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58
LAW AND THE RIGHTS OF THE NON-HUMANS
Dr. Deepa Kansra1
Abstract
The law confers rights on the non-human entities, namely nature, machines (AI), and animals.
While doing so, the law is either viewed as progressive or sometimes as abstract and
ambiguous. Despite the critique, it is undeniable that many of the rights of the non-humans
have come to solidify in statutory and constitutional rules of different systems. In the context
of these developments, the article sheds light on the core justifications for advancing the
rights of non-human entities. In addition, it discusses the conditions for the emergence of
these rights and the non-binding normative statements adopted by different stakeholders for
advocacy. These include the Charter on the Law of the Living (2021), the Toulon Declaration
(2019), and Vienna Manifesto on Digital Humanism (2019), etc. The paper also discusses the
relevant theoretical frames, namely post-humanism, digital humanism, and multi-species
justice, followed by selective critical views on the subject.
I. Introduction
There are multiple roles attributed to the law, out of which three roles stand out, namely the
regulation of human conduct, reforms, and the harmonization of diverse and conflicting
interests. While fulfilling these roles, the law makes use of various legal tools and concepts.
Take the example of the juristic/juridical/legal personality (juristic personality hereinafter).
The concept of juristic personhood has been applied to give effect to and operationalize
interests like that of the corporate entities, trusts, and organizations. The concept of juridical
personhood in law applies to define the subjects of law, more so the subject matter of rights
and duties. Take the example of the United Nations Organization (UNO). The Convention on
the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, 1946 provides that the United Nations is
defined as juridical personality encompassing the specific capacity (a) to contract; (b) to
acquire and dispose of immovable and movable property; (c) to institute legal proceedings.2
According to Reinisch, “when the United Nations was established it was considered
1
Assistant Professor of Law, Human Rights Studies Programme, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal
Nehru University, India. Email- deepakansra@mail.jnu.ac.in ; dkansra@gmail.com.
2
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, 1946. Available at
https://legal.un.org/avl/ha/cpiun-cpisa/cpiun-cpisa.html.
59
necessary that it should enjoy the status of a legal person under the domestic law of its
Member States. Such a domestic legal personality is a prerequisite for international
organizations to effectively manage numerous practical needs such as procurement contracts,
the acquisition of property and the capacity to pursue its private law rights before national
courts”.3
According to Fitzgerald, “legal persons are beings, real or imaginary, who for legal reasoning
are treated to a greater or lesser degree in the same way as human beings.” 4In the case of
Salim v. State of Uttarakhand 5, the Indian court writes, “the juristic person connotes
recognition of an entity to be in law a person which otherwise it is not. It is not an individual
natural person but an artificially created person which is to be recognized to be in law as such.
This extension of the personality to the class beyond human beings is one of the noteworthy
accomplishments of law or the legal imagination.” In other words, the juridical person is not
a human/natural person, but one who is attributed a personality by the legal system. On
juristic personhood, the court in the case of Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana6states, “for a
bigger thrust of socio-political-scientific development, the evolution of a fictional personality
to be a juristic person becomes inevitable. This may be any entity, living inanimate, objects
or things. It may be a religious institution or any such useful unit which may impel the Courts
to recognize it. This recognition is for subserving the needs and faith of the society.”
According to Tanasescu, “whoever or whatever has legal standing becomes, because of that,
a ‘person’ in front of the law. Legal personality and legal standing are a package; you cannot
have one without the other”.7
A look at the juristic/legal person brings one closer to the category of the non-human entities,
their status, and their importance in law. This is also the area that sheds light on the assertions
for recognition of the non-human category, particularly animals, machines, and nature. A
series of developments in the fields of technology, philosophy, and other disciplines, have
moved the non-human entities to the forefront of legal reforms, domestic and international.
The key question that emerges from these developments is who are the non-human entities?
And why are they claiming rights?
3
August Reinisch, Convention On The Privileges And Immunities Of The United Nations Convention On The
Privileges And Immunities Of The Specialized Agencies (2009). Available at
https://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/cpiun-cpisa/cpiun-cpisa_e.pdf
4
P.J. Fitzgerald, Salmond on Jurisprudence 62 (2009).
5
High Court Of Uttarakhand, Writ Petition No. 126 Of 2014 (Dated March 20, 2017); 2016 (116) ALR 619.
6
High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh (decided on 31.5.2019); CRR-533-2013
7
Mihnea Tănăsescu, Understanding the Rights of Nature A Critical Introduction (Verlag 2022).
60
The more recent literature on the subject brings forth the grounds behind the rise of the non-
human in law. In Non-Human Nature in World Politics: Theory and Practice, the editors cite
two grounds. Firstly, there is a clear understanding that “nature is not external to human
politics” and thus must be represented in the political spaces, and secondly, “harm and
violence inflicted on non-human nature compromises human security and the very conditions
that enable life (human and non-human)”. 8In Rights in Nature: A Critical Introduction, the
author writes, rights of nature are best understood in the context of this double movement of
rights expansion and intensification of human pressure on the environment through capital
flows.9In the same context, the Supreme Court of Pakistan in DG Khan Cement Co. Ltd. v.
Government of Punjab through its Chief Secretary, Lahore10 states, “the environment needs
to be protected in its own right. There is more to protecting nature than the human-centered
rights regime.” In the context of animal rights, Swemmer writes about the “gaps in
international law towards protecting the rights of all non-human animals” and that “there is a
need for reform.”11
II. The Seven Conditions
The literature cited above speaks of the emerging consensus on the gaps in the existing legal
frameworks that concern the responsibilities of human beings towards nature and the other
species (the non-human life forms). Seven conditions that are most cited for leading to
“taking the non-human seriously”.12 These conditions are (1) the governance challenge (2)
conflict of interests (3) advancements in technology (4) emerging consciousness (5) new
theoretical frameworks (6) law’s evolution, and (7) cross-disciplinary influences.
The first condition i.e. the governance challenge relates to the gaps in existing legal
frameworks. In Karnail Singh’s Case13, the court states that the animals including avian and
aquatics have a right to life and bodily integrity, honor and dignity. They can not be treated as
property. There are gaps in laws and new inventions are required to be made to protect the
environment and ecology.14 In another case in which the governance challenge was
8
Joana Castro Pereira, André Saramago (Eds.), Non-Human Nature In World Politics: Theory And Practice, 3
(Springer 2020).
9
Supra note 7.
10
C.P.1290-L/2019
11
Sheena Swemmer, “International Law, Domestic Violence, And The Intersection With Nonhuman Animal
Abuse” Society & Animals 1-19 (2019).
12
Florian Cord, “Posthumanist Cultural Studies: Taking the Nonhuman Seriously”, 6 Open Cultural Studies 25-
37 (2022).
13
Supra note 6.
14
Ibid.
61
underlined was at the adoption of the Ordinance on Establishing Sustainability Rights by the
City of Santa Monica in 2013. In its objective clause, the Ordinance states, “in the last fifty
years, national and state governments have attempted to address the crisis by adopting
specific environmental protection laws, such as the Clean Water Act, Clean Air Act, National
Environmental Policy Act and California Environmental Quality Act, that limit pollution and
resource consumption; but those laws also have proven inadequate to provide long-term
protection of our rights to clean air, water, and soil, and sustainable food systems, and the
rights of natural ecosystems; and whereas, the inadequacy of these laws results, in part, from
the underlying legal assumption that the natural world is property, which may be used by its
owners -- be they individuals, corporations, or other entities -- for their own, private, short-
term economic benefit, generally with minimal regard for the health of the environment”.15 In
the case of rights of animals, advocacy efforts are moving beyond animal welfare legislations
to address animal suffering through in-depth research, knowledge production, training, and
education.16
The second condition is the conflicts in interests. The clash of interests between the human
and the non-human categories, particularly animals, machines, and nature has been posed as
one of the biggest challenges to existing legal processes. A notable instance is a legal case for
the freedom rights of Happy- the elephant, pursued by the Non-Human Rights Project against
the zoo in the United States. The Project Annual Report, 2020 cited a few responses to the
litigation from the academia.17 The Report cites Lawrence H. Tribe, who states, “one of the
greatest blemishes on our justice system is the wrongful detention of persons ...While the
Writ (Habeas Corpus) has provided a procedural vehicle for vindicating the right of
thousands of humans to not be unlawfully detained, this brief argues that the time has come
to consider the Writ’s application to other cognitively complex beings who are unjustly
detained. The non-humans at issue are unquestionably innocent. Their confinement, at least
in some cases, is uniquely depraved—and their sentience and cognitive functioning, and the
cognitive harm resulting from this imprisonment, is similar to that of human beings.”18 The
15
The City Council Of The City Of Santa Monica Ordinance Establishing Sustainability Rights (2013).
https://www.smgov.net/departments/council/agendas/2013/20130409/s20130409_07A1.htm.
16
Animal Ethics, Strategic considerations for effective wild animal suffering work (2022). Available at
Strategic-considerations-wild-animal-suffering-work.pdf (animal-ethics.org).
17
The Non- human Rights Project, Annual Report, 2020. Available at
https://www.nonhumanrights.org/blog/2020-annual-report/.
18
Supra note 17.
62
conflict of interests is apparent in many such instances of animal, nature, and machine rights
litigation.
The third condition is the rapid pace of technological advancements, which have opened
immense possibilities for human beings. These developments demand the recognition of
technological entities as an important subject matter of legal reforms. According to
Pietrzykowski, “another cutting edge technology that casts doubts on the traditional
dichotomy between persons and things concerns the rise of autonomous artificial agents
capable of flexibly adjusting their conduct and reactions to the environment. This technology
is still in its very early stage of development, but even the first and the most primitive semi-
autonomous devices (such as driverless cars and drones or software bots) suggest that further
progress in their design and scope of capabilities may pose serious questions concerning the
liability for their activities. Moreover, some strands of this technology, such as companion
humanoid robots, dedicated in particular to assist elderly patients, may make it difficult for
people interacting with them to continue perceiving them as mere objects.”19 In the same
context, Hofkirchner writes, “it seems a common agreement that due to certain progress made
in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and related fields mankind is facing a blurring of the human and
the machine such that humanism is put under pressure”.20 The field of Intellectual Property
Rights is one of the fertile legal grounds for the above-mentioned claims.21
The fourth condition is the emerging consciousness, which is embedded in the worth and
sacredness of non-human life and forms. Studies from across several fields have contributed
to the development of a universal ethic on protecting and nurturing the non-human world. In
the words of Svoboda, “non-human entities have intrinsic value independent of their
instrumental value. Svoboda writes, “mind-independent intrinsic value is held to be a
property possessed by some entities independently of the beliefs, desires, or attitudes of any
actual or possible valuer or knower.”22
The fourth condition connects with the fifth condition about the application of new
theoretical frameworks across legal and other disciplinary spaces. This paper, in particular,
19
Tomasz Pietrzykowski, The Idea of Non-personal Subjects of Law, in V.A.J. Kurki, T. Pietrzykowski (eds.),
Legal Personhood: Animals, Artificial Intelligence and the Unborn, Law and Philosophy Library 54 (2017).
20
Wolfgang Hofkirchner, Digital Humanism: Epistemological, Ontological and Praxiological Foundations, in
Pieter Verdegem (ed.), AI for Everyone: Critical Perspectives (2021).
21
LexCampus, “AI and IP: The Dabus Patent Case” (2021). Available at https://www.lexcampus.in/ai-and-ip-
the-dabus-patent-case/.
22
Toby Svoboda, “Why there is no Evidence for the Intrinsic Value of Non-humans”, 16(2) Ethics & The
Environment 26 (2011).
63
discusses three theoretical frames, namely multispecies justice, posthumanism, and digital
humanism. These frameworks aim for “the reach of inclusion, and the distinction between
life and non-life need to be posited as questions.23 While speaking for the mainstreaming of
the new frameworks, Pietrzykowski writes, “the dualistic divide of the world into persons and
things is far too crude to adequately respond to the present and future ethical challenges.
Theoretical deficiency here becomes one of the critical obstacles in reconciling law with its
scientific and ethical context.”24
The sixth condition is law’s evolution. Recent literature on the future of international and
constitutional laws assumes that the law has begun to evolve towards the equal representation
of the interests of the human with the non-human entities. On the question of why the
language of legal rights is preferred for the non-humans, Tanasescu writes, “rights provoke
strong advocacy and inspire passionate struggle”25 Further, “a right has a non-negotiable
character, it cannot be traded off as one interest amongst others. Rights Holders are
understood as the moral source of the claim, as distinct from being considered an object,
albeit a valued one, afforded protections when ethical others recognize their worth.”26
Another way to see law’s evolution is through the emergence of legal sub-fields, for instance,
animal law. “It is found that animal law, and the corresponding academic field of legal
animal studies, is flourishing and animal rights are gradually beginning to emerge and
solidify in case law”. 27
The seventh notable condition is the development and exchange of cross-disciplinary
research, which has informed and infused the reforms for sustainable systems and effective
rights for non-humans. In the book Non-Human Nature in World Politics, Carter and Harris
write, “over the past decade, notions of the non-human have become established in a range of
disciplines—for example, archaeology, human geography, anthropology, and architecture”.28
One notable cross-disciplinary contribution is the Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness,
adopted in 2012 by members of the scientific community. The Declaration claims that “non-
23
Danielle Celermajer, David Schlosberg, Lauren Rickards, Makere Stewart Harawira, Mathias Thaler, Petra
Tschakert, Blanche Verlie, Christine Winter, “Multispecies Justice: Theories, Challenges, And A Research
Agenda For Environmental Politics” 30:1-2 Environmental Politics 119-140 (2021).
24
Supra note 19 at 65.
25
Supra note 7.
26
Supra note 23 at 130.
27
Editorial, “Animal rights: interconnections with human rights and the environment”, 11:2 Journal of Human
Rights and the Environment 149-155 (September 2020).
28
Bob Carter and Oliver J. T. Harris, The End of Normal Politics: Assemblages, Non-Humans and International
Relations, in Joana Castro Pereira, André Saramago (eds.), Non-Human Nature in World Politics: Theory and
Practice (Springer 2020).
64
human animals have the neuroanatomical, neurochemical, and neurophysiological substrates
of conscious states along with the capacity to exhibit intentional behaviors. Consequently, the
weight of evidence indicates that humans are not unique in possessing the neurological
substrates that generate consciousness. Nonhuman animals, including all mammals and birds,
and many other creatures, including octopuses, also possess these neurological substrates.”29
The Declaration has been cited on several occasions, including the Indian case of Karnail
Singh30. In Karnail Singh, the court cites the Declaration and other scholarly contributions to
conclude that “the entire animal kingdom including avian and aquatic are declared as legal
entities having a distinct persona with corresponding rights, duties and liabilities of a living
person. All the citizens throughout the State of Haryana are hereby declared persons in loco
parentis as the human face for the welfare/protection of animals”. A cursory view of the legal
advancements for the non-humans indicate the benefits arising from cross-disciplinary
influences and research.
The above-mentioned seven conditions establish the grounds for asserting the interests of the
non-human entities in law.
III. Non-Human Life and Dignity
The factors that drive a legal system to pursue reforms can be multi-fold and complex. In the
case of the dignity of human beings, for instance, authoritative international instruments like
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 speak of human capacity, potential, and
worth, which should be the basis for legal rights to prohibit and prescribe codes of conduct.
Further, the UDHR, in its Preamble, refers to the inherent dignity of all members of the
human family as the foundation of freedom, justice, and peace in the world. The essence of
the UDHR stands tall in the text of various national and international documents that speak of
respect and protection of human dignity.
A question as compelling, and on the lines of human dignity, concerns the worth and
potential of the non-human life forms. Comparative research and studies (the Cambridge
Declaration, for instance) indicate that because the essence of life reflects in many non-
human life forms, human beings are not the only species that can be designated as “living”,
“existing”, and “worthy”.31 In this context, a host of questions were also posed on the
29
Animal Ethics, Five Years of the Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness (2017). Available at Five years of
the Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness — Animal Ethics (animal-ethics.org).
30
Supra note 6.
31
Deepa Kansra, Dignity, “A regenerative idea”, ILI Law Review (Winter 2016).
65
occasion of the seventieth anniversary of the UDHR. Should the “UDHR be recast for a time
in which new technologies are continually altering how humans interact, and the legal status
of robots, rivers, and apes alike are at times argued in the language of rights?”32 According to
Huneeus, a lot of these questions can no longer be cast aside, because lawyers are raising
these arguments in courts and other legal venues and there is a blossoming field of post-
humanism in the humanities in dialogue with the social sciences and even natural sciences,
and an important national security law debate on autonomous weapons (or killer robots) and
humanitarian law.33
With great vigor, the interests of the non-human category have informed several
constitutional and statutory reforms. For instance, in 2017, the Te Awa Tupua ( Whanganui
River Claims Settlement) Act of New Zealand, declared the Whanganui River as a spiritual
and physical entity, a living whole. Another example is the Uganda National Environment
Act, 2019, which under Section 4 provides the rights of nature. Under clauses (1), (2), and (3),
the Act provides, “nature has the right to exist, persist, maintain and regenerate its vital cycles,
structure, functions and its processes in evolution. A person has a right to bring an action
before a competent court for any infringement of rights of nature under this Act. Government
shall apply precaution and restriction measures in all activities that can lead to the extinction
of species, the destruction of the ecosystems or the permanent alteration of the natural cycles”.
IV. Advocacy For Reforms
Litigations instituted before domestic courts have also been complemented with the adoption
of academia/expert-led declarations and instruments. Most of them project a set of values that
are expected to shape the legal systems of the world. A few notable ones are the Charter on
the Law of the Living (2021)34, the Toulon Declaration (2019)35, the Universal Declaration of
Rights of Mother Earth (2010)36, Collective Thinking on the Rights of the Pacific Ocean,
2018 (Ocean Rights Statement hereinafter)37, Vienna Manifesto on Digital Humanism38, etc.
32
Alexandra Huneeus, Human Rights and the Future of Being Human, Vol. 112 American Journal of
International Law (2018).
33
Ibid.
34
United Nations Harmony with Nature Programme, The Charter on the Law of the Living, 2021. Available at
https://www.univ-tln.fr/IMG/pdf/charter_on_the_law_of_the_living_-_eng.pdf
35
Declaration of Toulon, 2019. Available at https://www.univ-tln.fr/Declaration-de-Toulon.html
36
Available at https://declarationproject.org/?p=1164
37
Collective Thinking on the Rights of the Pacific Ocean, Study on rights of the Pacific Ocean, New Zealand
(2018).
38
Available at https://dighum.ec.tuwien.ac.at/dighum-manifesto/
66
In totality, the contributions of the above-mentioned statements can be summarized as
follows;
- They emphasize the need for greater advocacy for reforms of the non-human
entities in legal systems around the world.
- They emphasize the need for entity-specific rights, meaning culturally appropriate
rights supported by scientific research and shared knowledge.
- They emphasize the need for recognizing the embeddedness of human interests in
the non-human world, making both the human and non-human worlds entwined
through a shared destiny.
- They emphasize the need for recognizing the dependency of human rights on the
rights and welfare of the non-human entities.
On the subject of legal reforms, the Charter on the Law of the Living makes a direct reference
to the needed reforms within legal systems and the change in “legal dynamics” for the non-
human world.39 Section 3 provides, “the interests of human beings and of other animals, as
well as the integrity of ecosystems, must be prioritized. Said interests may only be affected
exceptionally, measuredly and extraordinarily.” Under Section 6 it provides, “it is necessary
to widen each legal system, based on the criteria of the living, as well as the notion of natural
persons, to include the above mentioned non-human persons. Specific and appropriate
positive rights, different from those attributed to human persons, must be recognized with
respect to the principles arising from this Charter”. Section 6, in particular, insists on the
development of specific and appropriate rights, as distinct from the rights applicable to the
humans. In this regard, The Ocean Rights Statement writes of “a transformational shift” that
is needed in the behavioural, societal, legal, governance and economic relationships to live in
harmony with the Ocean.
The Toulon Declaration concerns the legal personality and rights of animals. It states, “in
most legal systems, animals are still considered as things and lack legal personality, which
alone can confer on them the rights they deserve as living beings. Believing that today, the
law can no longer ignore the progress of science that can improve the consideration of
animals, knowledge that has been largely underused until now. Finally, considering that the
current inconsistency of national and international legal systems cannot support inaction and
39
Supra note 34.
67
that it is important to initiate changes so that the sensitivity and intelligence of non-human
animals are taken into account.”40
On the requirement of specific rights for the non-human world, the Ocean Rights Statement
provides, she (oceans) is an entity, with rights including but not limited to the right to exist,
thrive and evolve, the right to integral health, the right to be free of pollution and a healthy,
functioning climate system, the right to restoration and regeneration, and to continue her vital
functions and cycles.
On a shared destiny and intricate bonds of the human and the non-human world, the
Declaration of Mother Earth in its Preamble provides, “considering that we are all part of
Mother Earth, an indivisible, living community of interrelated and interdependent beings with
a common destiny. Gratefully acknowledging that Mother Earth is the source of life,
nourishment and learning and provides everything we need to live well. In addition, the
Statement on the Rights of Oceans provides, “we are the Ocean and the Ocean is us. The
Ocean is our source of life, our family and blood. All Earth’s systems and beings are related
and interdependent. The Ocean has authority (mana) and life force (mauri)”. The Charter on
the Law of the Living speaks for “sustainable, reasonable and balanced development for
present and future human and non-human generations”.
On the dependency of human rights on the rights of the non-human entities, the Ocean Rights
Statement provides, “we have a responsibility and obligation to conserve, protect and defend
the rights of the Ocean; the rights of past, present and future generations of all beings rely on
respect for the rights of the Ocean” The Declaration of Rights of Mother Earth affirms the
same. It provides, “to guarantee human rights it is necessary to recognize and defend the
rights of Mother Earth and all beings in her and that there are existing cultures, practices and
laws that do so”.
The above-mentioned Statements are commonly cited for advocacy and furthering the cause
of legal rights for non-humans.
V. Theoretical Frames
In addition to the academia-backed statements, one must also look at A few theoretical
frames that establish the boundaries for making claims for non-human entities. These include
multi-species justice, post-humanism, and digital humanism.
40
Supra note 35.
68
In the article Multispecies Justice: Theories, Challenges, And A Research Agenda For
Environmental Politics, the authors make a case for re-thinking the notions of justice to
respond to the “destruction of multi-species lifeways”.41 The authors write, “rethinking the
subject of justice moves attention from the fiction of individuals to the actual ecological array
of relationships that sustain life. As humans and other beings surround, infuse, and support
each other, justice for any cannot be divorced from MSJ for all.”42 Further, it is through the
prism of the “multi-species justice” (MSJ) concept that the false assumptions about the
supremeness of human beings can be addressed and countered. In this regard, Plunkett states
that influential works speak of the ethical status of the non-humans and how it matters in
terms of accounts of justice. This is because of the combination of two facts; first, the fact
that non-human animals are radically marginalized in much theorizing in political philosophy,
and second, the fact that many non-human animals in our world are having a lot of bad things
happen to them.43 The idea of MSJ responds to the question about the non-human i.e. “what
about those non-subjects, such as animals or natural living entities—habitats and biotopes—
which cannot even fight for recognition, whose interests do not appear recognizable, and
which are not eligible for consideration in the law’s already institutionalized processes and
structures of representation? How can those who have no voice be heard? Can those who
have not yet assembled find justice as well?”.44. According to Ulmer, the aim of MSJ is not to
remove humans from research, but to deemphasize the focus on humans and recognize that
non-human elements are always already present. And “knowledge frameworks that privilege
the human at the expense of the more-than human could therefore be viewed as incomplete,
as well as a potential injustice to non-human entities”. 45
The second frame, posthumanism, stands as a response to humanism. Humanism, according
to Figdor, “situates the human species as distinct and unique from the non-human categories
in terms of their cognitive capacities (superior and advanced), ability to self-reflect, reason,
and communicate through language. These abilities forge the basis for developing a system of
respect for all those that are humans”46 In response, posthumanism speaks of the “human
41
.Supra note 23.
42
Id. at 120.
43
David Plunkett, Justice, Non-Human Animals, and the Methodology of Political Philosophy, Jurisprudence 6
(2016).
44
Malte-Christian Gruber, Why Non-Human Rights? 32:2 Law & Literature 268 (2020).
45
Jasmine B. Ulmer, “Posthumanism as Research Methodology: Inquiry in the Anthropocene”, International
Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education 3 (2017).
46
Carrie Figdor, The Psychological Speciesism of Humanism, 178 Philosophical Studies 1545-1569 (2021).
69
beings’ inextricable embeddedness in biological and technological worlds.”.47 Under
posthumanism, life is viewed as interconnected, relational, and transversal, it then can be
positioned as an interactive and open-ended process.48 Gruber writes, today’s “posthuman”
humanism seeks dignity of the living, and that is the only message of the idea of human rights
that we still ought to dream of”.49
The third theoretical frame, digital humanism, speaks about the blurring of boundaries
between humans and technology/AI. The Vienna Manifesto on Digital Humanism speaks of
digital humanism as the humanism which “describes, analyzes, and, most importantly
influences the complex interplay of technology and humankind, for a better society and life,
fully respecting universal human rights.” On this, writes, digital humanism, means an update
of humanism-of the image of man- in the age of digitalization.50 It is also about “preserving
the value of human dignity in the context of the digital society, understood as the recognition
that a person is worthy of respect in her interaction with autonomous technologies.”51
A social robot, for instance, is “an autonomous entity that interacts and communicates with
humans or other autonomous physical agents by following social behaviors and rules attached
to its role.” Digital humanism in this context would suggest that social robots must
understand social contexts i.e. understand users’ behaviour and emotions, and respond with
appropriate gestures, facial expressions, and gaze. The challenge is to provide algorithms to
sense, analyse situations and intentions, and make appropriate decisions.”52 These ethical
considerations about the human and machine interactions would be pressing in the times to
come, as the demands for social or assistive robots increases. The perspectives on digital
humanism consider the vast landscape of possibilities being created by human and machine
interaction.
VI. Conclusion
While there is great interest in the legal rights of the non-human, the critique of such
developments is not far behind. A diverse set of reasons have been advanced to caution about
47
Supra note 23 at 123.
48
Supra note 45 at 6.
49
Supra note 44 at 269.
50
Supra note 20 at 35.
51
Paola Inverardi, ``The Challenge of Human Dignity in the Era of Autonomous Systems”, in Hannas Werthner,
Erich Prem, Edward A. Lee and Carlo Ghezzi (eds.), Perspectives on Digital Humanism 25 (Springer 2022).
52
Nadia Magnenat Thalmann, Social Robots: Their History and What They Can Do for Us”, in Hannas
Werthner, Erich Prem, Edward A. Lee and Carlo Ghezzi (eds.), Perspectives on Digital Humanism 13 (Springer
2022).
70
the law’s turn towards conferring rights to the non-human. Some would ask whether the law
needs new theories? Are there any limits to the application of the juristic/legal person concept?
Is it viable to extend the reach of existing frameworks like human rights to the non-human?
What are the challenges in the way of the rights of the non-humans?
In the case of the rights of machines, caution is exercised. Take the example of the Statement
on Artificial Intelligence: An Evangelical Statement of Principles (2019)53. The Statement
poses a theological challenge to the growing interests in the entwining of AI and human life.
The Statement provides, “while technology can be created with a moral use in view, it is not
a moral agent. Humans alone bear the responsibility for moral decision making”. Under
Article 12, it states, “we deny that AI will make us more or less human, or that AI will ever
obtain a coequal level of worth, dignity, or value to image-bearers. Future advancements in
AI will not ultimately fulfill our longings for a perfect world. While we are not able to
comprehend or know the future, we do not fear what is to come because we know that God is
omniscient and that nothing we create will be able to thwart His redemptive plan for creation
or to supplant humanity as his image-bearers” (Article 12).54 According to Richards,the
Evangelical Statement is sceptical that computers can become conscious moral agents
(Article 3). The Statement also explores the relationship of AI to medicine, sexuality, work,
war, public policy, and the future.55
In the context of rights of nature, Tanasescu writes, “the underlying assumption is often that
all of these cases are fundamentally similar – part of a nature rights movement – and that they
are (at least in theory) a radical solution to environmental degradation. But practice has not
yet proven that these kinds of rights are a good mechanism of environmental protection.
Instead, it has demonstrated that these rights are of various kinds, have appeared in different
contexts, and embody tensions and contradictions that predate them.” 56
Many have also spoken of a research-informed approach to what the moral and legal
requirements for each of the entities are. Like it was in the case of ending animal suffering
(Animal Ethics).57 The Charter on the Law of the Living also speaks of “specific and
53
https://erlc.com/resource-library/statements/artificial-intelligence-an-evangelical-statement-of-principles/.
54
Ibid.
55
Jay Richards, New Evangelical Statement on AI is Balanced and Well-Informed, Mind Matters News (2019).
Available at https://mindmatters.ai/2019/04/new-evangelical-statement-on-ai-is-balanced-and-well-informed/.
56
Supra note 7.
57
Supra note 16.
71
appropriate” rights for the non-human as different from those for the human category.58 The
critical views, like those advanced by, make it sort of mandatory to understand the diversity
in approaches and arguments for rights of the non-humans.
In terms of laws’ evolution, the new theoretical frames like multispecies justice.
Posthumanism and digital humanism make way for re-imagining representation, democracy,
and institutional governance.59 The “non-human” category also introduces a turn towards
knowledge systems that have historic validity, practical wisdom, and emancipatory
potential.60 In light of the many developments cited in the paper, it is substantiated that
protecting and representing the life and worth of the non-human is a great evolutionary
demand that is creating many implications for legal systems across the world.
58
Supra note 34.
59
Joe Gray, Anna Wienhues, Helen Kopnina and Jennifer DeMoss, Ecodemocracy: Operationalizing
ecocentrism through political representation for non-humans, Vol 3 No 2 The Ecological Citizen (2020).
60
Supra note 7.
