Beijing’s policy toward the Nicolás Maduro regime and its conflict with Georgetown is marked by ambiguity. Now, state-owned China Petroleum has expressed its interest to the Venezuelan regime in taking over Chevron’s operations in Venezuela.
This is a new chapter in Beijing’s longstanding acceptance of the South American autocrat, whose re-election on July 28, 2024, has been rejected even by governments that were once his allies.
Paradoxically, China also has an increasingly active presence in the exploitation of resources in neighboring Guyana, with which Venezuela has a long-standing dispute over the Essequibo region.
This conflict has been escalating to the point that the Guyanese Foreign Ministry issued a statement warning of Caracas’ plans to take military action in the disputed territory, which covers some 160,000 square kilometers. In April, the Maduro regime announced the appointment of an active military officer, Admiral Neil Villamizar Sánchez, to run for governor of Guayana Esequiba, a state created unilaterally through a law passed by the Venezuelan Parliament, dominated by the ruling party.
These decisions go against a recent ruling by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The court, which is settling the dispute over the Essequibo, ruled that Venezuela must refrain from taking any action on the disputed territory.
Beijing’s silence concerning Maduro’s actions in his claim to the Essequibo and the March incursion of a Venezuelan warship into Guyana’s exclusive economic zone has been interpreted as tacit support for the Venezuelan regime’s position.
In mid-April, Guyana rejected China’s suggestion of a friendly negotiation with Caracas to resolve the Essequibo dispute, stressing that the matter was before the ICJ. “Guyana will not engage in discussion of any matter that has been brought before the Court [ICJ],” the Guyanese Foreign Ministry said in a statement. China, it added, “needs to be principled in its position to respect Guyana’s territorial integrity, and not to appease Nicolás Maduro’s serial violations of international law.”
China is also involved in oil exploration in the disputed waters. State-owned China National Offshore Oil Corp. (CNOOC) has so far invested more than $54 billion in multiple exploration projects in the Stabroek maritime block.
As such, the Chinese Communist Party seemingly seeks to take full advantage of its relationship with Venezuela and Guyana by exploiting as many resources as possible on both sides of the border, even if this means strengthening the Maduro regime and its plans for war.
No democratic clause
How can Beijing’s attitude be explained? According to Milos Alcalay, former Venezuelan representative to the United Nations, China’s relations with Latin American countries are characterized by practicality.
“China’s presence in Latin America and the Caribbean is not ideological; it’s not based on political relations with one country or another, as might be the case with Russia or Iran. Rather, it is a relationship that allows them to penetrate the Third World,” Alcalay told Diálogo.
This general attitude, the diplomat said, forces China to give the appearance of maintaining the utmost discretion regarding the conflict over the Essequibo.
“China does not enter the realm of defending Western democracy or the principles of democracy and citizen participation. They recognize more of a state policy, and their version of state policy is to recognize whoever is in charge of the executive branch,” Alcalay said. “They are not part of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, they do not have the democratic clause that we have in MERCOSUR, they do not have a position in defense of elections as the United States or the European Union do. So, China’s relationship is with the state.”
For Venezuelan political scientist María Teresa Romero, the facts indicate that Chinese diplomacy toward Venezuela and Guyana is not governed by principles, but by interests.
In conversation with Diálogo, the expert in international relations indicated that Beijing’s attitude would remain unchanged until the ICJ issues a ruling on the dispute.
“China sees possibilities for the balance to tip one way or the other. That’s why they do not want to look bad to either Guyana or Venezuela, because they’re not sure; although most experts assume that the Court will rule in favor of Guyana,” Romero said. “But the Maduro dictatorship’s latest actions have gone against the Court’s requests, so China prefers to maintain that equidistance, that ambiguity, until the Court rules.”
For the Andrés Bello Foundation, a think tank dedicated to analyzing Sino-Latin American relations, China’s position is questionable. In a December 2024 report, the institution noted that despite China’s “non-intervention” policy in the Essequibo dispute, high-level bilateral visits between Beijing and Caracas increased throughout 2024, culminating in the visit to China in December and again more recently in April by nominal Vice President Delcy Rodríguez.
“This rapprochement can be interpreted as implicit support” for the Maduro regime, “an ambiguity that has sparked analysis and debate in various diplomatic circles,” the institution said.
