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in New London County
Ruling
Dawn Schultz et al vs DOE 1 et al
Apr 07, 2025 |
22CV408584
22CV408584 Dawn Schultz et Motion to Compel (Request for Production of Documents and Special
al vs DOE 1 et al Interrogatories) Defendant Doe 1 a/k/a The Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints motions to compel further responses and production of
documents from Plaintiffs Dawn Schultz and Danai Mooneyham to
Defendant’s Request for Production Of Documents (Set One), and Special
Interrogatories (Set One). Defendant argues that the motions are brought
as Plaintiffs’ responses are incomplete and do not meet the statutory
requirements. By this motion, filed December 20, 2024, Defendant seeks
further responses and production of documents to its Special Interrogatory
Nos. 1-4, 11, 13-15, 17-18 and Request for Production No. 1, without
objections. Plaintiffs oppose the motions. The Court has carefully and
thoroughly reviewed all briefing. As an initial matter this is essentially 4
separate motions combined into one motion. Counsel are cautioned that a
motion should relate to only one set of discovery. As to all the motions,
the Court does not find the meet and confer efforts to be adequate or
meaningful. With respect to the motions to compel against both plaintiffs
regarding special interrogatories, Plaintiffs responded to the
interrogatories on August 23, 2023 and further responded to only
Interrogatories 11 and 13 on November 15, 2024. The record is void as to
whether or not an extension to file a motion to compel was granted as to
the initial responses for the interrogatories in dispute to which further
responses were not provided. As such, the Court will only address the
further responses to Interrogatories 11 and 13 for which a motion to
compel is timely:Interrogatory 11: DENIED. Interrogatory 13: DENIED.
With respect to the motion to compel document request No.1, the separate
statement only addresses this request for Plaintiff Schultz. The Court
rules:1: GRANTED IN PART. Plaintiff to provide a verified, further
response as to why only portions of emails were previously produced.
Counsel are ordered to meet and confer in person or by video conference
for each of the items in dispute in motions to compel that have been filed
but not yet heard, in as many sessions as it takes. The parties shall then
file a joint statement 10 days before each hearing that sets forth the nature
7
of the meet and confer efforts, the remaining discovery in dispute, why
they should be compelled/not compelled. Moving party to prepare formal
order.
8
Ruling
RONALD CEBALLOS VS COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
Apr 10, 2025 |
25STCV00984
Case Number:
25STCV00984
Hearing Date:
April 10, 2025
Dept:
72 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT 72 TENTATIVE RULING RONALD CEBALLOS, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES DISTRICT ATTORNEYS OFFICE, Defendant. Case No: 25STCV00984 Hearing Date: April 10, 2025 Calendar Number: 12 Defendant County of Los Angeles and the Los Angeles County District Attorneys Office (the County) demurs to the Complaint filed by Ronald Ceballos (Plaintiff). The Court CONTINUES the hearing on the demurrer to May 19, 2025 at 8:30 a.m. so that Plaintiff can be properly served with the demurrer. Background Factual Background This appears to be a malicious prosecution case. The following facts are taken from the allegations of the Complaint, which the Court accepts as true for the purposes of the demurrer. On May 13, 2023, a City of Los Angeles Administrative Judge issued a ruling stating that Plaintiff had received an overpayment from the County of Los Angeles Department of Public Social Services. The decision stated that Plaintiff was responsible for reimbursing the County with the amount of $784.00. The decision did not make a determination that any action by Plaintiff had been felonious or fraudulent. At the hearing, Angelita Leon-Chang testified as a representative of the Department of Public and Social Services that there was a mistake in calculating a $2,169.00 overpayment, and that the correct amount was a $784.00 overpayment. On May 25, 2023, the County filed felony charges against Plaintiff, alleging that Plaintiff had received an overpayment amount of $2,169.00. Plaintiff alleges that the County filed the charges as an act of malfeasance and retaliation against Plaintiff. Plaintiff apparently did not find out about the felony charges pending against him until June 27, 2023, when Plaintiffs employment was terminated due to his employer receiving a background report stating that the County had filed felony charges against Plaintiff. Plaintiff was not able to secure employment and remained unemployed for 12 months. On October 2, 2023, Plaintiff received a Criminal Complaint and Order to Appear for Arraignment on November 8, 2023 regarding the felony charges. This was the first written communication that Plaintiff received from the County regarding the charges. On November 8, 2023, Plaintiff appeared for his arraignment and pleaded not guilty on the advice of his public defender. On January 10, 2024, Plaintiff appeared for his Trial Setting Hearing. On the advice of his public Defender, Plaintiff paid the outstanding amount of $784.00 to the county. On February 23, 2024, the felony charges against Plaintiff were dismissed at an Early Disposition Hearing. Plaintiff alleges that the felony charges remained on Plaintiffs background reports for the following three months and prevented Plaintiff from securing employment until June 2024. Procedural History Plaintiff filed this action on January 15, 2025. Although the Complaint does not identify any specific causes of action by name, Plaintiffs claim appears to be one for malicious prosecution. On March 3, 2025, the County demurred to the Complaint and attempted to serve Plaintiff by mail. On the same day, Raymond J. Fuentes, counsel for the County, mailed a meet and confer letter to Plaintiff. (3/3/2025 Fuentes Decl. ¶ 5.) Fuentes could not call Plaintiff because a phone number was not provided in the Complaint. (3/3/2025 Fuentes Decl. ¶ 5.) On March 12, 2023, the envelope containing the Countys demurrer was returned to Fuentes, stamped Return to Sender, Attempted-Not Known-Unable to Forward. (3/12/2025 Fuentes Decl. ¶ 7, Ex. B.) On the same day, Fuentes filed a declaration stating as such and served that declaration, along with Exhibit B, the photo of the returned envelope, on Plaintiff via mail. (3/12/2025 Fuentes Decl. at p. 3.) On March 13, 2023, the envelope containing Fuentes meet and confer letter was returned to Fuentes, stamped Return to Sender, Attempted-Not Known-Unable to Forward. (3/19/2025 Fuentes Decl. ¶ 8, Ex. C.) On March 18, 2025, Plaintiff called Fuentes office and informed Fuentes that he had received Fuentes March 12, 2025 declaration with Exhibit B, the photo of the returned demurrer envelope. (3/19/2025 Fuentes Decl. ¶ 9.) Fuentes told Plaintiff that the demurrer was still on calendar for April 10, 2025 and explained the basis of the demurrer. (3/19/2025 Fuentes Decl. ¶ 10.) Fuentes told Plaintiff that he still had time to file a written opposition, but Plaintiff stated that he preferred to appear at the hearing and orally argue the demurrer. (3/19/2025 Fuentes Decl. ¶ 9.) Discussion Service Although Plaintiff now has notice, by phone, that a demurrer has been filed, it appears that Plaintiff has not actually been served with a copy of the demurrer yet. Plaintiff must be served before the proceedings on the demurrer can continue. The Court continues the hearing for this reason. Merits of the Demurrer Prosecutorial Immunity Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act or omission of an employee of the public entity where the employee is immune from liability. (Gov. Code, § 815.2, subd. (b).) A public employee is not liable for injury caused by his instituting or prosecuting any judicial or administrative proceeding within the scope of his employment, even if he acts maliciously and without probable cause. (Gov. Code, § 821.6.) Here, the basis that Plaintiff alleges for liability is that the County wrongfully filed criminal charges against Plaintiff. This case therefore appears to fall within the prosecutorial immunity granted by Government Code, section 821.6. And because no public employee could be held liable on this basis, Government Code, section 815.2, subd. (b) prevents the County from being held liable as well. The Court is therefore inclined to sustain the demurrer without leave to amend. However, the Court defers ruling on this demurrer until Plaintiff can be properly served and given an opportunity to oppose the demurrer after full notice.
Ruling
Luna, et al. v. Google LLC
Apr 08, 2025 |
24CV434093
24CV434093 Luna, et al. v. Google LLC See Line 6 for tentative
ruling.
Ruling
MAGDALENO vs CITY OF ELSINORE
Apr 07, 2025 |
CVRI2405661
DEMURRER ON COMPLAINT FOR
MAGDALENO VS CITY OF AUTO (OVER $35,000) OF JASON
CVRI2405661
LAKE ELSINORE MAXWELL LOGAN MAGDALENO BY
COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE
Tentative Ruling:
The Court sustains Defendant County of Riverside’s demurrer with 30 days leave to amend.
Factual / Procedural Context
This is an action for personal injury involving a motor vehicle collision. Plaintiff alleges
that, on April 12, 2024, Plaintiff was injured in a collision involving a motor vehicle operated by
Defendant Jennifer Marie Aguirre. Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant(s), Defendants’ employees
and or agents, and each of them, so negligently, carelessly, and wantonly drove, managed,
maintained, controlled, operated and entrusted their motor vehicle so as to legally cause the
plaintiff to be injured when the driver of the defendant’s vehicle suddenly, unexpectedly and
negligently operated the defendant’s vehicle so as to legally cause a collision with a vehicle
containing plaintiff.” (Complaint, pg. 5.) Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant(s), Defendants’
employees and or agents, and each of them, negligently hired, trained, supervised, retained,
employed, and/or managed their employees, agents and assigns so as to legally cause a collision
with plaintiff.” (Ibid.)
Plaintiff’s form Complaint (PLD-PI-001), filed in this case on October 14, 2024, alleges two
causes of action for motor vehicle and general negligence against various Defendants, including
Jennifer Marie Aguirre and the County of Riverside.
Defendant County now demurs to the Complaint on the ground it fails to state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action and is not pleaded with sufficient specificity pursuant to
the Government Claims Act. (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.)
Analysis
A general demurrer lies where the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., §430.10(e).) The court assumes the truth of all material facts
which have been properly pleaded, of facts which may be inferred from those expressly pleaded,
and of any material facts of which judicial notice has been requested and may be taken (Crowley
v. Katleman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 666, 672.) However, a demurrer does not admit contentions,
deductions or conclusions of fact or law (Daar v. Yellow Cab Company (1967) 67 Cal. 2d 695,
713.) If the complaint fails to state a cause of action, the court must grant the plaintiff leave to
amend if there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment. (Blank v.
Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal. 3d 311, 318.)
I. The demurrer is sustained as to all causes of action.
The complaint must contain “statement of facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary
and concise language.” (Code Civ. Proc., §425.10(a).) As against the County, the Complaint
does not meet up to this standard. Plaintiff fails to state any statutory basis on which to hold the
County directly liable for negligence, nor does he allege any facts, other than conclusory
statements, to demonstrate that the County can be derivatively liable for any negligent acts of any
County employee. Plaintiff alleges no facts at all demonstrating any County employee conducted
himself or herself negligently to cause Plaintiff’s injuries.
The Government Claims Act is “a comprehensive statutory scheme that sets forth the
liabilities and immunities of public entities and public employees for torts.” (Aubry v. Tri-City
Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 969, fn. 5.) Under the Act, liability of a public entity may be
direct or derivative. (McCarty v. State of California Dept. of Transp. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 955,
975.) A public entity such as the County can only be held directly liable for violation of a duty
imposed by statute or law. The Act declares that except as otherwise provided by statute, “a public
entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public
entity or a public employee or any other person.” (Gov. Code, §815, subd. (a).) This means that
“there is no [governmental] entity liability, unless it is established by statute.” (Bradford v. State of
California (1973) 36 Cal.App.3d 16, 19.) “Under the Government Claims Act, ‘there is no common
law tort liability for public entities in California; such liability is wholly statutory. [Citations.]’
[Citations.]” (Ibid.)
Here, the Complaint fails to state the statutory grounds on which the County can be found
directly liable for Plaintiff’s injuries. Therefore, without a statutory basis for direct liability, the
County can only be found liable on the theory of respondeat superior based on the negligence of
its employee. A public entity is ordinarily vicarious liable “for injury proximately caused by an act
or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or
omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee
or his personal representative.” (Gov. Code, §815.2(a).) However, no liability will attach if the
employee’s act or omissions do not give rise to a cause of action against the employee or if the
employee is immune from liability. (Strong v. State (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1439, 1448.) Here,
the Complaint is insufficient to allege a cause of action for negligence against any County
employee, and hence no derivative liability is alleged. The Complaint is unclear as to any
employment relationship between the County and any other Defendant. Other than conclusory
allegations, the Complaint is bereft of facts demonstrating any act or omission by any other
Defendant giving rise to the cause of action for negligence and whether the collision occurred
based on act or omission of an employee within the scope of his or her employment.
In opposing the demurrer, Plaintiff argues that the facts are presently unknown, without
an opportunity to conduct discovery, to determine who employed the individual Defendant Aguirre
when she operated the vehicle that struck Plaintiff. Plaintiff argues that he should be allowed to
complete discovery to confirm who employed Aguirre at the time of the collision, as well as to
determine whether there is any basis to hold the County liable on a new theory of liability related
to the condition of bushes which may have obstructed Aguirre’s view. Plaintiff argues that until
then, it is premature to dismiss the County from the action.
However, the Complaint, as pleaded, contains no “statement of facts constituting the
cause of action, in ordinary and concise language.” (Code Civ. Proc., §425.10(a).) Ordinarily, the
complaint is sufficient if it alleges ultimate rather than evidentiary facts, and the plaintiff is required
only to set forth the essential facts of the case with “reasonable precision and with particularity
sufficient to acquaint a defendant with the nature, source and extent of his cause of action.” (Doe
v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550.) Here, Plaintiff fails to allege even the minimum
level of facts to provide sufficient notice to County as to the nature of the claims asserted against
it. No facts are alleged as to the nature of the conduct that constituted the breach causing the
collision.
As such, the demurrer is sustained with leave to amend.
Ruling
Zaitun Printing and Graphics, Inc. vs Cheree Schabilon et al
Apr 07, 2025 |
23CV418951
23CV418951 Zaitun Printing and Graphics, Inc. vs Motion: Compel Further Responses to Form
Cheree Schabilon Interrogatories—General (Set One), Special
Interrogatories (Set One), and Request for
Production of Documents (Set One)
Ctrl Click (or scroll down) on Line 4 for
tentative ruling.
Ruling
34-2022-00316881-CU-MM-GDS
Apr 04, 2025 |
Unlimited Civil (Medical Malpractice) |
34-2022-00316881-CU-MM-GDS
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO
34-2022-00316881-CU-MM-GDS: Brenda Wilson vs. Martel Eye Institute, LLC
04/07/2025 Hearing on Motion for Order Pltf Brenda Wilson's Motion to Substitute
Expert in Department 53
Tentative Ruling
NOTICE:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to “Public Notice – Civil Division Expansion of
Law and Motion Calendar” any oral arguments regarding this tentative ruling will be
heard in Department 25, located at 720 9th Street, Sacramento, CA, the Hon. Julie
G. Yap presiding. Should argument be requested by either party, the requesting party
must call the Law and Motion Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-2615, request
the hearing, and notify the opposing party of the location and time of hearing pursuant
to Local Rule 1.06.
The Court encourages parties to appear remotely for the hearing on the tentative ruling
through the Court’s Zoom Application. But, any party wishing to appear in person may
do so, provided that party notifies the Court by 4:00 the Court day before the hearing.
The parties may join the Zoom session for hearing on the tentative ruling by audio
and/or video through the following link:
https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/my/sscdept25
SIP Address:
16113421868@sip.zoomgov.com
(833) 568-8864
ID: 16113421868
Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court
reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and
California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are
listed in the Policy for Official Reporter Pro Tempore available on the Sacramento
Superior Court website at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-6a.pdf.
Parties may contact Court-Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list
of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at
https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-13.Pdf
A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required
to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the
Page 1 of 2
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO
34-2022-00316881-CU-MM-GDS: Brenda Wilson vs. Martel Eye Institute, LLC
04/07/2025 Hearing on Motion for Order Pltf Brenda Wilson's Motion to Substitute
Expert in Department 53
hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore
list.
Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver
and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with
a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing
or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk
will be forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.
Plaintiff moves to substitute an expert witness pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section
2034.610. The motion is unopposed but is DENIED. As explained in the Court’s March 18, 2025
ruling on Plaintiff’s ex parte application seeking to substitute the same expert, Plaintiff may not
seek relief in the law and motion department for this issue. Trial in this case began on March 18,
2025. Code of Civil Procedure section 2024.030 requires that all motions pertaining to expert
witnesses be “heard on or before the 10th day, before the date initially set for the trial of the
action” (or before the continued trial date if so ordered or stipulated by the parties). This
deadline has passed.
The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312 or
further notice is required.
Page 2 of 2
Ruling
GERARDO RAMIREZ, ET AL. VS BEST WESTERN SUMMIT INN, INC., ET AL.
Apr 07, 2025 |
24CMCV00357
Case Number:
24CMCV00357
Hearing Date:
April 7, 2025
Dept:
A
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles south central District
compton courthouse, Department A
GERARDO RAMIREZ, ET AL.
Plaintiffs
,
vs.
BEST WESTERN SUMMIT INN, INC.,
et al.,
Defendants
.
Case No.: 24CMCV00357
Hearing Date:
April 7, 2025
Time:
8:30 a.m.
[Tentative] Order
RE: PETITION TO CONFIRM MINORS COMPROMISE
The court has considered the Petition to Confirm Minors Compromise and proposed order, and the proposed Order to Deposit Funds in
Blocked Account.
After hearing, t
he court grants the petition.
DATED:
April 7, 2025
_____________________________
Elizabeth L. Bradley
Judge of the Superior Court
Ruling
Connors, et al. vs. Rodger
Apr 07, 2025 |
23CV-0201906
CONNORS, ET AL. VS. RODGER
Case Number: 23CV-0201906
This matter is on calendar to reset the Mandatory Settlement Conference and trial. The Court notes that the matter
is now at issue. The Court deems this matter to be exempt from Plan Designation and intends to set the matter
for trial no later than October 7, 2025. Plaintiffs and Defendant Constance Rodger have posted jury fees.
Defendant Lee Alan Rodger has not. Defendant Lee Alan Rodger is granted ten days leave to post jury fees. A
failure to post jury fees in that time will be deemed a waiver of the right to a jury. The parties are ordered to meet
and confer prior to the hearing regarding proposed dates for trial. An appearance is necessary on today’s
calendar.
Document
LEE, LINDA v. MELLO, JULIE
Apr 07, 2025 |
V01 - Vehicular - Motor Vehicles - Driver and/or Passenger(s) vs. Driver(s) |
KNL-CV25-6074279-S
Preview
DOCKET NO.: KNL-CV-21-6053091-S SUPERIOR COURT JURIS NUMBER 019193 RENSO GONZALEZ J. D. OF NEW LONDON vs. AT NEW LONDON HEYDARI YOUNESS ET AL APRIL 26, 2022 FAX (203) 250-3131 MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME Pursuant to Practice Book §13-7 and §13-10, the defendant, Future Equipment Inc., (203) 250-2000 hereby moves this Court to extend the time limit for an additional thirty (30) days or until LAW OFFICES NUZZO & ROBERTS, L.L.C. May 29, 2022 within which to answer or otherwise respond to the plaintiff, Renso CHESHIRE, CONNECTICUT 06410 Gonzalez’s, interrogatories and requests for production, dated November 30, 2021 THE DEFENDANT FUTURE EQUIPMENT INC POST OFFICE BOX 747 By Carmine Annunziata, Esq. NUZZO & ROBERTS, L.L.C. ONE TOWN CENTER One Town Center P.O. Box 747 Cheshire, CT 06410 Phone: (203) 250-2000 Facsimile: (203) 250-3131 Juris No. 019193 cannunziata@nuzzo-roberts.co JURIS NUMBER 019193 CERTIFICATION I certify that a copy of the above was or will immediately be mailed or delivered electronically or non-electronically on April 26, 2022 to all counsel and self-represented parties of record and that written consent for electronic delivery was received from all counsel and self-represented parties of record who were or will immediately be electronically served. (203) 250-2000 FAX (203) 250-3131 Steven J. Errante, Esq. Lynch, Traub, Keefe & Errante, P.C. 52 Trumbull Street P.O. Box 1612 New Haven, CT 06510 LAW OFFICES NUZZO & ROBERTS, L.L.C. serrante@ltke.com bparks@ltke.com CHESHIRE, CONNECTICUT 06410 Carmine Annunziata F:\WP\416020\070\DISCOVERY\DEF\Discovery Motions\MET 04 26 22.doc ONE TOWN CENTER POST OFFICE BOX 747 -2-