IR Experts Give Trump’s Second Term Very Low Marks

Foreign-policy experts agree. Researchers from the Teaching, Research, and International Policy (TRIP) Project at the College of William & Mary’s Global Research Institute surveyed international relations (IR) scholars at U.S. colleges and universities on their views about Trump’s first 100 days. The results we report below are based on the responses of 726 experts surveyed between April 29 and May 8. (Read the full report to see the top-line results for all the questions.)

Respondents were overwhelmingly negative about Trump’s foreign-policy performance; these experts expressed that Trump’s foreign-policy choices have made the United States less secure, less respected abroad, and less able to achieve its goals on the global stage. Consequently, the IR experts concluded that the world will be less peaceful and less stable in the months and years ahead.

Assessing Trump’s Foreign Policy

Experts take a dim view of Trump’s overall foreign policy and the president’s performance on several issues. When asked how he had performed on foreign policy during his first 100 days, 95 percent of respondents said “poorly” or “very poorly.”

This finding marks a striking departure from the approval levels enjoyed by U.S. President Joe Biden during his first 100 days. When we asked the same question four years ago about Biden, just 5 percent of respondents said that the president had performed poorly or very poorly. At the same time, Trump’s performance appears to be in line with the low expectations that our respondents reported having for him in our preelection survey last year.

On specific foreign-policy issues, evaluations of Trump’s record are also overwhelmingly negative. More than 90 percent of respondents indicated that they somewhat disapprove or strongly disapprove of Trump’s handling of climate change, immigration, foreign aid, international trade, global human rights, and national security.

Importantly, IR scholars generally do not object to the foreign-policy tools that Trump has used; they disagree with the goals that he has pursued with those tools.

We asked the experts about the ethics of cutting off aid and implementing tariffs to pursue foreign-policy goals. Most were unwilling to agree that tariffs or economic sanctions are ethically acceptable when the goal is to boost the competitiveness of a country’s businesses abroad or to change the balance of trade with a target country.

In contrast, the IR experts viewed the same tools as acceptable when the goal is to restore a democratically elected government (68 percent in the case of aid and 72 percent in the case of tariffs or sanctions), punish a target government for violating a past commitment (61 percent for aid and 71 percent for trade or sanctions), or compel a target or recipient government to end an existing policy (55 percent for aid and 64 percent for tariffs or sanctions).

Eroding the U.S. Reputation

To IR experts, one of the chief results of the Trump administration’s foreign-policy choices is diminished respect for the United States in the world. Ninety-six percent of respondents believe that the United States is less respected today than in the past. Nonmaterial factors such as the United States’ global reputation might be tempting to dismiss in some circles, but roughly two-thirds of our respondents—and 57 percent of the American public—believe that such respect is “very important.”

IR scholars have long appreciated the role that reputation plays in international cooperation and conflict. A reputation for credibility built by honoring one’s commitments or following through on one’s threats is thought to make deals with other countries easier and less costly to secure.

We asked respondents about a variety of Trump’s headline moves: the imposition of high tariffs on many trading partners, large and sudden cuts to U.S. foreign aid programs, and withdrawal from the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Paris climate agreement. Across these issues, the IR experts were pessimistic about the consequences for both the United States and the world. Large majorities said that the withdrawals from both the WHO and the Paris Agreement would worsen global health outcomes and greenhouse gas emissions, respectively.

Such effects might be expected. Less appreciated among the public and some policymakers, however, might be the spillover effects that Trump’s brand of foreign policy has for U.S. national security and the country’s ability to achieve its other foreign-policy goals.

Not so among our respondents: In every case, majorities anticipated that Trump’s moves—tariffs, aid cuts, and withdrawal from the WHO and Paris Agreement—would somewhat or significantly worsen perceptions of the United States as a global leader, make the United States less able to achieve its foreign-policy goals, and—in the case of tariffs and aid cuts—harm U.S. national security.

It should not be surprising that IR scholars worry about how these policy choices will shape the country’s relations with long-term friends and allies. The vast majority of respondents said that they strongly disapprove of Trump’s handling of relations with Canada (95 percent), Greenland (93 percent), Panama (82 percent), Israel (67 percent), and NATO members (84 percent).

Of course, the reputational harm of Trump’s policy choices arises not only from violating commitments to other countries but also from violating commitments to individuals whom we have welcomed as guests. We asked respondents about how the Trump administration’s treatment of foreign nationals residing in or attempting to enter the United States legally would affect the country’s ability to attract future skilled and unskilled immigrants, international students, tourists, foreign investors, and major industry trade shows.

In all cases, a majority of respondents said that Trump’s treatment of foreign nationals who are legal residents or legally attempting to enter the United States would make the country a less attractive destination. Likewise, these experts anticipate a decline in demand for U.S. cultural exports. The soft power that the late Joseph Nye called a “force-multiplier” in world affairs—and that Washington relied upon to further its interests in the post-World War II era—is thus directly imperiled by Trump’s policy choices, according to the IR experts.

Conflict in Ukraine and Beyond

Trump has raised the eyebrows of NATO allies and drawn the ire of congressional Democrats with his treatment of Ukraine and his softening rhetoric and policy toward Russia. His decisions to limit aid to Ukraine and pursue a peace deal on terms more amenable to Russia have already had negative consequences for Ukraine, impacting both the battlefield and the security of its civilians.

We asked respondents how Trump’s handling of the Russia-Ukraine war would affect the United States’ reputation. The consensus was striking: Nearly 93 percent of the experts surveyed said that Trump’s Ukraine policy would worsen the U.S. reputation as a reliable security partner. Unsurprisingly, our respondents were overwhelmingly negative in their overall assessment of Trump’s handling of Russia’s war in Ukraine, with 93 percent saying they disapprove.

Large majorities also believed that Trump’s policy toward Ukraine and Russia would have implications for the behavior of other potential adversaries. When asked how the Trump administration’s handling of Ukraine would affect the probability that China would use military force against Taiwan, for instance, 64 percent said that Trump administration’s policy toward Ukraine would increase the odds of Chinese aggression.

It is ironic that Trump’s bad policy choices in the Ukraine-Russia war might be shaping experts’ views of the one area where they appear to be more open to Trump’s approach: conflict between China and Taiwan. A majority of scholars disapprove of the president’s handling of the conflict, but their displeasure does not rise to the level of concern about the Trump administration’s policies on other issues.

Just 28 percent of the surveyed IR experts said they “strongly” disapprove of Trump’s policy on China and Taiwan, and another 20 percent were willing to reserve judgment, saying that they did not know whether they approve or disapprove. This contrasts sharply with the overwhelming majority of respondents who said they “strongly disapprove” of Trump’s handling of the Russia-Ukraine war (around 80 percent) and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (around 76 percent). Similarly, less than 1 percent of respondents said that they “do not know” whether they approve or disapprove of U.S. policy toward these two conflicts.

Despite these concerns that Trump’s Ukraine policy might affect China’s approach to Taiwan, IR scholars still consider an invasion of Taiwan by China to be unlikely in the coming year. We divided respondents into two groups to ask whether China would use military force against Taiwan in the next year. When members of the first group were asked to make a forced choice (among “yes,” “no,” or “don’t know”), 59 percent said no.

Respondents in the second group were asked to make a prediction about the likelihood that China would invade Taiwan in the next year. On average, the IR experts in this group responded that there is a 30 percent chance that China will use military force against Taiwan. This prediction may not mean that war is imminent, but it is a very high probability of war relative to base rates of conflict among states. In the event that China uses direct military force against Taiwan, IR scholars favored significant U.S. support for Taiwan.

As worrisome as IR scholars find much of the Trump administration’s foreign policy, the specter that has always haunted analysts most is a major-power war. We asked respondents to indicate on a scale from 0 (definitely not) to 100 (definitely) how likely a war is between the United States and China or the United States and Russia over the next decade.

The mean prediction for a U.S.-China war was around 29, and with respect to Russia, the mean prediction was around 20. Notably, these predictions were higher for China (which was assessed at 24 in 2022) and lower for Russia (32 in 2022) than when we asked this question in our 2022 survey.

Despite the large and direct material effects of these policy choices to date, IR experts say that the greatest impacts may be felt over the long run as U.S. allies and adversaries alike revise their beliefs about Washington’s capability or willingness to honor its past, present, and future commitments to the rest of the world.