Related Content
in Kings County
Ruling
JOSH ANDERSON VS. AMY BEASOM ET AL
Apr 30, 2025 |
CGC24614589
Matter on the Law & Motion/Discovery Calendar for Wednseday, April 30, 2025, line 11, 3 - PLAINTIFF JOSH ANDERSON Motion For Order Compelling Production Of Documents (tentative ruling part 1 of 2) Plaintiff Josh Anderson moves to compel further responses to his requests for production of documents, set one, and for monetary and evidentiary sanctions. For the reasons stated herein, the court grants the motion in part and denies it in part. The relevant factual history and procedural history are set out in the court's companion order concerning the motion to compel further responses to form interrogatories. Beasom has provided objection-free verified supplemental responses. Her responses aver that she has only two documents related to her mortgage in her possession, custody, or control. Beasom's obligation to produce documents extends to documents she can readily obtain from her agents such as a mortgage broker. It is not clear whether Beasom has made a diligent inquiry. In addition, CCP 2031.230 provides that "A representation of inability to comply with the particular demand for inspection ... shall affirm that a diligent search and a reasonable inquiry has been made in an effort to comply with that demand. This statement shall also specify whether the inability to comply is because the particular item or category has never existed, has been destroyed, has been lost, misplaced, or stolen, or has never been, or is no longer, in the possession, custody, or control of the responding party. The statement shall set forth the name and address of any natural person or organization known or believed by that party to have possession, custody, or control of that item or category of item." Here, where Anderson's RFPs relate to categories of documents that likely exist somewhere, such as documents about Beasom's bills, mortgage, and refinancing, even if they are no longer in Beasom's possession, Beasom is obliged to respond with the information required by 2031.230. Beasom is ordered to make further responses by May 15, 2025 to all RFPs in set one and to comply with 2031.230 in her amended responses. Anderson seeks sanctions. The court does not award evidentiary sanctions in light of Beasom's supplemental response but does find Beasom's position lacks substantial justification. Beasom shall pay $500 in sanctions to Anderson by May 15, 2025. [END OF TENTTIVE RULING PART 1, SEE PART 2] = (301/CVA)
Ruling
ANDRE WILLIAMS ET AL VS. SAN FRANCISCO HOUSING AUTHORITY 1815 EGBERT AVE ET AL
Apr 29, 2025 |
CGC24616313
Real Property/Housing Court Law and Motion Calendar for April 29, 2025 line 3. DEFENDANT'S DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT is SUSTAINED with leave to amend for Plaintiffs to state facts showing compliance with the Tort Claims Act, including the date of compliance and whether the complaint was filed pursuant to an express rejection or a rejection by operation of law. Plaintiffs shall have 30 days from notice of entry of order to file an amended complaint. The Court further notes that Plaintiffs appear to have added a claim for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress. Following an order sustaining a demurrer . . . the plaintiff may amend his or her complaint only as authorized by the court's order. [Citation.] The plaintiff may not amend the complaint to add a new cause of action without having obtained permission to do so. (Harris v. Wachovia Mortgage, FSB (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1018, 1023. Plaintiffs' claim for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress shall be excluded from any further amended complaint unless and until Plaintiffs seek leave. =(501/CFH) Parties may appear in-person, telephonically or via Zoom [Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849; Phone Dial in: (669) 254-5252]. Parties who intend to appear at the hearing must give notice to opposing parties and the court promptly, but no later than 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing unless the tentative ruling has specified that a hearing is required. Notice of contesting a tentative ruling shall be provided by sending an email to the court to Department501ContestTR@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. A party may not argue at the hearing if the opposing party is not so notified and the opposing party does not appear.
Ruling
Susana Saldana vs Della Avina Manzo, et al.
Apr 29, 2025 |
22CV-02149
22CV-02149 Susana Saldana v. Della Avina Manzo, et al.
Trial Setting Conference
Appearance required. Parties who wish to appear remotely must contact the clerk of the
court at (209) 725-4111 to seek permission and arrange for a remote appearance. On
April 15, 2025, the parties agreed to binding arbitration before Weldon Mattos and
requested time to execute an appropriate agreement. Appear to address whether this
matter should be dismissed or stayed pending arbitration.
Ruling
Abdo Saeed vs. City of Huron
Apr 29, 2025 |
24CECG02366
Re: Abdo Saeed v. City of Huron
Superior Court Case No. 24CECG02366
Hearing Date: April 29, 2025 (Dept. 502)
Motion: by Defendant to Expunge Lis Pendens
Tentative Ruling:
To deny. (Code Civ. Proc., § 405.32.)
Explanation:
Legal Standard
At any time after notice of pendency of action has been recorded, any party may
apply to the court to expunge the notice. (Code Civ. Proc. § 405.4.) The court shall
expunge the lis pendens unless (1) the pleading contains a real property claim; and (2)
plaintiff provides, by a preponderance of the evidence, the probable validity of plaintiff’s
real property claim. (Code Civ. Proc. § 405.3.)
Application
Real Property Claim. A real property claim is one that, if meritorious, affects title
to, or the right of possession of, specific real property, or the use of an easement,
identified in the pleading. (Code Civ. Proc. § 405.4.) A claim for specific performance is
a real property claim. (Hilberg v. Superior Court (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 539, 542.)
Here, the moving party does not appear to dispute that the complaint alleges a
real property claim. At issue is the City Property identified by APN 075-110-26. Plaintiffs’
second cause of action in their complaint is for specific performance following a breach
of contract, with the end result ultimately being the exchange of the City Property for the
plaintiffs’ Myrtle Property. There is a real property claim.
Probable Validity. Expungement of an improper lis pendens is mandatory, not
discretionary. If the court finds that the claimant has not established by a preponderance
of the evidence the probable validity of the real property claim, the lis pendens must be
expunged. (Code Civ. Proc. § 405.32.) Thus, a motion to expunge under section 405.32
requires an evidentiary hearing on the probability that the plaintiff will be able to establish
a valid real property claim. (BGJ Associates, LLC v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th
952, 957.) “‘Probable validity,’ with respect to a real property claim, means that it is more
likely than not that the claimant will obtain a judgment against the defendant on the
claim.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 405.3.)
“Unlike other motions, the burden is on the party opposing the motion to
expunge—i.e., the claimant-plaintiff—to establish the probable validity of the underlying
claim. The claimant-plaintiff must establish the probable validity of the claim by a
preponderance of the evidence… That is, the plaintiff must ‘at least establish a prima
facie case. If the defendant makes an appearance, the court must then consider the
relative merits of the positions of the respective parties and make a determination of the
probable outcome of the litigation.’” (Howard S. Wright Construction Co. v. Superior
Court (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 314, 319, internal citations and footnotes omitted, emphasis
added.) “Thus, a showing of good faith and a proper purpose are no longer sufficient to
overcome a motion to expunge. The claimant must show a probably valid claim.”
(Palmer v. Zaklama (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1378, internal citation omitted.)
Here, plaintiffs have opposed the motion, and argue that there is probable validity
of their claim for specific performance. “To obtain specific performance after a breach
of contract, a plaintiff must generally show: ‘(1) the inadequacy of his legal remedy; (2)
an underlying contract that is both reasonable and supported by adequate
consideration; (3) the existence of a mutuality of remedies; (4) contractual terms which
are sufficiently definite to enable the court to know what it is to enforce; and (5) a
substantial similarity of the requested performance to that promised in the contract.’”
(Real Estate Analytics, LLC v. Vallas (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 463, 472.)
Plaintiffs argue the well-known principle that there is a presumption of uniqueness
and therefore inadequacy of damages when the subject matter is real property. The
contract is reasonable, as the consideration for the underlying contract is an exchange
of property for property, which is adequate consideration. Plaintiffs assert that mutuality
of remedies exists as both parties undertook reciprocal obligations to convey their
respective parcels. Such mutuality is unrefuted by defendant. The agreement identifies
the two specific parcels of land to be exchanged and presents essential terms of the
contract to be followed. There is a similarity of contract and requested performance as
the exchange sought by plaintiffs is that which is outlined in the parties’ agreement.
As plaintiffs can establish a prima facie case for their claim of specific
performance, the court must consider the merits of the respective positions of the parties.
The parties are in dispute as to when and if the agreement was properly executed.
Plaintiffs’ position is that the City and one of the plaintiffs executed the agreement on
June 26, 2023, six days after the date for close of escrow contemplated by the
agreement (i.e. June 20, 2023). (Saeed Decl., ¶ 4.) Plaintiffs state that the City knew and
agreed for the other plaintiff to sign the agreement on his later return to the country. (Id.,
¶ 5.) Plaintiffs claim they didn’t know the City didn’t intend to proceed with the deal until
October 25, 2023. (Id., ¶ 8.) Plaintiffs offer deposition testimony of Juanita Veliz (City Clerk
of the City of Huron) and Rey Leon (Mayor of the City of Huron) to argue that the date of
execution of the agreement by both parties is in question.
Defendant relies on the e-mail sent by Juanita Veliz on June 12, 2023 to counter
that the agreement was already “corrected and signed” by the City when picked up by
plaintiffs or their representatives. (Costanzo Decl., ¶ 10.) Defendant contends that it was
solely the plaintiffs who did not provide the City with a fully executed copy of the
agreement prior to October 26, 2023. (Id., ¶ 11.) Defendant indicates it was understood
to be the City’s responsibility to deposit the agreement into escrow. (Id., ¶ 12.)
Defendant’s position is that it could not be done without receipt of the fully executed
agreement. It’s not made clear when the agreement fully executed by all parties was
finalized, but it appears to be at least on or prior to October 26, 2023. (Id., ¶ 11.)
Considering the present issues of fact and the parties’ conflicting evidence,
defendant has not sufficiently demonstrated that plaintiffs prima facie case for specific
performance cannot stand. There is a fully executed agreement before the court and a
showing that plaintiffs were ready and willing to perform the contract. At this time, the
court is inclined to find that plaintiffs’ claim of specific performance has probable validity
and deny the motion to expunge lis pendens.
Attorney’s Fees
Under Code of Civil Procedure section 405.38, “[t]he court shall direct that the
party prevailing on any motion under this chapter be awarded the reasonable attorney's
fees and costs of making or opposing the motion unless the court finds that the other
party acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition
of attorney's fees and costs unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 405.38, italics added.) Thus, an
award of fees is mandatory unless the court specifically finds that plaintiffs acted with
substantial justification or there are other circumstances that would make the imposition
of fees unjustified.
Here, plaintiff does not request any costs or fees. The court will not speculate to
award attorney’s fees and costs, without prejudice to the prevailing party bringing a
separate fees motion.
Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Procedure
section 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order
adopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerk
will constitute notice of the order.
Tentative Ruling
Issued By: KCK on 04/28/25 .
(Judge’s initials) (Date)
Ruling
ALL GOOD REAL ESTATE, LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY VS THE 10786 MISSOURI AVE, LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY
Apr 29, 2025 |
24SMCV05526
Case Number:
24SMCV05526
Hearing Date:
April 29, 2025
Dept:
205
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles
West District
Beverly Hills
Courthouse /
Department
20
5
ALL GOOD REAL ESTATE, LLC
,
Plaintiff,
v.
THE 10786 MISSOURI AVE, LLC,
et al.,
Defendant
s
.
Case No.:
24SMCV0
5526
Hearing Date:
April 29
,
202
5
[
TENTATIVE] order
RE:
DEFENDANT
s
MOTION
FOR
ATTORNEYS fees and costs
BACKGROUND
This case arises out of
a real estate transaction
.
Defendant
The 10786 Missouri Ave, LLC (Seller)
owns the
real property
located
at 10786
Missouri Ave, Los Angeles, CA 90025
(the Property)
.
In
December 2023, Seller listed the Property for sale
.
Plaintiff
So Good Real Estate, LLC (Buyer)
submitted
an offer
to buy
the Property for $4
.2 million
. Seller accepted Buyer
s offer and returned a counter
-
signed copy of the Purchase Agreement to Buyer
s agent. (
Id.
at ¶5
; Ex. 1 to Zacky Decl.)
A dispute arose between the parties
regarding
the sale, and Buyer filed suit
,
recording a
lis
pendens
on the Property
.
Seller successfully moved to expunge the
lis
pendens
.
This hearing is on Sellers motion for attorneys fees and costs
.
Seller argues it is entitled to reasonable attorneys fees and costs
because it is
the prevailing party on a motion to expunge
lis
pendens
, and Buyer cannot show it acted
with substantial justification or that an award would be unjust
.
Seller seeks $11,250 in fees and $60 in costs
.
LEGAL STANDARD
Code of Civil Procedure
section 405.38
reads: The court shall direct that the party prevailing on any motion under this chapter be awarded the reasonable attorneys fees and costs of making or opposing the motion unless the court finds that the other party acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of attorney's fees and costs unjust.
The award of attorneys fees is mandatory unless the specified exceptions apply
.
(
Castro v. Superior Court
(2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1018
.)
DISCUSSION
Buyer
argues that fees should not be awarded because it has substantial justification for opposing the motion to expunge
lis
pendens
.
Buyer argues that the only evidence before the Court was that
the LOA was a document required by the City of Los Angeles
.
Buyer further argues that the Seller
failed to
show the LOA would have an adverse effect on Seller, which was an exception to the requirement in the cooperation agreement
.
While
Buyers arguments were
ultimately
rejected
by the Court,
they were not
entirely
meritless
,
and the Court
concludes fees are not warranted
.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court
DENIES
the motion
for attorneys fees
.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:
April 29
, 202
5
___________________________
Edward B. Moreton, Jr.
Judge of the Superior Court
Ruling
Julia Castro vs. Amy Zwaan
Apr 29, 2025 |
23CECG02824
Re: Julia Castro v. Amy Zwaan
Superior Court Case No. 23CECG02824
Hearing Date: April 29, 2025 (Dept. 503)
Motion: to Set Aside Default of Cross-Defendant Humane Society of
the United States
Tentative Ruling:
To grant the motion to set aside the default entered as to cross-defendant
Humane Society of the United States. Cross-defendant is to file its answer within ten (10)
days of the clerk’s service of the minute order and to serve the same at the soonest
available opportunity.
Cross-complainant Transamerica Life Insurance Company’s request for fees is
granted in the amount of $1,437.97, payable by counsel for Humane Society of the United
States to counsel for Transamerica Life Insurance Company within thirty (30) days from
the day of this order.
Explanation:
Timeliness of Filings
“It is well settled that the appearance of a party at the hearing of a motion and
his or her opposition to the motion on its merits is a waiver of any defects or irregularities
in the notice of motion. (Alliance Bank v. Murray (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 1, 7, quoting
Lacey v. Bertone (1949) 33 Cal.2d 649, 651; Carlton v. Quint (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 690,
697.) If the opposing party appears at all, they should limit their argument to objections
based on the defective notice. Otherwise, the court will treat their opposition on the
merits as a waiver of the defects. (Ibid.)
Cross-complainant Transamerica Life Insurance Company (“TLIC” or “cross-
complainant”) opposed the motion on its merits and did not limit its response to
untimeliness of Estelle J. Munn’s late filed declaration. Therefore, any untimeliness in the
service of the notice of motion and its supporting documents is waived.
Legal Standard
The trial court has broad discretion to vacate a judgment and/or the clerk’s entry
of default that preceded it. However, that discretion can be exercised only if the moving
party establishes a proper ground for relief, by the proper procedure, and within the
statutory time limits. (Cruz v. Fagor America, Inc. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 488, 495.)
Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 473, subdivision (b), relief is either mandatory
or discretionary. Relief is mandatory where it is based on an attorney’s affidavit of fault.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).) Relief is discretionary where it is based on mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. (Ibid.)
“The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal
representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him
or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.
Application for this relief shall be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other
pleading proposed to be filed therein, otherwise the application shall not be granted,
and shall be made within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after the
judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).)
Discretionary Relief
The instant application for relief was made on the grounds of inadvertence,
surprise, mistake, or excusable neglect. (Notice, 2:1.) Estelle J. Munn, General Counsel
and authorized representative for cross-defendant Humane Society of the United States
(“HSUS” or “cross-defendant”), provided a declaration attesting to her inadvertence,
surprise, mistake, or excusable neglect which caused HSUS to be unaware of the cross-
complaint until after default had been entered. (Munn Decl., ¶ 7.) Ms. Munn states that
while cross-defendant’s office received the cross-complaint on or about May 24, 2024
(Id., ¶ 4), she was unaware of the cross-complaint until August 6, 2024 (Id., ¶ 7) due to a
delay caused by absent staff and lack of priority markers. (Id., ¶ 5-6.)
There appears to have been a slight delay in pursuing the present application for
relief, as counsel for cross-defendant, Noah B. Herbold, states that Ms. Munn directed him
to communicate with cross-complainant’s counsel “[b]eginning on or about October 1,
2024[.]” (Herbold Decl., ¶ 4.) This is two months later that Ms. Munn indicates she became
aware of the cross-complaint. Subsequent discussions after September of 2024 (when
cross-complainant filed its default judgment packet) to stipulate to set aside the default
were unsuccessful, and this motion was filed on the last possible day. Regardless, it was
timely.
The court in its discretion intends to grant the motion to set aside default, as the
cross-defendant’s oversights fall under inadvertence, mistake, and excusable neglect,
and appear to have had an insignificant impact on the case as a whole. Critically, cross-
complainant has presented no evidence of prejudice, and in fact it has been
demonstrated that cross-complainant was willing to stipulate to set aside the default on
the condition of payment of costs and attorney fees. (See Reply, 2:3, Exh. A.) The moving
party filed a copy of its proposed answer to be filed. The notice and motion were filed
exactly six months from the entry of default (subject to California Rule of Court, rule
1.10(b)). As such, the court finds the elements for discretionary relief to have been met.
Objections
Code of Civil Procedure section 2009 authorizes the use of declarations in motion
proceedings. Declarations must be based on personal knowledge and not solely on
information and belief. (Kendall v. Barker (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 619, 624.) Objections 1
and 2 by cross-complainant are overruled, as Ms. Munn is making statements as to when
and how she received the cross-complaint. Objection 3 is sustained, as Mr. Herbold is
attempting to relay information on behalf of Ms. Munn that he does not rest in his personal
knowledge.
Fees
As cross-defendant’s relief is not based in an attorney affidavit of fault,
compensatory legal fees and costs are not required. However, where the court grants
relief from a default, it has discretion to “[g]rant other relief as is appropriate.” (Code Civ.
Proc., § 473, subd. (c)(1)(C).)
Here, it appears cross-defendant waited until the last possible minute to act and
still remain “timely,” during which delay cross-complainant was within its right to seek
default and default judgment. However, the court in its discretion sees fit to reduce the
amount of sanctions, as sanctions in the amount of $6,709.97 (Horstmann Decl., ¶ 10) is
excessive for a default and default judgment application. Counsel states costs of $537.97,
which the court will allow. Counsel reflects his hourly rate as $300/hour, and the court will
allow for recovery of 3 hours for work in relation to the default judgment sought. Cross-
defendant is to pay cross-complainant in the total amount of $1,437.97.
Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Procedure
section 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order
adopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerk
will constitute notice of the order.
Tentative Ruling
Issued By: JS on 4/28/2025 .
(Judge’s initials) (Date)
Ruling
Maria Anguiano vs. John Balquist
Apr 25, 2025 |
C23-02656
C23-02656
CASE NAME: MARIA ANGUIANO VS. JOHN BALQUIST
*HEARING ON MOTION IN RE: TO BE RELIEVED AS COUNSEL
FILED BY: ANGUIANO, MARIA M.
*TENTATIVE RULING:*
The motion to be relieved as counsel is granted. The order shall be effective upon the filing of the proof
of service of the signed order upon the client.
Ruling
MCCONNELL vs KIA AMERICA, INC.
Apr 28, 2025 |
CVRI2403948
MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER
RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFFS'
MCCONNELL VS KIA
CVRI2403948 REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF
AMERICA, INC.
DOCUMENTS, SET ONE BY MORGAN
MCCONNELL, TODD GALEANA
Tentative Ruling: The Court GRANTS the motion as to RFP nos. 1-14. The Court GRANTS the
motion as to RFP nos. 15-29, but limited to rules, policies, and procedures applicable to vehicles
of the same year, make, and model as the Vehicle. The Court GRANTS the motion as to RFP
RFP no. 30, but limited to complaints about the defects/nonconformities that Plaintiffs contend
impaired the use, value, and safety or the Vehicle.
The Court DENIES the motion as to RFP no. 31.
Preview
FILED: KINGS COUNTY CLERK 09/02/2021 03:34 PM INDEX NO. 516989/2021 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 10 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 09/02/2021 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF KINGS ________________________________________________X Index No.: 516989/2021 SLATE ADVANCE Plaintiff, AFFIRMATION OF SERVICE vs. MBJ FINISHED SOLUTIONS LLC; MBJ CONCRETE DEFENSES FINISHING CORP DBA MBJ FINISHED SOLUTIONS; MBJ CONCRETE FINISHING and EBER \ RAYNALD KERNIZAN and RESLANDE SEUS Defendants ________________________________________________X Mikhail Usher, Esq., an attorney duly admitted in the State of New York affirms under the penalties of perjury as follows: I am the attorney for Defendants in the above entitled action. I hereby certify that on September 2, 2021, I served a true copy of an ANSWER by NYSCEF, additionally by properly sealing and enclosing in a post-paid wrapper by First Class Mail with Tracking, addressed to Counsel for Plaintiffs at: To: Ariel Bouskila, Esq. Berkovitch & Bouskila, PLLC 80 Broad St Suite 3303 New York, NY 10004 Dated: Brooklyn, New York September 2, 2021 Respectfully Submitted, __/s/ Mikhail Usher_____________ Mikhail Usher, Esq. USHER LAW GROUP P.C. Counsel for Defendants 2711 Harway Avenue Brooklyn, New York 11214 Phone: (718) 484-7510 Fax: (718) 866-8566 E-mail: musheresq@gmail.com 1 of 1