Fiat Iustitia, Pereat Mundus

Modern Intellectual History

,

14

,

1

(

2017

), pp.

35

–

65

C



Cambridge University Press

2015

doi:

10

.

1017

/S

1479244315000049

fiat iustitia, pereat mundus

:immanuel kant, friedrich gentz,and the possibility of prudentialenlightenment

∗

jonathan green

Trinity Hall, University of CambridgeE-mail: jag

202

@cam.ac.uk

Since the early twentieth century, historians of political thought have read Immanuel Kant’sinterventionsintodebatesovertheFrenchRevolution—hisessayon“Theoryand Practice” (

1795

), and his tract on

Perpetual Peace

(

1793

)—against Edmund Burke’s

Reflections on the Revolution in France

(

1790

). Kant is said to have upheld the sovereignty of pure reason for political practice, over and against Burke’s stubborn traditionalism. What this dichotomy ignores, however, is that Kant’s first public commentsontheRevolutionweredirectednotagainstBurke’s

Reflections

,butagainst a heavily edited German version of the text published in

1793

by Kant’s former student,Friedrich Gentz (

1764

–

1832

). The central thrust of Gentz’s translation was that while Kant’s normative theory of politics was admirable, it needed to be complemented with a prudential grasp of statecraft in order to be made practicable. Without prudence,the rights of man would remain an empty ideal. In responding to Gentz, Kant entered into a debate over whether philosophical reason and political prudence are mutually compatible. His dogmatic refusal to endorse such an alliance, even in the face of the Terror, places his political thought in an unfavourable light.

To make a government requires no great prudence. Settle the seat of power, teachobedience, and the work is done. To give freedom is still more easy. It is not necessary toguide; it only requires to let go the rein. But to form a free government, that is, to tempertogether these opposite elements of liberty and restraint in one consistent work, requiresmuch thought, deep reflection, a sagacious, powerful, and combining mind.Edmund Burke,

Reflections on the Revolution in Franc e

1

∗

I am grateful to Richard Bourke, Christopher Meckstroth, Isaac Nakhimovsky, JoachimWhaley and the two anonymous referees of

Modern Intellectual History

for their helpfulcomments on earlier drafts of this article.

1

Edmund Burke,


, ed. J. C. D. Clark (Stanford, CA,

2001

),

412

–

13

.

35

Core terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1479244315000049 Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. Columbia University Libraries, on 03 Jun 2017 at 07:07:57, subject to the Cambridge

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36

jonathan green

i

At the turn of the twentieth century, Paul Wittichen solved a riddle. Hewas a historian of ideas and, like many of his peers in

fin de siècle

Germany,had long puzzled over Immanuel Kant’s (

1724

–

1804

) curious relation to theFrenchRevolution.ThoughKantwasanadmireroftheRevolutionariesfromthebeginning of their campaign—at the proclamation of the First French Republiche is said to have effused, “Lord let thy servant depart in peace, for I have seenthedayofsalvation!”

2

—hewasreluctanttoendorsethemovementpubliclyinitsearlyyears.“Whenpowerfulmenofaffairsaredrunkwithrage,”hetoldafriend,“asoft-skinnedpygmyshouldnotinserthimselfintotheirfray,evenifpersuadedgently and reverently.”

3

In

1793

, however, Kant broke his silence and published“On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory but Does Not Apply in Practice” in the

Berlinische Monatsschrift

, in which he confirmed his respectfor the Revolutionaries’ ideals but raised doubts about their violent tactics.

4

Two years later, he reiterated his support for the republican cause in

Perpetual Peace

(

1795

).

5

It was this abrupt volte-face, and its odd timing in particular,that vexed Wittichen. Why would Kant remain silent at the beginning of theRevolution—during the optimistic years of

libert´ e

,

´ egalité

, and

fraternité

—only toofferthemovementhisimprimaturasitdescendedintotheanarchyandchaosof Robespierre’s Terror? Why would he defend the principles of a crusade now associated with the spectre of the guillotine, the barbarism of the sans-culottes,and regicide?Reflectingonthesequestionsacenturylater,Wittichenspeculatedthatshortly before Kant wrote “Theory and Practice,” some opponent—an interlocutor inKönigsberg,perhaps,orinprint—goadedhimintoabandoninghissilence.WhenWittichen turned to the text of Kant’s article, he found apparent confirmationof this thesis. In his essay’s introduction, Kant complained about a certain“worthygentleman”whoblamedphilosophersfortheviolenceoftheRevolution.According to Kant, this “gentleman” and his allies relish

2

Quoted in Karl August Varnhagen von Ense,

Denkw¨ urdigkeiten und vermischte Schriften

,

9

vols. (Leipzig,

1843

–

59

),

7

:

427

. All translations are my own unless otherwise noted. Theexceptions to this rule are Kant’s “Theory and Practice” and

Perpetual Peace

, where I havegenerally relied on Mary Gregor’s renderings in

The Works of Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy

, ed. Allen Wood (Cambridge,

1996

).

3

Kant to Carl Spener,

22

March

1793

, in

Kants Gesammelte Schriften

, ed. Königlich-Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften,

29

vols. (Berlin,

1902

–),

9

:

417

.

4

Immanuel Kant, “Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugtaber nicht f ür die Praxis,”


,

22

(Sept.

1793

),

201

–

84

; repr. in


,

8

:

273

–

313

(hereafter “Theorie und Praxis”).

5

Immanuel Kant,

Zum ewigen Frieden

(Königsberg,

1795

); repr. in


,

8

:

343

–

86

.


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kant, gentz, and enlightenment

37

attacking the academic, who theorizes on their behalf and for their benefit; presumingthat they understand things better than he, they seek to confine him to his school (

illa se iactet in aula!

) as a pedant who, useless in practice, only stands in the way of their moreexperienced wisdom.

6

Such philistinism was both theoretically misguided and dangerous in practice,Kant argued. In order to judge the moral status of existing regimes, statesmenrequire a universal, absolute standard of justice. But if this “gentleman” wereright—if political norms were not accessible via pure reason, but insteadresided in the realm of phenomenal experience—it would not be possible todifferentiatejustgovernmentsfromunjustones,andtheRevolutionaries’attemptto theorize and then implement a just constitutional order would be futile.And so in “Theory and Practice” Kant set out to prove that philosophicalreason does, in fact, furnish universal principles to guide the practice of politics.But who was this enigmatic interlocutor? How did he induce Kant to enterthe debate over the Revolution? According to Wittichen, Kant placed a cluein his essay that, upon close inspection, revealed his “gentleman” as noneother than the British statesman Edmund Burke. In

1790

, Burke’s


attacked philosophical “speculatists” who indictgovernments that do not “quadrate with their theories.” These men, Burkewrote,

despise experience as the wisdom of unlettered men . .. they have wrought undergrounda mine that will blow up, at one grand explosion, all examples of antiquity, all precedents,charters and acts of parliament. They have “the rights of men.” Against these there canbe no prescription, against these no agreement is binding; these admit no temperamentand no compromise ... I have nothing to say to the clumsy subtilty of their politicalmetaphysics. Let them be their amusement in the schools.

Illa se jactet in aula Aeolus, et clauso ventorum carcere regnet.

But let them not break prison to burst like a Levanter tosweep the earth with their hurricane and to break up the fountains of the great deep tooverwhelm us.

7

As Wittichen noted, the same Latin verse that Burke cited in his critique of metaphysics also appeared in the introduction to Kant’s essay .

8

Burke used itto insinuate that just as Neptune imprisoned Aeolus for insubordination inVirgil’s

Aeneid

,speculativepoliticalphilosophersshouldbequarantined,lesttheiridealistic proselytizing incite rebellion beyond the borders of France. Wittichen

6

Kant, “Theorie und Praxis,”

276

–

7

, translation mine.

7

Burke,

Reflections

,

217

.

8

“InthathallletAeoluslordit/andrulewithinthebarredprisonofthewinds.”SeeVirgil,

Aeneid

, trans. H. R. Fairclough, Bk

1

, ll.

140

–

41

.



38

jonathan green

reasoned that just before Kant wrote “Theory and Practice,” he must have readthe

Reflections

, taken offence at Burke’s scorn for “political metaphysics” andresolved to rescue his own philosophical system from exile. In

1904

Wittichensubmitted a brief, excited note to the

Historische Zeitschrift

to announce hisdiscovery:

To characterize the opinions of this “gentleman,” . .. Kant cited a strange half-verse:

illa se iactet in aula

. This citation only becomes intelligible in light of its complement:

aeolus et clauso ventorum carcere regnet

. Together, these comprise a familiar verse from Virgil,one which the greatest opponent of the French Revolution—indeed, one of the greatpolitical thinkers of the modern era—Edmund Burke, directed against propagandisticnatural rights theorists in his


.

9

Circumstantial evidence lent weight to this interpretation, too. In January

1793

,eight months before Kant published “Theory and Practice,” his former studentFriedrich Gentz (

1764

–

1832

) released a new translation of Burke’s

Reflections

inBerlin (see Fig.

1

).

10

Wittichen reasoned that since Burke’s arguments threatenedthe public authority of political philosophy, Kant was hesitant to attack himdirectly. “For this reason Kant eschewed an explicit critique of the

Reflections

and resigned himself to a terse, opaque gibe.”

11

A century later, the only evidence of this esoteric argument was Kant’s indirect nod to his unspokennemesis.For Wittichen, this debate between Kant and Burke inaugurated a broadernineteenth-century struggle between the opposing forces of rationalismand traditionalism. Kant stood as a veritable embodiment of the GermanEnlightenment, a principled philosopher who sought to bring regimes intoalignment with the normative demands of reason. Burke, contrariwise, arguedthat political norms are not accessible through abstract theoretical analysisbut inhere in the mores, customs and traditions of particular nations. Assuch, he revered and sought to preserve the same timeworn institutions thatKant scorned. According to Wittichen, “Kant’s attack on Burke marks thearrival of an antagonism that has framed Prussian politics into the modern era[

die Neuzeit

].”

12

9

Paul Wittichen, “Kant und Burke,”

Historische Zeitschrift

,

93

/

2

(

1904

),

253

–

5

, at

254

.

10

Friedrich Gentz,

Betrachtungen ¨ uber die franz¨ osische Revolution nach dem Englischen des Herrn Burke

,

2

vols. (Berlin,

1793

); partially repr. in Gentz,

Gesammelte Schriften

, ed.GüntherKronenbitter,

12

vols.(Zurich,

1997

–

2004

),

6

:

6

–

262

.Wherepossible,Ihavecitedthe


edition of this text.

11

Wittichen, “Kant und Burke,”

254

–

5

.

12

Ibid.,

255

. The poles of Wittichen’s “antagonism” between Kantian reason and traditionwere captured in the title of Friedrich Meinecke’s widely read

Weltb¨ urgertum und Nationalstaat

(Munich,

1908

).




39

Fig.

1

. The title page of the second edition of Gentz’s translation of Burke’s

Reflections

.Friedrich Gentz,

Betrachtungen ¨ uber die franz¨ osische Revolution

,

2

nd edn,

2

vols. (Berlin,

1794

).

In the years since Wittichen named Burke as Kant’s “worthy gentleman,” hisreading of “Theory and Practice” has exerted a strong influence among Kantscholars. While not all historians are persuaded that Kant had the

Reflections

inmind while penning his argument—the conservative writers Justus Möser andAugust Wilhelm Rehberg have also been aired as potential opponents—thereneverthelessexistsabroadconsensusthatKantintendedthisessayasadefenceof political rationalism against the scepticism of his traditionalist critics. Accordingto Reidar Maliks, what united these “conservative critics” was their shared desire



40

jonathan green

to dethrone the primacy of reason in politics: they “defended the existing order,partly from fear of social dissolution and partly from a conviction that moralsresult from traditions.”

13

Scholars as diverse as Allen Wood, Dieter Henrich andFrederick Beiser have all offered similar appraisals of this debate.

14

But what this simple dichotomy overlooks—what Wittichen missed in hisanalysis, and what scholars have continued to neglect since—is the crucial rolethatGentzplayedasamediatorbetweenKant,hiserstwhileteacher,andBurke.If Kant did, in fact, write “Theory and Practice” after encountering Gentz’s editionof the

Reflections

, then his understanding of Burke would have been contingenton the accuracy of Gentz’s translation. So how faithful was it? How did it colourKant’s arguments? And why did Gentz’s translation, in particular, prompt himto come to the Revolutionaries’ aid? On the assumption that Gentz’s critique of theRevolutionarieswasidenticaltoBurke’s,generationsofscholarshaveignoredthese questions.

15

But as a close reading of at Gentz’s version of the

Reflections

shows, this text presented a case against the Revolution that was, in principle,Kantian.Farfromofferingascepticalcritiqueofpoliticalrationalismortherightsof man, Gentz’s translation articulated a critique of the Revolutionaries that wasessentially distinct from, and far more nuanced than, the conservatism defendedin Burke, Rehberg or Möser.

16

Inhisversionofthe

Reflections

,GentzexplicitlyrejectedBurke’s“nonsensical”idea that normative political principles might be located in the realm of phenomenal experience.

17

With Kant he insisted that only a priori reason,unsullied by the dictates of tradition, custom or precedent, could describethe conditions of a rightful constitution. Where Gentz diverged from Kant,however—and where he agreed quite emphatically with Burke—was in arguing

13

Reidar Maliks, “The State of Freedom: Kant and His Conservative Critics,” in QuentinSkinner and Martin van Gelderen, eds.,

Freedom and the Construction of Europe

,

2

vols.(Cambridge,

2013

),

2

:

188

–

207

, at

198

. See also Maliks ,

Kant’s Politics in Context

(Oxford,

2014

), esp.

39

–

79

.

14

See Allen Wood, “Introduction [to “Theory and Practice”],” in

The Works of Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy

,

275

–

6

; Dieter Henrich,

¨ Uber Theorie und Praxis

(Frankfurt,

1967

),

9

–

16

;andFrederickBeiser,

Enlightenment,RevolutionandRomanticism:TheGenesis of Modern German Political Thought

(Cambridge, MA,

1992

),

38

–

48

.

15

According to Maliks (“The State of Freedom,”

190

), Gentz’s conservatism was rooted in“skepticism about theorists in general.” Henrich (

Theorie und Praxis

,

21

), sees it as simple“Humean pragmatism,” and Beiser (

Enlightenment, Revolution, and Romanticism

,

326

),has denounced it as “the greatest intelligence in the service of the greatest stupidity.”

16

For Gentz’s political thought see Günther Kronenbitter,

Wort und Macht: Friedrich Gentz als politischer Schriftsteller

(Berlin,

1994

), and Raphaël Cahen, “La pensée politique deFriedrich Gentz: Penseur post-Lumières et acteur du renouveau de l’ordre européen autemps des revolutions” (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Provence,

2014

).

17

Gentz,

Betrachtungen

,

1

:

89

.




41

that just principles are not, in and of themselves, sufficient for political practice.“What was most absurd in the proceedings of those who sought to rootthe new French constitution in the so-called rights of man was not theirsearch for these rights and their respect for them,” he argued, “but that they thought these rights sufficed—that they hoped to build a state with thesemere rights when, in fact, it calls for different materials as well.” To makenormative rights concrete in the contingent world of historical particularity,statesmen must possess not only sound principles, but also more practicaltools: they must respect the universal “rules of morality” and attend tothe situational “demands of prudence [

Klugheit

].”

18

Because the Revolution’sleaders ignored such practical considerations, their movement was doomed tofailure.

19

Gentz, in other words, articulated a modified Kantian strategy for therationalization of politics. His version of the

Reflections

charted a

via media

betweenanaive,impracticalidealismandadogmatic,anti-metaphysicalrealism.Revisiting his critique of the Revolution offers, in turn, a new lens for tracingthe evolution of Kant’s politics throughout the

1790

s. It seems incontrovertible,as others have noted, that the traditionalism of Rehberg and Möser wason Kant’s mind while writing “Theory and Practice.” Against these sceptics,Kant had to show that a priori reason could, in fact, furnish normativeprinciples for political practice. But if Wittichen were correct—if Gentz’s

Reflections

were the text, or even one of the texts, that provoked Kant in

1793

—then another, perhaps more interesting, debate can be uncovered inthe pages of “Theory and Practice.” Kant’s debate with Gentz was a debate

within

the German Enlightenment: a debate not over

whether

to enlighten, but

how

.At stake in this debate was whether theoretical reason and political prudenceshould, or even could, work in concert. In “Theory and Practice,” Kant voicedscepticism about such a union. If the Revolution had faltered, he argued, thefault lay not in its leaders’ imprudence, but in their misapprehension of reason’sdemands;ashesawit,theyhad“

notenough

theory.”

20

Uponreadingthisrebuttal,Gentz set out to convince his teacher otherwise. Over the next two years—in aresponse to Kant published in the


, and in two in-depthanalyses of the Revolution—Gentz argued that an empirical approach to politics

18

Ibid.,

1

:

89

–

90

,

95

.

19

For the extent to which Gentz’s edition of the

Reflections

reinterpreted Burke’s argumentsthroughaKantianparadigmseeJonathanGreen,“FriedrichGentz’sTranslationofBurke’s

Reflections

,”

Historical Journal

,

57

/

3

(Sept.

2014

),

639

–

59

.

20


275

, italics in original.



42

jonathan green

was a prerequisite for the realization of Kantian Enlightenment.

21

Without apractical means of implementation, a sole concern for principle is stillborn andindeed dangerous, threatening to engender resentment and undermine publicorder. Philosophers, therefore, have a duty to consider both the ends and themeans of political progress:

We have debated specific aspects of government ... and illuminated what was flawed inthe old

anciens régimes

. But this was just half of our task. In addition, we must establishthe real (not merely ideal) possibility of better constitutions, and provide tools for theirrealization.

22

When Kant responded to this argument in

Perpetual Peace

, he remainedintractable. While he admitted that an alliance of reason and prudence wasconceivable in principle, Kant was reluctant to endorse Gentz’s more pointedclaim that a priori political theories are, of themselves, insufficient in practice.ReadingKantvis-à-visGentz,therefore,leadstoaperhapsmorecriticalviewofhismaturepoliticsthanscholarshavetraditionallyoffered.Giventhechoiceoftheory

or

practice, Kant’s intransigent defence of reason has seemed principled andnoble.ButforGentz,thisdichotomypresupposedafalsechoice.Throughouttheearly

1790

s,hebeckonedKanttoamoderatedvisionofprudentialEnlightenment,one that sought to unite theoretical reason and practical statesmanship into acoherent programme for real, tangible progress. But even as France smouldered,Kant’s response was unflinching: “

fiat iustitia, pereat mundus

”—let justice bedone, though the earth should perish.

23

ii

Like Kant, Gentz greeted initial news of the French Revolution withanticipation. “The spirit of the age stirs strong and quick within me,” he told hisfriend Christian Garve in

1790

. “Now is the time for the human race to awakefrom its long slumber. I am young, and the universal striving for freedom thathas overcome our age fills me with sympathy and warmth.”

24

Like most of hispeers, Gentz saw the

Ancien Régime

as sclerotic and corrupt, and welcomed

21

Gentz presented his analyses of the Revolution in two annotated translations of Frenchhistoriesofthemovement—FriedrichGentz,

MalletduPan ¨ uberdiefranz¨ osischeRevolution unddieUrsachenihrerDauer

(Berlin,

1794

),andGentz,

MouniersEntwicklungderUrsachen welche Frankreich gehindert haben zu Freiheit zu gelangen

,

2

vols. (Berlin,

1795

)—both of which have been partially reprinted in Gentz,


,

6

:

263

–

536

.

22

Gentz,

Betrachtungen

, in Gentz,


,

6

:

180

–

81

.

23

Kant,

Zum ewigen Frieden

,

378

.

24

Gentz to Garve,

5

March

1790

, in F. P. Wittichen, ed.,

Briefe von und an Gentz

,

3

vols.(Berlin,

1909

),

1

:

158

–

9

.




43

the apparent willingness of Louis XVI to reform his nation’s constitution.Gentz’s faith in what he called “the good cause” was further reinforced by the publication of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen in

1789

.

25

This document, he believed, held the potential to liberate France fromits heteronomous obedience to the demands of tradition, setting out a rationalframework for the construction of a just constitution.

26

From his educationunder Kant in the mid-

1780

s, Gentz was convinced that all men possess inherentdignity as self-governing moral agents, and that this unique status confers onthem certain intrinsic rights that all governments must respect. “I would regardthefailureofthisrevolutionasoneoftheworstdisastersevertobefallthehumanrace,” he told Garve. “It is the first practical triumph of philosophy, the firstexample of a government that is based on principles and a coherent, consistentsystem.”

27

Gentz’s view of the Revolution soon soured, however, as the once-noblemovement degenerated into a maelstrom of violence and disorder in the early

1790

s. The confiscation of private estates and church properties, the factionalismoftheAssembléenationale,theriseofseditiousrevolutionarycabalsinParis—allof these developments convinced him that the Revolutionaries had broken faithwith the true cause of Enlightenment. Instead of encouraging concrete moralprogress, their crusade had given rise to a new and strange fanaticism which,like the religious enthusiasms of earlier eras, furnished a pretext for savage actsof barbarism. Gentz’s disillusionment was so profound that in the aftermathof the September Massacres of

1792

he was describing active

resistance

to theRevolution as a “holy duty for the enlightened friend of mankind [

aufgekl¨ arten Menschenfreundes

].”

28

Sincetheearlynineteenthcentury,the

expostfacto

alignmentofEnlightenmentand the Revolution has made it difficult for readers to see the force of Gentz’s claim. But given the vision of progress that Kant sketched in “WhatIs Enlightenment?”—published in

1784

, while Gentz was his student inKönigsberg—Gentz’s notion of an anti-revolutionary Enlightenment had acertain prima facie plausibility .

29

Kant had described Enlightenment as a slow process that must be undertaken with care and moderation. “A public can only reach enlightenment over time,” he wrote:

25

Gentz to Garve,

5

Dec.

1790

, in Wittichen,


,

1

:

179

.

26

See Gentz, “Über den Ursprung und die obersten Prinzipien des Rechts,”


,

18

(April

1791

),

370

–

96

; repr. in Gentz,


,

7

:

7

–

33

.

27

Gentz to Garve,

5

Dec.

1790

, in Wittichen,


,

1

:

178

.

28

Gentz,

Betrachtungen

, in Gentz,


,

6

:

29

.

29

ImmanuelKant,“BeantwortungderFrage:WasistAufklärung?”,

BerlinischeMonatsschrift

,

12

(Dec.

1784

),

481

–

94

; repr. in


,

8

:

35

–

42

.



44

jonathan green

Arevolutionmightputanendtodespotismoranacquisitiveanddomineeringoppression,but it will never lead to true reform in men’s ways of thinking; instead, new prejudices,like the old, will serve as the controlling leash of the great unthinking mob.

30

According to Kant, men are best able to free themselves from their “self-imposedimmaturity” and achieve moral self-government in a robust public sphere,infused with “a spirit of rational respect for the worth of each man.”

31

Butrational civil discourse is impossible in an chaotic state of nature. It followed,therefore,thattheprospectsforEnlightenmentaredependentontheexistenceof stablepoliticalorder.Statesmenmustbalancethefloweringofpublicreasonwiththeneedforstatestability.Whenthistensionisdeftlymanaged—aswasthecase,Kant argued, in Frederick the Great’s Prussia—then as subjects slowly becomecapableofrationalself-government,theneedforapaternalisticregimewillwane.Butifthisbalanceisupset,ifemancipatedsubjectsbegintoquestiontheauthority of their governments and embrace sedition or rebellion, then the flourishing of public rationality will undermine the state and,

ipso facto

, destabilize the publicsphere. Enlightenment, in other words, would dissolve the conditions of its ownexistence.But how, precisely, could this transition from despotism to liberalism befacilitated?Howshouldajustconstitutionbestructured?Andwhatfundamentalrights should it protect? Though Kant’s preference for orderly progress was clear,“What Is Enlightenment?” gave little attention to these practical questions of implementation. After Gentz left Königsberg in the

1780

s for a post in the civilservice in Berlin, they came to dominate his thinking. He befriended many of the luminaries of the German Enlightenment in the city’s famed salons—mensuch as Alexander and Wilhelm Humboldt, Ludwig Tieck, Friedrich Schlegel,Moses Mendelssohn and Johannes von Müller—and, at Kant’s behest, beganattending the public lectures of Johann Gottfried Kiesewetter, one of Berlin’sleading reformers.

32

Though Gentz shared this coterie’s vision of a liberalizedPrussia,hegrewworried thatneither Kantnorhis allieswereattuned tojusthow complex the mechanisms of eighteenth-century government were, and just how fraughtthepathtoEnlightenmentwouldbe.AtthesuggestionofhisfriendGarve,heturnedtoforeignsourcesforguidance—toMontesquieu,Hume,FergusonandSmith.

33

Gentz’sinitiationintothisAnglophilictraditionledhimtoappreciatethewaysinwhichtheriseofcommerce,therefinementofmanners,thedevelopment

30

Ibid.,

8

:

36

.

31

Ibid.,

8

:

35

–

6

.

32

See Gentz to Garve,

5

March

1790

, in Wittichen,


,

1

:

155

; see alsoKronenbitter,

Wort und Macht

,

32

–

4

.

33

In

1790

Gentz told Garve that he was reading the

Wealth of Nations

“for a third time”; seeGentz to Garve,

5

Dec.

1790

, in Wittichen,


,

1

:

181

.




45

of statesmanship and the science of constitutionalism had helped bring aboutthe ordered liberty that modern Britain enjoyed.

34

He came to see the GloriousRevolution of

1688

as a paradigm for successful political reform, and the Britishconstitution as a model for “the enlightenment of mankind.”

35

In

1789

, Gentz was hopeful that the French would follow the example of theBritish, reviving their long-dormant representative institutions and crafting abalanced constitutional monarchy. As he argued in the preface to his edition of Burke’s

Reflections

, the prospects for such reforms were auspicious in the yearsleading up to the Revolution:

In this period of regeneration, every step along the path of learning was a decisive gainthat sooner or later permeated all social classes. The powerful were made gentle and mildthrough the increase of knowledge, while the small became self-sufficient and corrigible.That which pleased citizens also strengthened governments [

Regierungen

]. The scourgecouldrestasreasongrippedthesceptre,andenlightenedcitizens[

aufgekl¨ arteB¨ urger

]weretruer subjects than unknowing slaves.

36

Before the Revolution, in other words, the slow diffusion of public reason acrossEurope had conduced to a process of a gradual, yet real, liberalization. GentzlamentedthatasaresultoftheRevolution,thepublicspherehadbeenpoliticizedand the fragile moral progress of the eighteenth century had been swept away ina torrent of fanaticism. Just as Kant warned, new prejudices simply eclipsed theold:

The despotic synod of Paris, upheld internally by its inquisitorial courts and externally by its thousands of willing missionaries, has denounced each and every departure fromits maxims as heresy and anathema, with an intolerance not witnessed since the doctrineof papal infallibility ... Rather than careful systems of government, slowly infused withwisdom and experience,

libert´ e

and

egalité

have now taken up the sceptre of the world,andtyrantsandtheirallies,alongwithallreligion,scienceandart .. . havebeenbanishedinto the night of an eternal oblivion.

37

The Revolutionaries had commandeered and perverted the idea of Enlightenment. Rather than “non-partisan reason,” moral improvement and

34

For this tradition see J. G. A. Pocock, “Clergy and Commerce: The ConservativeEnlightenment in England,” in R. Ajello, ed.,

L’età dei Lumi: Studi Storici sul Settecento EuropeoinonorediFrancoVenturi

,

2

vols.(Naples,

1985

),

1

:

523

–

62

;forBurke’splacewithinit see Richard Bourke, “Burke, Enlightenment and Romanticism,” in David Dwan andChristopherInsole,eds.,

TheCambridgeCompaniontoEdmundBurke

(Cambridge,

2012

),

27

–

40

.

35

Gentz,

Betrachtungen

, in Gentz,


,

6

:

212

.

36

Ibid.,

6

:

9

–

10

.

37

Ibid.,

6

:

26

–

7

.



46

jonathan green

public order, Kant’s vision was now associated with paranoid fanaticism, civilinsurrection and political violence.

38

Gentz took it upon himself to distinguish Kant’s true, reformist

Aufkl¨ arung

from the false imitation espoused by the Revolutionaries.

39

Using his translationof Burke’s

Reflections

as a platform, he outlined a strategy for politicalliberalization that differed radically from the Jacobins’—one that, he claimed,could successfully reconcile the demands of reason with the exigencies of political practice. Gentz called this programme his “complete theory of theanti-revolutionary system.”

40

As he saw it, Burke’s central argument was nothisscepticismabouttheRevolutionaries’metaphysics.

41

ForGentz,rather,Burkewas prescient because he saw that in the day-to-day arena of political decision-making, a solely philosophical grasp of what is right will be insufficient forpractice. Augmenting his translation with an extensive apparatus of interpretiveessaysandexegeticalnotes,GentzheldupBurkeanstatesmanshipastheepitomeof an enlightened political practice.The philosophical crux of Gentz’s interpretation came in a footnote insertedtowards the middle of the

Reflections

, some eleven pages after Burke’s suggestionthat “speculatists” should be quarantined—the same passage to which Kantalluded in “Theory and Practice.” In the original version of his text, Burkecomplained that the

philosophes

were more concerned with philosophical rigourthan with the practical realities of governing. “The pretended rights of thesetheorists are all extremes; and in proportion as they are metaphysically true,they are morally and politically false.”

42

In a note attached to this sentence,Gentz fixed upon Burke’s threefold distinction between metaphysics, moralsand politics. “There are three discernible gradations that pervade all Burkeanreasoningbutthatareneverdistinguishedwithadequatesharpness:principlesof right,questionsofmoralwarrant[

moralischeBefugnisse

]andrulesofprudence.”Gentz explained that Burke used the term “metaphysical right” to denote “whatwe Germans ... are accustomed to calling strict right [

strenge Recht

]”—thatis, moral injunctions derived from synthetic a priori precepts. But what Burkecalled“moral”and“politicalright”didnot,infact,denotenormativeclaims,butreferred rather to the tools needed to implement reason’s demands in everyday

38

Ibid.

39

For Gentz’s distinction between reformist and radical wings within the GermanEnlightenment see Ian Hunter,

Rival Enlightenments

(Cambridge,

2001

).

40

Gentz,

Betrachtungen

,

1

:

2

.

41

AccordingtoGentz,Burke’scritiqueofrationalismbelieda“lackofsecurefirstprinciples”;see Gentz,

Betrachtungen

, in Gentz,


,

6

:

114

–

15

.

42

Burke,

Reflections

,

221

.




47

practice.

43

The point of Burke’s sentence, according to Gentz, was that althoughtheRevolutionariesmayhavebeenprincipled,theirmovementwasneithermoralnor prudent and failed for these reasons. This insight was the hinge upon whichGentz’s “theory of the anti-revolutionary system” turned. And it was the sameclaimtowhichKantrespondedin“TheoryandPractice”someeightmonthslater.Gentz elucidated his point with a metaphor. Just as the captain of a ship mustset his course vis-à-vis the North Star, political movements require normativeorientation in order to make progress.

But if [the captain] ends his preparation here, if he begins his trip around the world inan empty boat with nothing but a foolish faith in his preliminary knowledge, withouta rudder or compass or oars or charts, he will be scorned as an idiot and chastised as areckless adventurer.

Likewise, though just principles are vital in politics, they must be coupled withmoral virtue and political prudence to be successfully enacted. “The rights thatthesetheoristschimericallytakeforeverythingarenothingbutextremes,”Gentzargued. “Since there are many other important considerations in the moralworld and many other rules in the political world, these rights are insufficient[

unzureichend

] for him who wishes to erect a constitution, and will produce badresults when taken as his sole principle.”

44

Gentz’s understanding of the relation between metaphysics, morals andpolitics was rather technical, and he included a diagram to help readers see thelogical dependencies that pertain between them (see Fig.

2

). A sound theoreticalgrasp of what is right is a prerequisite for moral action, he argued. One cannotenact a just state of affairs without understanding, at a conceptual level, what justiceis.Second,arightfulaimandamoralplanofactionarebothpreconditionsfor the exercise of circumstantial prudence. Thus, as Gentz’s diagram indicated,“the logical spheres of these three concepts become progressively smaller”:

Every conceivable action that accords with the rules of prudence . .. must be compatiblewith the laws of moral order and with the principles of strict right .. . But the conversedoes not hold—that everything that transpires in line with the principles of right alsocomplies with the demands of morality or, far less, the rules of prudence; or that allactions that satisfy the moral law also satisfy the rules of prudence.

45

Gentzexplainedthattherulesofmoralityarenormativeanduniversallybinding,regardless of circumstance. An actor is moral if his means are congruent with his

43

Gentz,

Betrachtungen

,

1

:

89

,

93

.

44

Ibid.,

1

:

92

–

3

,

95

. Gentz may have borrowed this image from Kant; see Immanuel Kant,

Was heißt: Sich im Denken orientieren?

(

1786

), in


,

8

:

133

–

47

, at

135

.

45

Ibid.,

1

:

93

.



48

jonathan green

Fig.

2

. Gentz’s illustration of the “whole realm of the concept of permissiveness.” Gentz,

Betrachtungen

,

2

nd edn,

1

:

86

.




49

(just) ends, and he is immoral if he seeks to bring about a just world throughunjust means. Such an incongruence between means and ends often stems fromexcessive zeal, Gentz argued. The Revolutionaries were an ideal case in point. “If begunwiththearroganceofIcarus,man’sloftiestflightsintounexploredregionswill end with the downfall of Icarus. The human race can only progress towardthe attainment of that which is sublime gradually, step-by-step.”

46

Like morality, Gentz’s notion of prudence was also practical—that is,concerned with the implementation of right. But whereas moral considerationsarerationalanduniversal,thedemandsofprudencearecontingentandhistorical,dependent on the unique circumstances in which an actor is imbedded. Sinceprudence is a situational concept, it demands an empirical grasp of one’simmediate surroundings. Before a statesman sets out to reform an institution,he must apprehend how it is interwoven with the habits, mores, customs andtraditionsofthenationitgoverns.Therefore,Gentzargued,“ifaparticularnationinvitedawisestatesmantoassembleaplanfortheexpansionofitspoliticalliberty and vested him with great power, he would not consent to their wishes at once”:

He would first observe the character, customs, passions, degree of education,circumstances, needs and history of the people for whom he is legislating; he wouldcomparetheresultsofhisinvestigationwiththedegreeoffreedomthattheyhavehithertoenjoyed, and the amount that they now demand ... It is just as unreasonable to hopethat in an instant, a people can be converted from the slaves of a Sultan into a state of British enlightenment ... as it is foolish to seek to transform a Turkish constitution intoa British one at once.

47

Similarly, Gentz’s notion of prudence required that statesmen have a soundunderstanding of history. Unlike the principles of justice, one cannot learnthe demands of prudence through a priori reflection. Echoing Aristotle, Gentzdefined prudence as a practical skill that can only be learned by emulating theexamplesofwise,judiciousstatesmenthroughouthistory.Theprudentpoliticianwill, in a moment of crisis, compare his potential course of action to similarsituations in the past. If the lessons of experience indicate that his plans arefeasible, he can pursue them with confidence; if not, he can revise his strategy,or abort it altogether. This comparative form of reasoning thus ensures a highlikelihood of success. “If ever a constitution of pure reason [

reinen Vernunft

]should be realized somewhere, then it will be time to depart from the wisdomof experience,” Gentz argued. “But until then ... reason and duty both dictatethat the safest path lies along the well-travelled coast of experience.”

48

46

Gentz,

Betrachtungen

, in Gentz,


,

6

:

182

.

47

Ibid.,

6

:

66

.

48

Ibid.,

6

:

181

. Though Gentz did not cite Kant, there was precedent in Kant’s corpus. Inhis

Grundlegung f¨ ur Metaphysik der Sitten

, Kant defined “anthropology” as a series of



50

jonathan green

Whereas morality demands congruence between ends and means, prudencedemands consonance between means and context. When these three factors arebrought into alignment, the gap between theory and practice becomes passable.Suchwasthecase,Gentzexplained,intheGloriousRevolutionof

1688

and,morerecently, the American Revolution of

1776

.

49

But as the example of the FrenchRevolution demonstrated, principles without morality and prudence are of littlepractical use. Because the Revolution’s leaders were unable to enact the rightsoutlined in their Declaration, this document only engendered resentment andviolence. As a result, “the rights of men have never, in any age of history, been soterribly,obscenely,andthoroughlydisgracedasinthelastthreeyears,inanationwhere they should have been respected and venerated.”

50

iii

In the months after Gentz released his translation, the situation in Francedeteriorated further. In January

1793

a Revolutionary tribunal ordered theexecution of Louis XVI, prompting Austria and Britain to join the Prussianwar against France. In Paris, Robespierre assumed power, instituting martial law andusheringinthehorrorsofhisinfamousTerror.Thesedevelopmentsshockedthe German reading public, and propelled Gentz’s

Reflections

to a position of prominence in political discourse. Throughout

1793

, his translation provoked aheateddebateoverwhetherthenormativedemandsofpurereasonarecompatiblewith the practical exigencies of politics.

51

Gentz defended a moderate position,arguingthatreason’sdictatesareindeed practicableif coupledwithmoralityandprudence. But the debate quickly radicalized. August Wilhelm Rehberg insistedthat philosophical reason has no place in politics.

52

Johann Gottlieb Fichte took uptheoppositeposition,arguingthatallregimesbebroughtintoalignmentwithreason, no matter the cost.

53

practical investigations into one’s phenomenal circumstances, and argued that it was aprerequisite for making morality “effective

in concreto

in the conduct of one’s life”; see


,

4

:

387

–

463

, at

388

–

9

. Kant would later echo this sentimentin his

Metaphysik der Sitten

of

1797

, claiming that “morality requires anthropology for itsapplication to human beings”; see


,

6

:

205

–

493

, at

412

.

49

ForGentzonAmericaseeGentz,

Betrachtungen

,inGentz,

GesammelteSchriften

,

6

:

90

–

98

.

50

Ibid.,

6

:

144

.

51

SeeBeiser,

Enlightenment,Revolution,andRomanticism

,

287

–

8

;andReinholdAris,

History of Political Thought in Germany

(London,

1965

),

251

–

8

.

52

A.W.Rehberg,

Untersuchungen ¨ uber die Franz¨ osische Revolution

,

2

vols.(Hannover,

1793

).

53

J. G. Fichte,

Beitr¨ age zur Berichtigung der Urteile des Publikums ¨ uber die Franz¨ osische Revolution

(Danzig,

1793

).




51

Kant was not insulated from the turmoil that Gentz’s translation provoked.In March, the bookseller Carl Spener wrote to him from Berlin, begging him torespond to the growing scepticism about the Revolution. “Is it not your duty to alleviate with a small drop of oil this terrible friction that threatens to crushhundreds of thousands?” he asked.

54

Similar petitions continued to arrive overthe coming months.

55

Kiesewetter wrote to Kant in June, noting that “there ismuch to be said about the principles of the French Republic and their agreementwith reason” and urging him to come the Revolutionaries’ aid.

56

In September,Kant relented, submitting “Theory and Practice” to the


as a contribution to the debate that now raged over the political authority of apriori reason.In all likelihood, Kant knew that his former student had incited this debate.Gentz’slettersfromthemid-

1780

ssuggestthatthetwomenforgedaclosepersonalrelationship in Königsberg.

57

They were in direct correspondence as late as

1790

,when Kant asked Gentz to edit a draft of his

Critique of Judgement

.

58

And Kantwas attentive to Gentz’s rising political fortunes throughout the

1790

s as well.

59

It seems almost certain, then, that Kant would have read Gentz’s translation of Burkein

1793

,andwouldhavebeenalerttoitseffectsonGermanpublicopinion.At the same time, however, Kant would also have known that Gentz’s edition of the

Reflections

had attracted the praise of Prussia’s monarch regnant, FriedrichWilhelm II, and that Gentz had been named to the king’s council of advisers inmid-

1793

. Kant had good reason to pen an esoteric argument against Gentz, onethathisstudentwouldrecognizebutthatgrantedhimplausibleinnocencebeforethePrussiancensors.

60

Whenallthisevidenceisplacedalongsidethetextualcluethat Wittichen uncovered in Kant’s essay, a neat prima facie case emerges tosuggestthatGentz’s

Reflections

was,infact,thesourcethatinspiredKanttowrite“Theory and Practice.”Kant framed his appraisal of the Revolution generally, vis-à-vis the “commonsaying” that an idea “may be correct in theory but does not apply [

taugt . . .

54

Spener to Kant,

9

March

1793

, in


,

11

:

415

–

16

.

55

See ibid.,

11

:

401

–

31

.

56

Kiesewetter to Kant,

15

June

1793

, in ibid.,

11

:

422

.

57

See, for instance, Gentz to Garve,

8

Oct.

1784

, in Wittichen,


,

1

:

140

–

41

.

58

See Gentz to Garve,

5

Dec.

1790

, in ibid.,

1

:

182

.

59

See Johann Biester to Kant,

4

March

1794

, and Kiesewetter to Kant,

25

Nov.

1798

, in


,

11

:

490

and

12

:

266

.

60

In

1792

, the censor had reprimanded Kant for the heterodoxy of his

Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft

, and forbade him from printing sections of it in the

Monatsschrift

; see Biester to Kant,

18

June

1792

, in


,

8

:

329

–

33

.



52

jonathan green

nicht

] in practice.”

61

In one sense, this was a plausible restatement of Gentz’sargument. In order to implement an ideal theory of justice, Gentz argued,statesmenmustpossessamoralplanofactionandpayprudentattentiontotheircircumstances;otherwise, whatis “correctin theory” will be impracticable. Withthisschematicargument,GentzmeanttovindicateKant’spre-Revolutionaryideaof Enlightenment: to show how, precisely, the transition from despotism to self-governmentcouldbeachievedwithoutfallingintotheanarchyoftheRevolution.But when Kant encountered this argument in

1793

, it worried him. Gentz’semphasis on prudence, especially, seemed little more than a shrewd attempt torationalize a bankrupt

Ancien Régime

and to provide intellectual cover for theRevolution’s critics. At the prodding of his radical allies Kant decided to pushback against Gentz—the “would-be expert who admits the value of theory forteaching purposes ... but argues that matters are quite different in practice”—and set out to prove that a priori reason was, in fact, wholly sufficient for thepractice of politics.

62

Kant’s introduction contained a précis of this argument. He conceded that,sometimes, theory and practice seemed incongruent. But could circumstantialprudencereconcilethem?Kantacknowledged that“between theoryandpracticethereisrequired ... anactofjudgementthroughwhichthepractitionerdecideswhether ... something is a case of the rule.” But such situational judgementcould not guarantee a successful implementation of right, Kant argued. Assumethat a statesman possessed perfect judgement: in every situation presented tohim, he would be able choose a set of principles appropriate to his context.Even with such prudence, this statesman would not be able to make

all

theoriespracticable,fortheobviousreasonthat“evenwherethisnaturaltalentispresent,there can still be a deficiency in premises; that is, a theory can be incomplete.”If this wise statesman chose a theory that was underdeveloped, his aims wouldbe unrealizable. “In such cases it is not the fault of theory if it was of little use inpractice, but rather of there having been

not enough

theory.”

63

Kant elaboratedthis point with a metaphor from Newtonian physics:

Now if an empirical engineer tried to disparage general mechanics, or an artillerymanthe mathematical doctrine of ballistics, by saying that whereas the theory of it is nicely thoughtoutitisnotvalidinpracticesince,whenitcomestoapplication,experienceyieldsquite different results than theory, one would merely laugh at him (for if the theory of friction were added to the first and the theory of the resistance of air to the second, henceif only still more theory were added, these would accord very well with experience).

6461


273

, translation mine.

62

Ibid.,

275

–

6

, translation mine.

63

Ibid.,

275

, italics in original.

64

Ibid.,

276

.




53

To reconcile the expected and actual results of these experiments, prudential judgementwouldbeofnouse;rather,“moretheory”wasneeded.Kantintimatedthat just as it would be premature to abandon mathematical physics after onefailed ballistics experiment, it would be unwise to reject a priori reason as thefinal source of political norms, or to infer that its dictates are impracticable, afterthe Revolutionaries’ halting attempts to enact them. “Theory and Practice,” inotherwords,invertedGentz’sargument:iftheRevolutionhadfaltered,itsufferedfrom a dearth, not an excess, of theoretical reason.Kantdividedhisargumentintothreeparts,andthesubstanceofhisresponsetoGentzappearedinhissecondsection,“ontherelationoftheorytopracticeintheright of a state.”

65

He began by registering his enthusiastic support for the rightsdefended in the Revolutionaries’ Declaration, outlining three conditions “inaccordancewithwhichalonetheestablishmentofastateispossibleinconformity with pure rational principles of external human right:

1

. The freedom of every member of the society as a human being.

2

. His equality with every other as a subject.

3

. The independence of every member of a commonwealth as a citizen.”

66

When Kant spelled out the implications of these rights, his Revolutionary sympathies became clear. He defined freedom as the right of each citizen topursue his own vision of happiness, and censured paternalistic governmentsthat seek to impose their own ideas about flourishing onto their subjects. It isimmoral, Kant argued, to treat grown adults “like minor children who cannotdistinguish between what is truly useful or harmful to them.” Second, Kant’snotion ofequalitydemandedtheendofaristocraticprivilegesandtheformationof a meritocratic society. “Every member of the commonwealth must be allowedto attain any level of rank ... to which his talent, his industry and his luck cantakehim;andhisfellowsubjectsmaynotstandinhiswaybymeansofahereditary prerogative.” Finally, his concept of “independence” entailed a right to politicalrepresentation. Under absolutist governments, subjects’ rights are contingent on

65

Ibid.,

289

.Kant’snotestothissectionofhisessaysuggestthathewroteitinmid-

1793

;thatis, after the publication of Gentz’s

Reflections

. See


,

23

:

125

–

44

.

66

Ibid.,

290

. Because Kant asserted these rights rather than deducing them from his morebasic metaphysical commitments, there exists a long-standing interpretive debate abouttherelationbetweenpoliticalfreedomandmoralautonomyinhisthought.Inthiscontext,it is perhaps helpful to note that Gentz provided a Kantian derivation of political rightfrom “the pure concept of humanity” in an article printed in the

Monatsschrift

in

1791

,entitled“ÜberdenUrsprungunddieoberstenPrinzipiendesRechts.”Thismightexplainwhy Kant was content to assert his preferred catalogue of rights in “Theory and Practice,”rather than making their theoretical grounding explicit. For Gentz’s essay see Gentz,


,

8

:

7

–

33

; see also Green, “Gentz’s

Reflections

,”

645

–

8

.



54

jonathan green

the benevolence of their sovereigns. Only under a constitution grounded in the“general (united) will of the people,” therefore, are the rights of man secure.

67

In its original context, Kant’s catalogue of rights amounted to a clearendorsement of the French vision of a nation conceived in

liberté

,

´ egalit´ e

, and

fraternité

. At the same time, however, he was still sensitive to the dangers thatpolitical tumult posed to the enlightened public sphere, and was reluctant toendorse the worst tactical excesses of the Revolution:

If a people now subject to a certain actual legislation were to judge that in all probability this is detrimental to its happiness, what is to be done about it? Should the people notresist it? The answer can only be that, on the part of the people, there is nothing to bedone but to obey .

68

Yet it was unclear how Kant could hold this position. If revolutions werecategoricallybarred—ifpeopleshadnorighttocastofftheirexistinggovernmentsin order to create better ones—then what practical use were his republicanprinciples?Thisobjectioncouldbeturnedaroundandposedfromaconservativeangle.Earlierinhisessay,inarejoindertoChristianGarve,Kantsuggestedthatatheoretical grasp of what is right necessarily compels moral action.

69

If this wereso,andiftheprinciplesoftheRevolutionwerejust,thenwasKantnotcommittedtotheradicalclaimthatRevolutionaries’violenttacticswere,infact,permissible?To circumvent this dilemma, Kant might have turned to Gentz’s concept of prudence. He could have argued that the French people were not suited forrepublican self-government, or that the Revolutionaries faltered because they were not sufficiently attuned to their unique circumstances. But he did not. Kantsawthatifheweretofallbackontowhathewouldlatercall“enlightenedconceptsof political prudence,” he would have to acknowledge that what is true in theory is, in certain circumstances, impractical.

70

If this were so, moral norms would beconditional, not universal:

All is lost when empirical and therefore contingent conditions of carrying out the law are made conditions of the law itself, so that a practice calculated with reference to an

67


290

–

92

,

295

.

68

Ibid.,

297

–

8

.

69

Garve’schargewasthatKant’srationalismisnotabletoinspiremoralconductinpractice,since all human action assumes a eudemonistic idea of moral flourishing. In his response(ibid.,

279

–

80

),Kantarguedthatinthemomentthatthewillacknowledgesthesovereignty ofmoralduty,itpostulatesaconceptualendapriori (whichitthenpursues,ofnecessity).This response to Garve might therefore be read as a tacit rejection of Gentz’s claim that inthepursuit of just ends,human actorsoften resort toimmoral means.Insofarasone

truly

submits to the authority of reason, Kant argued, moral action will follow in due course.

70

Kant,

Zum ewigen Frieden

,

344

.




55

outcome probable in accordance with previous experience is given authority to control aself-sufficient theory .

71

Circumstantialprudence,therefore,wasincompatiblewiththeconceptofright.If politicians could rightfully invoke mitigating empirical conditions to rationalizetheir own inaction, the whole force of the moral law would be suspended. Justicewould be a mirage.Rather than turning to prudence, Kant argued that the Revolutionaries’principles were partially deficient. Their defence of human rights was laudable,but their concept of the state was misguided. Even in the most favourableconditions, prudence could not render certain revolutions permissible, sincethe very concept of a rightful revolution was nonsensical. If subjects had aright to overthrow their governments, this right would have to be groundedin a universalizable maxim. This would be equivalent to a law that licenseslawlessness, which is absurd.

72

Thus for Kant, “any resistance to the supremelegislative power, any incitement to have the subjects’ dissatisfaction becomeactive, any insurrection that break out in rebellion, is the highest and mostpunishable crime within a commonwealth, because it destroys its foundation.”

73

In an essay “On the Morality of Political Revolutions” included in his edition of the

Reflections

, Gentz had argued that in certain narrow circumstances nationshave recourse to an extra-constitutional right of resistance; such was the casein the Glorious Revolution of

1688

, for instance.

74

When Kant answered Gentzin “Theory and Practice,” he used the same example to arrive at the oppositeconclusion:

If those uprisings by which ... Great Britain won its constitution ... had failed, thosewho read the history of them would see in the execution of their now celebrated authorsnothing but the deserved punishment of great political criminals ... The people didwrong in the highest degree by seeking their rights in this way; for this way of doing it(adopted as a maxim) would make every rightful constitution insecure and introduce acondition of complete lawlessness (

status naturalis

), in which all rights cease . .. to haveeffect.

7571


277

.

72

Kant had been making this argument consistently since the mid-

1780

s against the naturallaw resistance theory of Gottfried Achenwall: see


,

27

:

1319

–

94

. For an interpretation of Kant’s politics that places central emphasis on it see Jeremy Waldron, “Kant’s Legal Positivism,”

Harvard Law Review

,

109

(

1996

),

1535

–

66

.

73


299

.

74

SeeGentz,“ÜberdieMoralitätindenStaatsrevolutionen,”inGentz,

GesammelteSchriften

,

6

:

74

–

100

.

75


301

.



56

jonathan green

Gentz’s suggestion that in certain circumstances revolution might be a moral,even wise, course of action was therefore confused.

In the constitution of Great Britain—where the people carry on about their constitutionas if it were the model for the whole world—we nevertheless find that it is quite silentabout the authorization belonging to the people in case the monarch should transgressthe contract of

1688

...

The reason for this silence was obvious. “That a constitution should contain alaw for such a case authorizing the overthrow of the existing constitution .. . isan obvious contradiction.”

76

For Kant, then, the Revolutionaries’ problem was not that they were impru-dent; rather, like the engineers in his metaphor, they had “not enough theory.”They had strayed past the limits of reason, presuming a right to overthrow theirgovernmentthattheydidnot,infact,possess.Thisfundamentaltheoreticalerrorledthemtoembracethesamepoliticalparadigmastheir

AncienRégime

nemeses:

Thecauseoftheiractionsis,inpart,thecommonmistake . .. ofsubstitutingtheprincipleof happiness for [the principle of right] in their judgments .. . Here it is obvious whatevil the principle of happiness .. . gives rise to in the right of a state, just as it does inmorals, despite the best intentions of those who teach it. The sovereign wants to make thepeople happy in accordance with his concept and becomes a despot; the people are notwilling to give up their universal human claim to their own happiness and become rebels.Had it first been asked what is laid down as right (where principles stand firm a prioriand no empiricist can bungle them), then the idea of the social contract would remain inits incontestable authority .. . as a rational principle for appraising any public rightfulconstitution.

77

For Kant, the Revolutionaries’ occasional missteps did not prove reason’sinadequacy; instead, they illustrated the terrible results that follow when itssovereigntyisignored.Andifwhatistrueintheoryisnecessarilytrueinpractice,prudence need not be brought into account.

iv

When Gentz encountered “Theory and Practice” in the

Monatsschrift

, hemust have felt dejected. The strident rationalism that Kant used to evaluate theRevolution must have seemed wholly separate from the moderate, reformistvision of Enlightenment that he defended in the

1780

s. Why, he wondered,would Kant reject the prudentialist agenda for political progress outlined inhis

Reflections

? Gentz reasoned that Kant must have misread his argument, and

76

Ibid.,

303

.

77

Ibid.,

285

,

301

–

2

.




57

decidedtorestateitina“ResponsetoHerrProf.Kant’sReasoningontheRelationbetween Theory and Practice,” which he submitted to the

Monatsschrift

in late

1793

.

78

Prudence,hehopedtoshow,didnotthreatentheauthorityofpurereasonbut was consonant with, and indeed presupposed by, Kant’s normative theory of justice.Gentz began his article by distancing himself from the anti-theoreticalscepticism of Rehberg and his allies:

If the saying “that may be true in theory but does not apply in practice” is intended tomean that something could be true in theory but nevertheless false in practice, then it isa thoroughly wrongheaded notion and deserves the full severity with which Prof. Kant,in his noteworthy and profound essay on the subject, reveals its emptiness.—Sometimes,however, it only means “that may be true in theory but is not sufficient [

zureichend

] forpractice” .. . Purelogicandwell-constitutedreasonarguethatwhathasbeenprovenandestablished in theory cannot be overturned in practice. But there is another, much morecomplicated, interesting and fruitful question to be asked. At what point does practicecease to be a mere echo of theory? At what point does it earn the right to speak for itself,and indeed for theory as well?

79

Kant had shown that philosophical reason was necessary for politics. But hadhe proven that it was sufficient? As Gentz observed, the argument of “Theory and Practice” was ambiguous. Sometimes Kant objected to the strong claim thatwhatistrueintheoryis“invalid”(

ung¨ ultig

)inpractice.Butelsewhereheseemedconcerned to refute the more limited claim that what is true in theory is “notsuited” (

taugt nicht

) for practice.

80

These statements are not equivalent. WhileGentzwasunwillingtodefendtheformer,hethoughtthatthelatterwasplausibleand deserved further consideration.“Atfirstglance,”heexplained,“onemightbetemptedtothinkthatalltheoriesthat are grounded rationally upon a priori principles must be counted amongthose that are sufficient in and of themselves.”

81

But further examination provesthat this is not the case. In the sphere of interpersonal moral duties—or whatGentz called “relations of pure obligation” (

bloßen Pflichtbegriff

)—pure reasonis wholly sufficient. Neither historical knowledge nor situational prudence isneeded in order to recognize and follow the demands of morality. But mattersare essentially different in politics: the relation between the sovereign and hissubjects is not one of reciprocal moral obligations. “What is essential about the

78

Friedrich Gentz, “Nachtrag zu den R äsonnement des Herrn Professor Kant über dasVerhältniszwischenTheorieundPraxis,”


,

22

(Dec.

1793

),

518

–

54

;repr. in Gentz,


,

7

:

35

–

72

.

79

Gentz, “Nachtrag,” in Gentz,


,

35

–

6

.

80


273

.

81



,

37

.



58

jonathan green

civilcondition ... isthatitsecurestherightsofmenthroughcompulsorypubliclaws.”

82

As Kant’s own critique of the Revolution showed, the rights of mancannot be made effective in an anarchic state of nature. If they are to be realizedin practice, there must exist stable, well-ordered governments that can compelsubjectstorespecttheirneighbours’rights.YetasGentzpointedout,purereasonis not able to explain how constitutions should be organized, how sovereignpower is best wielded, or how state stability can be best preserved. In order toenact the rights of man in practice, statesmen need an empirical account of how order is constructed and maintained. In a Europe littered with failed and failingstates, simply decrying rebellion was not enough.Gentz was prepared to meet Kant halfway. In his rendering of Burke’s

Reflections

,hedepictedprudenceasapracticalvirtuelearnedthroughhabituationand historical observation. But if, as Kant suggested, this sort of Aristotelian judgement could not span the gap between theory and practice, then perhapsprudence might be reconceived as a series of generalizable maxims, gleanedfrom empirical observation, that explain how state order is best maintained.Returning to Kant’s ballistics metaphor, Gentz explained that just as “a puretheory of mathematics cannot be made practicable unless it is augmented witha second, derivative theory formed by observing the resistance that projectilesencounter as they pass through air,” so, too, Kant’s normative theory of rightmust to be paired with a practical account of politics, or what Gentz called his“new empirical theory.”

83

Just as scientific experiments cannot bring the lawsof mathematics into question, Gentz was quick to insist that empirical maximsabouthowtopreservestateordercannotunderminereason’sdictates.Rather,his“empirical theory” aimed to secure the necessary conditions for the enactmentof Kantian principles:

Inordertocreateajustconstitution,anunderstandingoftherightsofmanisindispensable,but merely preliminary. If the statesman is to uncover a way to realize these rights, hemust go beyond his theory. The best-developed system of rights will always remain only a noble ideal without the practical substance [

Stoff

] that experience alone ... offers. Inevery just constitution, sovereignty must be vested somewhere. Where should this powerbe located? How should it be wielded? What are its limits? How should it be safeguarded?To these exceedingly important questions, a pure theory of right can offer no answers.An understanding of men, of individuals and groups; a knowledge of human abilities,inclinations, passions, and weaknesses; prolonged observation; a comparison of man’smany climates and circumstances; investigation of his social relations; a prolonged seriesof trial and error—only these can provide answers.

8482

Ibid.,

36

,

43

.

83

Ibid.,

57

.

84

Ibid.,

56

.




59

If reason furnishes the ends of politics, experience teaches its means. Because“Theory and Practice” offered only an ideal account of justice, Kant hadignored essential questions about how to reconcile order and liberty. “If heonly meant to establish the principles upon which rational constitutions mustbe founded, this oversight would be unproblematic,” Gentz wrote. “But it iscurious that Kant neglected [the lessons of experience] in an essay on theory

and

practice.”

85

This oversight led Kant to misjudge the Revolutionaries, according to Gentz.Liberty, equality and independence are indeed foundational principles of thesocial contract. “But this contract is a mere norm, a guide for legislative reason,”not a practical plan for how to build a stable polity .

86

Just as projectiles do notfly through air at the speed predicted by physicists, the normative rights of mancannotbeenactedunconditionallywithoutcastingnationsintoastateofanarchy.But this is what Kant had recommended. “Theory and Practice” defined liberty,for instance, as the antithesis of paternalism. But while a nation undergoes theslowprocessofEnlightenment,isnotawell-intentionedpaternalisticregimevitalfor the orderly expansion of subjects’ rights? Indeed, was this not Frederick theGreat’s central achievement? Similarly, Kant argued that since all men must beequal before the law, feudal honours and privileges must be abolished. But look to the example of modern Britain, Gentz countered. Here, in the most liberalnation in Europe, a virtuous nobility was necessary for maintaining public orderand keeping royal authority in check. If the relation between a sovereign andhis subjects was rightfully unequal (as Kant admitted), why could the sovereignnot delegate his authority to the vassals and allies who helped him uphold thepeace?Wasthisnottherationalebehindaristocracies?ThoughGentzposedthesequestions rhetorically, his point was clear. Theories of justice are meaningless ina pre-political state of anarchy. To ignore the empirical question of order, then,is to consign philosophy to irrelevance.Asiftodescribewhat,exactly,hisempiricalpoliticalapproachentailed,Gentzspent the next two years compiling an in-depth account of the rise and fall of theRevolution. He centred his efforts on two French sources, which he translatedandannotatedforhisGermanreaders—JeanJosephMounier’s

Investigationsinto the Causes which Prevented the French from Becoming Free

,and JacquesMalletduPan’s

Considerations on the Nature of the Revolution in France

.

87

Gentz admiredthese authors because, unlike his peers in Berlin—“a learned class which has

85

Ibid.,

57

–

8

, emphasis mine.

86

Ibid.,

54

–

5

.

87

Jacques Mallet du Pan,

Considérations sur la nature de la R´ evolution en France et sur les causes qui en prolongent la dur´ ee

(Brussels,

1793

); Jean Joseph Mounier,

Recherches sur les causes qui ont empêché les Fran¸cais de devenir libres

(Geneva,

1792

).



60

jonathan green

remained loyal to the Revolution from a position of order, comfort and peace,and which longs for the success of a movement that has decimated the moralprogress of the past three centuries”—Mounier and Mallet du Pan witnessedthe Revolution first-hand, and rooted their “non-partisan” judgements in anempirical grasp of its course rather than in an ideal vision of its promise.

88

LikeGentz, both men were moderates who initially cheered the Revolution—MalletduPanaseditorofthereformist

MercureduFrance

,andMounierasthedeputyof the

monarchien

factionwithinthe

tiers´ etat

.ButwhentheRevolutionfellunderthecontrol of radical democrats in late

1789

, they were forced to flee. While in exile,MalletduPanandMounierpublishedtheiranalysesoftheRevolution,seekingtoexplainhowamovementthatbeganwithsuchpromisecouldhaveendedinsuchdisaster.As Gentz translated their histories of the Revolution, he underscored theirlessonsincommentsscatteredthroughouthistranslations.Broadly,heidentifiedthree precepts that all prudent statesmen will heed. First, simple forms of government are intrinsically unstable and inevitably devolve into chaos. Thiswas the case, according to Gentz, in Louis XVI’s regime and the Revolutionary government that succeeded it. As the “enlightened” Montesquieu knew, only a“mixed constitution” (

Staatsverfassung des Gleichgewichts

) can effectively check the destabilizing effects of concentrated power and guarantee a durable liberty .

89

Second, Gentz observed that if subjects have a duty to obey their sovereigns,then rulers must have an equal duty to prevent revolutionary turmoil by addressing their subjects’ legitimate concerns. With Mallet du Pan, he faultedthe intransigence of Louis XVI for exacerbating the Revolutionary crisis. Insteadof negotiating a moderate settlement with the

tiers ´ etat

, the king and his alliessimply ignored “the character of the age” and “pored over old adages.”

90

Finally,MounierandMalletduPan’sanalysesillustratedhowill-preparedforrepublicanself-government the French people were in

1789

. Whereas prudence demandsgradualreform,theRevolutionariesdemandedradicallibertiesthatwereentirely incommensurate with their compatriots’ moral development. “Reason, wisdomand virtue always follow a middle path, but foolishness and wickedness callfrom beyond this middle path, towards an unhappy alternative.”

91

Because theRevolutionaries hoped to condense the slow process of Enlightenment into a

88

Friedrich Gentz,

Mallet du Pan ¨ uber die franz¨ osische Revolution

, in Gentz,


,

6

:

267

,

284

.

89

Gentz,

Mouniers Entwicklung

,

2

:

9

.

90

Mallet du Pan,

Considérations

,

14

–

15

; cf. Gentz

, Mallet du Pan ¨ uber die franz¨ osische Revolution

,

54

–

6

,

166

.

91

Gentz,

Mallet du Pan ¨ uber die franz¨ osische Revolution

,

272

.




61

single instant, their principles became self-defeating. As Mallet du Pan put it,“the Revolution, like Saturn, devoured its own children.”

92

Withhisessayinthe

Monatsschrift

andhistranslationsofMounierandMalletduPan,GentzhopedtovindicatethereformistvisionofEnlightenmentthatKanthaddefendedinthe

1780

s.Wisepoliticalleadership;awell-balancedconstitution;a moral, self-governing people—these, Gentz insisted, are prerequisites forimplementing the rights of man in practice. Throughout the mid-

1790

s, reportsfromabroadseemedtoprovehispoint.InParis,thetollofguillotined

ennemisdu peuple

continued to rise, while across Europe Revolutionary

armées du libération

wrought havoc upon France’s neighbors. The Revolutionaries’ conquest of theNetherlands in early

1795

intimidated the Prussian government, and prompted itto agree to an armistice with France at the Peace of Basel in April. Kant saw thisentente as a chance to clarify his stance on the Revolution, and responded to hiscritics in a tract entitled

Perpetual Peace

. As in “Theory and Practice,” Kant didnotexplicitlyciteGentzashisinterlocutorinthisessay,butthesurvivingevidenceindicatesthatGentzwasamonghischieftargets.ItiscertainthatKantreadGentz’s“Response to Herr Prof. Kant,” which the editor of the

Monatsschrift

mailedhim in

1794

.

93

Just as “Theory and Practice” contained an allusion to Gentz’stranslation of the

Reflections

, Kant placed a conspicuous reference to Mallet duPan’s

Considérations

in

Perpetual Peace

.

94

Perhaps most tellingly, however, hededicated a substantial portion of his essay to the relation between philosophicalreason and political prudence. Throughout the

1790

s, none of his interlocutorsmade this relation more central to their political thought than Gentz.

95

In

Perpetual Peace

, Kant reiterated his support for the revolutionaries’principles—“a constitution based upon the principle of the freedom of themembersofasociety ... theircommondependenceuponasharedlegalauthority ... and their mutual equality [is] the only constitution that proceeds from thepure idea of the original contract”—and applauded their attempt to craft arational constitution for their nation.

96

But his essay also made an importantconcession to Gentz. In

1793

, Kant had rejected Gentz’s case for a union of purereason and prudential statecraftasself-contradictory.Butin theaftermathof theTerror, he was prepared to admit the possibility of a “moral politician ... whotakes the principles of political prudence in such a way that they can coexist withmorals.” With clear reference to the Revolutionaries, he voiced concern about“despotizingmoralists”whoseprinciplesarejustbut“whooffendinvariousways

92

Mallet du Pan,

Consid´ erations

,

63

.

93

See Johann Biester to Kant,

4

March

1794

, in


,

9

:

490

–

92

.

94

See Kant,

Zum ewigen Frieden

,

353

; for discussion see below.

95

For Kant’s other interlocutors see Maliks,

Kant’s Politics, passim

.

96

Kant,

Zum ewigen Frieden

,

349

–

50

, translation mine.



62

jonathan green

against political prudence.”

97

These passages mark the first positive references toprudence (

Klugheit

) in Kant’s corpus. With Gentz, he was now willing to admitthat since “severing the bond of civil ... union even before a better constitutionis ready to take its place is contrary to all political prudence,” statesmen must beallowed to wait to reform their nation’s constitution “until the people [is] fit tolegislate for itself.”

98

It is rational, in other words, to act prudently.Kant contrasted the idea of a “moral politician” with the image of a “politicalmoralist who frames morals to suit the statesman’s advantage” and who invokes“sophisticalmaxims”toelidehismoralduties.

99

Thisdistinctionreflectedalmostverbatim a passage from Gentz’s article in the

Monatsschrift

. Here, Gentz haddecried “empirical charlatans” who appeal to prudence to excuse injustice. “Noconstitution,” he wrote, “can contradict [Kant’s] theory of politics, which iswholly rooted in the concept of duty”:

The statesman who renounces this theory . .. is not only a despicable politician, butalso consigns himself to grasp eternally at unstable, superficial and elusive precepts of governance, since he has foolishly abandoned the one idea that can offer him safety on hisdangerous path.

100

Kant and Gentz agreed, in other words, that if the purpose of the state is theprotection of its subjects’ rights, the exigencies of political prudence cannotoverride the normative demands of reason: the state must be preserved

so that

subjects’ rights can be upheld. But how, exactly, were the dictates of prudence tobe determined? On this question, Gentz and Kant diverged. For Gentz, prudencedemandsahistoricalunderstandingofhow,inpractice,politicalorderfunctions.Thelessonsthatsuchhistoricalstudygenerateswill,inturn,dictatetheconditionsunder which the normative rights of men can be enacted: a nation’s constitutionmust be well balanced, its people must be morally responsible, the transition tolibertymustbegradual,andsoon.ForGentz,inotherwords,purereasonrequiresan empirical,

external

check on its normative, totalizing demands in order to bemade practicable. Blindly following reason’s dictates will only undermine thestate and lead to anarchy.AsKantmadeclearin

PerpetualPeace

,thiswasavisionofreasonthathewouldnot endorse. “Morality is ... a sum of laws commanding unconditionally ...how we ought to act. It would be absurd to grant this concept of duty its rightfulauthority, but then claim that we cannot fulfil it. That would remove the concept

97

Ibid.,

373

.

98

Ibid.,

372

.

99

Ibid.,

372

,

374

.

100



,

53

.




63

of duty from morality altogether.”

101

What role, then, did Kant afford prudencein his political thought? As in “Theory and Practice,” he sidestepped Gentz’shistoricism by arguing that the basic lessons of prudence are not derived fromexperience, but are accessible to all rational agents a priori. Embedded in thestructure of moral reason, he explained, there exist “permissive laws of reason”that “allow a situation of public right afflicted with injustice to continue untileverything has either ... become ripe for a complete overthrow or has beenmade almost ripe by peaceful means.” Is it not obvious, he argued, that “someform of a rightful constitution ... is better than no constitution at all, which istheinevitableresultofprematurereforms?”

102

ThoughKantsaidlittleabouthow statesmen should distinguish between “mature” and “premature” conditions forreform, he was confident that recognizing this difference did not require thecomprehensivehistoricalstudythatGentzdemanded.Moderation,forKant,wasrooted in a conceptual grasp of the demands of reason. “Political wisdom urgesitself upon us of its own accord, so to speak, is clear to everyone, and puts allartifices to shame,” he wrote; “moreover it leads straight to the end, but withthe reminder of prudence not to draw toward it precipitately by force but toapproach it steadily as favourable circumstances arise.”

103

Unlike Gentz, Kantsaw prudence as a principle

internal

to reason, not one that needed to be foistedupon it from outside. This gave him a convenient rationalization of the Terror:if Robespierre and the Jacobins had been acting rationally, the republicanizationprocess in France would have been considerably more moderate and judicious.ThisfaithintheinherentmoderationofreasonhelpsexplainKant’sdismissivestance toward Gentz’s version of Mallet du Pan’s

Considérations

. In this work,Gentzhadexpendedconsiderableefforttoshowthatstateordercanonlybetruly secured by wise rulers who are sensitive to their subjects’ needs. But in Kant’smind, this argument was self-evident a priori. Was it really necessary to observethe course of the Revolution, he asked sarcastically, to see that good states will beguided by good statesmen?

In his pompous but empty language, Mallet du Pan boasts of having at last, after many years of experience [

Erfahrung

], discovered the truth of Pope’s famous saying: “For formsofgovernmentletfoolscontest;whate’erisbestadministeredisbest.”Ifthismeansthatthebest-administered government is the best-administered, Mallet du Pan .. . has cracked anut that rewarded him with a worm. If he means that the best-administered governmentis also the best government—i.e., the best constitution—then it is entirely false . ..

104101

Kant,

Zum ewigen Frieden

,

370

, translation mine.

102

Ibid.,

374

, translation mine.

103

Ibid.,

378

.

104

Ibid.,

353

, translation mine.



64

jonathan green

At the same time, Kant’s attempt to sublimate prudence up into his rationalistpolitical vision helps explain his announcement, at the end of

Perpetual Peace

,thatthefinaltouchstoneofajustpoliticalpracticeistheadage“

fiatiustitia,pereat mundus

.”

105

Since the early nineteenth century, Kant’s detractors have cited thispassage as evidence of his idealistic, utopian and ultimately destructive approachto politics.

106

While there is a kernel of truth in this argument—Kant clearly intended this citation as a provocative statement of his political rationalism

—

inits original context, his intended meaning was less polemical than ironic. If statesmen are

truly

pursuing justice, Kant believed, the contingent world of politics will not, in fact, perish. Regressing into an anarchic state of naturecontradicts the most basic demands of reason. This meaning is clear from hisodd, non-literal translation of the Latin maxim: “let justice reign, even if allthe rogues [

Schelme

] in the world should perish.”

107

These rogues, and only these rogues, would perish, according to Kant, because prudence is intrinsicto a rational approach to politics. In order to realize the demands of justice inpractice, all that is necessary is fidelity to principle.

v

In one sense, Kant saw Enlightenment as a necessarily prudential process. Ata deeper level, however, his facile understanding of prudence ignored the thrustof Gentz’s critique. Gentz’s point was simple: Kant’s a priori account of rightpresupposedstateorder,butitofferedhimfewresourcesforexplaininghowsuchorder could be constructed and maintained in practice. In the happy years of Frederick the Great’s reign, this incongruity was inconspicuous. But in the early

1790

s, as Kant’s worries about the destabilizing potentialities of Enlightenmentwere vividly realized, the practical impotence of his theory became morepronounced. For Gentz, the very survival of Enlightenment depended on thepreservationofstateorder.Thismeantthatpoliticaltheoristsneededtoturntheirattentionawayfromabstractquestionsofright,towardstheempiricalconditionsfor political stability. Absent such a turn, the rights of man would remain at bestan empty ideal, and at worst a goad to further violence and suffering.

105

Ibid.,

378

.Kant’sslogandoesnothaveancientroots;Manlius’s

Loci Communes

(

1563

)citesit as the motto of the Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand I (r.

1558

–

64

), which seems thelikely antecedent for Kant’s usage.

106

See, for instance, Heinrich Heine,

Zur Geschichte der Religion und Philosophie in Deutschland

(

1835

), trans. Terry Pinkard as

Concerning the History of Religion and Philosophy in Germany

(Cambridge,

2007

),

79

.

107

Kant,

Zum ewigen Frieden

,

378

, translation mine. Kant had other reasons for trustingthat his principles would ultimately lead to a more just world; these include his rationaltheology, his belief in historical progress, and his account of the “unsocial sociability”inherent in human nature.


or



65

What Gentz perceived, in other words—and what made Kant’s endorsementof the Revolutionaries’ naive republicanism so disconcerting to him—wasthat Enlightenment is a process that is necessarily more complex than simply deducing, then enacting, a normative catalogue of rights. Such a moralizedpolitical practice will lead not to a just state, but to the injustice of a statelessanarchy. Political theorists, therefore, must balance the demands of justiceagainst the need for order. As Gentz put it in his “Response to Herr Prof. Kant,”

To combine a steadfast commitment to respect the sovereign’s authority, even if thispower should be found in the worst possible hands, with a diligent and steadfast zeal forthe improvement of one’s nation, a zeal that does not falter . .. even after unsuccessfulattempts at reform—this is the true character of enlightened patriots [

aufgekl¨ arten Patrioten

] in every nation, in every age, and in every stage of civilization.

108

In the wake of Kant and Gentz’s debate, the challenge of reconciling liberty and order came to occupy a central place in early nineteenth-century politicalthought. Even Fichte, perhaps Kant’s most radical student, would concedeby

1807

that while “the doctrine of the rights of man and liberty and naturalequality are the eternal and immutable foundation of all [just] social order,”a “mere grasp” of these principles hardly licenses a political theorist “to foundor administer a state.”

109

A century later, Weimar political theorists turned toGentz for an antidote to the excesses of liberalism in their own day. HannahArendt, for instance, admired him as an exponent of the conservative wingof the Prussian Enlightenment. Carl Schmitt’s

Political Romanticism

offereda similarly positive review of Gentz, painting him as a critic of both naive,idealized liberalism and effete, reactionary sentimentalism.

110

As both ArendtandSchmittrecognized,Gentz’svisionofaprudentialEnlightenmentamountedto an attempt to disentangle Kant’s political vision from the tainted legacy of the Revolution, and to overcome the gap between morality and politics that theTerror had so shockingly exposed. Yet sadly, this was a vision of Enlightenmentwhich, in the last analysis, Kant left Gentz to defend alone.

108



,

66

–

7

.

109

J. G. Fichte, “Über Machiavelli als Schriftsteller” (

1807

), in Fichte,

Gesamtausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften

,

42

vols. (Stuttgart and Bad Cannstatt,

1962

–

2012

),

9

:

245

. For Fichte’s own attempt to harmonize the principles of right withthe harsh realities of eighteenth-century power politics see Isaac Nakhimovsky,

The Closed Commercial State: Perpetual Peace and Commercial Society from Rousseau to Fichte

(Princeton,

2011

).

110

Hannah Arendt, “Friedrich von Gentz: Zu seinem

100

. Todestag am

9

. Juni,”

K¨ olnische Zeitung

,

8

June

1932

; repr. in Arendt,

Reflections on Literature and Culture

, ed. SusannahGottlieb (Stanford, CA,

2007

),

31

–

7

; Carl Schmitt,

Politische Romantik

(

1919

), trans. Guy Oakes (Cambridge, MA,

1986

).


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