China-Taiwan Weekly Update, June 16, 2025
Authors: Matthew Sperzel and Karina Wugang of the Institute for the Study of War;
Alexis Turek and Alex Chou of the American Enterprise Institute
Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Nicholas Carl of the American Enterprise Institute
Data Cutoff: June 11, 2025
The China–Taiwan Weekly Update is a joint product from the Institute for the Study of War and the American Enterprise Institute. The update supports the ISW–AEI Coalition Defense of Taiwan project, which assesses Chinese campaigns against Taiwan, examines alternative strategies for the United States and its allies to deter the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) aggression, and—if necessary—defeat the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and cross–Taiwan Strait developments.
Note: The publication of this edition of the China-Taiwan Weekly Update was delayed due to recent events in the Middle East. This week's China-Taiwan Weekly Update will be published at its regular time later this week.
South Korean President Lee Jae-myung acted in accordance with his “pragmatic” foreign policy in the first week following his election. Lee held phone calls with US, Japanese, and People’s Republic of China (PRC) leadership following his inauguration. Xi Jinping congratulated Lee Jae-myung on June 4, stressing the importance of strong bilateral relations between the PRC and South Korea.[1] Xi discussed the “century-long transformation” underway, a phrase often used by Xi to refer to major changes in the international system and often tied to the idea of the “rise of the East and decline of the West” that will inevitably result in the collapse of US hegemony. Xi’s use of this phrase when talking with Lee likely suggests that the PRC will continue to push for closer ties with South Korea, furthering their “mutual success and common development” since establishing diplomatic ties in 1992. The PRC began easing its K-Culture ban in recent months, likely to court support from Lee and his Democratic Party (DP).[2] Lee has stated that he does not view participation in a conflict over Taiwan as being in South Korea’s interest, further aligning with the PRC’s interests.
North Korean state media reported on the outcome of South Korea’s presidential election on June 5, marking the first time since Yoon Seok-yeol’s removal from office that North Korea publicly commented on South Korea’s political situation. North Korean media did not issue criticism over Lee’s election, as it has done following previous South Korean elections.[3] North Korean criticisms of South Korean politics have largely halted following Kim Jong-un’s 2023 pronouncement that inter-Korean ties were between two “hostile” states.[4] Lee pledged to reduce tensions with North Korea following his election.[5] Lee has seemingly begun this effort already, following the June 11 announcement that South Korea would halt anti-North Korean loudspeaker broadcasts along the inter-Korean border.[6] South Korea began these daily broadcasts in June 2024 in retaliation for North Korea flying trash-filled balloons into South Korea. Lee’s conciliatory approach towards North Korea will likely be supported by his cabinet nominations, some of whom vocally supported the engagement-forward Sunshine Policy.[7]
Lee will likely pursue a balancing strategy, maintaining a strong United States-Japan-South Korea alliance in addition to warming relations with the PRC and North Korea. US President Donald Trump and Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba both congratulated Lee on his election, reaffirming the importance of their cooperation.[8] Lee’s call with Trump focused on the ongoing tariff discussions, a source of tension in US-South Korean relations in recent months. Lee will likely continue to pursue mutually beneficial economic and diplomatic relations with the United States, Japan, the PRC, and North Korea in an effort to reduce tensions in the Indo-Pacific and protect what he sees as South Korea’s strategic interests.
Key Takeaways
- South Korea: South Korean President Lee Jae-myung appears to be balancing between reducing tensions with North Korea and the PRC and maintaining a strong US-Japan-South Korea trilateral relationship.
Cross-Strait Relations
Taiwan
The PRC is leveraging its influence in Taiwan's education sector to shape youth perceptions and cultivate support for its cross-strait narratives. Taiwan’s Ministry of Interior (MOI) announced on June 6 the dissolution of the Chinese Kunpeng Association, a cross-strait academic exchange organization that received public criticism for conducting United Front activities in Taiwan.[9] The United Front is a whole-of-government and society effort to advance Chinese Communist Party (CCP) ideology and interests by co-opting non-government segments of claimed Chinese society. United Front activities in Taiwan aim to inculcate in the Taiwanese public CCP notions that the PRC is the only legitimate government of China and that Taiwan is a part of that China.
The Taiwan Economic Democracy Union (TEDU), a think tank that works to insulate Taiwan from PRC influence, accused the Kunpeng Association in May of luring Taiwanese students to participate in exchange programs that instill CCP narratives of cross-strait relations.[10] TEDU cited the Kunpeng Association’s close ties with the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO), the PRC’s foremost United Front agency directed at Taiwan.
The MOI disbanded the Kunpeng Association for violations of its charter and the Civil Associations Act, which regulates the operations of civil society organizations. The MOI stated that CCP United Front organizations exploit Taiwan’s free and open society to conduct their activities and warned Taiwanese citizens to be vigilant of questionable organizations. Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te announced in March that the MOI would take a more active role in combating United Front operations in Taiwan’s education sector as part of a broader series of measures to resist malign PRC influence in Taiwan.[11]
United Front activities in Taiwan’s education sector highlight the PRC’s focus on shaping the perceptions of young people to increase political support for narratives that facilitate its annexation of Taiwan. The PRC views young people as a crucial demographic to shape Taiwan’s political landscape—the political identity of young people in Taiwan currently skews in favor of the incumbent Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), whose platform centers on championing Taiwanese identity and preserving democracy.[12] United Front agencies such as the TAO host frequent cross-strait youth exchanges, often academically focused, and pressure attendees to accept a shared Chinese identity and deny the reality of Taiwan’s sovereignty.[13]
All but four recall petitions for Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) legislators have failed. Taiwan’s mass recall movement has overwhelmingly favored the DPP over the opposition Kuomintang (KMT), increasing the likelihood for the balance of power within the Legislative Yuan (LY) to shift in favor of the DPP. A total of eleven recall petitions have failed to gather enough signatures to meet the second-stage threshold by their deadline.[14] Four recall petitions have deadlines throughout June and are still collecting second-stage signatures. No petitions against DPP legislators have yet cleared the second stage threshold needed to trigger a recall election, while petitions against 31 KMT legislators have passed the second stage and were submitted to the Central Election Commission for validation.[15]
Recall elections could occur as early as July 2025.[16] Sources within the KMT have stated that the remaining petitions against DPP legislators are unlikely to succeed. This outcome would mean that 31 out of 52 KMT legislators would face recall elections, with all 51 DPP seats remaining secure. The KMT-led opposition currently holds a majority within the LY. The DPP needs to recall at least six KMT legislators and replace them with DPP candidates to gain an LY majority. A DPP-controlled LY would undo major government budget cuts passed by the opposition targeting the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mainland Affairs Council, Control Yuan, and other government bodies. A DPP-controlled LY could unfreeze the funding to these bodies and approve supplemental budgets. A DPP-controlled LY could also approve nominees to fill vacancies in the Constitutional Court, restoring functionality to the court after months of paralysis.
The PRC will likely attempt to exploit political discord in Taiwan. The PRC has repeated KMT talking points about “Green terror” and “authoritarianism,” phrases that reference DPP party colors and accuse them of undemocratic behavior. The PRC seeks to erode public support for the DPP and spread the narrative that Lai is an ineffective and potentially damaging leader for Taiwan.
China
The PRC agreed to ease rare-earth export license restrictions for six months after trade negotiations in London, which followed the Xi-Trump phone call on June 5. PRC critical mineral exports are necessary to manufacture advanced technologies such as fighter jets and electronics. PRC Vice Premier He Lifeng met with US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, US Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick, and US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer for trade negotiations in London beginning June 9.[17] US President Donald Trump announced on June 11 via Truth Social that the United States and the PRC reached a trade deal pending approval from Xi and himself.[18] US tariffs will be set at 55 percent under this agreement. The PRC agreed to ease export restrictions on rare-earth minerals and magnets for six months, and Trump stated the United States would provide visas to PRC students.[19] The PRC also sought the removal of advanced technology export controls, but Bessent did not provide any further details.[20] A major PRC rare earth magnet maker publicly announced it had obtained an export license on June 11, shortly after the trade deal was announced, but it is unclear when the licenses were approved.[21] The agreement is notably only a temporary measure to address supply-chain shortages in rare earths—the six-month timeframe will allow the PRC to continue to leverage its control over rare earths in future negotiations.
[22]
The two countries accused each other of violating the Geneva trade agreement in mid-May. Trump specifically accused the PRC of slow-walking export control license approvals for rare earth minerals, and the PRC in turn accused the United States of undermining the agreement by warning against Huawei AI chips.[23] The Trump administration followed the accusations with export restrictions on critical technologies, such as semiconductors and jet engines, on May 30. PRC General Secretary Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump discussed tariffs and rare earth mineral access on June 5.[24] Trump claimed that they had addressed “any complexity” regarding rare earth products in the call without elaborating on any details, but the PRC readout on state-media outlet Xinhua made no mention of rare earth minerals. [25] Xinhua instead called attention to visa issues for PRC nationals and US policy towards Taiwan.[26] The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) declined to comment on the details of the rare earth mineral issue in the press conference following the phone call. [27]
The PRC has not directly stated, but has implied, that critical mineral export controls do not qualify as a non-tariff measure against the United States under the Geneva agreement, as the policy applies to all countries.[28] The PRC Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) previously defended the export controls as a standard international practice for dual-use items.[29] The PRC issued export controls on seven rare earth metals in April in response to the “Liberation Day” tariffs. The PRC currently controls approximately 70 percent of the global supply of rare earth minerals and refines approximately 90 percent of them.[30] Export licenses currently must be approved by MOFCOM, and the United States wanted to speed up the approval speed with the London trade talks in light of supply-chain shortages.
[31]
[32]
The PRC’s declassification of specifications for its first-generation intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) likely signals its focus on developing new capabilities to modernize its nuclear arsenal. PRC state media ran a televised segment on June 2 that revealed for the first time core information about the DF-5, the PRC’s first nuclear-capable ICBM, which went operational in 1981.[33]
The PRC’s exposition on the DF-5 is likely a response to the United States’ May 21 test launch of the Minuteman III ICBM, which landed near a US military base in the Marshall Islands.[34] Such tests by the United States are routine, with the second most recent one occurring in February.[35] The PRC’s exposition of the DF-5, however, comes at a time of heightened PRC unease about a potentially widening disparity in nuclear capabilities with the United States following President Donald Trump’s announcement of the “Golden Dome” missile defense system. PRC MFA spokesperson Mao Ning reiterated the PRC’s concern about the Golden Dome on May 21 and stated that it had a “strong offensive nature.”[36]
The PRC test launched an ICBM into the Pacific Ocean on September 25, 2024, the first launch of its kind since 1980.[37] That missile probably belonged to the PRC’s third or fourth generation of ICBMs, which have greater range and more advanced payloads. The US Department of Defense assessed in its 2024 China Military Power Report that the PRC is rapidly expanding and modernizing its nuclear arsenal, which likely aims to maximize the capabilities in the PRC’s stockpile with more current missiles.[38]
The PRC’s uncharacteristic willingness to disclose details about its first-generation ICBM likely indicates the DF-5’s shrinking importance relative to newer missiles in the PRC’s arsenal. Showcasing older generation missiles enables the PRC to express defiance and publicly warn the United States of its own nuclear capabilities amid increased competition without revealing sensitive details about its more advanced ICBMs.
Northeast Asia
Japan
A PLA Navy (PLAN) carrier strike group (CSG) breached the second island chain for the first time. A second PLAN CSG simultaneously operated in the Pacific. Japan’s Ministry of Defense (MOD) announced that the PLAN Liaoning CSG entered Japan’s Minamitori Island’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) on June 7.[39] Minamitori Island is Japan’s easternmost territory, located approximately 1550 km northeast of Guam. The MOD previously tracked the Liaoning transiting through the Miyako Strait on May 27 and the Philippine Sea waters east of Samar Island on May 30. Four additional vessels joined the Liaoning CSG on June 8 while operating in international waters between Minamitori Island and Iwo Jima. Japan also confirmed on June 9 that the Shandong CSG was operating in the EEZ north of Okinotori Island and approximately 500 km southwest of Iwo Jima.[40]
Japanese Defense Minister Gen Nakatani decried PLAN aircraft carrier activity near Japanese territory.[41]PRC MFA spokesperson Lin Jian downplayed Japan’s protest however, claiming that the PLAN’s activities align with PRC defense policy and are “fully consistent with international law and international practice.”[42] PLAN spokesperson Wang Xuemeng added that the two CSGs were conducting an “annually planned routine training exercise” to test the PLAN’s “far-sea defenses and joint operational capabilities.”[43]
This is the first time PLAN warships have breached the second island chain, and the first time that two PLAN CSGs were simultaneously seen in the Pacific. The PRC is likely improving its ability to conduct operations in distant maritime and air domains to repel potential reinforcements from Guam in a Taiwan invasion scenario. The ability to operate in the far seas would also allow the PRC to potentially isolate Japan by cutting off Japan’s sealine of communications in a Taiwan contingency.
[1] http://politics.people.com dot cn/n1/2025/0605/c1024-40494056.html
[2] https://www.scmp dot com/lifestyle/entertainment/article/3308356/mainland-china-host-first-k-pop-concert-k-wave-ban-began-2016
[3] https://www.arirang dot com/news/view?id=284125&lang=en
[4]
https://www.arirang dot com/news/view?id=284125&lang=en
[5]
https://www.koreatimes.co dot kr/foreignaffairs/northkorea/20250605/north-koreas-state-media-reports-on-lees-presidential-win-for-1st-time
[6] https://www.nknews dot org/2025/06/seoul-says-it-halted-loudspeaker-broadcasts-into-north-korea-to-restore-trust/
[7] https://www.koreatimes.co dot kr/southkorea/politics/20250604/president-nominates-rep-kim-min-seok-as-pm
[8] https://www.chosun dot com/english/national-en/2025/06/07/VOHAEBCU6FCHVK6KZNM5TKKR5I/; https://www.japantimes.co dot jp/news/2025/06/10/japan/politics/japan-south-korea-leaders-phone-talks/
[9] https://www.moi dot gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=2&s=328701
[10] https://www.edunion dot org.tw/newsrelease/【統戰鯤鵬會牽線臺灣學子赴中】-借用大學場地,/
[11] https://www.president dot gov.tw/NEWS/39105
[12] https://www.tpof dot org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/20250217%E3%80%8C2025%E5%8F%B0%E7%81%A3%E4%BA%BA%E7%9A%84%E6%94%BF%E9%BB%A8%E8%AA%8D%E5%90%8C%E8%88%87%E8%AE%8A%E9%81%B7%E3%80%8DTPOF-2%E6%9C%88%E5%8D%B3%E6%99%82%E6%B0%91%E8%AA%BF%E4%B9%8B1.pdf
https://news.ltn dot com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/4736857
[13] www.taiwan dot cn/local/dfkx/202506/t20250612_12706080.htm
www.taiwan dot cn/local/dfkx/202506/t20250612_12706081.htm
www.taiwan dot cn/local/xwzx/202506/t20250612_12706076.htm
[14] https://news.ltn.com dot tw/news/politics/paper/1710518; https://www.chinatimes dot com/realtimenews/20250610004374-260407?chdtv
[15] https://tw.news.yahoo dot com/%E5%A4%A7%E7%BD%B7%E5%85%8D31%EF%BC%9A0%EF%BC%81%E5%9A%B4%E9%98%B2%E8%97%8D%E5%A7%94%E7%AC%AC%E4%B8%89%E9%9A%8E%E6%AE%B5%E7%BD%B7%E5%85%8D%E6%8A%95%E7%A5%A8-%E6%9C%B1%E7%AB%8B%E5%80%AB%EF%BC%9A%E5%85%A8%E9%BB%A8%E9%80%B2%E5%85%A5%E6%88%B0%E9%AC%A5%E7%8B%80%E6%85%8B-073705703.html?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAHe80UNNxnhJ4zBT-htNuoqyzZTBsjxY-9LwuH9Cx4355U23EueBqUcbv4i3zBrzVCzLX2iUHhoMpdUC_TlLwtz0fMOYPxTxbYnfD6HfEyiNWdQMQcXUosZpn5FMkXERhhIoBYvjxzvVifgomSz0D7Hb7ln0BJkfSBJzwnNezMwz
[16] https://law.moj.gov dot tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=D0020010
[17] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/09/business/us-and-china-trade-war-meeting.html
https://www.wsj.com/economy/trade/export-controls-to-take-center-stage-at-u-s-china-trade-talks-3478a1c6?mod=china_news_article_pos1
[18] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/114664632971715644
[19] https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2025/06/10/china-trade-london-truce-rare-earth-minerals/
https://www.wsj.com/world/china/beijing-puts-six-month-limit-on-its-ease-of-rare-earth-export-licenses-ec8277ed?msockid=1e7993fab93767f3158c86ebb8786616
https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/114664632971715644
[20] https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2025/06/10/china-trade-london-truce-rare-earth-minerals/
[21] https://www.reuters.com/world/china/jl-mag-rare-earth-says-it-obtained-export-licenses-rare-earth-products-us-europe-2025-06-11/
[22] April 4: https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/what-know-about-chinas-rare-earth-export-controls-2025-06-04/
May 11: https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3313235/china-us-presidents-break-months-long-stand-phone-call?module=top_story&pgtype=homepage
May 28: https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/28/business/economy/jet-engine-chip-software-exports-to-china.html
May 30: https://www.wsj.com/economy/trade/export-controls-to-take-center-stage-at-u-s-china-trade-talks-3478a1c6?mod=china_news_article_pos1
June 5: https://www.wsj.com/world/china/trump-xi-speak-amid-trade-tensions-7e637978?mod=china_news_article_pos1
June 6: https://www.wsj.com/economy/trade/export-controls-to-take-center-stage-at-u-s-china-trade-talks-3478a1c6?mod=china_news_article_pos1
June 7: https://english.news dot cn/20250607/c41ed8f522164b5db5a9aa330faad480/c.html
June 9-10: https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/09/business/us-and-china-trade-war-meeting.html
June 11: https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/114664632971715644
[23] https://www.wsj.com/economy/trade/export-controls-to-take-center-stage-at-u-s-china-trade-talks-3478a1c6?mod=china_news_article_pos1
https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3313235/china-us-presidents-break-months-long-stand-phone-call?module=top_story&pgtype=homepage
[24] https://www.wsj.com/world/china/trump-xi-speak-amid-trade-tensions-7e637978?mod=china_news_article_pos1
https://apnews.com/article/trump-china-xi-tariffs-negotiations-trade-f2e4b48205001d7169ee34250089d8c1
[25] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/09/business/us-and-china-trade-war-meeting.html
https://www.english.news dot cn/20250606/4ba6a170f9c64c5d87563973136f19de/c.html
https://www.english.news dot cn/20250606/4ba6a170f9c64c5d87563973136f19de/c.html
[27] https://www.mfa dot gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/202506/t20250606_11642615.shtml
[28] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/03/business/rare-earth-metals-china.html
[29] https://paper dot people.com.cn/rmrbhwb/pc/content/202506/06/content_30077462.html
http://www.news dot cn/politics/20250608/5e6f47b9e58f4cc5b0293c4ac09e8366/c.html
[30] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/03/business/rare-earth-metals-china.html
[31] https://cleantechnica.com/2025/04/05/china-just-turned-off-u-s-supplies-of-minerals-critical-for-defense-cleantech/
https://www.magnetapplications.com/blog/custom-magnets-and-magnetic-assemblies-for-defense-applications
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/R41744.pdf
https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3898948/department-of-defense-awards-422-million-to-increase-production-of-terbium-and/#:~:text=the%20.gov%20website.-,Department%20of%20Defense%20Awards%20%244.22%20Million%20to%20Increase%20Production,and%20Other%20Rare%20Earth%20Elements
https://www.stanfordmaterials.com/blog/gadolinium-oxide-applications-and-benefits-in-metallurgy-and-alloy-production.html
https://periodic-table.rsc.org/element/64/gadolinium#:~:text=It%20is%20also%20used%20in,the%20core%20of%20nuclear%20reactors.
https://www.stanfordmaterials.com/blog/lutetium-properties-and-applications.html#:~:text=The%20high%20density%20and%20melting,durability%20and%20performance%20are%20critical.
https://www.scandium.org/applications/scandium-for-defense-and-military/#:~:text=High%2DStrength%20Munitions%3A,the%20effectiveness%20of%20defense%20systems.
[32] https://rmis.jrc.ec.europa.eu/rmp/
[33] https://www.zaobao dot com.sg/news/china/story20250607-6584360#:~:text=%E6%8D%AE%E5%A4%AE%E8%A7%86%E6%97%97%E4%B8%8B%E7%9A%84%E2%80%9C%E5%B0%8F,%E4%B8%80%E4%BB%A3%E6%B4%B2%E9%99%85%E6%88%98%E7%95%A5%E5%AF%BC%E5%BC%B9%E3%80%82
[34] https://www.spaceforce.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/4197640/minuteman-iii-test-launch-showcases-readiness-of-us-nuclear-forces-safe-effecti/
[35] https://www.defensenews.com/air/2025/05/21/air-force-test-launches-unarmed-minuteman-iii-missile/
[36] https://www.mfa dot gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/202505/t20250521_11629950.shtml
[37] http://www.mod dot gov.cn/gfbw/qwfb/16340551.html
[38] https://media.defense.gov/2024/Dec/18/2003615520/-1/-1/0/MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2024.PDF
[39] https://www.mod.go dot jp/js/pdf/2025/p20250608_01.pdf
[40] https://www.mod.go dot jp/js/pdf/2025/p20250609_02.pdf
[41] https://www.mod.go dot jp/j/press/kisha/2025/0610a.html
[42] mfa.gov dot cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/202506/t20250609_11643733.shtml
[43] mod.gov dot cn/gfbw/wzll/16390730.html