the CCP is orchestrating a widespread intelligence-gathering campaign at Stanford. In short, there are Chinese spies at Stanford
Given its dominance in AI, Stanford is academic target number one
of the approximately 1,129 Chinese International students on campus, a select number are actively reporting to the CCP
the CCP demands total compliance and directs individuals toward sensitive information
This summer, a CCP agent impersonated a Stanford student. Under the alias Charles Chen, he approached several students through social media. Anna*, a Stanford student conducting sensitive research on China, began receiving unexpected messages from Charles Chen. At first, Charles's outreach seemed benign: he asked about networking opportunities. But soon, his messages took a strange turn.
Charles inquired whether Anna spoke Mandarin, then grew increasingly persistent and personal. He sent videos of Americans who had gained fame in China, encouraged Anna to visit Beijing, and offered to cover her travel expenses. He would send screenshots of a bank account balance to prove he could buy the plane tickets. Alarmingly, he referenced details about her that Anna had never disclosed to him.
He advised her to enter China for only 24 to 144 hours, short enough, he said, to avoid visa scrutiny by authorities, and urged her to communicate exclusively via the Chinese version of WeChat, a platform heavily monitored by the CCP. When Charles commented on one of her social media posts, asking her to delete screenshots of their conversations, she knew this was serious.
Under the guidance of experts familiar with espionage tactics, Anna contacted authorities. Their investigation revealed that Charles Chen had no affiliation with Stanford. Instead, he had posed as a Stanford student for years, slightly altering his name and persona online, targeting multiple students, nearly all of them women researching China-related topics. Charles Chen was likely an agent of 
Ministry of State Security tasked with identifying sympathetic Stanford students and gathering intel.
For years, concerns about espionage have quietly persisted at Stanford. One student who experienced espionage firsthand was too fearful to recount their story, even via encrypted messaging. “The risk is too high.”
Transnational repression, $64M in funding, and allegations of racial profiling have contributed to a pervasive culture of silence at Stanford and beyond.
MSS uses civilians unaffiliated with the intelligence community to acquire and report sensitive information. The aim of non-traditional collectors isn’t necessarily to steal classified documents but rather to quietly extract the know-how behind American innovation: conclusions from Stanford research projects, methodologies, software, lab workflows, collaborative structures, and even communication channels. Stanford faculty speaking anonymously stated that this non-traditional collection of sensitive technology is extensively practiced at Stanford, particularly in AI and robotics.
In July 2020, Stanford student Chen Song was indicted for lying about her affiliation with the PLA. Prosecutors accused Song of concealing her involvement in the PLA to obtain a J-1 visa to conduct research at Stanford and sending multiple updates to a government entity detailing the nature, results, and value of her research work at Stanford.
The case of Chen Song is the only well-known espionage incident publicly acknowledged by Stanford. However, espionage cases are only disclosed to the public in extraordinary circumstances. Claims of racial profiling have the potential to derail investigations, leading to strong institutional pushback against investigating these issues. Therefore, it is Stanford's policy and that of investigative authorities to maintain privacy, choosing instead to cancel student visas without public notice.
stanfordreview.org/investigation-