At the terminus of my span, I have had to sort through the detritus of my life and dispose of a myriad of papers collected over almost a century. Among numerous boxes, I discovered papers, many on Burma/Myanmar, I had long forgotten. One was a National League for Democracy (NLD) Enemies List. Carefully typed, it was titled “Enemies of the Burmese Revolution” and dated May 27, 2006. It was created with considerable care and research over some time, for it contained in alphabetical order 460 names of those the NLD considered enemies of the “Burmese Revolution.” Most of the names had titles, military units, and comments on their views. The vast majority of those included were military, but there were a large number of foreigners of varying nationalities. Since Steinberg comes close to the end of the alphabet, I was listed as number 320, with a note that I was opposed to the sanctions policy of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. That was accurate. I know not the degree of intensity against me, but I did not seem to suffer because of my inclusion.
The Tatmadaw (Myanmar’s military) over the years had its own, more virulent, enemies list, perhaps not compiled so assiduously in alphabetical order, but far more dangerous, as the lists were and are composed of thousands of political prisoners and others—as the campaign against the Rohingya indicates. The potential end of some such lists is genocide.
Myanmar is certainly not alone with enemies lists. Nazi Germany, Mussolini’s Italy, all the former communist countries of Eastern Europe, Russia, North Korea, South Korea in its dictatorial period, and China today all have or have had such lists. They are common, if not a hallmark, of dictatorial or autocratic regimes or institutions. Such lists are even more widespread. US President Nixon had an infamous enemies list, and used the mechanisms of the state to harass them. And the FBI has a truncated list—the ten most wanted criminals. The acidity between the two major US political parties implies that such lists, however informal and non-lethal, may well develop.
But beyond the suffering of those included is a broader issue. Enemies’ lists indicate patterns of enforced orthodoxy. They demonstrate a rigidity of doctrine, required credos, and an intolerance of diverse alternatives. Such regimes engender contradictory results. They may be extremely effective in quickly mobilizing the resources of such states, for there is little or no articulated opposition. In the longer term they suffer because the orthodoxy they impose prevents them from effectively responding to change. Leaders are surrounded by “yes men” who articulate existing doctrine, and the authorities have a greater tendency to believe their own propaganda, reinforcing orthodoxy. This is not an effective way to make policy.
Effective policy formulation requires dialogue and debate—the testing of differing hypotheses. It needs access to unbiased information and an inquiring mind. Teachers sometimes teach students to “think outside the box.” But regime rigidity precludes such efforts.
This rigidity prevents them from deftly responding to change. History demonstrates that change is ubiquitous and may be rapid, as in the era in which we live. The inability to adapt quickly severely limits such governments or organizations. And as Buddhist doctrine indicates, change is continuous, and impermanence is the nature of our world.
Myanmar is a sorry state of fiercely contending diverse forces, some of which have illustrated a tendency to create orthodoxies within their groups. The outcome, if there is one, of these conflicts is still unclear, no matter what the official orthodoxy and propaganda of any group may now proclaim. But if Myanmar is to come together and reunite as a union, then dialogue, rational debate, and consideration of alternative solutions are necessary. Myanmar history demonstrates that diverse orthodoxies have been prevalent and remain. If they persist, with the resultant equivalent of enemies lists that will emerge, they will hinder the development of the state and continue to deprive the people of safety and progress. So eschew orthodoxies. This is something to consider.
David I. Steinberg is distinguished professor of Asian studies emeritus, Georgetown University. He is 95 years old.
