

Budanov stated that the number of North Korean citizens in Russia will "significant[ly] increase" and that it will no longer "look like" North Korea sent its own soldiers to Russia as a "certain number" of North Korean citizens will "voluntarily" sign contracts with the Russian military and be "real volunteers."[33] South Korean media outlet Daily NK reported on July 7, citing a Russian source, that Russia will likely bring large numbers of North Korean engineers and workers to Vladivostok in Russia's Far East and to Kursk Oblast along Russia's international border with Ukraine.[34] Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu announced on June 16 that North Korea will also send 6,000 sappers and military engineers to help with reconstruction efforts in Kursk Oblast.[35] Russia likely hopes to use North Korean civilian workers and soldiers to alleviate some of the pressure of labor shortages on the Russian defense industrial base and high casualties on the Russian forces' abilities to continue offensive operations in Ukraine, respectively.

Budanov said that North Korea is already operating the first Russian Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air system. Budanov said on July 1 that there are an unspecified number of Pantsir-S1 installations in North Korea, including at least one that is part of the air defense umbrella defending Pyongyang. Budanov stated that Russia has nearly completed training North Korean soldiers to independently operate the Pantsir systems.[36] The Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT), a group of 11 UN member states established to monitor compliance with North Korea-related sanctions, reported on May 29 that Russia provided at least one Pantsir system to North Korea, in clear violation of the UN arms embargo on North Korea.[37] The MSMT reported that Russia provided North Korea with "operational knowledge" on how to operate the Pantsir systems, likely including lessons learned from Russian air defense operations during the war against Ukraine.[38] These Pantsir air defense systems and Russian training based on experience in the war in Ukraine will likely augment North Korea's air defense capabilities against any future strikes targeting North Korea, particularly from South Korea, Japan, or their allies.

Defense Industrial Base Cooperation

Nothing significant to report.

Economic and Financial Cooperation

The PRC reportedly intends to increase its economic support to North Korea to bolster North Korea's ability to serve as a hub for bilateral PRC-North Korea and trilateral PRC-Russia-North Korea cooperation. A source recently in Pyongyang told the South Korean outlet Daily NK on July 7 that PRC embassy officials have spent recent months touring North Korea to assess public infrastructure and industrial capabilities and to guide the PRC's strategic aid efforts.[39] The source stated that the PRC intends to develop North Korea's border regions of North Pyongan, Ryanggang, Chagang, and North Hamgyong provinces into strategic exchange hubs. The source said that the PRC aims to develop North Hamgyong Province's ports of Chongjin and Rason, including developing the latter into a key gateway for North Korea's exchanges with Russia and the PRC. The source stated that the PRC and North Korea agreed in June 2025 "in principle" to expand economic and social cooperation and that the PRC also intends to support telecommunications infrastructure, medical infrastructure, and tourism in North Korea. North Korea will likely reap further economic benefits from PRC support to build out its infrastructure, and the PRC's industrial support in particular may augment North Korea's defense industrial base capabilities and ability to provide weapons to Russia.

Political and Diplomatic Cooperation

Differing views and priorities among members of BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) are increasingly impeding the viability of those organizations as vehicles to advance Russian and PRC geopolitical interests. Representatives and heads of state of the BRICS economic bloc met in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, on July 6 and 7. The organization released a joint declaration that included condemnations of the US and Israeli strikes on Iran, as well as against “unilateral coercive measures” and protectionist trade barriers. The statement did not name Israel or the United States in its criticisms, however, reflecting differences among BRICS members in their views of the Israel-Iran conflict and the interest of some members in maintaining good relations with the United States.[40] US President Donald Trump responded July 7 by threatening 10-percent tariffs on countries aligning with the “anti-American policies of BRICS,” prompting condemnation from several BRICS members, including Brazil and South Africa.[41] Russian President Vladimir Putin notably did not attend in-person because Brazil is a member of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which has an open warrant for Putin’s arrest. Putin also skipped the BRICS summit in South Africa in 2023 for the same reason.[42]

Both the PRC and Russia have promoted BRICS and other non-Western multilateral organizations, such as the SCO, as key to their vision for a multilateral world order, challenging what they perceive to be US and Western hegemony. Putin has promoted a “new security architecture,” particularly in Eurasia, based on existing organizations, including BRICS and the SCO.[43] The PRC has championed these organizations in the name of giving a more prominent voice to the “Global South” and claimed that these organizations do not target any other country, but BRICS and SCO nevertheless allow Beijing to promote narratives and policies that support a more Sino-centric world order, including the perception that a large coalition of non-Western nations is aligned against Western dominance.[44] The ability of BRICS to advance Russian and PRC interests depends on its ability to reach consensus on key issues, however, which is hampered by the competing ambitions of other member states, particularly India. India has opposed efforts by Russia and the PRC to promote “de-dollarization” in international trade, including using the Chinese renminbi or another currency for trade among BRICS members.[45] India has similarly been a consensus-breaker in the SCO, objecting to an SCO statement that condemned Israeli strikes on Iran and blocking an SCO defense ministers’ joint statement in June because it did not directly condemn the terrorist attack in Kashmir in April. India has blamed fellow SCO member Pakistan for the attack.[46] India has friendlier relations with the United States than other members and has its own aspirations for regional or Global South leadership that compete with PRC and Russian ambitions.[47]

The difficulty of these organizations in forming consensus will likely be exacerbated as they expand to include more countries. BRICS admitted six new countries in 2024-2025, including both Iran and Saudi Arabia, which are regional rivals.[48] A meeting of BRICS foreign ministers in April failed to agree on a joint statement, as new members Egypt and Ethiopia objected to proposals about UN Security Council (UNSC) reform to include South Africa.[49] The joint declaration in July did endorse a greater role for India and Brazil in the UNSC, however.[50]

Russian President Vladimir Putin has failed to use the Israel-Iran war as a means of painting himself as an effective negotiator to US President Donald Trump. Trump told journalists on June 24 that Putin called him with an offer to “help resolve the conflict between Israel and Iran,” to which Trump reportedly responded, “I don’t need help with Iran. I need help with you.”[51] Putin and Trump later held a phone call on July 3 during which the two discussed the war in Ukraine and the situation in the Middle East.[52] Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov claimed that both Trump and Putin emphasized the need to resolve the “Iran issue” through diplomatic means.[53] Ushakov claimed that Putin used the call to reiterate that Russia will not back down from its goals in Ukraine, and Trump stated after the call that he was “not happy” about the war in Ukraine and that he and Putin “didn’t make any progress at all” during the call.[54] Trump’s statements regarding Putin strongly suggest that Putin has not been successful in using the circumstances of the Israel-Iran war to make himself appear as a trustworthy negotiating partner to the Trump administration. ISW recently assessed that Putin first used Iranian nuclear negotiations and then offered to mediate the Israel-Iran war to pose himself to Trump as an effective negotiator in order to later secure concessions on the war in Ukraine.[55] Putin’s inability to use the Israel-Iran conflict to his benefit may lead to even further Russian divestment from Iran and future US-Iran negotiations.

[1] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/china-high-representativevice-president-kaja-kallas-holds-eu-china-strategic-dialogue-foreign_en

[2]  https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3316875/china-tells-eu-it-cannot-afford-russian-loss-ukraine-war-sources-say?module=top_story&pgtype=subsection

[3] https://www.fmprc.gov dot cn/mfa_eng/wjbzhd/202507/t20250703_11664496.html ; https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/china-high-representativevice-president-kaja-kallas-holds-eu-china-strategic-dialogue-foreign_en

[4] https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/web/fyrbt_673021/202507/t20250704_11665456.shtml

[5] https://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/The%20Strengthening%20China-Russia%20Nexus.pdf

[6] https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/eng/xw/fyrbt/lxjzh/202407/t20240730_11463260.html

[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-update-2; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/china-says-it-respects-ukraines-sovereignty-russias-security-concerns-2022-02-25/ ; http:/paper.people.com dot cn/rmrb/html/2022-03/15/nw.D110000renmrb_20220315_2-17.htm ; http:/paper.people.com dot cn/rmrb/html/2022-03

[8] https://merics.org/en/china-russia-dashboard-facts-and-figures-special-relationship ;

https://www.occrp.org/en/news/china-becomes-russias-lifeline-for-critical-war-minerals ;

https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-ukraine-china-sanctions-dual-use-yangjie-technology/33223415.html ;

https://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/The%20Strengthening%20China-Russia%20Nexus.pdf

[9] https://www.fmprc.gov dot cn/eng/xw/fyrbt/lxjzh/202407/t20240730_11463257.html

[10] https://t.me/ab3army/5699; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/07/zrobleno-v-kytayi-znyshheno-v-ukrayini-shturmovyky-demilitaryzuvaly-ridkisnu-kytajsku-rszv/ ;

https://global.espreso.tv/russia-ukraine-war-107-mm-rockets-for-chinese-type-63-mlrs-found-at-russias-51st-grau-arsenal  ;

https://x.com/andrii_sybiha/status/1941091923671851271

[11] https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/iran-receives-chinese-surface-air-missile-batteries-after-israel-ceasefire-say-sources

[12] https://x.com/saeedazimi1772/status/1942519127090049267?s=46&t=EGYcIyXosW6lVJmixq2r5Q; https://www.israelhayom dot com/2025/07/08/china-denies-report-of-air-defense-system-transfers-to-iran/

[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-19-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/consequences-idf-strikes-iran

[14] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/why-you-cant-be-an-iran-hawk-and-a-russia-dove; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/consequences-idf-strikes-iran

[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-report-june-19-2025-morning-edition; https://t.me/BenTzionM/5205  ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1934294306690310302; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-report-june-17-2025-evening-edition ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/23018; https://x.com/MiddleEastBuka/status/1934359001849893145; https://x.com/IAFsite/status/1934342358574698531

[16] https://www.military.africa/2025/07/egypt-confirms-acquisition-of-chinese-hq-9b-long-range-air-defence-system/

[17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-3-2025

[18] https://x.com/JasonMBrodsky/status/1941430780518924595

[19] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/adversary-entente-task-force-update-july-2-2025

[20] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/02/25/iran-missile-defences-high-alert-attack-fears-us-israel/?ICID=continue_without_subscribing_reg_first; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-25-2025

[21] https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/irans-revolutionary-guards-commander-says-iran-purchased-russian-made-sukhoi-35-2025-01-27/

[22] https://www.reuters.com/world/china/irans-supreme-leader-asks-putin-do-more-after-us-strikes-2025-06-23; https://x.com/ali_motahari_ir/status/1939591211867582569

[23] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/adversary-entente-task-force-update-july-2-2025

[24] https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3316215/china-stay-cautious-iran-seeks-help-amid-clashes-us-israel-middle-east-expert

[25] https://thediplomat.com/2015/08/will-iran-order-150-new-fighter-jets-from-china; https://armyrecognition.com/news/aerospace-news/2025/intelligence-iran-seeks-to-acquire-chinese-j-10c-fighter-jets-to-counter-israeli-f-35i-superiority ;

https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/750222/%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%AE%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%AF-%D8%AC%D9%86%DA%AF%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%87%E2%80%8C%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AC%DB%8C-%DB%B1%DB%B0-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B7-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86

[26] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/750222; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-29-2025

[27] http://www.mod dot gov.cn/gfbw/xwfyr/yzxwfb/16395884.html

[28] https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/iran-receives-chinese-surface-air-missile-batteries-after-israel-ceasefire-say-sources

[29] https://suspilne dot media/1056365-rosia-peredala-kndr-pancir-s1-i-tehnologiu-virobnictva-sahediv-budanov/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3r5P5bqniQY ; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/russia-arms-north-korea-pantsir-s1-systems-deployed-in-pyongyang/

[30] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/adversary-entente-task-force-update-june-26-2025

[31] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/adversary-entente-task-force-update-june-26-2025

[32] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-2-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062625

[33] https://suspilne dot media/1056365-rosia-peredala-kndr-pancir-s1-i-tehnologiu-virobnictva-sahediv-budanov/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3r5P5bqniQY ; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/russia-arms-north-korea-pantsir-s1-systems-deployed-in-pyongyang/

[34] https://www.dailynk dot com/english/russia-turns-to-north-korean-workers-amid-western-sanctions/

[35] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061725

[36] https://suspilne dot media/1056365-rosia-peredala-kndr-pancir-s1-i-tehnologiu-virobnictva-sahediv-budanov/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3r5P5bqniQY ; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/russia-arms-north-korea-pantsir-s1-systems-deployed-in-pyongyang/ 

[37] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/adversary-entente-task-force-update-june-11-2025; https://msmt.info/view/save/2025/05/29/1085cade-a4b1-4405-94c0-7c980c24fd21-Unlawful_Military_Cooperation_including_Arms_Transfers_between_North_Korea_and_Russia_(MSMT_2025_1).pdf

[38] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/adversary-entente-task-force-update-june-11-2025; https://msmt.info/view/save/2025/05/29/1085cade-a4b1-4405-94c0-7c980c24fd21-Unlawful_Military_Cooperation_including_Arms_Transfers_between_North_Korea_and_Russia_(MSMT_2025_1).pdf

[39] https://www.dailynk dot com/english/china-plans-major-aid-initiative-north-korea-relations-warm/

[40] https://brics dot br/en/documents/presidency-documents/250705-brics-leaders-declaration-en.pdf

[41] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-07-07/ramaphosa-blasts-back-at-trump-over-threatened-tariffs-on-brics

[42] https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/putin-will-not-go-brics-summit-brazil-due-icc-arrest-warrant-kremlin-aide-says-2025-06-25/

[43] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-29-2025

[44] https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/web/fyrbt_673021/202507/t20250707_11666634.shtml

[45] https://www.newindianexpress dot com/nation/2025/Jan/31/de-dollarisation-not-our-policy-or-strategy-india-after-yet-another-trump-threat-to-brics ; https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202410/1321609.shtml

[46] https://www.reuters.com/world/china/india-says-defence-gathering-china-unable-adopt-joint-statement-2025-06-26/ ; https://timesofindia.indiatimes dot com/india/india-distances-itself-from-sco-statement-condemning-israeli-strikes-on-iran-we-did-not-participate-in-the-discussions-says-mea/articleshow/121848870.cms

[47] https://www.cfr.org/article/battle-global-south-leadership

[48] https://brics dot br/en/about-the-brics

[49] https://www.reuters.com/world/brics-ministers-fail-reach-joint-statement-brazil-warns-against-protectionism-2025-04-29/ ; https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3308435/brics-ministers-meeting-brazil-flag-serious-concern-over-trade-barriers

[50] https://brics dot br/en/documents/presidency-documents/250705-brics-leaders-declaration-en.pdf

[51] https://www.newsweek.com/trump-putin-iran-deal-ukraine-war-russia-2089972

[52] https://www.axios.com/2025/07/03/trump-putin-speak-ukraine-iran; https://x.com/IranIntl/status/1940814464154014034; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77354

[53] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77354; https://x.com/IranIntl/status/1940814464154014034

[54] https://www.axios.com/2025/07/03/trump-putin-speak-ukraine-iran

[55] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/adversary-entente-task-force-update-june-11-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/adversary-entente-task-force-update-june-18-2025