Ruling
Midwest Employers Casualty Company vs LAVAN CONSTRUCTION
Apr 09, 2025 |
24CV441915
24CV441915 Midwest Plaintiff’s motion to vacate dismissal, enforce settlement, and enter judgment is
21 Employers GRANTED. See line 10 for complete ruling. Court will prepare formal order on
Casualty Company the motion. Plaintiff is ordered to submit a proposed form of judgment within
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vs LAVAN 10 days of the service date of the formal order.
23 CONSTRUCTION
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7 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
8 COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA
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10 SABSE TECHNOLOGIES, INC., a California Case No. 18CV335735
Corporation; and SABEER BHATIA,
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Plaintiffs, [Tentative] ORDER SUSTAINING
12 DEFENDANTS’ DEMURRER, IN PART,
13 v. WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND
14 YOGESH PATEL, an individual; DHRUV
PATEL, an individual; GLOBAL WALLET, a
15 Delaware Corporation; RAVI PATEL, an
individual; and DOES 1 through 10 inclusive,
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17 Defendants.
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Before the Court is Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint (“FAC”).
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Pursuant to California Rule of Court 3.1308, the Court issues its tentative ruling.
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I. Alleged Facts
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23 Sabeer Bhatia (“Bhatia”) and Yogesh Patel (“Y. Patel”) became acquainted in 2004. In the
24 same year, Y. Patel induced Bhatia to invest in Arzoo.com (India) Pvt. Ltd (“ARZOO”), based in India,
25 and become its majority shareholder. (FAC ¶¶ 13, 14)
26 In 2008, Y. Patel induced Bhatia to co-found SABSE, a telecommunication software company,
27 and become its majority shareholder. SABSE owns Sabse Technologies Pvt. Ltd., a subsidiary in
28 India. Later, it was agreed that Y. Patel would contribute his network and infrastructure, and Bhatia
would fund the operations of both ARZOO and SABSE. Y. Patel was in charge of SABSE’s and
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1 ARZOO’s day-to-day operations and reported to Bhatia. Initially, Y. Patel was the chief executive
2 officer and president of SABSE and in 2011 he also became its Chief Technology Officer. (FAC ¶¶ 16-
3 22)
4 On February 17, 2018, Y. Patel resigned from SABSE via email to Bhatia, as the accounts for
5 ARZOO and SABSE were being audited. Bhatia now alleges, among other things, that (1) Y. Patel, and
6 Dhruv Patel (“D. Patel”), improperly diverted the work of SABSE’s employees and vendors to help
7 Global Wallet, (2) Y. Patel improperly took money from SABSE’s account and charged the company’s
8 credit card for his own personal use, (3) Y. Patel diverted ARZOO funds and employees’ work to
9 benefit Global Wallet and for his own personal use.
10 Global Wallet was originally a California corporation, incorporated by Y. Patel, and later
11 became a Delaware corporation with D. Patel as its Chief executive officer. (FAC ¶¶ 5-8)
12 Plaintiffs initiated this action on September 30, 2018, and subsequently amended their
13 complaint on April 12, 2019, alleging causes of action for (breach of fiduciary duty – undivided
14 loyalty, (2) breach of fiduciary duty – failure to use reasonable care, (3) conversion1, (4) fraud2, (5)
15 fraudulent conveyance, and (6) unjust enrichment.
16 II. Legal Standard
17 “The party against whom complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may object, by
18 demurrer or answer as provided in [Code of Civil Procedure] section 430.30, to the pleading on any
19 one or more of the following grounds: (e) The pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute
20 cause of action, (f) The pleading is uncertain.” (Code Civ. Proc., 430.10, subds. (e) (f).) A demurrer
21 may be utilized by "[t]he party against whom complaint has been filed" to object to the legal
22 sufficiency of the pleading as whole, or to any "cause of action" stated therein, on one or more of the
23 grounds enumerated by statute. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.10, 430.50, subd. (a).)
24 The court treats demurrer “as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not
25 contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Piccinini v. Cal. Emergency Management
26 Agency (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 685, 688, citing Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “A
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Stated as the fourth cause of action in the caption.
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Stated as the third cause of action in the caption.
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1 demurrer tests only the legal sufficiency of the pleading. It admits the truth of all material factual
2 allegations in the complaint; the question of plaintiff's ability to prove these allegations, or the
3 possible difficulty in making such proof does not concern the reviewing court.” (Committee on
4 Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 213-214 (Committee on
5 Children's Television).) In ruling on demurrers, courts may consider matters subject to judicial
6 notice. (Scott v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 743, 751.) Evidentiary facts
7 found in exhibits attached to complaint can be considered on demurrer. (Frantz v. Blackwell (1987)
8 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94.)
9 III. Judicial Notice
10 Defendants request for judicial notice of SABSE’s filing history with the California Secretary
11 of State and its Statements of Information filed on February 6, 2009, and July 12, 2018 is GRANTED,
12 IN PART. The Court will take judicial notice of the existence of these documents but not the truth of
13 their content. (Stevens v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 594, 607-608, citing Hughes v. Blue
14 Cross of Northern California (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 832, 856.)
15 IV. Analysis
16 A. Fraud (Intentional Misrepresentation)– Against Y. Patel
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The elements of a fraud claim are (1) misrepresentation; (2) knowledge of falsity; (3) intent
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to deceive; and (4) reliance and resulting damage. (Vega v. Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue (2004) 121
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Cal. App. 4th 282, 290.) “To withstand demurrer, the facts constituting every element of fraud must
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be alleged with particularity, and the claim cannot be salvaged by references to the general policy
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favoring the liberal construction of pleadings.” (Goldrich v. Natural Y Surgical Specialties, Inc. (1994)
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25 Cal. App. 4th 772, 782.) The particularity requirement necessitates pleadings facts that “show
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how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.” (Lazar v.
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Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal. 4th 631, 645.)
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Defendants contend Plaintiffs’ claim is not pled with the requisite particularity because there
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are no particular facts alleged regarding (1) specific false statements, (2) many false statements
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were made, (3) when and where those false statements were made, (4) Y. Patel knowledge of the
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falsity of his statements, (5) the reasonableness of Bhatia’s reliance on those false statements, or
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1 (6) which Doe defendant conspired with Y. Patel to make false statements. Defendants further
2 argue Bhatia’s reliance solely on Y. Patel’s statements was not even plausible since he was both the
3 chairman of the board and SABSE’s chief financial officer during relevant times.
4 There are two purposes served by the specific-pleading requirement. First, it is designed to
5 assist the defendant in preparing a defense by ensuring the allegations are sufficiently specific to
6 allow the defendant to fully understand the nature of the charge. (Committee on Children's
7 Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp., Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods
8 Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 216-217; Stansfield v. Starkey (1990) 220 Cal. App. 3d 59,
9 73.) Accordingly, “less specificity is required when ‘it appears from the nature of the allegations that
10 the defendant must necessarily possess full information concerning the facts of the controversy,’ . .
11 .” (Committee on Children's Television, Inc., supra, at p. 217, quoting Bradley v. Hartford Acc. & Indem.
12 Co. (1973) 30 Cal. App. 3d 818, 825.) Second, it is intended to assist the courts to weed out
13 unmeritorious actions based on the pleadings by requiring the plaintiff to allege sufficient facts to
14 establish a prima facie case of fraud. (Id. at pp. 216-217.)
15 With these purposes in mind, Plaintiffs’ fraud allegations pass muster because they allege the
16 when, to whom, and by what means requirements. When: between 2009 until his resignation in
17 2018. To whom: Bhatia. By what means: writing (emails and reports) and orally. The FAC further
18 alleges that between 2009 and 2018:
19 • Y. Patel falsely and repeatedly told Bhatia that the software for SABSE’s business was being
worked on by engineers in India, while he knew those engineers were working on software
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for Global Wallet.
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22 • Y. Patel falsely and repeatedly told Bhatia they needed additional funds for SABSE’s payroll,
rent, and expenses while he diverted the funds to Global Wallet and other Defendants.
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24 • Y. Patel falsely and repeatedly told Bhatia that his wired funds were used for legitimate
business purposes and business needs of SABSE and ARZOO while he diverted the funds to
25 Defendants.
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• Y. Patel knowingly and falsely told Bhatia that SABSE was in the final stages of finalizing
27 contracts with telecommunication giants and it would be profitable shortly.
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• Y. Patel knew his statements were false since he was in charge of the daily operations for
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1 SABSE and directed the work of at least 40 of the 89 SABSE employees to non SABSE
platform.
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3 • In 2016 Y. Patel reported to Bhatia that they needed to hire and pay former employees of
SABSE’s subsidiary under ARZOO. As a result, Bhatia wired $5.658 million to ARZOO. Y.
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Patel’s intention was to cover his embezzlement from SABSE and funnel funds from ARZOO,
5 which he did from 2016 through early 2018.
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• Y. Patel’s reports on SABSE’s financial needs to Bhatia were false and were made to provide
7 sufficient funds for him to plunder.
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• Y. Patel’s November 21, 2013, email to Bhatia is an example of his misrepresentations; in
9 which he informed Bhatia they had a verbal approval to deploy SABSE’s platform on a
10 revenue share basis at a major carrier. (FAC Ex. A)
11 (FAC ¶¶ 46, 48, 49, 55, 56, 58, 96-103.)
12 The FAC’s allegations sufficiently put Defendants on notice and permit the Court to prima
13 facie analyze their sufficiency. (See, CCTV, Inc., supra, 35 Cal.3d at pp. 217-218 [holding fraud
14 allegations concerning “all ads for sugared cereals within a given four-year period” was “sufficient
15 to define the subject of the complaint and provide notice to defendants”]); Wald v. Truspeed
16 Motorcars, LLC (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 378, 394, [holding allegations of “[o]ral statements made at
17 a meeting” in “June 2008” at company offices alleged fraud with sufficient particularity]; Murphy v.
18 BDO Seidman (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 687, 693, [“The complaint thus provides enough information
19 for respondents to know what purported falsehoods they must defend against”].)
20 Defendants’ claim that failure to identify the doe defendant also does not defeat this claim.
21 Code Civil Procedure section 474 specifically provides that an unknown party can be identified as a
22 “Doe” in a pleading. While section 474 refers only to ignorance of the name of a defendant, “[t]he
23 words ignorant of the name of a defendant are construed broadly to include other kinds of
24 ignorance which explain the failure to name a person as a defendant until sometime later.” (Miller
25 v. Thomas (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 440, 444.) “Even a person whose identity was known to the
26 plaintiff when the action was filed may be brought in under § 474 as a ‘Doe’ defendant if the plaintiff
27 was initially unaware of that person’s true relationship to the injuries upon which the action was
28 based.” (Id., at pp. 444-445.) “In determining the propriety of a plaintiffs Doe allegations in the
original complaint, the courts look only at the plaintiffs’ actual knowledge at that time. The plaintiff
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1 is not charged with knowledge of the defendant’s true identity which could have been acquired by
2 reasonable diligence.” (Barrows v. American Motors Corp. (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 1,10 fn. 4.)
3 More importantly, adequacy of allegations against Doe Defendants has no impact on the
4 adequacy of allegations against Y. Patel, who is the sole named defendant in this claim.
5 Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action for fraud is OVERRULED.
6 B. Breach of Fiduciary Duties – Against Y. Patel & Does 1 to 2
7 To prevail on a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, Plaintiffs must establish (1) the existence
8 of a fiduciary relationship, (2) breach of that duty, (3) causation, and (4) damages caused by that
9 breach. (Mosier v. Southern California Physicians Insurance Exchange (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1022;
10 Pierce v. Lyman (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1101.) A “fiduciary” relationship is synonymous with a
11 “confidential” relationship and describes “any relation existing between parties to a transaction
12 wherein one of the parties is duty bound to act with the utmost good faith for the benefit of the other
13 party. Such a relation ordinarily arises where a confidence is reposed by one person in the integrity
14 of another, and in such a relation the party in whom the confidence is reposed, if he [or she]
15 voluntarily accepts or assumes to accept the confidence, can take no advantage from his [or her]
16 acts relating to the interest of the other party without the latter's knowledge or consent…. [citations
17 omitted].” (Richelle L. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop (2003) 106 Cal. App. 4th 257, 270 - 271.)
18 Defendants contend Plaintiff’s first and second causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty
19 sound in fraud and as such fail for lack of particularity because the FAC (1) alleges Defendants’
20 fiduciary duty arose from their collective roles as officer / co-founder / shareholder without
21 specifying the exact role and when each defendant occupied that role, (2) fails to identify Does 1
22 and 2 and how they owe a fiduciary duty to Plaintiff, (3) fails to state particular facts of how Y. Patel’s
23 alleged wrongdoing caused the alleged damages, and (4) fails to specify the amount of damages with
24 supporting particular facts.
25 Plaintiffs do not dispute these claims sound in fraud. “[A]ny action sounding in fraud … must
26 be pleaded with particularity,” a standard informally known as the heightened pleading
27 requirement for claims of fraud. (City of Pomona v. Sup. Ct. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 793, 803.)
28 Here, the FAC alleges:
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1 • Y. Patel and Bhatia were business partners and they co-founded SABSE in 2008 and acted as
its officers. Initially, Y. Patel was SABSE’s chief executive officer and later in 2011 he also
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became the chief technology officer. Y. Patel continued in these positions until February 17,
3 2018.
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• Y. Patel breached his fiduciary duty by diverting SABSE’s employees and vendors to work
5 on Global Wallet’s projects while contracted with SABSE; redirecting and utilizing funds
6 from SABSE’s accounts for his own personal expenditure; wrote company checks to cash
and deposited them into his personal accounts; used company credit cards for personal and
7 family expenses.
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• Utilizing SABSE’s funds, Y. Patel paid $42,340 to those with no entitlement to SABSE funds;
9 paid $39,400 in checks written to cash for himself; charged $1.6 million in personal
10 expenses on credit card; paid $110,000 in checks to himself; and paid $61,945.16 on his
personal Chase credit card.
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12 • Damages sustained for diverting employees and vendors to Global Wallet are currently
unknown, however exceed $20 million subject to proof at trial.
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(FAC ¶¶ 22, 24-29, 31, 37, 40, 41, 64, 73.)
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These allegations sufficiently allege each element of these claims. Indeed, Defendants do not
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dispute the existence of a fiduciary relationship between Y. Patel and SABSE; instead, they
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unpersuasively argue the FAC lacks particularity since it does not specify which role gave rise to Y.
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Patel’s fiduciary duty. As for damages, the FAC alleges the type of suffered damages with specificity.
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It is not necessary for the FAC to state particular facts establishing a specific dollar amount. (Furia
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v. Helm (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 945, 956.) Finally, as analyzed above, the FAC is not rendered
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insufficient due to deficient identification of Doe Defendants.
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Accordingly, Defendants’ demurrer to first and second causes of action for breach of
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fiduciary duty are OVERRULED.
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C. Conversion – Against Y. Patel, D. Patel, Global Wallet & Does 3 to 10
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“Conversion is the wrongful exercise of dominion over the property of another. The elements
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of a conversion claim are: (1) the plaintiff's ownership or right to possession of the property; (2)
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the defendant’s conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of property rights; and (3) damages.”
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(Hodges v. County of Placer (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 537, 551.) “[C]onversion is a strict liability tort. It
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does not require bad faith, knowledge, or even negligence; it requires only that the defendant has
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1 intentionally done the act depriving the plaintiff of his or her rightful possession.” (Voris v. Lampert
2 (2019) 7 Cal. 5th 1141, 1158.) “To mandate a conversion action ‘it is not essential that plaintiff shall
3 be the absolute owner of the property converted but she must show that she was entitled to
4 immediate possession at the time of conversion.’” (Hartford Financial Corp. v. Burns (1979) 96
5 Cal.App.3d 591, 598.)
6 Defendants again contend this cause of action, as a fraud based claim, lacks the required
7 specificity and it is unintelligible because the FAC fails to (1) identify the Doe Defendants who
8 conspired to convert SABSE’s assets, (2) detail how D. Patel or Global Wallet were in a position to
9 convert SABSE’s assets, (3) detail the mechanism Defendants used to convert the assets, (4) detail
10 the name of companies or accounts used to receive the converted assets, or (5) identify and specify
11 the amount of damages converted.
12 Plaintiffs sufficiently allege facts showing Y. Patel took unauthorized sums from SABSE
13 accounts for his own use and directed SABSE’s vendors, e.g. V2, and its employees to work on Global
14 Wallet while on SABSE’s payroll, thereby converting SABSE’s economic rights and benefits to
15 himself, Global Wallet, and his sons. (FAC ¶¶ 42, 46, 53-56, 60, 87-90, 92, 111-118.) Plaintiffs are
16 not required to provide factual evidence of what mechanisms Defendants used to allegedly convert
17 SABSE’s assets and/or specify the account numbers the assets were transferred to. And the Doe
18 defendant argument is addressed above.
19 Accordingly, Defendants’ demurrer to the third cause of action for conversion is
20 OVERRULED.
21 D. Fraudulent Conveyance – Against D. Patel, R. Patel, and Does 7 to 10
22 While the FAC does not specify the supporting statute, Defendants assume Plaintiffs attempt
23 to plead a claim under Uniform Voidable Transaction Act (UVTA)3, Civil Code § 3439. Defendants
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The UVTA “is a contemporary retooling of the common law remedies available to unsecured creditors seeking payment
from debtors who evade collection. Originally enacted as the ‘Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act’ (‘UFTA’) in 1986, its
27 retitling in 2016 reflected the Legislature's intent to reduce misconceptions that the law requires proof of fraudulent
intent. Little else changed in substance.” (Nagel v. Westen (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 740, 747, internal quotations and
28 citations omitted.) Because the UVTA “did not alter the essential elements of a cause of action for a fraudulent or
voidable transfer,” courts “may rely on opinions addressing the UFTA" for purposes of analyzing the sufficiency of a
pleading.” (Aghaian v. Minassian (2020) Cal.App.5th 447, n. 8.)
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1 contend the FAC does not state a viable claim because it fails to plead specific facts showing (1) a
2 debtor-creditor relationship between the parties, (2) a court determination that Plaintiffs have a
3 right to payment, (3) Defendants were insolvent at the time of the purported transfers, (4) D. Patel,
4 R. Patel, and Doe Defendants made any transfers to third parties that Plaintiffs may have a right to
5 void.
6 California Civil Code § 3439.04 provides in part:
7 (a) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is voidable as to a creditor,
8 whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was made or the
9 obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation as
10 follows:
11 (1) With actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor
12 of the debtor.
13 (2) Without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in
14 exchange for the transfer or obligation, and the debtor either:
15 (A) Was engaged or was about to engage in a
16 business or a transaction for which the remaining
17 assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in
18 relation to the business or transaction.
19 (B) Intended to incur or believed or reasonably
20 should have believed that the debtor would incur,
21 debts beyond the debtor's ability to pay as they
22 became due.
23 (Civil Code § 3439.04, subd. (a).)
24 Civil Code § 3439.01, subdivisions (b), (c), and (e) define “creditor,” “debtor,” and “claim,”:
25 (b) "Claim," except as used in "claim for relief," means a right to payment,
26 whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated,
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1 fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal,
2 equitable, secured, or unsecured.
3 (c) "Creditor" means a person that has a claim and includes an assignee of a
4 general assignment for the benefit of creditors, as defined in Section
5 493.010 of the Code of Civil Procedure of a debtor. ...
6 (e) "Debtor" means a person that is liable on a claim.
7 (Civil Code § 3439.01.)
8 Thus, to state a claim for a violation of the UVTA, a plaintiff must allege: (1) the plaintiff has
9 a right to payment from the debtor; (2) the debtor transferred property or incurred an obligation
10 to the defendant; (3) the debtor transferred the property or incurred the obligation with the intent
11 to hinder, delay, or defraud one or more of the debtor's creditors; (4) the plaintiff was harmed; and
12 (5) the debtor's conduct was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's harm. (CACI No. 4200
13 (2023 ed.) p. 670.) “The purpose of the UVTA is to prevent debtors from placing, beyond the reach
14 of creditors, property that should be made available to satisfy a debt.” (Chen v. Berenjian (2019) 33
15 Cal.App.5th 811, 817.)
16 A judgment or court finding is not required to allege the legal existence of a debtor-creditor
17 relationship. Our Supreme Court has specifically stated that the predecessors to the UVTA, the UFTA
18 and the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act, protect both present and future creditors. (Mejia v.
19 Reed (2003) 31 Cal.4th 657, 664 [“Under the UFTA, a transfer is fraudulent, both as to present and
20 future creditors, if it is made with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the
21 debtor.” (internal quotations omitted)].) Thus, per the express language of Civil Code section
22 3439.01 and our Supreme Court's decision, future creditors whose right to payment against the
23 debtor has not yet been reduced to judgment, are protected by the UVTA. And the FAC adequately
24 pleads that Plaintiffs and Defendants are in a creditor-debtor relationship by pleading the existence
25 of the ongoing fraud case.
26 At this stage, Plaintiffs are not required to provide evidentiary facts supporting their
27 allegation that Y. Patel did not have the means or assets to make the disputed transfers or
28 expenditures and that the remaining Defendants accepted these transfers and gifts knowing it was
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1 Y. Patel’s intention to thwart his creditors. (See FAC ¶118.)
2 Accordingly, Defendants’ demurrer to the fifth cause of action for fraudulent conveyance is
3 OVERRULED.
4 E. Unjust Enrichment – Against Y. Patel, D. Patel, Global Wallet and Does 7 to 10
5 There appears to be a split of authority as to whether California recognizes an independent
6 cause of action for unjust enrichment. (See Melchior v. New Line Productions, Inc. (2003) 106
7 Cal.App.4th 779, 793 (“There is no cause of action in California for unjust enrichment[;]” it “is a
8 general principle, underlying various legal doctrines and remedies, rather than a remedy itself.”)
9 (internal quotations omitted); Levine v. Blue Shield of California (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1117
10 (same); Elder v. Pacific Bell Telephone Co. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 841 (“This allegation satisfies the
11 elements for a claim of unjust enrichment: receipt of a benefit and unjust retention of the benefit at
12 the expense of another.” (internal citations and quotations omitted); Lectrodryer v. Seoulbank
13 (2000) 77 Cal. App.4th 723 (affirming judgment for plaintiff on unjust enrichment claim).
14 However, this Court falls under the Sixth Appellate District, and that court of appeal
15 unequivocally held in a 2020 decision:
16 “[Plaintiff’s] complaint includes a cause of action entitled unjust
17 enrichment. Summary adjudication of that claim was proper because
18 California does not recognize a cause of action for unjust enrichment.
19 (Melchior v. New Line Productions, Inc. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 779, 793
20 [131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 347] [the phrase “unjust enrichment” does not describe
21 a theory of recovery; it is a general principle underlying various legal
22 doctrines and remedies].)”
23 (Hooked Media Group, Inc. v. Apple Inc. (2020) 55 Cal. App. 5th 323, 336.)
24 Accordingly, Defendants’ demurrer to the sixth cause of action is SUSTAINED WITHOUT
25 LEAVE TO AMEND.
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27 Date:
28 Hon. Evette D. Pennypacker
Santa Clara Superior Court Judge
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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
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COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA
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JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Case No. 24CV448944
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13 Plaintiff,
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR
14 v. JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
15 KENT NGUYEN,
16 Defendant.
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18 JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.’s motion for judgment on the pleadings came on for hearing
19 before the Court on April 8, 2025. Pursuant to California Rule of Court 3.1308, the Court issued its
20 tentative ruling on April 7, 2025. No party appeared to contest that ruling, and it is accordingly
21 adopted.
22 JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED. A notice of
23 motion with this hearing date and time was served on Defendant by U.S. mail on December 26, 2024.
24 Defendant did not oppose the motion. “[T]he failure to file an opposition creates an inference that
25 the motion or demurrer is meritorious.” (Sexton v. Super Ct. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410.)
26 There is also good cause to grant this motion.
27 Plaintiff filed its complaint on October 7, 2024 seeking $26,532.22 in unpaid credit card debt.
28 Defendant answered on November 12, 2024 stating he did not have money to pay the debt but not
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1 denying the debt was owed.
2 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED. Plaintiff is
3 ordered to prepare and file a form of judgment for the Court’s review within 10 calendar days of
4 service of this formal order.
5 IT IS SO ORDERED.
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7 Date:
8 Hon. Evette D. Pennypacker
Santa Clara Superior Court Judge
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6 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
7 COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA
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9 KIMBERLY BLUFORD, Case No. 22CV405176
10 Plaintiff,
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
11 v. MOTIONS TO QUASH AND FOR
12 PROTECTIVE ORDER
THE CITY OF SAN JOSE, MIKE SANTELLANO,
13 and DOES 1 to 20,
14 Defendants.
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17 Plaintiffs’ motion to quash and motion for protective order first came on for hearing before
18 the Court on February 4, 2025. Because the motion contained insufficient information for the Court
19 to rule, the Court continued the hearing on the motion to April 8, 2025. Pursuant to California Rule
20 of Court 3.1308, the Court issued its tentative ruling on April 7, 2025.
21 Plaintiff filed this action on October 4, 2022 alleging she was injured by a car collision with
22 Defendant Mike Santellano who was driving for the City of San Jose at the time. Plaintiff does not
23 allege the date of the purported collision but seeks compensatory damages for lost wages, loss of
24 use of property, hospital and medical expenses, and property damage.
25 Defendants served deposition subpoenas for documents seeking Plaintiff’s medical records
26 and insurance information by U.S. mail on November 4, 2024. Plaintiff seeks to quash these
27 subpoenas on privacy grounds.
28 Any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the
subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that
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1 action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead
2 to the discovery of admissible evidence. (Code of Civ. Proc. §2017.010.) Relevance in this context
3 means having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence
4 to the determination of the action. (Evid. Code §210.)
5 Defendant is entitled to collect documents related to Plaintiff’s medical care and
6 independently investigate what the records detail about Plaintiff’s health that may (or may not) be
7 the cause or contribution to Plaintiff’s claimed injuries. Plaintiff did not limit the scope of her alleged
8 injuries in her complaint. The document requests comply with the privilege waiver analysis in Britt
9 v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 857 and Morales v. Sup. Ct. (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 283, 288.
10 Plaintiff’s motion to quash or for a protective order is therefore DENIED.
11 However, the Court realizes these are very sensitive documents for Plaintiff, and they should
12 not be generally disclosed. Thus, the Court orders the parties to meet and confer and enter a
13 stipulated protective order governing the production and use of these documents in the litigation
14 before the documents are produced to Defendant.
15
16 IT IS SO ORDERED.
17
18 Date:
19 Hon. Evette D. Pennypacker
Santa Clara Superior Court Judge
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1 Line 6
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5 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
6 COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA
7
8 DANIEL KRAMER, an individual, Case No. 23CV426760
9 Plaintiffs,
10 v. ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO COMPEL
11 GUSTAVO CALDERON, an individual; and
12 DOES 1 to 25, inclusive,
13 Defendants.
14
15
16
17 Defendant Gustavo Calderon’s motion to compel Plaintiff Daniel Kramer to respond to form
18 interrogatories (set one), special interrogatories (set one), and demand for inspection (set one) and
19 for $990.00 in sanctions came on for hearing before the Court on April 8 2025. Pursuant to
20 California Rule of Court 3.1308, the Court issued its tentative ruling on April 7, 2025.
21 A notice of motion with this hearing date and time was served on Plaintiff by electronic mail
22 on December 24, 2024. Plaintiff failed to file an opposition. “[T]he failure to file an opposition
23 creates an inference that the motion or demurrer is meritorious.” (Sexton v. Super Ct. (1997) 58
24 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410.)
25 Defendant served form interrogatories (set one), special interrogatories (set one), and
26 demand for inspection (set one) on Plaintiff by electronic mail on July 3, 2024. Despite Defendant’s
27 communications to Plaintiff’s prior and current counsel, no responses were ever served.
28 Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to compel and for $990 in sanctions is GRANTED. Plaintiff
is ordered to serve verified, code compliant responses to form interrogatories (set one), special
18
1 interrogatories (set one), and demand for inspection (set one) without objections and to pay
2 Defendant $990 in sanctions within 15 days of the service date of this formal order.
3 IT IS SO ORDERED.
4
5 Date:
6 Hon. Evette D. Pennypacker
Santa Clara Superior Court Judge
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5 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
6 COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA
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8 MAKRAM MANSOUR, an individual, and Case No. 24CV441647
MAYA MANSOUR, an individual,
9
10 Plaintiffs,
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO COMPEL
11 v.
12 REBECCA BILLECI aka BECKY BILLECI,
trustee of the Laine Living Trust, and DOES
13 1 to 20, inclusive,
14
Defendants.
15
16 REBECCA BILLECI , an individual,
17 Cross-complainant,
18 v.
19 NRT WEST, INC., a corporation, dba
20 Coldwell Banker Realty; MADELYN G.
JASON COBB, an individual, BISHOP
21 CLANCY COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE INC.,
a corporation; DAVID WILLIAM CLANCY,
22
an individual; and ROES 1-50,
23
Cross-Defendants.
24
25
26 Plaintiffs’ motion to compel the Building Division of the City of San Jose (“SJBD”) to produce
27 documents that deponent failed to produce in response to the September 12, 2024 deposition
28 subpoena and for an order of $2,200 in sanctions came on for hearing before the Court on April 8
2025. Pursuant to California Rule of Court 3.1308, the Court issued its tentative ruling on April 7,
20
1 2025.
2 A notice of motion with this hearing date and time was personally served on SJBD on
3 December 19, 2024 and served by U.S. mail on Defendant son December 16, 2024. No party filed an
4 opposition. “[T]he failure to file an opposition creates an inference that the motion or demurrer is
5 meritorious.” (Sexton v. Super Ct. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410.)
6 Plaintiffs issued a subpoena to SJBD on September 12, 2024. Neither SJBD nor Defendants
7 served objections to the subpoena or moved to quash it. On the deadline for production, a Staff
8 Specialist at SJBD requested that Plaintiffs pay to copy the requested records, which Plaintiff did on
9 or around October 18, 2024. Thereafter, Plaintiffs received a USB drive and a custodian declaration,
10 but some materials were missing. In particular, the production failed to include emails and other
11 communications with Rebecca Billeci referenced in other SJBD records and redacted the names of
12 the persons involved in SJBD’s building code violation investigations.
13 Plaintiffs emailed SJBD three times to confer regarding their view that materials were
14 missing from SJBD’s production. SJBD did not respond.
15 The Court finds the requested supplementation reasonably calculated to lead to the
16 discovery of admissible evidence and SJBD’s failure to produce the missing information or to even
17 both to respond to Plaintiffs regarding their concerns with the production to be without substantial
18 justification. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion to compel and for sanctions is GRANTED.
19 SJBD is ordered to (1) produce all emails and other communications with Rebecca Billeci, (2)
20 produce any redacted documents from the first production in unredacted form, and (3) pay
21 Plaintiffs $1400 in sanctions representing the 3 hours it took counsel to prepare the motion to
22 compel and the $200 filing fees.
23 IT IS SO ORDERED.
24
25 Date:
26 Hon. Evette D. Pennypacker
Santa Clara Superior Court Judge
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5 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
6 COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA
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8 MIDWEST EMPLOYERS CASUALTY Case No. 24CV441915
COMPANY,
9
Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
10 VACATE DISMISSAL, ENFORCE
11 v. SETTLEMENT AND ENTER
JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT
12 LAVAN CONSTRUCTION, a California PURSUANT TO CODE OF CIVIL
corporation, and DOES 1 to 20, inclusive, PROCEDURE SECTION 664.6
13
Defendants.
14
15
16 Plaintiff Midwest Employers Casualty Company’s motion to vacate dismissal, enforce
17 settlement agreement, and enter judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 came
18 on for hearing before the Court on April 8, 2025. Pursuant to California Rule of Court 3.1308, the
19 Court issued its tentative ruling on April 7, 2025.
20 Plaintiff served this motion on Defendants by U.S. mail on December 20, 2024. Defendant
21 failed to oppose the motion. “[T]he failure to file an opposition creates an inference that the motion
22 or demurrer is meritorious.” (Sexton v. Super Ct. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410.) There is also
23 good cause to grant this motion.
24 The parties stipulated to conditional judgment on September 9, 2024. The stipulation
25 provides:
26 1. Plaintiff shall recover from Defendant the total sum of
27 $131,493.18 (“Settlement
28
Amount”).
22
1 Payment Terms
2 Forty-Seven (47) monthly payments of $2,739.44 due
3 beginning August 30, 2024
4 2. One (1) payment of $2,739.50 due on or before August 30,
5 2028 Failing to make any payment on time or should any payment be
6 refused or returned by the bank upon which it is drawn, Defendant
7 shall be in default under the terms of this Stipulation. Additionally,
8 Defendant shall be solely responsible for all fees and charges
9 associated with any return check fees. If Defendant fails to cure
10 within fourteen (14) days of the date of default, Plaintiff may then
11 obtain a judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 664.6 for the
12 entire balance owed by Defendant for the Principal Balance of
13 $131,493.18, plus court costs expended, interest, attorney’s fees, less
14 any payments made to date, and may execute on the judgment
15 immediately after entry, upon application.
16
Plaintiff stopped making payments after November 5, 2024. Thus, Plaintiff is entitled to
17
judgment, and Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED. Plaintiff is ordered to submit a form of judgment
18
within 10 days of the service date of this formal order.
19
20
Date:
21
Hon. Evette D. Pennypacker
22 Santa Clara Superior Court Judge
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Ruling
DIVERSIFIED TRADING CORPORATION VS RALCO HOLDINGS (MAG), INC., ET AL.
Apr 08, 2025 |
24NWCV00593
Case Number:
24NWCV00593
Hearing Date:
April 8, 2025
Dept:
C
DIVERSIFIED TRADING COPRORATION v. RALCO HOLDINGS (MAG), INC., ET AL.
CASE NO.: 24NWCV00593
HEARING: April 8, 2025 @ 9:30 a.m.
#4
TENTATIVE ORDER
Defendant Ralco Holdings (MAG), Inc.s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for Forum Non Conveniens is GRANTED.
Defendant to give notice.
Background
This is a collections case. On February 26, 2024, Plaintiff Diversified Trading Corporation (Plaintiff) filed this action against Defendants Ralco Holdings (MAG), Inc., Ed Tucker, Distributor, Inc., Turn Distribution Inc., and Does 1 to 10. The Complaint alleges Plaintiff sold goods to Defendants Ralco Holdings (MAG), Inc. and ED Tucker, Distributor, Inc., and Defendants failed to pay for the goods. The Complaint alleges one action for common counts and seeks damages in the amount of $45,467.30.
Defendant Ralco Holdings (MAG), Inc. (Ralco), specially appearing, now moves to dismiss the action on the ground of forum non conveniens.
No opposition has been filed as of April 4, 2024.
Requests for Judicial Notice
Ralcos Request for Judicial Notice of Statement of Information for ED TUCKER, DISTRIBUTOR, INC. is granted.
Legal Standard
When a court upon motion of a party or its own motion finds that in the interest of substantial justice an action should be heard in a forum outside this state, the court shall stay or dismiss the action in whole or in part on any conditions that may be just. (Code Civ. Proc., § 410.30, subd. (a).)
A defendant, on or before the last day of his or her time to plead or within any further time that the court may for good cause allow, may serve and file a notice of motion for one or more of the following purposes: (2) To stay or dismiss the action on the ground of inconvenient forum. (Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10, subd. (a)(2).)
Section 410.30 is a codification of the doctrine of forum non conveniens [citation], but the principles governing enforcement of a forum selection clause are not the same as those applicable to motions based on forum non conveniens. In California, forum selection clauses are valid and may be given effect, in the court's discretion and in the absence of a showing that enforcement of such a clause would be unreasonable. The burden of proof is on the plaintiff, and the factors involved in traditional forum non conveniens analysis do not control. Instead, the forum selection clause is presumed valid and will be enforced unless the plaintiff shows that enforcement of the clause would be unreasonable under the circumstances of the case. (
Trident Labs, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch Commercial Finance Corp.
(2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 147, 153-154, 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 551.)(Internal citations and quotations omitted.)
Discussion
Ralco moves to dismiss the Complaint based on a mandatory forum selection clause. The Complaint stems from a dispute regarding a Purchase Order Agreement between Defendant Ed Trucker Distributor, Inc. (Ed Tucker) and Plaintiff. (Landers, Decl., ¶ 3, Exh. 2.) The Purchase Order Agreement was subject to Terms and Conditions, which contains the following forum selection clause:
Seller [Diversified] and Buyer [Ed Tucker] expressly agree that all rights and duties under the purchase order and any disputes arising from any contract resulting from the acceptance of the purchase order, shall be governed by and construed in accordance with, the laws of the State of Texas. Seller [Diversified] and Buyer [Ed Tucker] further agree that all actions brought regarding such rights, duties and/or disputes shall be brought in a court of competent jurisdiction in the State of Texas in Tarrant County. Seller [Diversified] irrevocably waives any objection which it may now or hereinafter have to the laying of venue of any such suit, action or proceeding and any claim that any suit, action or proceeding has been brought in an inconvenient forum. Seller agrees that a final judgment in any such suit, action or precedent brought in such a court shall be conclusive and binding upon it.
(Landers, Decl., ¶ 4, Exh. 3, ¶ 13.)
Ralco asserts that, although it is not party to the Purchase Agreement, that it may still enforce the forum selection clause because 1) Ralco is listed under the Product Liability Insurance Requirement section of the Terms and Conditions, and 2) the Terms and Conditions allow Ralco to terminate any outstanding purchase orders if the seller breaches any provision. (Landers, Decl., ¶ 4, Exh. 3, ¶ 18.) Further, Plaintiff alleges alter ego among all Defendants. (Compl., Attachment 4C.)
The Court initially finds Ralco may enforce the forum selection clause even though it is not a party to the Purchase Order Agreement. [A] range of transaction participants, parties and non-parties, should benefit from and be subject to forum selection clauses. Here, the alleged conduct of [non-party defendants] is closely related to the contractual relationship. They are alleged to have participated in the fraudulent representations which induced plaintiffs to enter into the Agreement. Indeed, plaintiffs go so far as to allege [non-party defendants] are the alter ego of [party defendant], which did sign the Agreement containing the forum selection clause. Under these circumstances, the fact that [non-party defendants] did not sign the Agreement does not render the forum selection clause unenforceable. To hold otherwise would be to permit a plaintiff to sidestep a valid forum selection clause simply by naming a closely related party who did not sign the clause as a defendant. (
Lu v. Dryclean-U.S.A. of California, Inc.
(1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1494 (rejecting plaintiffs argument that the forum select clause is unreasonable because two of the defendants did not sign the agreement containing the clause).)(Internal citations and quotations omitted.)
Here, Plaintiff alleges alter ego among all Defendants. (Compl., Attachment 4C.) The Terms and Conditions further indicate Ralco is involved in, or at least is closely related to, the contractual relationship. (Landers, Decl., ¶ 4, Exh. 3, ¶ 18.) Therefore, Ralco may enforce the forum selection clause even though it is not party to the agreement containing such clause.
Ralco asserts that the forum selection clause is mandatory because the clause contains language that designates Tarrant County, Texas as the exclusive forum. The Court agrees. The clause states the following: Seller [Diversified] and Buyer [Ed Tucker] further agree that all actions brought regarding such rights, duties and/or disputes shall be brought in a court of competent jurisdiction in the State of Texas in Tarrant County. (Landers, Decl., ¶ 4, Exh. 3, ¶ 13.)
A mandatory forum-selection clause is given effect without regard to the parties' convenience; the only question is whether its enforcement would be unfair or unreasonable. (
Richtek USA, Inc. v. uPI Semiconductor Corp.
(2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 651, 661.)
Ralco asserts that the forum selection clause is reasonable for the following reasons: 1) Plaintiff, an experienced business in the motorsport industry, expressly agreed to the forum selection clause; 2) Texas is an appropriate forum because Ed Tuckers headquarters are in Tarrant County (RJN, Exh. A); 3) Plaintiff voluntarily entered into the Purchase Order Agreement with Ed Tucker, 4) Plaintiffs rights would not be diminished if the clause is enforced, as Plaintiff has redress under Texas contract law.
Plaintiff has filed no opposition.
The Court agrees with Ralco that the mandatory selection clause is reasonable. Plaintiff has failed to meet its burden in demonstrating the forum selection clause is otherwise unreasonable. Further, Plaintiffs counsel confirmed that the Purchase Order Agreement and the incorporated Terms and Conditions are the basis of Plaintiffs claims in this lawsuit. (Landers, Decl., ¶ 5, Exh. 4.)
Accordingly, Ralcos Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for Forum Non Conveniens is granted. The Complaint as dismissed as to Ralco.
Preview
ELECTRONICALLY FILED Redacted by Clerk of Court COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Wednesday, June 8, 2022 11:58:18 AM CASE NUMBER: 2022 OS 00003 Docket ID: 36371453 MIKE FOLEY CLERK OF COURTS MONTGOMERY COUNTY OHIO IN THE COMMON PLEAS COURT OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, OHIO DOMESTIC RELATIONS DIVISION TIMOTHY RICHARDS CASE NO. 74 SOUTH WOOD STREET EMPORUIM , PA 15834 Plaintiff,/Petitioner, Judge ~vs- SANGHU! HAN PETITIONER’S MOTION TO 1476 ALEX-BELL ROAD REGISTER A FOREIGN ORDER DAYTON, OH 45459 ORDER OF CUSTODY FILE #95562 DOCKET NO. V-00488-20/20A Defendant/Respondent. Now comes Petitioner Timothy Richards, father of Jeremiah Bradley Richards, dob : October 23, 2013, by and through counsel, pursuant to Ohio Revised Code 3115.012 and 3115.59 and respectfully moves this Court to register the Judgment and Decree from Rochester, New York attached hereto, as the child currently resides in Ohio, and have for more than six months, and thus Ohio should accept jurisdiction of this matter. Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court register the above-referenced order, so Father may file to modify and enforce the same. Respectfully submitted, ae Mark A. Fisher (0066939) STATON, FISHER & CONBOY LLP 5613 Brandt Pike Huber Heights, OH 45424 (937) 237-9485 Fax (937) 237-1978At a Trial Term of the Family Court held in and for the County of Monroe at the Hall of Justice, Rochester, NY on January 6, 2021. PRESENT: Referee Thomas W Polito, Esq. Family Court County of Monroe State of New York Timothy Richards, DOB 08/27/1976 Petitioner v. Order Docket No.: V-00488-20/20A File: 95562 IAS: Polito/R Sanghui Han, DOB 07/10/1982 Respondent The above entitled action having been commenced by the filing of a petition by Petitioner in January 2020 seeking a modification of custody and visitation, Respondent having opposed the application and having further filed an application to dismiss the Petition by Notice of Motion dated the 10 day of March 2020 and supported by the affidavit of Sanghui Han as sworn to by her on the 9" day of March 2020 and supported by Exhibits A and B, the application having been opposed byPetitioner and the Court by affidavit of Petitioner as sworm to by him on the 15" day of May 2020 and the affirmation of counsel as affirmed by her on the 17" day of May 2020 and Exhibits A through D, The Court having rendered written Findings in an order denying Respondent’s Application dated and entered May 29", 2020, William Farr, Esq., having been appointed by the Court as the attorney for the parties’ child, Jeremiah Bradley Richards DOB 10/23/2013, The matter having come on to be heard for a virtual trial on the 6" day of January 2021, Petitioner and counsel, Maureen A Pineau, Esq., present virtually, Respondent and counsel Steven Levitsky, Esq., present virtually, and William Farr, Esq., attorney for Jeremiah Richards present virtually, After hearing the proof and deliberating and making Findings of Fact, the transcript of which is attached hereto and made a part hereof, Now Therefore on application of Maureen A Pineau, Esq., counsel for the Petitioner, Timothy Richards, it is Ordered, Petitioner’s application for sole custody is denied; and it is further Ordered, Petitioner shall have the following periods of residency: One weekend a month to coincide with any three day holiday, and if no three day holiday in any given month, then the first weekend of the month. A three day weekend shall be defined as beginning on a Thursday at 4:00 pm and continuinguntil Sunday at 6:00pm, or, if the three day holiday weekend includes a Monday, then the weekend shall be defined as commencing Friday at 4:00 pm and continuing until Monday at 6:00 pm all in accord with the Springboro Schools Calendar, copies of the 2020-2021 and 2021-2022 are attached hereto and made a part hereof and following in each successive year; and it is further Ordered, the parties shall alternate the following holidays: Easter. From 4:00 pm on the last day of school through Easter Sunday at 4:00 pm. Petitioner to have this holiday in all odd years and Respondent in all even years Thanksgiving: Shall be defined as commencing at 4:00 pm on the last day of school and continuing through Sunday at 4:00 pm. Petitioner shall have this holiday in all even years and Respondent in all odd years Christmas: Shall be defined as commencing at 4:00 pm on the last day of school commencing the break and continuing until December 27" at 4:00 pm. Petitioner shall have this holiday in all odd years and Respondent in all even years. Christmas Break: Shall be defined as commencing at 4:00 pm on December 27" and continuing until 4:00 pm the day before school reopens. Petitioner shall have this holiday in all even years and Respondent in all odd years. Petitioner shall always have Father’s Day weekend from the close of school through Sunday at 4:00 pm Respondent shall always have Mother’s Day from the close of school until Sunday at 4:00 pm and it is further Ordered, the parties shall have the following Summer schedule:Each party shall be entitled to two (2) consecutive weeks every July and two (2) consecutive weeks in August. Petitioner shall notify Respondent by May | of each year which weeks Petitioner intends to exercise. In the event of a conflict between dates chosen, Petitioner shall have first preference in odd years and Respondent in all even years. Respondent must respond to Petitioner within five (5) days of Petitioner’s notice of weeks selected by Petitioner by email or text message. Petitioner shal] also notice Respondent by email or text by May 1 of each year and it is further Ordered, Petitioner shall always have Labor Day weekend and Memorial Day weekend from Friday at 4:00 pm through Monday at 4:00 pm; and it is further Ordered, exchanges for ordinary weekend visits shall take place at the Greene County Family Visitation Center! in Xenia, Ohio; and it is further Ordered, with respect to all other periods of visitation, Petitioner shall travel to Xenia, Ohio at the Green County Family Visitation Center to pick up the parties’ son to commence visitation and Respondent shall pick up the parties’ son from Petitioner’s home located at 1911 Pointview Avenue, Cherry Hill, New Jersey 08003; and it is further Ordered, Petitioner shall have electronic contact by any means available [i.e. Skype, Facetime, cellular telephone, landline, or any other electronic method], at ' In all situations, if the Center is closed and provides an alternate location for pick up and drop off, the parties shall utilize the alternate site as directed by the Green County Family Visitation CenterPetitioner’s election least every Tuesday and Thursday at 7:00 pm and Respondent shall insure that Jeremiah is available to speak and has the affirmative duty of placing the telephone call. Respondent shall have the same telephone contact as Petitioner when the parties’ child is on extended residency with Petitioner; and it is further Ordered, Petitioner shall have independent access to any record associated with Jeremiah including but not limited to school records, health records [medical, dental, mental health] and educational as well as independent access to any provider of services, by way of example and not limitation, educators, physicians, dentists, therapists; and it is further Ordered, Petitioner may attend any school or extracurricular activity relating to the parties’ son including but not limited to parent teacher conferences, school plays, concerts, soccer or athletic activities, etc.; and it is further Ordered, Respondent must allow the parties’ son, Jeremiah, to have and retain gifts that Petitioner shall from time to time make to Jeremiah; and it is further Ordered, Respondent must give Petitioner thirty (30) days notice before changing residence to any other location including the address to which Respondent is relocating with the parties’ son; and it is further Ordered, all other applications are denied. Ordered, this custodial determination and schedule shall be filed as aregistered order in the jurisdictions of the Parents (Michigan and New Jersey), pursuant to UCCJEA (McKinney's DRL § 77-d) § 77-d. Registration of child custody determination. Those model act provisions in Michigan are §722.1304. Registration of child-custody determination issued in another state; In New Jersey 2A:4-30.168. Registration of order issued in another state or foreign order for enforcement, and NJ Directive 9-07. Family/Updated Procedures for Filing and Enforcement of Out-of-State (“Foreign”) Custody/Parenting/Visitation Orders. Dated: March 24, 2021 er Rochester, New York Thomas W Polito, Esq. Attorney Referee PURSUANT TO SECTION 1113 of the Family Court Act, an appeal must be taken within thirty days of receipt of the order by appellant in court, thirty-five days from the mailing of the order to the appellant by the clerk of the court, or thirty days after service by a party or attorney for the child upon the appellant, whichever is earliest. a wutlllttyyy, S$ 42% sé BE ORDER ENTERED ss 6% 2g a= = x= B< ss Ey $s MAR 2 4 2021 % « a “Mx; Woe cot e Nyy aw FAMILY COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK HAW COUNTY OF MONROE4® sprincsoro scHoois 2021-2022 AUGUST 2021 SEPTEMBER 2021 OCTOBER 2021 S M 7T W Th FS S M T _W Th FS S M T W Th F_ S 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 1 2 8 § 10 11 42 13 14 5 Mb, 8s 9 10 11 3°94 5 6 7 86 9 15 16[17]18 19 20 21 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 10 14 12 13 14 [45] 16 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 19 20 21 22 23 24 17 18 19 20 21 22 2 26 27 28 28 W 24 26 26 27 28 29 30 NOVEMBER 2021 DECEMBER 2021 JANUARY 2022 S M _T _W The 8 SM T W Th F S$ S M T W ThE S$ 2 4 6 12 3 4 4 7 8 $ 10 ft 12 13 &§ 6 7 8 8 10 11 23 4 5 6 7 8 14 15 18 17 18 19 20 12 13 14 18 18/17] 18 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 21 22 23 (EZHIESES 27 19 PPPS 2s 16 MEM 18 19 20 21 22 28 29 30 a 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 341 FEBRUARY 2022 MARCH 2622 APRIL 2022 S M T WhF s S MT WthF § S_M T Wh F_ § mn iS 1 2 38 4 5 Em 2 6 7 8 9 0 11 12 6 7 8 9 [49}44 12 34 5 6 7 8 9 13 14 15 36 417 18 19 20 AH 22 23 24 25 26 1314 15 76 17 «18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 40 11 12 43 14 BEB 16 17 MEM 19 20 21 22 23 27 28 27 EERO 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 MAY 2922 JUNE 2022 JULY 2022 S MT Wt éF S§ S M T W Tr F S SoM _T W Th F S§ 42 3 4 & 6 7 t 2 3 4 1 2 8 8 10 11 12 12 14 5 6 7 8 § 10 1% 3 4 5 6 7 8 98 15 46 17 ¥8@ 19 20 21 12:13 14 «15 15 17 #18 10 11°42 13 «14 «18 16 22 23 24 25[26]27 28 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 29 EG 31 26 27 28 29 30 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 oT | Weacher n-Servi far i [ere] Tee YR Fe Sato: [ i Early Release L] FirstLasl Seyi. Aug 12-16 Teacher In-serviceWD Nov 17 Enrly Release Aor 15-18 Hb SES ssa Crea Aug 17 First Day of Schooi-Gr. 1-12 Nov 24-28 No SchoolThenkagiring Break Agr20 Early Release Aug 17-19 PKS Phasewn Days Dec 8 Early Release ‘May 18 Early Release Avg 20 First Day of SchookGr, PKC Gee 20-31 No SchoolWinter Break ‘May 21 ‘Graduation Sep 6 No Schootf.abor Dey van 17 No Schoo¥M.L. King Dey "May 26 Last Day of Schoo! Sep 1s Early Release Jan 19 Eerly Retease May 27 Teacher Work Day Sep 27-008 Evening PT Cont ee ua May30 Memorial Day Oct 14 leu Fab 21 No S President's Day ” ator Aug 17-0018 42daya bus Day Feb 26-tar10 Evening PIT Cow, 2nd Qe Oct 18-Dec 17 41 days Oc20 Eany Ruvease Mor 11 No SchooTeacher Workday 3rd Ctr Jan 3Mer 10 48 days Nov.§ No Schoal/Daytime PrT Cont, Mar 16 Eerty Release thor Martduay25 47 ame Nov 11 Veteran's Day ‘Mar 2B-Apr 1 Ma SchoolSpring Break 7 +s SCHOOL YEARICALENDAR MAY BE ALTERED/EXTENDED DUE TO INCLEMENT WEATHER, BOARD APPROVED: 12/9/2020SPRINGBORO SCHOOLS 2020-2021 AUGUST 2020 SEPTEMBER 2020 OCTOBER 2020 SoM T W Th F § gM wm fs S M T W Th F S 4 3.4 ~=5 12 3 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 CME s wh a 4 5 6 7 8 8 10 g 10 41 12 13 14 16 13°14 16 17 18 19 11°12 13 «14 «15 16 17 16 17 18 19 20 24 22 29 21 S 23 24 25 26 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 23 24 25 28 27 28 29° «27 28 29 40 25 26 27 28 29[30] 31 30 34 NOVEMBER 2020 OECEMBER 2020 JANUARY 2021 SoM oT W Th FS S M T W Th F § S M T W Th F S 4 234 § 6 7 12 3 4 5 me 2 8 9 10 31 12 EM 14 6 7 @ 9 4 _141. 12 $4 65 & 7 8 9 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 10 11 12 13 14 15 18 22 23 24 (PEWESPG 28 a x 17 EBM 19 20 21 22 23 29 30 or EREOMEL 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 APRIL 2021 FEBRUARY 2021 MARCH 2021 S Mt W th F 8 S M T W Ta FS SoM T W Th FS 7 23 4 6 6 1 2,3 4 15 6 Raa; 7 8 9 1 411 12 13 7 8 ¢ t0[4]12 13 4 Mc 7 8 9 10 44 BE te 17 18 19 20 14°15 16 17 «18 «19 «2 1112 13 14 15 16 17 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 21 22 23 26 25 26 27 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 28 23 (EQESET|) 25 26 27 28 29 30 MAY 2021 SUNE 2021 JULY 2021 S MT WThF § SoM 7 WThF 8 SM T WhF 5 i 7 2,3)]4 5 1 2 3 23 4 5 6 7 8 6 7 8 9 1 11 12 45 6 7 @ @ 10 8 10 11 12 13 14 «15 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 11°12°«13 14-15 16 «17 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 23 24°25 28 27 28 29 27 28 29 30 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 30 il SCHOOL ‘TEAR/CALENOAR MAY BE AL TERED/EXTENDED DLE ‘fC INCLEMENT WEATHER. SOARD roe dea ‘Aug 20-Sep 4 Teacher In-servicalWD Sep7 Labor Day Sep é First Oay of Schoot-Al Grades: Oct. 12:23 Evening PT Cont. Now1T Veteran's Day Nov.13 No School-Daytime P/T Cont, Nov 25-27 ‘Thanksgiving Break Nov26 = “hanksgiving Dec 21-Jan 1 Winter Break Deo 25 Chietmas Day Mar 1-11 Evening PIT Gant “Mar 12 Teacher Workday “Mar 29-Apt 5 Spring Break Ape2 Good Friday Agra Easter May 29 Graduation May 34 Memorial Coy IMPORTANT DATES, vant New Year's Dary Jan 18 MLL King Day Feb 12 Teacher in-sen'cs Feb15 President's Day 191 Qtr Sep0-Oct30 3days Nov 2-Dec 13. 31 days Jand-Mari* 48 daysAt a Trial Term of the Family Court held in and for the County of Monroe at the Hall of Justice, Rochester, NY on January 6, 2021. PRESENT: Referee Thomas W Polito, Esq. Family Court County of Monroe State of New York Timothy Richards, DOB 08/27/1976 Petitioner v. Corrected Order of, CVSTOPY/ Docket No.: V-00488-20/20A ' File: 95562 IAS: Polito/R Sanghui Han, DOB 07/10/1982 Respondent The above entitled action having been commenced by the filing of a petition by Petitioner in January 2020 seeking a modification of custody and visitation, e Respondent having opposed the application and having further filed an application to dismiss the Petition by Notice of Motion dated the 10" day of March 2020 and supported by the affidavit of Sanghui Han as sworn to byher on the 9" day of March 2020 and supported by Exhibits A and B, the application having been opposed by Petitioner and the Court by affidavit of Petitioner as sworn to by him on the 15" day of May 2020 and the affirmation of counsel as affirmed by her on the 17" day of May 2020 and Exhibits A through D, The Court having rendered written Findings in an order denying Respondent’s Application dated and entered May 29", 2020, William Farr, Esq., having been appointed by the Court as the attorney for the parties’ child, Jeremiah Bradley Richards DOB 10/23/2013, The matter having come on to be heard for a virtual trial on the 6" day of January 2021, Petitioner and counsel, Maureen A Pineau, Esq., present virtually, Respondent and counsel Steven Levitsky, Esq., present virtually, and William Farr, Esq., attorney for Jeremiah Richards present virtually, After hearing the proof and deliberating and making Findings of Fact, the transcript of which is attached hereto and made a part hereof, Now Therefore on application of Maureen A Pineau, Esq., counsel for the Petitioner, Timothy Richards, it is Ordered, Petitioner’s application for sole custody is denied; and it is further Ordered, Petitioner shall have the following periods of residency: One weekend a month to coincide with any three day holiday, and if no three day holiday in any given month, then the first weekend of the month. A three dayweekend shall be defined as beginning on a Thursday at 4:00 pm and continuing until Sunday at 6:00pm, or, if the three day holiday weekend includes a Monday, then the weekend shall be defined as commencing Friday at 4:00 pm and continuing until Monday at 6:00 pm all in accord with the Springboro Schools Calendar, copies of the 2020-2021 and 2021-2022 are attached hereto and made a part hereof and following in each successive year; and it is further Ordered, the parties shall alternate the following holidays: Easter. From 4:00 pm on the last day of school through Easter Sunday at 4:00 pm. Petitioner to have this holiday in all odd years and Respondent in all even years Thanksgiving: Shall be defined as commencing at 4:00 pm on the last day of school and continuing through Sunday at 4:00 pm. Petitioner shal! have this holiday in all even years and Respondent in all odd years Christmas: Shall be defined as commencing at 4:00 pm on the last day of school commencing the break and continuing until December 27" at 4:00 pm. Petitioner shall have this holiday in all odd years and Respondent in all even years. Christmas Break: Shall be defined as commencing at 4:00 pm on December 27" and continuing until 4:00 pm the day before school reopens. Petitioner shall have this holiday in all even years and Respondent in all odd years. Petitioner shall always have Father’s Day weekend from the close of school through Sunday at 4:00 pm Respondent shall always have Mother’s Day from the close of school until Sunday at 4:00 pm and it is further Ordered, the parties shall have the following Summer schedule:Each party shall be entitled to two (2) consecutive weeks every July and two (2) consecutive weeks in August. Petitioner shall notify Respondent by May | of each year which weeks Petitioner intends to exercise. In the event of a conflict between dates chosen, Petitioner shall have first preference in odd years and Respondent in all even years. Respondent must respond to Petitioner within five (5) days of Petitioner’s notice of weeks selected by Petitioner by email or text message. Petitioner shall also notice Respondent by email or text by May 1 of each year and it is further Ordered, Petitioner shall always have Labor Day weekend and Memorial Day weekend from Friday at 4:00 pm through Monday at 4:00 pm; and it is further Ordered, exchanges for ordinary weekend visits shall take place at the Greene County Family Visitation Center’ in Xenia, Ohio; and it is further Ordered, with respect to all other periods of visitation, Petitioner shall travel to Xenia, Ohio at the Green County Family Visitation Center to pick up the parties’ son to commence visitation and Respondent shall pick up the parties’ son from Petitioner’s home located at 1911 Pointview Avenue, Cherry Hill, New Jersey 08003; and it is further Ordered, Petitioner shall have electronic contact by any means available [ie. Skype, Facetime, cellular telephone, landline, or any other electronic method], at Petitioner’s election least every Tuesday and Thursday at 7:00 pm and Respondent shall insure that Jeremiah is available to speak and has the affirmative ‘Th all situations, if the Center is closed and provides an alternate location for pick up and drop off, the parties shall utilize the alternate site as directed by the Green County Family Visitation Centerduty of placing the telephone call. Respondent shall have the same telephone contact as Petitioner when the parties’ child is on extended residency with Petitioner; and it is further Ordered, Petitioner shall have independent access to any record associated with Jeremiah including but not limited to school records, health records [medical, dental, mental health] and educational as well as independent access to any provider of services, by way of example and not limitation, educators, physicians, dentists, therapists; and it is further Ordered, Petitioner may attend any school or extracurricular activity relating to the parties’ son including but not limited to parent teacher conferences, school plays, concerts, soccer or athletic activities, etc.; and it is further Ordered, Respondent must allow the parties’ son, Jeremiah, to have and retain gifts that Petitioner shall from time to time make to Jeremiah; and it is further Ordered, Respondent must give Petitioner thirty (30) days notice before changing residence to any other location including the address to which Respondent is relocating with the parties’ son; and it is further Ordered, all other applications are denied. Ordered, this custodial determination and schedule shall be filed as a registered order in the jurisdictions of the Parents (Ohio and New Jersey), pursuantto UCCJEA (McKinney's DRL § 77-d) § 77-d. Registration of child custody determination. Those model act provisions in Ohio OH ST § 3127.35 Registration of out-of-state child custody determination; contest of determination. New Jersey 2A:4-30.168. Registration of order issued in another state or foreign order for enforcement, and NJ Directive 9-07. Family/Updated Procedures for Filing and Enforcement of Out-of-State (“Foreign”) Custody/Parenting/Visitation Orders. nitty, yy gs of THE Sarin, Hori, 202) ~—S n\e Dated: Mareh-24,202+ p)BS Rochester, New York Thomas W Polito, Esq. %' * LS § % $ Attorney Referee “ujtios sont » “iy “Atay PURSUANT TO SECTION 1113 of the Family Court Act, an appeal must be taken within thirty days of receipt of the order by appellant in court, thirty-five days from the mailing of the order to the appellant by the clerk of the court, or thirty days after service by a party or attorney for the child upon the appellant, whichever is earliest. ORDER ENTERED APR 14 2024 5 BGRCAGM 8B VRAIS HROY WIN 80 TATE SHIT BO TRUS Varad FAMILY COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK CAG WIRED 8H (COUNTY OF MONROE nn 1 Nesnathe exert ni lenigho rove to elorter Ce: m, Pine. a 0 ed ban 0 ed ort boxe Fin~ Sebae she teild foes M coeu8 my 4 fifa (Mmariled )