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China United Staes

House passes $1.6 billion to deliver anti-China propaganda overseas

Somehow it’s a crime when Russia does it to us, but good 'information ops' when we want to discredit Beijing’s Belt & Road initiatives worldwide

Analysis | Asia-Pacific

Since at least 2016, foreign interference in American elections and civil society have become central to American political discourse. The issue is taken extremely seriously by the U.S. government, which has levied sanctions and called out foreign adversaries for sowing “discord and chaos” through their propaganda efforts.

But apparently Washington takes a different view when it comes to American propaganda operations in foreign countries. On Monday, the House passed HR 1157, the “Countering the PRC Malign Influence Fund,” by a bipartisan 351-36 majority. This legislation authorizes more than $1.6 billion for the State Department and USAID over the next five years to, among other purposes, subsidize media and civil society sources around the world that counter Chinese “malign influence” globally.

That’s a massive spend — about twice, for example, the annual operating expenditure of CNN. If passed into law it would also represent a large increase in federal spending on international influence operations. While it’s hard to total all of the spending on U.S. influence operations across agencies, the main coordinating body for U.S. information efforts, the State Department’s Global Engagement Center (GEC), has an annual budget of less than $100 million.

There is obviously no issue with the U.S. government presenting its own public view of what China is doing around the world, and doing so as forcefully as needed. But this bill goes beyond that by subsidizing “independent media and civil society” and other information operations in foreign countries. Indeed, this is already routine. The Global Engagement Center, which will likely play a strong role in implementing the bill, spends more than half its budget on such grants, and USAID, which will also play a lead role, makes grants to foreign media and civil society organizations a key part of its efforts. HR 1157 would supercharge these programs.

Crucially, HR 1157 doesn’t seem to contain any requirement that U.S. government financing to foreign media be made transparent to citizens of foreign countries (although there is a requirement to report grants to certain U.S. congressional committees). Thus, it’s possible that the program could in some cases be used to subsidize covert anti-Chinese messaging in a manner similar to the way Russia is accused of covertly funding anti-Ukrainian messaging by U.S. media influencers.

Such anti-Chinese messaging could cover a wide range of bread-and-butter political issues in foreign countries. The definition of “malign influence” in the bill is extremely broad. For example, program funds could support any effort to highlight the “negative impact” of Chinese economic and infrastructure investment in a foreign country. Or it could fund political messaging against Chinese contractors involved in building a port, road, or hospital, for example as part of Beijing’s globe-spanning Belt and Road Initiative.

Because some dimensions of U.S. information operations could be classified, it can be difficult to get a complete picture of the full range of what they look like on the ground. But a 2021 “vision document” on psychological operations and civil affairs from the First Special Forces Command at Fort Bragg gives a fascinating glimpse.

The document provides a case study (or “competition vignette”) of what an integrated effort to counter Chinese influence could look like in the fictional African country of Naruvu. In the vignette, members of a Special Forces Civil Affairs team spot a billboard with a picture of a port and Chinese characters. Quickly determining that the Chinese are investing in a new deep-water port in Naruvu, the 8th Psyop Group at Fort Bragg’s Information Warfare Center (IWC) works with local and U.S. government partners to immediately develop an influence campaign to “discredit Chinese activities.”

The influence campaign “empowered IWTF [Information Warfare Task Force], in coordination with the JIIM [local and U.S. government partners] to inflame long-standing friction between Naruvian workers and Chinese corporations. Within days, protests supported by the CFT’s ODA [Special Forces Operations Detachment Alpha], erupted around Chinese business headquarters and their embassy in Ajuba. Simultaneously, the IWC-led social media campaign illuminated the controversy.”

Faced with a combined propaganda campaign and intense labor unrest, the Chinese company is forced to back down from its planned port. (Although the vignette continues to an even more Hollywood-ready ending in which U.S. special forces break into the construction company’s offices, confiscate blueprints for the port, and discover that it is actually a Chinese plot to emplace long-range missiles in Naruvu to threaten U.S. Atlantic shipping).

This case study illustrates the extremes information warfare could reach. But of course it is fictional, and most operations funded to counter Chinese influence will be far more mundane and less cinematic. Indeed, some will probably look similar to the activities the U.S. government has bitterly condemned when foreign governments financed them in the U.S. civil society space, such as making social media buys or funding organizations sympathetic to Washington’s perspective.

But it’s still worth thinking about the consequences of such efforts. They are of course likely to make U.S. protests against similar foreign government activities look hypocritical. Beyond that, pumping a flood of potentially undisclosed U.S. government money into anti-Chinese messaging worldwide could backfire by making any organic opposition to Chinese influence appear to be covertly funded U.S. government propaganda rather than genuine expressions of local concern.

As the publics in many nations are likely to be suspicious of U.S. as well as Chinese involvement in their internal affairs, this could easily discredit genuine grassroots opposition to Chinese influence. A historical example is Washington’s funding of Russian civil society groups that criticized the integrity of Russia’s 2011 parliamentary elections. This backfired by allowing Putin to depict the opposition as tools in a U.S. plot and resulted in sharp restrictions on U.S. activity in Russia, including the expulsion of USAID.

Another problem raised by the proposed legislation is the possibility that anti-Chinese propaganda financed by this program will flow back into the American media space and influence American audiences, without any disclosure of its initial source of funding. Protections against U.S. government targeting of domestic audiences are already weak, and what protections do exist are almost impossible to enforce in a networked world where information in other countries is just a click away from U.S. audiences.

It’s easy to imagine U.S.-funded foreign media being used as evidence in domestic debates about China’s international role, or even to attack U.S. voices that advocate for a different view of China that is propagated by a hawkish U.S. government. During the Trump presidency, the State Department’s Global Engagement Center (GEC), a likely recipient of many of these funds, supported attacks on U.S. critics of Trump’s Iran policy. More recently, congressional conservatives have claimed the GEC has advocated for censorship of conservative voices who disagree with Biden’s foreign policies.

The overwhelming bipartisan majority for HR 1157 is a snapshot of a culture in Washington that seems not to see the risk to U.S. values and interests when we engage in the same covert activities that we criticize in other countries.


TSViPhoto via shutterstock.com

Analysis | Asia-Pacific
Merz Macron Starmer Zelensky
Top image credit: German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, French President Emmanuel Macron, Ukranian President Voloydmyr Zelensky, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk walk in the grounds of the Mariynsky Palace, in Kyiv, Ukraine, May 10, 2025. Ludovic Marin/Pool via REUTERS/File Photo

Europe's sticks are a little limp

Europe

As the Istanbul peace talks get underway, Europe’s response to the Russia-Ukraine war exposes its profound weakness and reliance on U.S. support, with leaders like France’s Emmanuel Macron, Britain’s Keir Starmer, and Germany’s Friedrich Merz resorting to bluffs that lack substance.

The European trio, after visiting Kyiv and meeting with the Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on May 10, issued Russia a 30-day ceasefire ultimatum to begin on May 12, threatening severe sanctions in case of Moscow’s non-compliance. Russian President Vladimir Putin dismissed it, offering talks in Istanbul without a truce instead, in line with Russia’s insistence that the “root causes” of the conflict be addressed, including Ukraine’s potential NATO membership.

Kyiv and its European allies insisted that a ceasefire should precede talks. However, U.S. President Donald Trump’s call for immediate negotiations, sidestepping the ceasefire, upended their strategy and forced Zelenskyy’s attendance. Europe has exposed itself as being increasingly irrelevant, its strategies crumbling without American backing.

Zelenskyy plans to attend the talks in Istanbul aiming to appear peace-seeking and avoid being blamed by Trump for the failure to use the chance to end the war. Putin, for his part, scoffed at the threat of new sanctions, declaring, in reference to the Europeans: “They harm themselves with these moves, but they do it anyway, the fools.”

However, Moscow is also reluctant to alienate Trump and provoke an end of its nascent dialogue with Washington. So, while Putin will not attend the talks, he will send his aide Vladimir Medinsky who already was the head of the Russian delegation at the Istanbul talks in Spring 2022, where both sides reached a draft agreement. This signals Moscow’s determination to resume talks based on the same parameters as in 2022: Ukraine’s neutral status, security guarantees from all five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council (U.S., UK, France, Russia, and China) and reduction of Ukraine’s armed forces.

The question now is whether Zelensky will accept to negotiate with Medinsky, or will send his own aides, such as his foreign minister or the head of the presidential administration. Either way, it would only further expose Europe’s inability to steer the process.

Regardless of Kyiv’s decision, the EU’s 17th sanctions package, approved on May, exemplifies this lack of leverage. Including a ban on chemical exports for weapons, visa bans and asset freezes for Russian officials, trade restrictions on companies evading sanctions, and measures against nearly 200 oil tankers in Russia’s “shadow fleet,” the package was deemed so weak that Hungary and Slovakia — who long advocated for negotiations with Moscow to end the war — didn’t bother blocking it. Sweden and Finland noted parliamentary approval is needed, but no delays are expected.

EU diplomats admit that “massive” sanctions of the sort threatened by Macron or escalatory steps like sending German Taurus missiles to Ukraine lack credibility without U.S. support and would take too long to implement, allowing Moscow to dismiss them as a bluff. With gas phase-outs delayed until 2027 and internal divisions — Hungary’s and Slovakia’s resistance chief among them — Europe’s economic leverage seems even less convincing.

Macron’s posturing further underscores this weakness. He admitted France has exhausted its aid to Ukraine and cannot escalate support. He noted that frozen Russian assets cannot be confiscated due to legal barriers, warning that Moscow could reclaim them if sanctions falter — a damning admission of Europe’s fragility.

His proposal to deploy European troops in Ukraine, framed as an alternative to NATO membership, is another empty gesture. “We cannot leave Ukraine alone. Since it will not join NATO, we offer alternative guarantees,” Macron claimed, suggesting troops be placed in “strategically important points” away from the front for joint operations to create a “deterrence effect.”

Yet, he confirmed no combat role, and Russia’s repeated opposition to Western troops renders the idea toothless. Macron and Starmer concede the plan hinges on Kyiv-Moscow agreements, admitting its speculative nature. Starmer, echoing Macron’s rhetoric, offers no concrete commitments, while Merz, Germany’s new chancellor, pushes for sanctions and aid but lacks the fiscal or political clout to act unilaterally. Their collective strategy — threatening Russia with sanctions or troops — collapses without U.S. muscle. It also diverts the focus from what should be a serious conversation on realistic, achievable security guarantees for Ukraine.

As the EU threatens sanctions if Russia rejects a ceasefire, Europe’s diluted measures and lack of coordination with Washington expose the bluff. Trump’s proximity to Istanbul during a Middle East visit could see him intervene if talks show promise, reinforcing his role as the decisive player. Without U.S.-driven terms or a U.S.-Russia deal, Europe’s calls for peace along current lines are futile, as neither Moscow nor Kyiv sees their respective positions as too weak to agree to unfavorable terms.

If the Istanbul talks lead to some sort of an agreement, it is Trump who’ll be in a position to claim credit as he insisted on the talks to take place in the first place. If the talks fail, Trump’s reaction — escalating arms deliveries to Ukraine, pressuring Kyiv, maintaining limited support, or disengaging — will impact the war’s trajectory.

Europe, shackled by weak sanctions, exhausted resources, hollow proposals, and stubborn refusal to talk to Moscow has no independent path.

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The desperation of Gaza famine denialism
Top photo credit: Dislocated Palestinians wait in line with pots in their hands to receive relief meals from a charity kitchen in Gaza City, on May 3, 2025. (Photo by Majdi Fathi/NurPhoto)

The desperation of Gaza famine denialism

Middle East

As the risk of famine spreads across Gaza — and as shocking images of overcrowded soup lines stream from Gaza daily — an influential network of Israeli government defenders has emerged to tell you that none of this is happening at all.

The Free Press — a pro-Israel media outlet often sympathetic to the neoconservative worldview — published a highly circulated article last week from journalist Michael Ames titled, “The Gaza Famine Myth,” which purports to demonstrate that food security in Gaza has been far above the famine and crisis levels that international humanitarian organizations have observed since at least early 2024.

The Israeli blockade, which the Israeli government openly admits has restricted all aid from entering the strip since March 2, 2025, has once again pushed Gaza to the edge of famine, with U.N. reports warning of starvation levels far surpassing 2024’s severity.

But Israel and its supporters are downplaying the unanimous chorus of famine warnings from international monitors, alleging that accusations of an Israeli starvation campaign have been overstated, accusing journalists of systematically exaggerating the hunger crisis in Gaza.

“The Gaza Famine Myth” focuses on a single statement from President Biden’s USAID Administrator Samantha Power, who said in May 2024 that there was a famine in northern Gaza, based on data from the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC).

“There were serious problems with Power’s sensational testimony,” Ames writes. “Foremost among them: The IPC never declared a famine in Gaza.”

Ames argues that Power and USAID did not have authority to declare a famine in Gaza because only the IPC can only issue that declaration based on its data. But the IPC itself saysthat it “does not ‘declare Famine’ or issue ‘Famine declarations,” but rather facilitates the analysis that allows governments, international/regional organizations and humanitarian agencies to issue more prominent statements or declarations.”

But it wasn’t just USAID declaring famine. Cindy McCain, director of the World Food Program, which distributes aid and monitors food security in Gaza, said in May, 2024 that there was a “full-blown famine” in northern Gaza and that it was “moving its way south.”

And in July, 2024, as Israel began to allow slightly more aid into the strip — though nowhere near the pre-war levels which were already to put the Palestinians “on a diet” — a group of U.N. experts declared that famine had spread throughout Gaza.

Each of these separate opinions reaffirmed USAID’s rationale for declaring a famine in northern Gaza and yet Ames never mentions them.

Despite these other famine declarations by reputable sources, Ames instead focuses only on the USAID statements and claims the IPC’s governing authority, the Famine Review Committee (FRC), had actually “rebuked” its analysis.

But the FRC did not “rebuke” the USAID analysis. It merely said it could not endorse USAID’s conclusions because the FRC lacked the access necessary to gather “essential up to date data on human well-being in Gaza.”

As U.N. Humanitarian Coordinator Jamie McGoldrick said on April 11, 2024, only three roads into Gaza were technically open — none consistently — and all in “very poor condition.” Visiting Kamal Adwan Hospital, he said “every single patient” in the children’s ward faced “life-threatening hunger.”

Ames does not address what the FRC said about its access limitations and instead claims the FRC report definitively debunks USAID’s famine statement — he points to a passage within the FRC report that criticizes USAID for discounting U.N. donations to bakeries and some private sector donations in its calculations of food insecurity to allege that, “north Gaza actually had 10 times more food last April than USAID had claimed,” and that “a famine had been averted.”

Ames derives his “10 times more food” claim by taking the highest end of the FRC’s estimate for bakery donations and private sector contributions during the month of April, 2024, a guess which the FRC discloses from the outset of the report it makes with limited evidence. But the idea that, through the exclusion of bakery donations and private sector contributions from its analysis, USAID had overestimated food insecurity in Gaza by such a wide margin is both intuitively implausible and directly contradicted by the reports of humanitarian organizations.

The World Food Program reported on April 19, 2024 that it had opened 3 bakeries in northern Gaza, “the only bakeries working in the north,” and “the first bakeries producing bread after more than 170 days.”

Oxfam reported in April based on IPC data that Palestinians in northern Gaza were “forced to survive on 245 calories a day.” WFP had documented how the Israeli blockade inflicted starvation conditions that approached famine levels in northern Gaza as early as January and February of that year.

Ames does not address any of this data. Instead, he suggests, mostly based on social media posts from an Israeli-British citizen who told Ames she is “not a journalist,” that Gaza is stocked with food.

There has been no evidence that any of these international humanitarian organizations exaggerated their food security data. Rather, there has been substantial evidence demonstrating that the number of Palestinians who have already died from starvation have been vastly undercounted.

Testimonies from healthcare professionals in Gaza support that conclusion. In October, a group of 99 American physicians, surgeons, nurses, and midwives who volunteered in the Gaza strip wrote an open letter to President Biden presenting even more evidence, using IPC data, that the human toll in Gaza was far higher than we understood.

“The scale of this starvation is not widely appreciated,” they wrote. “In total it is likely that 62,413 people have died of starvation and its complications in Gaza from October 7, 2023 to September 30, 2024. Most of these will have been young children.”

Ames’ apparent goal — to suggest that famine in Gaza has been oversold to the public — is directly at odds with the reports and opinions of independent humanitarian groups, their aid workers on the ground, healthcare providers, and starving Palestinians in Gaza.

Additionally, Ames’ article comes as international aid groups — and Israelis themselves — warn of impending catastrophe unless Israel’s more than two month-long total siege is lifted. On Tuesday, the New York Times reported that some Israeli military officials “have privately concluded that Palestinians in Gaza face widespread starvation unless aid deliveries are restored within weeks.”

Meanwhile, The U.N. declared that food stocks have already run out and that water access has become impossible. Last Thursday, Abdul Nasser Al-Ajrami, head of the Bakery Owners Association of Gaza, reported that “all bakeries have shut down due to a total lack of flour and fuel. Bread has run out completely, and half of Gaza’s homes have no flour left.”

The Free Press is determined to draw attention away from the human tragedy on the ground in Gaza by debating what is and what isn’t an officially declared famine. That is their right of course, but the rest of the world shouldn’t waste another minute on this nonsense when the real focus should be on saving civilian lives now.

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russia holds the cards
Top photo credit: okanakdeniz/shutterstock

Istanbul 2.0: Know when to hold 'em, know when to fold 'em

Europe

The biggest achievement of today’s Istanbul talks is that they are even taking place. U.S. engagement will remain vital to getting a peace deal over the line. Russia’s desire for a reset with Washingtonmay keep them on track.

I have a sense of déjà vu as I contemplate these long-overdue peace talks between Ukraine and Russia in Istanbul. In April 2022, Ukraine and Russia were close to agreeing a peace treaty, less than two months after war started. However, this came crashing down amid claims that western governments, in particular the United States and the United Kingdom encouraged Ukraine to keep fighting.

It’s worth recapping very briefly what was close to having been agreed. By far the best summary of negotiations between both sides was produced by the New York Times in June 2024. Those negotiations ranfor almost two months. The talks started with Ukrainian officials being spirited over the border into Belarus on February 29, 2022 while the fighting raged around Kyiv, and eventually led to the now famous talks in Istanbul in March and April.

What has changed since then?

Ukraine will enter the Istanbul talks in a weaker position than it held in 2022.

Western support for Ukraine financially and economically is not as sound as it was then. No big ticket economic aid and assistance has been made available since the G7 agreement of a $50 billion package of loans, in June 2024. While European states scratched together new economic aid to Ukraine in April, this cannot make up for the reduction in US support.

In territorial terms, Russia withdrew from Kyiv as a concession to the first Istanbul talks and lost ground in Kharkiv and in Kherson in late 2022. However, Russia has gone on steadily to gain further territory in the Donbas since the end of 2023. So while both sides have scores on the board, Russia now maintains the military upper hand on the battlefield and that seems unlikely to change. These two factors in particular were behind President Trump’s February assertion that Ukraine has no cards to play.

What has stayed the same?

NATO membership is still off the table

The verified documents shared by the New York Times last June confirmed that Ukraine’s neutrality and non-membership of NATO was the central issue agreed upon in 2022. Ukraine was ready to become a “permanently neutral state” that would never join NATO or allow foreign forces to be based on its soil.

There seems no route for Ukraine to resile from that given its currently weakened negotiating position and President Trump’s stated view that NATO membership for Ukraine is not practical. Although Germany’s new foreign Minister, Johann Wadephul recently repeated the line that Ukraine’s path to NATO is irreversible, most have agreed, privately and publicly, that Ukraine’s path to NATO is a fraught if not impossible one.

Right now, just having the talks is a huge breakthrough

The Istanbul talks would not be happening had the Trump administration not pushed for it so hard. We don’t need to rehash the “did they or didn’t they” debate around why Ukraine abandoned the Istanbul agreement in April 2022. What is clear, is that Ukraine became entrenched, not only in not negotiating with Russia, but in excluding Russia from all discussions on peace in Ukraine from then onward.

Having agreed in principle for Ukraine to accept neutral status Zelensky was soon pushing his own ten point peace plan. This included, among other things, Russia withdrawing its troops to the pre-2014 border, i.e. giving up Crimea and the Donbass and creating a Euro-Atlantic Security Architecture, by which he meant Ukraine joining NATO. Peace summits were organized in various countries that explicitly excluded Russia, culminating in the Switzerland event on June 15, 2024.

At this event, President Zelensky was dug in deeper on resisting any engagement with Russia until a full withdrawal of its troops from Ukraine, which was a completely unrealistic proposal. “Russia can start negotiations with us even tomorrow without waiting for anything – if they leave our legal territories,” he said.

Even after President Trump was elected, European leaders clung to the line that “only Ukraine can decide what peace means.”’ I see no circumstances in which a Kamala Harris presidency would have cajoled President Zelensky to enter into negotiations. The talks wouldn’t be happening unless the Trump administration broke a whole load of Ukrainian and European eggshells to get to this point.

The biggest issue now is territory

Even though he was wrongly derided at the time by mainstream media, Steve Witkoff correctly pointed out in his March interview with Tucker Carlson that the territorial issues in Ukraine will be most intractable. Russia’s decision in October 2022 to formally annex the four oblasts of Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk changed the calculus. However, Russia does not have full territorial control of any of those oblasts, which are cut through the middle by a hotly contested front line.

Resolving the line of control when the war ends is, by some margin, the most problematic challenge. This will be a hugely sensitive topic, and European allies will shoot down any major concessions to Russia, as they did when the idea surfaced that the U.S.might de jure recognise Russia’s occupation of Crimea.

The most obvious settlement is a de facto recognition of occupation, a Cyprus-style scenario, that does not stand in the way of Ukraine’s future membership of the European Union. Even that will require detailed agreement on issues around demilitarization of the line of control and enforcing any ceasefire.

Sanctions are probably tricky, but also tractable

As I have said before, there is enormous scope to a plan that allows for the immediate lifting of the bulk of zero-impact measures, phasing out the remainder at points agreed to by both sides. The toughest issue remains the $300 billion in frozen Russian assets, mostly held in Belgium. Russia has shown a willingness to concede this funding to support reconstruction in Ukraine, including those parts that Russia occupies.

But there is texture here. Freeing up those funds for reconstruction would immediately remove the source of interest payments that are meeting Ukraine’s obligations on its $50 billion in debt to the G7, agreed to in June 2024. But the more general policy question arises, how much of the freed up funding would be spent in Ukraine itself and how much in Russian-occupied Ukraine, where most of the war damage has occurred? The U.S. must keep the pressure on to ensure the talks stay on track.

A U.S. presence in Istanbul will be vital, to prevent, in particular, Ukraine from bailing on the talks. That’s why sending Steve Witkoff and Keith Kellogg makes sense. The former is trusted by the Russian side while the latter has built relationships in Ukraine. Their presence serves to keep the process moving forward until a deal can be pushed over the line and the fighting can stop.

Bear in mind that the 2022 talks ran for a month and a half and the circumstances have materially changed as I have indicated above. While there has been speculation that President Trump might drop into Istanbul, I am not sure that this is necessary if President Putin doesn’t himself attend. Knowing the Russians, I assess that Putin will want his own “‘meeting moment” with the U.S. President on terms that the Russian side can better choreograph. Indeed, that may be a prize for Russia’s engagement in the process, given its desire for a more comprehensive reset of relations with the U.S.

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Zelensky Putin
Top photo credit: Volodymyr Zelensky (Shutterstock/Pararazza) and Vladimir Putin (Shutterstock/miss.cabul)

Back to Istanbul! Key nodes for US-Russia-Ukraine talks

Europe

Direct talks between senior Ukrainian and Russian representatives, if they do take place in Istanbul on Thursday, will be a real step forward and a significant achievement by the Trump administration.

It is worth remembering that only three months ago the Ukrainian government was still rejecting even the idea of talks with the Putin administration as illegal, and demanding prior Russian withdrawal from all the occupied areas of Ukraine as a precondition for negotiations.

Putin’s apparent rejection of Zelensky’s challenge to a face to face meeting is a disappointment, but not a crucial setback. It is very rare for real progress in peace talks to be made in meetings between leaders themselves, and the Russians have some reason to see this as a maneuver, or stunt, by Zelensky to gain Trump’s favor rather than a serious proposal.

Normally, before leaders meet there have to be long and detailed negotiations by officials to lay the groundwork for agreement. Hopefully, the Istanbul meeting of officials proposed by Moscow will advance that process, whereas a public shouting-match between Putin and Zelensky could set it back.

The Ukrainian and European governments have stated that Moscow’s rejection of a 30-day ceasefire shows that “Putin is not interested in peace”, but this is disingenuous. Russia’s ability to advance — even if slowly — on the battlefield is Moscow’s main source of leverage in negotiations, and it is not going to give that up unless substantial agreement has already been reached.

Nor, and for the same reason, were Western countries ever going to agree to Russia’s demand for a complete and permanent end to military supplies to Ukraine as the precondition of a ceasefire. We have to accept that while the talks continue, so will the fighting. That should be a spur to efforts to move as quickly as possible to a comprehensive settlement.

And a comprehensive settlement is what we should be aiming at. Even if Russia could be brought to agree to a long-term ceasefire, absent a settlement, such a ceasefire would resemble that in the Donbas from 2014-22: deeply unstable, constantly interrupted by clashes and exchanges of fire, and at permanent risk of collapsing back into full scale war.

This situation would make Ukraine’s economic development and progress towards the European Union virtually impossible, both because it would prevent Western investment and because it would mean that Ukraine remains a highly militarized and semi-authoritarian society permanently mobilized for war.

It would also make it far more difficult for the U.S. to reduce its military presence in Europe so as to concentrate resources elsewhere - which is indeed probably a key motive for the European approach.

Trump’s threat to “walk away” from the peace process has succeeded in bringing both sides to the negotiating table, but they agreed only so as to avoid being blamed by him for refusal. On key issues, the Russian and Ukrainian positions remain quite far apart, and it will be a miracle if one round of direct talks in Istanbul is able to bring them together. Continued U.S. engagement in the peace process therefore seems essential.

For Washington’s involvement to be effective, it will have to set out concrete and detailed conditions for agreement and bring both pressure and incentives to bear on both sides to accept them. A U.S. incentive to the Ukrainian side has already been established in the form of the the minerals deal and its promise that long-term American economic engagement in Ukraine will also ensure Washignton’s interest in maintaining Ukrainian security.

For Russia, the Trump administration has a huge potential incentive in the form of a new U.S.-Russian relationship, and an end to Washington pressure on what the Russians see as their vital interests.

Some of the elements of an agreement between Ukraine and Russia were laid down at the talks in Istanbul in March 2022, and are still applicable. Conditions meeting the vital interests of both sides, and on which the U.S. could help them to agree, include the following: that the ceasefire line runs where the battle line eventually runs, and neither side can be asked to withdraw further; that both sides should promise not to try to change the ceasefire line through force, subversion or economic pressure; that the issue or the legal status of the occupied territory should be left for future negotiation and that NATO membership for Ukraine should be excluded, but that Ukraine should be guaranteed the right to seek membership of the EU.

Conditions also included that no NATO troops should be deployed in Ukraine, and any peacekeeping force should be from neutral countries under UN auspices; that the UN should guarantee the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine; that both sides should guarantee linguistic and cultural rights of minorities; that Western sanctions against Russia should be suspended, but with a “snap-back” clause guaranteeing that they would automatically resume in the event of new Russian aggression; that any limits on Ukrainian armaments should be restricted to long-range missiles, and that the West should be able to go on arming Ukraine for defense.

A settlement along these lines would leave both sides unhappy — but hopefully, not so unhappy that they would be willing to take on dreadful the risks and costs of a return to war. We may hope that — to adapt President Lincoln’s words — the “better angels” of the Russian and Ukrainian negotiators’ natures will incline them to such compromises at their talks in Istanbul this week. If not, and however incongruous this partnership may seem to many, it will be for the Trump administration to give the angels a helping wing.

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Donald Trump
Top image credit: U.S. President Donald Trump attends the Saudi-U.S. Investment Forum, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, May 13, 2025. REUTERS/Brian Snyder

Trump's wise, bold Syria reset

Middle East

President Trump kicked off his Gulf tour this week in Saudi Arabia by delivering a speech at the Saudi Arabia Investment Forum on Tuesday, in which he announced the lifting of U.S. sanctions on Syria.

Then on Wednesday morning, local time, he met briefly with Syria's President Ahmed al-Sharaa on the sidelines of the regional summit — the first such meeting of Syrian and American leaders in 25 years.

"After discussing the situation in Syria with the Crown Prince [Mohammed bin Salman (MbS)] and also with President [Recep Tayyip] Erdogan of Turkey, who called me the other day and asked for a very similar thing ... I will be ordering the cessation of sanctions against Syria in order to give them a chance at greatness," declared Trump on Tuesday to his audience, which responded with a standing ovation.

Describing the U.S. sanctions as “brutal and crippling,” Trump went on to say that now is the time for the Syrians “to shine” and he wished the war-torn country “good luck.”

Implemented in mid-2020, the Caesar Syrian Civilian Protection Act (a.k.a. the Caesar Act) constitutes the most stringent U.S. sanctions ever imposed on Syria. These derivative sanctions have been strangling the Syrian economy, both before and after Bashar al-Assad’s fall. The lifting of U.S. sanctions marks a significant shift in Washington’s approach to Syria a little more than five months into the post-Assad era.

Trump's meeting with Sharaa — described in papers Wednesday as an "encounter" — took place after the new Syrian leader paid his first trip to Bahrain since Assad’s ouster. The last time the presidents of the U.S. and Syria met in person was in 2000, when Bill Clinton and Hafez al-Assad were in Switzerland discussing efforts to broker an Israeli-Syrian peace deal.

“This indicates that Trump is willing to break with the precedent that has been set by the U.S. since the fall of the regime and introduction of [Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)] leadership, entertaining not only direct engagement, but a monumental shift in U.S. Syria policy through sanctions relief,” Caroline Rose, a director at New Lines Institute, told RS.

Even if just a "hello" to Sharaa, who remains on Washington’s “Specially Designated Global Terrorist” list, this illustrates how “Trump is open to pragmatism when there’s a regional consensus,” according to Francesco Salesio Schiavi, an Italian analyst and Middle East expert, who spoke to RS.

“It reflects a shift from doctrinal isolation to transactional engagement, especially if Sharaa is seen as a potential bulwark against Iran and a vehicle for stabilizing post-conflict Syria,” he added.

“While this is far from formal recognition, I think it plants the seeds for a phased normalization process, starting with limited contact and possibly leading to re-engagement on counterterrorism, reconstruction, and border security, provided Sharaa can credibly distance himself from his militant past,” commented Schiavi.

This move on Trump’s part speaks to the extent to which Turkey and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states have significant influence with the current U.S. administration. Notably, Israel, which is extremely skeptical of the Sunni Islamist leadership in Damascus that took power late last year, has been lobbying the Trump administration to avoid moves that could legitimize Syria’s new government or ease the pressure that it is currently under. Thus, Trump’s decision to disregard Israeli interests on this issue fits into a trend that has been emerging whereby Trump is increasingly sidelining Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government to align U.S. foreign policy more closely with Ankara, Doha, and Riyadh.

The administration’s approach to diplomacy with Iran, the pact with the Houthis, the de-linking of possible U.S. support for Saudi Arabia’s nuclear ambitions and a Washington-Riyadh defense treaty from Israeli normalization, and the securing of Edan Alexander’s release through direct U.S.-Hamas talks all underscored this overall pivot away from an Israel-centered Middle East foreign policy.

“After almost six months of hard resistance against sanctions relief and direct engagement from cabinet members, congressional voices, and advisors, the fact that this policy shift occurred within less than 24 hours when Trump touched down in Riyadh signals the large weight that the Crown Prince MbS wields over Trump’s decision-making in the Middle East,” explained Rose.

“MbS was successful in encouraging Trump to open the ‘flood gates’ of relief efforts and allow both Saudi Arabia and Qatar to lead these initiatives for reconstruction — efforts that were blocked by U.S. sanctions and non-engagement,” she added.

The fact that the driving force was ultimately MbS — alongside the influence of advisers like Steve Witkoff, pressure from President Erdoğan, and some competition on the part of France whose president hosted Sharaa last week — highlights the extent of Trump’s flexibility on Middle East policy.

Trump has signaled his desire to offer Syria an opportunity to begin its long journey of reconstruction and redevelopment, which will require luring a massive amount of foreign investment. Nonetheless, because many elected officials in Washington remain extremely suspicious toward the HTS-dominated government in Damascus, certain aspects of sanctions relief which require congressional approval might not necessarily move ahead as quickly as Trump and his friends in Turkey and the Gulf would like.

Regardless of how sanctions relief plays out in practice, Trump making this bold announcement and meeting Sharaa in Riyadh are major wins for the Saudi leadership, which has proven to be an effective bridge between post-Assad Syria and the U.S. With Saudi Arabia taking the lead within the GCC when it comes to outreach to the new Syrian government, the Kingdom has demonstrated its ability to use its influence to advance interests shared by all the Gulf Arab monarchies amid a period of regional crises and intensified geopolitical instability worldwide.

“The Trump-Sharaa meeting in Riyadh reflects Saudi Arabia’s capacity to align U.S. policy with shared strategic goals, notably containing Iran and managing the risks posed by HTS. For Trump, the Saudi setting offers political cover, framing the engagement as part of a broader Arab-led initiative rather than a unilateral move,” Schiavi told RS.

Trump’s decision to lift U.S. sanctions on Syria marks a bold reset. Originally designed to isolate and squeeze Syria’s Ba’athist government, the argument in favor of maintaining the Assad-era sanctions following the change of regime late last year has grown unconvincing. Trump now extends not just economic relief but a political overture — offering Syria’s Sunni Islamist leadership a chance to gain greater recognition and legitimacy in the eyes of Western leaders and statesmen, reflecting Trump’s characteristically transactional foreign policy approach.

If Sharaa, in this upcoming period, delivers on access to resources, economic openings, and regional stability, Trump may come to find the former militant as a leader whom he can make many deals with. This factor is particularly important within the context of a possible complete withdrawal of American military forces from Syria. Under that scenario, the White House would have greater incentive to foster positive relations with whichever government holds power in Damascus given that the U.S. would lack any presence on the ground.

In a wider context, great power competition probably played a significant role in Trump’s decision. Continuing to strangle Syria with U.S. sanctions would only open the door to China and Russia to gain greater clout in the country, particularly in the domains of defense and reconstruction.

Ultimately, although certain voices in the U.S. will inevitably find Trump’s move controversial and reckless while pointing to Sharaa’s extremist past, Trump is, to his credit, choosing to be pragmatic above all else.

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JD Vance
Top image credit: U.S Vice President JD Vance arrives at the U.S. military's Pituffik Space Base in Greenland on March 28, 2025. Jim Watson/Pool via REUTERS

Why spying on Greenland isn't the problem

North America

According to a report in the Wall Street Journal last week, Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard has instructed U.S. intelligence agencies to increase collection of information on Greenland.

The topics of interest include independence sentiment among Greenlanders, attitudes regarding U.S. mining interests, and individuals in Greenland and Denmark who might be supportive of U.S. objectives in Greenland.

It is not unusual, and can be appropriate, for the intelligence community to respond positively to peculiar interests of whoever is the incumbent administration. Such intelligence directives do not necessarily foreshadow actual administration policy and may be part of an exploratory effort to see what the possibilities are.

In this instance, the leak of the reported directive evoked sharp negative reactions in both Denmark and Greenland. The Danish government summoned the U.S. ambassador in Copenhagen for an explanation. The newly elected prime minister of Greenland, Jens-Frederik Nielsen, stated that the reported intelligence collection was “completely unacceptable,” “entirely abnormal” and “disrespectful toward an ally.”

A further downside of devoting intelligence resources to an administration hobby horse is that such resources are limited. Thus, there inevitably are opportunity costs in having fewer resources available to monitor matters more important for U.S. interests, including threats to U.S. national security, elsewhere in the world.

Gabbard’s directive may or may not point to future U.S. policy, but President Donald Trump has repeatedly indicated that he is serious about wanting U.S. ownership of Greenland. His sending of Vice President JD Vance on a trip to Greenland in March demonstrated the depth of the administration’s interest in the island.

The key policy question at hand is not whether Greenland is relevant to U.S. interests, but rather whether those interests are better advanced through current ownership and sovereignty arrangements or through the United States somehow acquiring the island.

The security interests stem from Greenland’s geographic location. It is underneath many air and missile routes between Russia and the United States. The location also is relevant to naval operations, with Greenland being on one side of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap between the North Atlantic and Arctic Ocean, as well as next to Northwest Passage navigation routes that will see increasing usage with the melting of arctic sea ice.

Under a 1951 treaty with Denmark, the United States already has what amounts to military sovereignty in Greenland. It is free to erect installations and conduct operations there without compensation to the Danes. During the Cold War, the United States constructed more than a dozen military installations in Greenland. Most have since been abandoned, only because they became obsolete or unneeded and not because of resistance from Denmark.

The United States still operates the Pituffik Space Base, the northernmost U.S. military installation in the world. The base’s main declared mission is to keep watch on the atmosphere and space to the north for any Russian and Chinese missiles and satellites.

The Danish and Greenlandic authorities have fully cooperated with the United States on security matters in other respects. This has included responding positively to U.S. prompting, from both the Biden and Trump administrations, to rebuff Chinese attempts to establish investments and infrastructure in Greenland. Greenland’s own foreign, security, and defense strategy published last year states that the territory “plays a key role in the defense of the United States against external threats, especially from the Arctic region.”

NATO ally Denmark recently has expressed its willingness to expand further its security cooperation with the United States in Greenland. Denmark also is augmenting its own defense activities in Greenland.

The economic interests, in a land that has only about 57,000 people and is mostly covered with ice, are minimal. Most talk on economic matters in Greenland focuses on minerals, echoing what Trump has talked about concerning Ukraine. And also like Ukraine, mineral exploitation in Greenland is mostly a matter of potential that is as yet unproven and undeveloped.

To the extent there is valuable potential to be developed, Greenlandic officials are not only willing but eager for the United States to participate in that development. This is part of a larger Greenlandic eagerness for U.S. economic involvement, to include tourism and other forms of investment.

Greenland’s minister of business and trade wrote earlier this year — while pointing out that 39 of the 50 minerals that the United States has classified as critical to national security and economic stability can be found in Greenland — that “the big obstacle to development of Greenland’s mineral resources is a lack of capital.” He noted that Greenland “has been collaborating with the U.S. State Department for several years to provide new knowledge about our critical minerals.” The latest agreement on this subject was signed in 2019 during the first Trump administration, and the minister expressed his “high hopes of signing a new agreement with the United States as soon as possible.”

In short, it is hard to imagine anything in Greenland that would serve U.S. security or economic interests that the United States cannot get already, simply by working harmoniously with the Danes and Greenlanders. Acquiring U.S. sovereignty over the island would not serve those interests any better.

The downsides of the act of acquisition also need to be factored in. So far, Trump has been vague about how this would be accomplished and has not ruled out any method, including even armed force. If it did come to a military operation, this would be an even more cataclysmic turnabout of the U.S. security posture than Trump already has caused with his shattering of alliances and cozying to authoritarians. It would be not only a naked act of aggression, but one against the territory of a NATO ally.

Even if military force were not used, acquisition would be an act of coercion because it would be contrary to the clear and strong preference of the people of Greenland. A recent poll showed that 85 percent of Greenlanders are opposed to becoming part of the United States. The Greenlandic prime minister before last month’s election in the territory reflected this sentiment in declaring “we do not want to be American.” The government of Denmark has supported this position and emphasized that the future of Greenland is for Greenlanders to decide, including eventually through a referendum.

It is not hard to understand this preference. While Greenland has had self-government since 2009, its people still have full Danish citizenship and mobility within the European Union. They also enjoy Nordic-type welfare rights including health care, social security, and free education.

Although most Greenlanders eventually want complete independence, the substantial support they get from Denmark — including a direct subsidy that amounts to $12,500 per capita — is the main reason they have hesitated to make that move by holding the promised referendum. The Trump administration has tried to exploit the pro-independence sentiment as a wedge issue between Greenland and Denmark, but the administration’s approach has backfired. Greenlanders’ anger over the U.S. attempt at a takeover has pushed them closer to Denmark.

This result is similar to what occurred in recent elections in Canada and Australia, in which right-of-center parties were punished by voters who associated them with Trump’s policies. In each case, citizens of an allied nation responded to what they perceived as unfriendly actions — either a trade war or threat of annexation — in a direction opposite to what the Trump administration presumably preferred.

The problems of coercively taking over a nation whose people do not want to be taken over would occur partly within the nation itself. A taste of that came during Vance’s visit, when concerns about popular demonstrations in opposition resulted in scrapping most of the planned itinerary and limiting the visit to a stop at a U.S. military base.

The problems also extend to other parts of the world, with the green light that coercive annexation would give to Russia, China, or other powers that might want to seize territory whose residents do not want to be annexed.

The overall conclusion is that U.S. acquisition of Greenland would be a clear net negative for the United States.

Trump’s determination nonetheless to pursue this project probably has multiple motivations. Partly it is nostalgia for his view of the late nineteenth century, in which imperialism as well as tariffs were the external counterparts of a domestic Gilded Age dominated by robber barons. Partly it is a desire to show a highly visible “accomplishment” as something some of his predecessors considered but never achieved. Partly it is a crude acquisitiveness that was reflected in Trump’s resistance to surrendering classified government documents that he claimed to be “my” documents.

What it is not is a well-reasoned pursuit of U.S. interests.

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To Lam Xi Jinping
Top image credit: Vietnam's communist party general secretary To Lam (R) poses with Chinese President Xi Jinping (L) during a meeting at the office of the Party Central Committee in Hanoi on April 14, 2025. NHAC NGUYEN/Pool via REUTERS

An unexpected pawn: Vietnam's key role in Trump's trade war

Asia-Pacific

On April 2 — christened “Liberation Day” — President Donald Trump declared a national emergency in response to the “large and persistent U.S. trade deficit” and “unfair” economic practices by foreign countries that, according to Trump, hurt the American people by undermining the U.S. industry and employment.

In response, the president announced a minimum 10% tariff on all U.S. imports, plus higher tariffs, ranging from 11% to 50%, on imports from nearly 60 countries. These “reciprocal tariffs,” based on trade deficit calculations, targeted over 180 countries and territories. After a week of turmoil in the stock and bond markets, Trump announced a 90-day pause on reciprocal tariffs over 10 percent for most countries except China.

However, the reality of imposing tariffs and changing global trade dynamics is more complex. For example, Vietnam, like other Southeast Asian countries, has long maintained a non-aligned stance on the global geopolitical front and navigating through the choppy waters of great power competition. Hence, Vietnam's response to Trump’s moves should be seen as a reflection of its foreign policy priorities rooted in its national interests, including economic development, and its commitment to non-alignment.

Vietnam has long been a central figure in the escalation of U.S.-China trade tensions since they began in earnest back in 2018, when President Trump placed 10% tariffs on Chinese imports. In the years since, the U.S. trade deficit with Vietnam has tripled, reaching $123.5 billion in 2024, the last year with complete data. One of the key catalysts for this change is the strategic “decoupling” approach by companies that have relocated production and manufacturing from China to other countries, including Vietnam, in an effort to diversify their supply chains and appease Washington’s concerns about Beijing’s economic ascendancy. With rising geopolitical uncertainties, cheap alternative manufacturing hubs, of which Vietnam has become a prime example, have become attractive substitutes for China.

Vietnam is also a backdoor for Chinese exports, importing and assembling Chinese goods with minimal added value before reexporting them to the United States. Peter Navarro, Trump’s senior counselor for trade and manufacturing, alleged in a recent interview that Vietnam is guilty of “nontariff cheating,” by which he meant Hanoi permits China to ship its products through Vietnam to disguise their origin and thus avoid U.S. tariffs. These reasons, coupled with Vietnam’s large trade surplus, have resulted in the administration’s perception that the country poses a major threat to the U.S. economy and the welfare of American workers.

Vietnam has tried to be responsive to the Trump administration’s demands, which have centered around reducing the trade deficit, addressing transshipment issues, and enhancing intellectual property rights. Vietnam’s Ministry of Finance is currently working on enhancing customs information-sharing with the U.S. and drafting a comprehensive bilateral trade agreement that includes provisions on taxation and intellectual property rights — all in response to concerns raised by the Trump administration. In fact, Vietnam was the first and remains the only Southeast Asian country whose leader has spoken directly to Trump about the tariffs.

After receiving a whopping 46% tariff rate on Liberation Day, Vietnam’s Communist Party General Secretary To Lam reached out to Trump in a call that the U.S. president would later describe as “very productive,” Vietnam offered to reduce tariffs on U.S. goods to zero, according to Trump, who said Hanoi is also addressing non-tariff issues raised by U.S. officials. Vietnam’s various ministries are tasked with examining existing legal frameworks and proposing changes.

Vietnam also authorized the operation of Starlink, the satellite internet service owned by Elon Musk, and agreed to expedite approvals for a proposed $1.5 billion Trump resort. Most important, Vietnam sent a top official, Deputy Prime Minister Ho Duc Phoc, to the U.S. for negotiations centered on improving the trade imbalance and tackling transhipment issues, where goods (specifically Chinese goods) are shipped through Vietnam to avoid tariffs or other trade restrictions imposed on countries such as China. To increase U.S. exports to Vietnam, Hanoi has struck a deal under which Hanoi agreed to buy a fleet of F-16 fighter jets.

So why is Vietnam yielding and moving to comply with the Trump administration’s demands?

One of Vietnam’s core interests includes defending its territorial claims in the South China Sea against Chinese pressure and aggression. Over the past few years, China has harassed Vietnamese fishermen near the Paracel Islands, most recently in an assault and seizure incident last October. By maintaining close diplomatic, economic, and military relations with Washington, Vietnam feels more protected from Chinese aggression. There is, however, a fine line between enhancing military cooperation with the Americans in pursuit of deterrence and provoking escalation in a potentially explosive conflict. The F-16 fighter deal could “stir up troubles” in the region, signaling to China increased U.S. military influence in the region that could call Hanoi’s non-alignment into question.

The Trump administration should realize that Vietnam is centering its foreign and trade policy on its own national interests and will happily engage with whichever foreign power is willing to help it enhance its economic development and bolster its national security. As a result, at the same time that Vietnam is responding in a friendly manner to Trump’s trade demands, it continues to cultivate close trade relations with Beijing, whose large manufacturing base, high technological capacity, and vast market make it its most important trade partner.

For example, during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Vietnam on April 14, the two countries signed 45 deals ranging from increasing digital connectivity and infrastructure to cooperating in emerging fields such as artificial intelligence and green energy, to further deepen bilateral economic ties. For his part, Xi vowed to expand Vietnam’s access to the Chinese market.

Vietnam’s recent actions with regard to the trade war are ultimately a reflection of its own national interests. Its decision to strike a deal with the U.S. for the purchase of fighter aircraft signals that, even while looking to cater to Trump’s trade demands, it will do so only in ways that enhance its economic and national security interests, as defined by the national government.

The U.S. should work with like-minded countries to strengthen bilateral and multilateral ties while decreasing its dependence on Chinese manufacturing exports. Through strategic partnerships, the U.S. can help address important issues like the transshipment of Chinese goods. Targeting Vietnam alone on that issue, however, will likely result only in Chinese companies diverting goods to Vietnam’s neighbors, such as Cambodia, Thailand, or Myanmar.

Rather than growing frustrated at Vietnam’s burgeoning trade relationship with China and seeing it as a direct threat to U.S. interests within the prism of great power competition, Washington should take the opportunity presented by Hanoi’s vow to open its markets much wider to U.S. exports. Indeed, there have been recent talks of collaboration between the two in areas such as energy, technology, and education.

By embracing policies based on pragmatism and mutual interest, the U.S. can remain a strategic partner to Vietnam while addressing its concerns amid the historic shifts in global trade dynamics.

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Woodrow Wilson World War I
President Woodrow Wilson (center) waves his top hat from the deck of USS George Washington (ID # 3018), as she steamed up New York Harbor upon the President's return to the U.S. from the World War I peace conference in France, 8 July 1919. (public domain)

'Victory Day for WW I' would be an embarrassment on global scale

Washington Politics

The United States looms large on the world stage, but it wasn’t always so important. President Donald Trump retrospectively applied America’s present role to yesterday’s world when he declared: “We won both [World] Wars, nobody was close to us in terms of strength, bravery, or military brilliance, but we never celebrate anything.” Henceforth, he wants to call Veteran’s Day “Victory Day for World War I.”

While the U.S. played a decisive role in that conflict, shifting the balance of power irreversibly against Imperial Germany after the other participants had exhausted themselves, Washington’s contribution remained much less than those of many allied belligerents. While U.S. soldiers were brave, their commanders were anything but brilliant, failing to learn from the allies and running up unnecessary casualties.

The most important contribution measure is the number of military personnel killed. American sacrificed 116,700 men in the war. That was a huge loss, to be sure, though less than a fifth of the number killed during the Civil War. However, America’s toll was small compared to that of the other allied combatants, with the U.S. ranking only number 8 on the allied side. Russia lost around two million men. (Most of the casualty figures for World War I are rough estimates.) France had 1.4 million deaths. Great Britain suffered almost 900,000. Estimates of Italy’s toll run as high as 700,000. Serbia lost in the range of 400,000 men. Romania endured around 300,000 deaths. British dominions and colonies—most importantly Australia, Canada, India, and New Zealand—collectively lost about 215,000. Washington was only ahead of Belgium, Greece, Montenegro, Portugal, and Japan.

There are much bigger problems with Trump’s claim, however. First, the U.S. had no reason to join Europe’s tragic murderfest. Second, the military triumph turned into a political fiasco, and just a couple decades later, a military disaster for the entire world. So bad were the consequences that by entering that conflict Woodrow Wilson staked his claim to being the country’s worst president.

Terry W. Hamby, chairman of the WWI Centennial Commission, dedicated a memorial to World War I, intoning: “The doughboys we are honoring today were the best of their generation. Their average age was 24.” Why were they sacrificed?

It surely wasn’t for America. None of the combatants threatened the U.S., for which the Atlantic acted as a vast moat. Although Anglo-Saxons, who originally populated the colonies, dominated U.S. politics and finance, that was no reason to go to war on Britain’s behalf. Indeed, German descendants were almost as populous. And still are. As of 2020, the number of Americans with British ancestry was 62 million. The number with German ancestry was 41 million. Nor was Washington’s entry into the war justified to ensure that financial interests got repaid on their generous loans to the Entente powers. Americans should not die to preserve lenders’ profits.

Finally, talk of a war for democracy, or to end war, or to destroy Prussian militarism, was just nonsense. The allies included an antisemitic despotism (Russia), a militant revanchist republic (France), the world’s leading colonial power (Great Britain), the globe’s cruelest colonial master (Belgium), a populist regime that chose war for territorial plunder (Italy), and a terrorist state that enabled the royal murder that triggered the conflict (Serbia). The so-called Central Powers were no friends of liberty, but they were generally evolving in a more liberal direction and likely would have continued to do so had war not intervened.

Unfortunately, America’s president at the time was the megalomaniac and sanctimonious Woodrow Wilson. A virulent racist, he also resisted women’s suffrage. He advocated imposing national conscription for the first time, proposed making it illegal to criticize him, and created what is widely recognized as the low point of American civil liberties.

Why did he decide on war? He was an Anglophile, who essentially believed that London could do no wrong. He wanted to transform the global order and recognized that he had to make the U.S. a belligerent to gain a “seat at the table” ending the war. Why worry about the many Americans who would needlessly die as a result?

The closest issue to a casus belli was the German U-boat (“unterseeboot” or submarine) campaign. Submarine warfare is terrible, but so was the British starvation blockade. It was illegal under international law and struck civilians as well as soldiers, killing several hundred thousand innocents by war’s end. The Germans began the war by having U-boats surface to seek the surrender of merchantmen, but the British armed civilian ships, designated them as reserve cruisers, and ordered them to ram any subs so foolish as to rise—prompting U-boats to remain submerged and sink vessels without mercy.

Moreover, even civilian liners, including the celebrated Lusitania, carried munitions through what amounted to a war zone. In the Lusitania’s case, the German embassy purchased ads warning Americans not to book passage on a legitimate military target. In May 1915 near Britain’s coast, it was sunk. Wilson bizarrely asserted that just one American baby on a commercial liner or cargo ship carrying bullets and bombs immunized its passage. This while the British navy was stopping even the ships of neutrals, like America, to prevent food from reaching the European continent. Wilson admitted that he was committed to London’s victory: “England is fighting our fight, and you may well understand that I shall not, in the present state of the world’s affairs, place obstacles in her way when she is fighting for her life—and the life of the world.” So much for his pretense of neutrality.

Germany restricted its U-boat operations until January 1917. Then, in a desperate move to win amid a two-front fight, it again targeted nominally civilian shipping. Wilson called for war, claiming “the recent course of the Imperial German Government to be in fact nothing less than war against the Government and people of the United States.” It was a lie, but one that conveniently advanced his desire to sit among the victors. Never were America or American interests threatened. Never was there anything at stake that warranted jumping into a merciless continental abattoir.

There was more movement on the eastern front, but it wasn’t until the first Russian revolution, in the February 1917 (March in the Western calendar), that victory there seemed possible for Germany, and even then, a compromise peace in the west was likely, given the allies’ advantages there. It was Washington’s entry that empowered the Entente to win, though not immediately. The conflict raged on, as the allies figured U.S. reinforcements would lead to victory while Germany gambled on another major offensive before American troops were ready for action. The offensive failed, so Germany finally yielded and sought an armistice, which took effect on November 11, 1918.

What might have been a compromise peace that preserved enough of the old world order to forestall revolutionary chaos and violence turned into a rout. The Austro-Hungarian, German, and Russian empires all collapsed, leading to authoritarian, and sometimes totalitarian systems. The Ottoman Empire’s disintegration yielded multiple rounds of conflict. Italy abandoned democracy and embraced the blustering dictatorship of Benito Mussolini. Communism, followed by fascism and, most virulently and aggressively, Nazism, reshaped Europe.

The Versailles Treaty with Germany (and related pacts with the other defeated Central Powers) rewarded the allies’ desire for vengeance and Wilson’s fantasy to transform the globe. The winners plundered the losers and traded peoples and lands as if playing a global game of Monopoly. The allies claimed to exalt self-determination. However, they forced disfavored minority groups, most notably Germans, to remain inside newly independent allied nations, particularly Czechoslovakia and Poland. Some Germans called these new nations Saisonstaaten, or “states for a season,” which provided the grievances used by Adolf Hitler and were soon swept away.

Alas, the resulting settlement failed in almost every particular. It treated Germany badly enough to create an enduring grievance against the allies and the post-World War I order they created. However, it was not truly “Carthaginian,” severe enough to prevent Germany, with its large population and significant industrial might, from reviving and seeking revenge. The allies tried appeasement too late. It could have prevented The Great War, but Hitler was the one political leader on the European continent who could not be appeased, having an agenda that could be achieved only through war.

It took just 20 years for the next conflict to arise. World War II caused even greater material destruction, loss of life, political disintegration, and future threats. That fight had barely ended after Germany’s surrender when the Cold War emerged. Although the U.S. and Soviet Union avoided open conflict, there were numerous limited but costly battles and proxy wars involving allied states. Only in the early 1990s, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, end of the Warsaw Pact, democratization of the former Eastern bloc, and collapse of the Soviet Union, did the world return to the age before, in which Germany’s short-lived Brest-Litovsk Treaty proved to be a lot more realistic than the Versailles debacle.

None of this looks very much like a “victory” for the U.S. Trump should drop his embarrassing triumphalism which denigrates Europe’s contribution to both World War I and World War II. Even more, he should stop calling what was a political disaster an American achievement. Instead, he should reiterate his message that Americans should not get involved in endless wars around the globe.

That certainly is what the Founders would do. In his famous Farewell Address George Washington warned Americans against undertaking “projects of pride, ambition, and other sinister and pernicious motives.” This foreign policy approach “gives to ambitious, corrupted, or deluded citizens (who devote themselves to the favorite nation), facility to betray or sacrifice the interests of their own country, without odium, sometimes even with popularity; guiding, with the appearances of a virtuous sense of obligation, a commendable deference for public opinion, or a laudable zeal for public good, the base or foolish compliances of ambition, corruption, or infatuation.” Sounds like the U.S. today.

Instead, America’s first president urged his fellow citizens to have with other nations “as little political connection as possible,” and not to “entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils” of other states’ “ambition, rivalship, interest, humor or caprice.” Had past presidents followed this approach, imagine the lives that would have been saved and wealth that would have been preserved. And imagine what Americans can achieve in the future if President Trump adopts that approach today.

This article was published with permission from The American Conservative

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Iran Oman
Top image credit: Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi is welcomed by an unidentified Omani official upon his arrival in Muscat, Oman, May 11, 2025. Iranian Foreign Ministry/WANA (West Asia News Agency)/Handout via REUTERS

Iran talks: At least they're still negotiating

Middle East

The fourth round of nuclear talks between Iran and the United States concluded Sunday in Muscat, Oman after a one-week delay. Many observers saw the postponement as a result of the Trump administration’s contradictory approach and lack of a clear endgame.

Just two days before the talks, U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff gave an interview to Breitbart, seeming to suggest “zero enrichment” as the administration’s red line and calling for the dismantlement of Iran’s core nuclear facilities. This maximalist stance stood in contrast with more measured comments by President Trump, who recently said the United States had "not yet decided" whether Iran could retain a civilian nuclear program. Vice President J.D. Vance struck a similarly ambiguous tone at a recent conference in Europe.

These conflicting messages have added to the uncertainty surrounding Washington’s true objectives and raised questions about whether it seeks a viable diplomatic outcome or is preparing for confrontation.

Meanwhile, ahead of Sunday’s talks, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi reaffirmed that uranium enrichment is a national red line. He cited the blood of Iranian scientists as the price paid for this right, and warned that the contradictory messages from Washington — one message inside the negotiating room and another in public — are undermining trust.

Regional dynamics are also complicating the path forward. Trump’s push for a negotiated outcome is increasingly at odds with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, who is continuing to advocate for military strikes. Israel sees any deal that allows Iran to retain enrichment capabilities as a strategic defeat.

At the same time, Trump is preparing for a high-stakes trip to the Arabian Peninsula, where he hopes to secure investment deals with countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE. These governments have made clear their desire to develop civilian nuclear programs. If the United States recognizes Iran’s right to enrichment, it may find itself in the uncomfortable position of denying that same right to its Arab partners. In this context, the administration’s hardline rhetoric ahead of the Muscat talks may have been aimed not only at Tehran, but also at Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.

The result is a negotiating approach that appears reactive and shaped more by political optics than strategic clarity. The Muscat talks may have kept diplomacy alive for now, but without a coherent and realistic endgame from Washington, the chances for a lasting agreement will diminish.

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West Bank
Top image credit: Israeli forces arrest a Palestinian activist during a demonstration near Bethlehem, West Bank, November 14, 2012. Editorial credit: Ryan Rodrick Beiler / Shutterstock.com

'Terrorism'? Israel has weaponized the charge for decades

Middle East

What do human rights activists in Jerusalem, humanitarian aid workers in Gaza, and college students in New York all have in common according to Israel and its influence network? They all purportedly have links to terrorism. Although such accusations are often baseless, they are frequently used to besmirch and undercut those who are unwilling to do Israel’s bidding.

Although this is a tactic very much on display today, it is one I first came across while serving with the U.S. Security Coordinator (USSC) in the West Bank, when a similar pattern of accusations and complaints from Israel, as documented in a report that has not been previously disclosed, threatened to wreck what was, back then in 2008, already a tenuous peace process in the West Bank.

The USSC often acts as an unofficial broker between the Israeli and Palestinian security sectors. Despite significant progress in the delivery of security on the Palestinian side, Israel was dragging its feet, claiming a lack of confidence in the Palestinian Security Forces.

The Israelis’ basic argument was that the Palestinian Authority was not taking sufficient action against individuals Israel accused of terrorism, and therefore Israel did not have the confidence to deliver its side of the negotiations — to reduce checkpoints and IDF presence in the West Bank. With the usual public relations savvy, Israel argued both privately and in the press that the Palestinian Authority security system was nothing more than a "revolving door" in that the Palestinian Authority would arrest people Israel had claimed to be terrorists or have ties to terrorists, but then quickly release them.

The Bush administration at the time was committed to the negotiations process under the Roadmap for Peace, but with Israel threatening to halt any progress on the basis of its concerns, the U.S. decided it would have to step in and address them.

As the USSC lead for Palestinian security sector governance, I was charged with leading a study of the alleged "revolving door" problem, and with colleagues including a senior UK police officer and a Canadian military officer, conducted a thorough review of the allegations, producing an official report, which was briefed to both Palestinian and Israeli officials, and to the U.S. National Security Council.

That study, officially titled, “The Jenin Revolving Door Report,” was not a victory for any of the parties involved. Although some of the context it addressed is now somewhat dated, some of its key findings remain very relevant today, given the allegations that led to the report and the parallel pattern we see today of Israel making accusations of terrorism against individuals and organizations it views as adversaries, complaining when these accusations are not acted upon in a manner that Israel finds sufficient, and then leveraging its allegations and complaints as a part of a public relations strategy.

The report has never been publicly released. Given the passage of time, but also due to its relevance and the value of transparency, the complete text may be found here (with redactions only to protect the names of the other authors).

The report found that there were plenty of challenges for all sides to address. For instance, when it came to the Palestinian side, the report concluded that "Palestinian law on some of the critical issues is often vague, and sometimes contradictory. The Palestinian criminal justice system is both overloaded and under-resourced."

However, more germane to the broader pattern, and the one we see today, of Israeli government weakly-sourced accusations and its subsequent complaints of inaction, are the findings of the report as it relates to Israel's approach, and in particular that:

"A final element to be considered here is the method by which Israel does transfer requests for arrest, detention, or other security actions to the Palestinian Authority. The common mechanism for this is the provision by the Israeli security establishment to elements of the Palestinian security establishment, of “lists” of targets (which may be people or institutions) and ‘actions requested,’ such as arrests or closures.

"These lists, which are not displayed in this report due to their sensitive nature, but examples of which have been viewed by the reporting team, commonly lack any evidence to substantiate the validity of the targets. Indeed, Palestinian reviews of the lists have shown many of them to be inaccurate or outdated, requesting, for example, the detention of deceased persons. These lists, then[,] represent the meeting of the thin requirements of the Israeli military and intelligence establishment with the rather more weighty ones of the Palestinian criminal justice system. The P.A. cannot simply arrest and administratively detain persons because Israel wants it done; it has processes it must follow, and these processes coincide, for the most part, with international human rights and legal best practice."

The provision of a list of names does not by itself constitute hard evidence for anything and in the experience of the U.S. Security Coordinator at the time I served in it, Israel's lists were often flawed and inaccurate, as the Revolving Door Report describes. Then, Israel refused to provide any corroborating information to substantiate its accusations, claiming that its accusations derived from sensitive intelligence sources. But even then, intelligence, as any national security official will tell you, is not evidence, and is often wrong.

Raw intelligence reporting may be the standard upon which Israel conducts detention operations — or even lethal strikes — but it does not suffice for any use by a third party, unless that third party is willing to take it on trust. In my experience, even the United States, which does tend to take Israeli allegations and claims at face value, has also developed an institutional understanding over time that there is often less to these Israeli allegations than meets the eye, like when it came to Israel's justifications for a strike in Gaza in 2021 that leveled a high rise building that multiple news agencies used as their offices, or as when, in 2022, Israel accused six Palestinian human rights organizations of terrorist ties.

In addition to recommending steps to close the gap between Israeli intelligence leads and substantiated facts that could meet evidentiary standards, the Revolving Door Report recommended that "Israel should thoroughly review its [own] current arrest and detention practices … in order to bring them into accord with international law," a recommendation that, as the UK government determined last September, it does not meet to this day.

The report also suggested a certain irony in Israel's identification of targets and complaints of inaction by third parties given the exploitation of its detention system as an intelligence tool for the purposes of serving Israeli interests:

"Israel does not try every Palestinian it detains, nor, although statistics are not available at this time, does it detain for significant periods every Palestinian it arrests. Rather, arrests and detentions form a regular part of intelligence gathering activities for the Government of Israel, and are often thought to be more pre-emptive or deterrent than they are reactive to specific threats. As Israel focuses on threats to its own state and citizens, it likely prioritizes these threats above those which are directed against the Palestinian Authority. From a Palestinian perspective, therefore, it is often seen that Israel, aside from the legality of its actions in arresting and detaining Palestinians, does itself maintain a revolving door. ..."

Today, we see similar allegations used not to derail a peace process, but to undermine the credibility of those who express concern regarding, or protest against, Israel’s violence against Palestinians.

One example can be found when Israel shuttered six Palestinian human rights organizations in 2022 amid allegations that they operated as a front for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). The Israeli government raided the offices of one of those organizations — Defense of Children International Palestine (DCIP) — one day after the United States informed Israel that it found DCIP’s reporting of the rape of a child in an Israeli detention facility credible. Many Western governments responded by cutting all ties with these organizations, only to quietly re-establish those ties several months later when Israel failed to produce any compelling evidence for its accusations.

More recently, in the context of its broader efforts to undercut the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), Israel has again, and with much public fanfare, levied a series of allegations that 108 of UNRWA’s employees in Gaza are members of Hamas's military wing, the Izzedin al Qassam Brigades. To date, UNRWA has been unable to substantiate those accusations, and despite UNRWA’s good-faith requests as it conducts an investigation, Israel has not provided any further evidence to back up its allegations.

And now, in a continuation of this pattern which is as alarming as it is absurd, similar accusations have made their way into the U.S. legal system. In a legal filing brought in late March, Israel’s American surrogates accused the Columbia University chapter of Students for Justice in Palestine of having foreknowledge of Hamas’s October 7 attack. This accusation — which appears to be based on the single testimony of an Israeli hostage of a claim made by his captors— is bizarre given that Hamas didn’t even give its sponsor Iran tactical warning. Why would Hamas leaders alert some college students in New York? Regardless of the accusation’s merit, the reputational damage to SJP is done.

As the work conducted in the Revolving Door Report demonstrates when it comes to Israeli allegations of terrorism, there is often less than meets the eye. Going forward, organizations and individuals facing thinly-sourced Israeli allegations of ties to terrorism should demand substantive evidence. If Israel cannot or will not provide such evidence, it should be ignored.

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Donald Trump
Top image credti: White House

The hidden costs of Trump's 'madman' approach to tariffs

Global Crises

Is the trade war launched by Donald Trump the act of a madman or a mad genius?

To the extent Trump’s tariffs are a “negotiating strategy,” as Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has claimed, are critics missing that they are simply part of the “art of the deal” that will enable America to gain coercive leverage over other states? According to the madman theory of international politics, it is possible Trump’s gambit has a strategic logic. However, there is a crucial flaw with this strategy that will likely cause it to fail.

The madman theory was developed in the nuclear weapons era by the scholars Daniel Ellsberg (the leaker of the Pentagon Papers) and Thomas Schelling (who won the Nobel Prize in economics). Its logic is that some threats, such as launching a nuclear attack against a nuclear-armed opponent, inherently lack credibility because carrying them out would be irrational in that it would cause both the target state and the threatening state great pain. However, if the leader making the threat is perceived as irrational or crazy, then the threat may actually be believable, and the target could decide that backing down to avoid punishment is the prudent option.

As Richard Nixon said in a private oval office discussion with his chief of staff in 1968:

“I call it the Madman Theory, Bob. I want the North Vietnamese to believe that I’ve reached the point that I might do anything to stop the war. We’ll just slip the word to them that ‘for God’s sake, you know Nixon is obsessed about Communism. We can’t restrain him when he is angry—and he has his hand on the nuclear button’—and Ho Chi Minh himself will be in Paris in two days begging for peace.”

Trump’s tariff strategy may follow a similar logic. According to the Yale Budget Lab, Trump’s tariffs could increase prices for the average American household by almost $5,000 just this year. Given the mutual costs Trump’s tariffs involve, his threats may lack credibility on their face, just as many nuclear threats do.

However, to the extent Trump is perceived of as at least somewhat crazy, his threats may be more believable than if he was viewed as rational. In fact, like Nixon, Trump is a self-professed fan of the madman strategy. For example, in a discussion with top cabinet officials regarding the U.S.-South Korea trade deal in 2017, Trump reportedly told Robert Lighthizer, the U.S. Trade Representative:

“You’ve got 30 days, and if you don’t get concessions then I’m pulling out.” “Ok, well I’ll tell the Koreans they’ve got 30 days,” Lighthizer replied. “No, no, no,” Trump interjected. “That’s not how you negotiate. You don’t tell them they’ve got 30 days. You tell them, this guy’s so crazy he could pull out any minute…You tell them if they don’t give the concessions now, this crazy guy will pull out of the deal.”

Trump’s plan to end the U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement in his first term was ultimately foiled by Gary Cohn, his chief economic advisor, who reportedly stole from Trump’s desk a letter that would have made the withdrawal official after Trump signed it. However, with a team of more loyal and pliant advisors installed in his second term, Trump has been able to follow through on his trade war strategy based on the madman theory.

Trump also seems to believe that this strategy is having the intended effect: “I am telling you, these countries are calling us up, kissing my ass. They are dying to make a deal…‘Please, sir, make a deal. I’ll do anything. I’ll do anything sir.’” Indeed, the European Union and countries like Vietnam and Israel have offered to lower trade barriers on American goods in return for the removal of Trump’s tariffs. The U.S. and Britain also just struck a trade deal that ostensibly involves some real, even if limited, concessions by the United Kingdom.

Despite some advantages, however, the madman strategy is far from a panacea and entails significant drawbacks that will likely limit what Trump is able to achieve. One major issue (for which I provided evidence in a peer-reviewed study that conducted surveys of the American public) is that a leader who is perceived as mad is likely to face increasing levels of disapproval among their own domestic public. This can then undermine their bargaining leverage with foreign leaders.

The madman strategy is generally unpopular domestically because the public values competence in leaders, and thus is unlikely to look kindly on a leader it perceives of as actually or potentially crazy. Alexander Hamilton made this argument about John Adams, a member of his own Federalist Party, when discussing the “great and intrinsic defects in his character, which unfit him for the office of Chief Magistrate.”

Richard Nixon said much the same in a private Oval Office conversation in 1973, when he said, “We are never going to have a madman as president, in this office…Ours [system] throws them out…about every four years, if a guy shows that he’s [unclear phrase], out!” That is one key reason why Nixon kept his own attempt to use the madman strategy to convince the Soviets and Vietnamese he was crazy and might use nuclear weapons to win the Vietnam War secret from the American public.

This reasoning helps explain why Trump’s trade war is unpopular domestically. Moreover, well-known psychological biases make average citizens more averse to losses than they are attracted to gains. In the case of a trade war, this means the public is likely to be wary of paying higher prices than they were previously in return for the theoretical promise of greater domestic production in the future. This is especially the case given that Trump’s promises to tame inflation was one of his campaign’s most effective selling points in winning the presidency last fall.

The domestic unpopularity of the madman strategy can undermine a leader’s leverage in negotiations with other states, as foreigners may doubt the leader will have the political capital to enact or maintain the threatened policies in the short, medium, or long term. This is what appears to be happening in the case of Trump’s tariffs, as the strongly negative reaction among the U.S. public and business community—the fact that that, in Trump’s words, “they were getting a little bit yippy, a little bit afraid”—forced the president to dramatically reverse course and pause the tariffs for 90 days before even a single deal was struck, undermining his bargaining leverage.

Some foreign governments may now question whether Trump will be willing to reimpose the tariffs even if his terms are not met. As a New York Times article put it, “[Chinese leader] Xi [Jinping] learned that his adversary has a pain point.” Just this weekend, the U.S. agreed to temporarily lower tariffs on China from 145% to 30% without yet receiving any specific, substantive concessions in return. By backing down, Trump may also have revealed that he is less crazy than he would like adversaries to believe, which was also the fatal flaw of Nixon’s attempt to use the madman strategy to win the Vietnam War.

In sum, while critics who claim the madman theory has zero utility are somewhat overstating the case, it does have crucial flaws that will severely undermine what Trump will likely be able to achieve in the realm of international trade. Moreover, the harsh economic costs of this strategy and its blatant inconsistency with long-held American values championed since World War II make it a clearly unwise course to pursue moving forward.

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Us Marines Panama 1989
Top photo credit: US Marines aboard a LAV-25 Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) keep a sharp watch around their vehicle after their patrol was stopped by supporters of GEN. Manuel Noriega on the road leading into the town, 10/31/1989. ( J. Alan Elliott, USN/public domain)

US invasion of Panama was first step toward the 'forever wars'

Latin America

This is the first in a new Quincy Institute/Responsible Statecraft project series highlighting the writing and reporting of U.S. military veterans. Click here for more information.


When the red tracers of an AC130 gunship’s minigun slashed through the warm, dry night skies above Panama City at 12:41 AM on December 20, 1989, few guessed that it would mark an opening stanza in America’s expansive unipolar moment.

In the hours that followed, more than 20,000 U.S. troops conducted a swift and violent invasion of a sovereign state to remove the inconvenient and venal regime of General Manuel Antonio Noriega, who had embarrassed and bedeviled U.S. policymakers for years.

Now nearly forgotten, this invasion — bequeathed with the trite and even cynical name of “Operation JUST CAUSE” — marked a tentative but crucial first step toward the “forever wars” of today. Freed from the frightening, but disciplining, constraints of the Cold War, American leaders were now unchecked by rival powers, and the very perception of success for Operation JUST CAUSE would help shape their decisions going forward.

Conceived as the illegitimate child of America’s late 19th and early 20th century flirtation with regional imperialism and the naval theories of U.S. Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, Panama and its canal have long exerted significant pull over U.S. strategy and domestic politics. A more fulsome account of the U.S.-Panamanian relationship is beyond the scope of this essay, but the hypocrisy and bad faith on both sides in this tragicomic saga has few equals, even in the annals of U.S. hemispheric policy.

The 1977 Panama Canal Treaty was ratified against fierce Republican opposition, and it provided for a 22-year turnover transition during which time there would be a hybrid administration of the Canal Zone. By 1989, this resulted in a dizzying checkerboard of U.S. and Panama Defense Force (PDF) military installations interspersed next to and co-located with each other across the isthmus. The U.S. reserved the treaty right to intervene militarily to protect the canal.

The agreement, however, was predicated upon the assumption of good relations between the signatories, a dubious proposition even under the nationalist but pragmatic Panamanian regime of Omar Torrijos. When the cartoonishly duplicitous Manuel Noriega assumed de facto power in Panama after Torrijos’ death in 1981, he initially leveraged support for Reagan’s policies in Central America to mask his growing ties with drug cartels and other adversaries. This awkward fling ended, when Noriega’s 1987 indictment on federal drug charges ushered in a hostile turn in relations.

Noriega quickly became a political detriment to the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations. Anti-Noriega candidates decisively won elections in May 1989, only for regime militias to violently overturn the results. Performative U.S. sanctions caused considerable damage to the populace, but did little to dislodge Noriega, who also saw off two coup attempts in 1988 and 1989.

During the latter attempt, with Noriega in the custody of the golpistas, American forces sealed two of the three routes leading to PDF Headquarters (“La Comandancia”) in Panama City, but failed to put in a third roadblock allowing loyalist forces to defeat the coup, rescue Noriega, and inflict a humiliating defeat on the Bush administration.

As tensions skyrocketed, U.S. military preparations accelerated and evolved from a special forces “snatch” operation personally targeting Noriega into a massive strike designed to destroy the PDF and uproot the regime in its entirety.

When PDF troops killed a U.S. Marine at a checkpoint in Panama City and detained and brutalized another U.S. family, Bush acted. Thousands of U.S. troops conducted a crushing and aggressive night attack, achieving complete surprise and effectively destroying the PDF by daybreak. After hiding for several days, Noriega was forced to flee, seeking refuge at the Papal Nunciature. Resistance quickly faded, and Noriega was extradited to the U.S. after several days of negotiations.

The denied victors in the May election assumed the reins of power. In the following weeks, most U.S. troops returned home, although units in Panama battled a massive crime wave and rooted out pockets of Noriega supporters. Twenty-three U.S. troops were killed. Panamanian casualty estimates are mired in controversy, with SOUTHCOM estimating that 314 PDF troops had died, along 202 civilians, and leftist sources citing higher civilian tolls.

For the U.S., JUST CAUSE was at the time a clear success. A quick, decisive, low-cost military operation had laid to rest a humiliating years-long array of diplomatic and policy failures. The invasion was an important proof of concept as one of the first skirmishes fought after passage of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act which provided for new unified “Regional Commands.”

It also marked a tactical inflection point: for over 200 years, U.S. ground forces had followed a distinctly “solar powered” pattern of operating in the day and digging in at night. In Panama, U.S. troops emerged as lethal and effective night fighters. The All-Volunteer Force — whose performance in the 1970s and early 80s had been shaky at best — finally seemed to deliver the capabilities that its early boosters had envisioned.

Strategically, however, the invasion of Panama has not aged as well. In hindsight, it seems policymakers drew a series of suboptimal initial lessons from this venture, which were then amplified by the much larger 1991 Gulf War.

First, U.S. leaders were seduced by the low casualties, domestic popularity, and quick success achieved first in Panama, and then repeated in DESERT STORM. These two operations enabled a strategic recalculation of the perceived costs and benefits of military action and elevated the relative attractiveness of military options. Even before the 9/11 attacks, the greater policymaker demand for “kinetic” solutions throughout the 1990s led to a dramatic spike in military activity.

Second, the invasion of Panama was clearly a “false positive” for the efficacy of regime change operations. The quick and politically antiseptic removal of a hostile government, and the ease with which the U.S. installed a new one, incentivized policymakers toward maximalist demands, incrementally undermining the messy and emotionally unsatisfying drudgery of diplomacy.

Bu the “Cliffs Notes” version of the operation that the policy community took on generally dismissed the unique advantages the U.S. military enjoyed in Panama, such the solid intelligence picture gleaned from an eighty-year presence, Noriega’s overwhelming unpopularity among Panamanians, and the existence of a legitimate alternate government.

Finally, the rapid success of the invasion and the ease with which it lanced an ugly and embarrassing political boil for the United States (Noriega) encouraged policy planning that underestimated or even obviated the need to plan for messy post-conflict political engagement. This is not surprising: military success is clean and popular; diplomacy is hard and draining. We retroactively devalued having a viable, legitimate, indigenous political option in Panama.

By contrast, when we went into Afghanistan and later Iraq, swift military success was followed by a policy vacuum and then by chaos and violence.

Microsoft co-founder Bill Gates once said that “success is a lousy teacher. It seduces people into thinking they can’t lose.” This was certainly the case for Operation JUST CAUSE. As we look back on decades of perpetual conflict and consider the path that brought us here, it is hard to look at the invasion of Panama as anything other than an early success that subsequently helped teach policymakers a slew of very dubious lessons.

And as any pre-GPS traveler remembers, it is hard to recover from an early wrong turn, especially when the mistakes only become clear miles down the road.

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Defense Department
Top image credit: T. Schneider / Shutterstock.com

DOD clinging to empty properties for money is 'out of hand'

Military Industrial Complex

What’s worse than the Pentagon spending taxpayer dollars on golf courses? Spending taxpayer dollars on golf courses that nobody uses.

Even as the Department of Defense renovates some of its 145 golf courses, the Army acknowledged in a new Pentagon study on excess capacity that it owns at least six facilities labeled “Golf Club House and Sales” that almost no one uses. The Navy owns at least two more golf facilities that it listed as underutilized.

But the problem goes far beyond golf courses. The Pentagon oversees some $4.1 trillion in assets and 26.7 million acres of land — a sprawling network of military installations across the United States and the globe. Wasted space and resources in that network could be squeezing taxpayers out of billions of dollars.

A Defense Department official familiar with the data included in the new report, which is only available for viewing in person at the House and Senate Armed Services Committees in Congress, explained to RS that the Pentagon’s problem of empty buildings has gotten out of hand.

“Most installations are incentivized to hang onto empty or partially empty spaces until they know for sure that the building is totally failing,” they said. Otherwise, installations will lose their funding.

In other words, the Pentagon has a phantom infrastructure problem made up of empty storage warehouses and training facilities that collect dust. The only thing real about them is the cost, brought to you by the U.S. taxpayer.

But just how bad has this problem gotten? Well, the Pentagon itself doesn’t have a consistent answer, meaning the real number of underused facilities could be much higher.

The last time the Pentagon tried to answer this question publicly was in a 2017 infrastructure capacity report, which found that roughly 20 percent of the Pentagon’s infrastructure was excess to need.

However, this new report — responding to a requirement in the Fiscal Year 2024 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which the House and Senate Armed Services Committees just received this month — tells a different story. Taken together, these two reports reveal flawed and incongruous systems for assessing the Pentagon’s costly excess infrastructure capacity, which in turn serve to undermine the case for reducing this excess infrastructure through a new round of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC).

In the new report, dated September 2024, each of the military service branches responded separately to a list of ten prompts included in the NDAA. One of these prompts seeks information on the total number of excess assets (i.e. buildings) and their total square footage. Another requests information on “the number of underused facilities with the associated use rate…”

One of the more obvious shortcomings of this report is that the Army is the only military service that listed total assets and their square footage alongside excess assets and their square footage; the Navy and the Air Force simply listed excess assets and square footage, obscuring the percentage of their assets that are excess to need. By searching a General Services Administration (GSA) database of government property, we were able to correct for this shortcoming (though numbers represent our best estimate because GSA’s methodology for assessing total assets may differ from the Pentagon’s).

The following table compares the 2024 report’s findings (and conclusions drawn from them based on GSA data) to findings in the 2017 report.

Taken at face value, this data appears to show that the Pentagon’s excess infrastructure has shrunk significantly in the seven-and-a-half years since its last public report on infrastructure capacity.

In particular, the Air Force may appear as if it has unlocked the secret to shedding excess capacity without the politically challenging work of a new BRAC process, having cut excess capacity from around 30 percent to less than 0.1 percent in under eight years. That news might come as a surprise to Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. David Allen, who has been pointing to the Air Force’s roughly 30 percent excess infrastructure in a dispute with lawmakers over the Pentagon’s backlog of deferred maintenance at its facilities.

Still, the new data would be welcome news, if it were sound. Unfortunately, methodological differences between the reports make it difficult to assess progress, and insight from an official familiar with the data suggests the new numbers are severely underestimated.

For one, Pentagon officials responsible for listing excess capacity in the report are incentivized to underreport, according to the Department of Defense official who was granted anonymity to discuss the report.

“Facility utilization data included in the report varies widely in its accuracy and timeliness,” they said. “The information is self-reported, labor-intensive to compile, and installations have an incentive to avoid declaring facilities as ‘excess’ because once they change the facility status from ‘active’ to ‘excess,’ the projected sustainment funding associated with the square footage of the facility (or other unit of measure) will drop by 85%.”

This not only makes access to accurate information exceedingly difficult, but it also creates a perverse incentive structure in which installations hang onto empty and partially empty spaces.

“For instance,” the official explained, “if an installation is receiving $250,000 annually in sustainment funding for a warehouse — but the base no longer needs or uses the warehouse — the installation commander and their public works director will likely keep the warehouse listed as ‘active’ rather than changing its real property status as ‘excess’ to avoid slashing their sustainment funds down to a meager $37,500 per year. While it’s empty and locked or boarded up, they can spend almost nothing on it, but still use the $250,000 a year for the installation and use that money on other needed repair and sustainment projects across the base.”

The new study acknowledges some issues with the data. For instance, the Army reported that it lacks “the manpower to do required utilization studies.” In other instances, military departments just blatantly ignored the data request, providing incomplete answers. But the study does not address the fundamentally perverse incentive for installations to underreport excess capacity.

The 2017 report by contrast, paints a much starker picture regarding Pentagon waste. Rather than detailing individual installations, that study assessed excess capacity by service using a baseline year of 1989 to maintain consistency with earlier infrastructure capacity reports.

However, the report itself still underscores that its findings are highly conservative, pointing to its assumption that there was not excess capacity in 1989. As the methodology section explains, “using 1989 as a baseline indicates the excess found in this report is likely conservative because significant excess existed in 1989, as evidenced by the subsequent BRAC closures.”

The Pentagon has said that past BRAC rounds are collectively saving taxpayers some $12 billion per year. Congress should work to authorize a new round of BRAC, which could save taxpayers additional billions of dollars per year, without further delay.

As a start, lawmakers should include a new reporting requirement in this year’s NDAA that requires the Pentagon to report on its excess infrastructure capacity on an annual or biennial basis and lays out clear parameters around methodology to ensure accuracy and consistency across reports. Failing that, lawmakers and taxpayers will continue to be kept in the dark as to the true scale of the Pentagon’s waste and the squandering of taxpayer dollars it entails.

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Kashmir terror attack
Top photo credit: An Indian paramilitary soldier stands guard near the Clock Tower (Ghanta Ghar) in Srinagar, Jammu and Kashmir, on May 7, 2025. (Photo by Firdous Nazir/NurPhoto)

The India-Pakistan Clash: Welcome to the Post-Unipolar World

QiOSK

India responded to the April 22 terrorist attack on tourists in picturesque Kashmir valley by striking multiple sites in Pakistan on Tuesday. This has led to questions as to what Washington should do as these two countries clash. What are U.S. interests in this theater and how should it defend them?

President Trump reacted to the news by saying “We knew something was going to happen…they’ve been fighting for a long time…many, many decades,” and expressing the hope that “it ends very quickly.” In earlier statements, Washington had strongly condemned the terrorist attack that triggered this cycle and also urged calm between the two Asian neighbors.

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Paul Bremer Iraq
Top image credit: Iraqi interim Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih (2nd L) and U.S. administrator Paul Bremer are sandwiched between armed guards before Bremer boarded a U.S. Air Force plane at Baghdad International Airport for his flight out of Iraq June 28, 2004. The United States handed over sovereignty to an interim Iraqi government on Monday, formally ending a 14-month occupation two days earlier than expected to try to forestall guerrilla attacks. REUTERS/Pauline Lubens/San Jose Mercury News-Pool CLH/CRB

Trump considering US-led Iraq-style occupation of Gaza

QiOSK

The Trump administration is reportedly considering a plan for the U.S. to lead the administration of Gaza after Israel’s siege, similar to how Washington ran Iraq after the 2003 American-led invasion.

Reuters reports that there have been “high level” discussions “centered around a transitional government headed by a U.S. official that would oversee Gaza until it had been demilitarized and stabilized, and a viable Palestinian administration had emerged.”:

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gaza pier project
Top photo credit: US military releases photos of pier to deliver aid to Gaza (Reuters)
US military releases photos of pier to deliver aid to Gaza (Reuters)

US Gaza pier op was more than a flop, it was a gigantic hazard

QiOSK

When President Joe Biden announced that the United States military would be building a pier off the shore of Gaza to inject much needed aid to the Palestinians there, he attempted to marshal the old feelings undergirding the "indispensable nation" — we would use our might, know-how, and ability to crack into action to make things right.

Turns out that our might and know-how was desperately lacking and, as time would tell (and skeptics at the time would have told you), making things "right" would have been using the leverage Washington had to tell the Israelis to open up the aid flood gates, not try to build a land bridge to get it in through the back door.

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Capital Washington D.C. Pentagon Department of Defense DOD
Top photo: credit Shutterstock. A 5% hike in US military spending would be absolutely nuts
A 5% hike in US military spending would be absolutely nuts

Report: Pentagon will likely fail audits through 2028

Washington Politics

The Defense Department has not taken adequate measures to address “significant fraud exposure,” and its timeline for fixing “pervasive weaknesses in its finances” is not likely to be met, according to a recently released government report.

The Government Accountability Office conducted the report to assist the Pentagon in meeting its timeline for a clean audit by 2028. DOD has failed every audit since it was legally required to submit to one each year beginning in 2018. In fact, the Pentagon is the only one of 24 federal agencies that has not been able to pass an unmodified financial audit since the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990.

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Jonathan Greenblatt
Top image credit: Anti-Defamation League CEO Jonathan Greenblatt speaks during 2023 National Action Network (NAN) Triumph Awards at Jazz at Lincoln Center in New York on October 16, 2023 (lev radin / Shutterstock.com)

ADL takes on shareholders questioning Israel arms sales

Middle East

The Anti-Defamation League’s mission is to “stop the defamation of the Jewish people and to secure justice and fair treatment for all.”

But over the past year that mission has stretched to include defending some of the world’s biggest weapons companies from shareholder proposals calling for reporting on the human rights impact of their weapons, according to a review of SEC filings, proving itself an important ally for weapons and tech firms seeking to profit from sales of weapons technologies to Israel and avoid accountability for the ways in which their products are used on Palestinians.

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Trump houthis
Top photo credit: Shy News Screenshot

Trump deal with the Houthis: Declare victory and go home?

QiOSK

Trump described the Houthis as having “capitulated,” saying, "We will stop the bombings. They have capitulated... we will take their word that they will not be blowing up ships anymore, and that's the purpose of what we were doing."

Trump’s announcement generated speculation about whether the agreement included Houthi attacks on Israel — Israel was apparently unaware of the deal — as Trump’s statement appeared to pertain exclusively to Red Sea shipping.

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Turkey earthquake
Top photo credit: Hatay Turkey - February, 09,2023 : Aid is distributed to earthquake victims. (Shutterstock)/ BFA-Basin Foto Ajansi)

Americans strongly support basics but are split on other foreign aid

Global Crises

An overwhelming majority of voting-age Americans support providing humanitarian and food aid to developing countries, but they are more divided along partisan lines on other forms of U.S. assistance to nations of the Global South, according to new poll results released by the Pew Research Center.

The findings come as the White House last week released a “skinny budget” that proposed a nearly 48% cut to total foreign aid, including a 40% reduction in humanitarian assistance, for next year and signaled its intent to rescind nearly half the current year’s aid budget appropriated by Congress but not yet spent.

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