Soviet Submarine Visits to Cuba

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^{1 nia}y be that the visits to Cuba by Soviet ^marines, which have been taking place since 1969, are political probes designed to whittle ^au>ay U' g resolve and influence in the aribbean. And, from our State Department’s P°tnt of view, that would he bad. It may be lit the visits have been initiatives of the Soviet ^avy ^and not fully endorsed by the Soviet Political leadership. And that, too, would be ^ad. Very bad.

Th

_r . ^e employment of the Soviet Navy in political a i^CS *^{ts use} short of actual conflict to support the an ^levement °f foreign policy objectives—has become 'increasingly important element in Soviet naval oper- tj^^Jns during the past ten years. The evolving role of k ^C ^°^v'et Navy as an instrument of foreign policy has j most apparent in the Mediterranean Sea and the no |^an ®^ccan- lesser prominence, but perhaps of j ess importance, have been Soviet naval operations Caribbean. Specifically, a series of submarine _t ^Sltj' ^t0 Cuban ports since 1969 provides an almost r ook case of Soviet political-military tactics. More ,e^0rtantly, trends in submarine classes, their activity ^{1 e} in port, and the locations of the port calls pose ^gmfi_cant q_uesti_ons about the Soviets’ motives and °ut their willingness to exercise restraints which jj°^u d appear to be necessary if relations with the ^nited States are to be improved over the long term.

ny conclusions drawn in this paper must be con- ^ered tenuous. Data available in the public domain

on Soviet naval operations, particularly those concern­ing submarine activity, generally are vague and incom­plete. Soviet operations in the Caribbean prove to be no exception to this rule; reports of submarine port visits, which are drawn almost exclusively from U. S. military sources, are fragmentary and sometimes contra­dictory. Nonetheless, there are sufficient data available to permit outlining of the rough pattern of activity and to speculate as to what other operations may have occurred. Hopefully, the meager information which appears in the public media is not misleading in terms of the broad directions of Soviet policy.

The first Soviet naval deployment to the Caribbean included two "Foxtrot”-class diesel-powered attack submarines and a submarine tender. These vessels along with three other warships and a naval oiler, visited Havana between 20 and 27 July 1969. Interest- ‘ⁿgly> the first Caribbean deployment also included a 'November”-class nuclear-powered attack submarine, but this vessel does not appear to have entered any Cuban port and was not mentioned in Soviet or Cuban accounts of the operation.

The Soviet Navy returned to the Caribbean in May 1970. The second deployment also included two "Fox- trot”-class submarines and a tender. In place of the "November” class, however, an "Echo II”-class sub­marine—a nuclear-powered attack submarine which carries cruise missiles—accompanied the task force.² All three submarines visited Cienfuegos (on Cuba’s south­ern coast) this time; significantly, the nuclear-powered vessel also put into port.

The third deployment was initiated only three months later (late August 1970). A submarine tender 'For footnotes, please turn to page 39.

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again was included, but there are no reports of accom­panying submarines. Nonetheless, this was a most im­portant step in the chain of events. From the first, the wording and tone of U. S. reports indicated that there was something special about the third deployment. After the ships put into Cienfuegos, the Defense De­partment announced that the Soviet vessels had brought with them two barges associated with the servicing of nuclear-powered submarines. In subsequent days, it became known that construction had been underway on shore at Cienfuegos since mid-August. According to U. S. officials, it looked like the development of a submarine base.

Events then began to assume a more threatening tone. After several days of secret negotiations and mounting pressure on the administration from the Congress, a White House spokesman issued a stern public warning. The United States was watching the situation "very closely,” he said, and viewed the con­struction with the "utmost seriousness.”³ The Soviet ships left the Caribbean within a few days of the warn­ing, except for an oceangoing tug and the submarine tender. The latter visited and revisited a number of Cuban ports until late December when she also left the Caribbean. There has been a Soviet tug at Cienfuegos ever since, with at least one replacement. Early in Octo­ber, the Soviet Union denied, in a statement published in Izvestia, that it had built, or had any intention of building a submarine base in Cuba.⁴

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The mast of a "foxtrot "-class diesel-powered attack submarine cuts the surface in the Caribbean. Two "Foxtrot” submarines were part of the first Soviet deployment to Havana in 1969, and there have been at least a dozen visits by "Foxtrots” to Cuban ports since.

"November”-class nuclear-powered attack submarine, accompanied by a tender, put into Cienfuegos. Three months later, an "Echo”-class nuclear-powered cruise missile submarine rendezvoused with the tender at Antilla, a port near Cienfuegos.⁵

The next significant development did not occur for another year. On 29 April 1972, a "Golf”-class diesel- powered strategic submarine, accompanied by a tender, put in at Bahia de Nipe. The "Golf’ class carries three ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. The submarine is classified as a strategic weapon system in that her missiles are generally believed to be designed for use

U. S. NAVY

_ GRAND CAYMAN

(Jamaica)

LESSER CAYMANS (Jamaica)

This minor confrontation, while apparently resolved successfully, was far from the end of Soviet submarine visits to Cuba. Visits by "Foxtrot”-class diesel-powered attack submarines have occurred on at least 12 subse­quent occasions. More important, in February 1971, a

^gainst fixed land targets. This was the first publicly °r ed visit by this type of submarine to a foreign

beh^ ^V*^S*^{t WaS n0t announcec}^ beforehand, and avior of the accompanying vessels indicated that

^Iet officials had some concern for the implications °f the visit.⁶

fue^^{VCr C}^^{e nCXt tW}° ^^ears’ ^{tw0 more} visits to Cien- _T^egos by "Echo”-class submarines were recorded, s k^’ °ⁿ ^ ^P^rii 1974, another "Golf”-class strategic tnarine visited Cuba. This time, the visit was an- ^ unced in advance and the submarine put into of T^a' ^ ^^aCt’ ^{an art}‘^c^^e about the visit, a photograph ^e task force and a close-up picture of the sub- li ^WCre Published in La Gramma, Havana’s Eng- *^s - anguage newspaper.⁷ Subsequently, the "Golf” ^ass tuoved to Cienfuegos—the first time a ballistic J⁷ussile submarine had been at the base—and remained ^ere for nearly two weeks.

diff^^{at t}^^Cn *^{S t0 ma<}^^{e f}bi^s series of visits by ^erent types of submarines, to various Cuban ports, ^Ver a five-year period? First, there is no doubt that, _s° 1970, the U.S.S.R. did indeed build a facility for ^erv'cing submarines at Cienfuegos. Construction in the ^ea, all of which remained in place at least through ^a °f 1974, included barracks, recreational facilities, and'^{ater t0wer}’ ib^e rehabilitation of an existing pier, the laying of moorings for visiting tenders and ^marines.⁸ As best the authors can tell, the barges y ^lch were transported to Cienfuegos from the Soviet ^ⁿⁱ°ⁿ, and which are associated exclusively with the ^^sP°^sal of effluents from nuclear power plants, remain r ibe port. All that is necessary to make use of the ^^C1 uy, according to U. S. defense officials, is the arrival ^{a su}bmarine and a tender.⁹ _So^Second, as a result of the U. S. protests in 1970, ^Vlet plans to make use of the facility were shelved, „^t ^^east temporarily. U. S. officials reported that an ^Understanding” had been reached with the Soviet ^ ⁿ*°n as to what the U.S.S.R. would and would not g ^Wlth regard to the basing of naval vessels in Cuba. al]^{11 C}^^{C content} this agreement remains secret to but a handful of officials, and its interpretation PParently is ambiguous. Furthermore, the official U. S. ^uterpretation of the meaning of the agreement seems ⁰ have narrowed over the intervening years.

Initially, U. S. concern over the use of facilities at uiuegos by Soviet submarines clearly was directed ^sub^>leVent*ⁿg ^t^^1C bl-S.S.R. from basing strategic missile d_e ^rnar'^nes ‘ⁿ this hemisphere. In this sense, the "un- ^tstanding” was viewed as an extension of the 1962 ^ennedy-Khrushchev agreement regarding Soviet de- ytnent of land-based ballistic missiles in Cuba. For ^Xarnple, at the height of the 1970 confrontation, the

previously mentioned White House spokesman warned:

". . . the Soviet Union can be under no doubt that we would view the establishment of a strategic base in the Caribbean with the utmost serious­ness ...”

He then quoted President Kennedy’s statement of 2 November 1962:

"If all offensive weapons are removed from Cuba and kept out of the Hemisphere in the future . . . there will be peace in the Caribbean.”¹⁰

The context, tone, and general nature of the discussions during the summer and fall of 1970 all support the view that U. S. concerns focused on strategic weapons.

In the face of the "Golf” class visits, however, the "understanding” is now interpreted more narrowly—to apply only to nuclear-powered submarines. Thus, the "Golf” class, even though considered a strategic weapon system, is said by the U. S. Department of Defense not to pose a challenge to the "understanding” because it has a diesel propulsion system.

Unfortunately, this fine distinction—even if valid— has not stood the test of time. The administration’s current position is best summarized in a statement made by former President Richard M. Nixon in January 1971:

", . . in the event that nuclear subs were serviced either in Cuba, or from Cuba, that would be a violation of the understanding. That has not hap­pened yet. We are watching the situation closely.”¹¹

The President did not have long to wait. One month after he made that statement, as noted, a nuclear- powered "November”-class submarine with a tender visited Cienfuegos. Whether the submarine actually was serviced in the port remains an ambiguous point in public discussions. It was reported, however, that Soviet sailors were observed on the soccer field and thus, at least one part of the facility was in use. There were no public U. S. protests about this visit. Nor did the U. S. protest subsequent visits by "Echo”-class sub- marines—nuclear-powered vessels carrying missiles, al­though not strategic weapons.

Third, and finally, we come to an assessment of Soviet behavior. It seems evident that the U.S.S.R. has been probing the margins of the 1970 "understanding,” thereby testing the limits of U. S. tolerance for its military activity in the Caribbean. Following attain­ment of the "understanding,” the Soviet Union has sequentially put a:

► Nuclear-powered attack submarine into Cienfuegos with a tender.

I

►  Nuclear-powered submarine carrying missiles (al­though not strategic missiles) into Cienfuegos with a tender.

►   Diesel-powered strategic ballistic missile submarine into Havana quietly.

►  Diesel-powered strategic ballistic missile submarine into Havana in a very public fashion, then quietly moved it to Cienfuegos.

And this is only what may be derived from the public record.

The ramifications of this naval activity should not be overstated. The submarine visits, after all, have oc­curred over a protracted period. And the U.S.S.R. has not, as yet, directly challenged the narrow inter­pretation of the "understanding,” for example, by sending a "Yankee”-class nuclear-powered strategic sub­marine into Cienfuegos. Nonetheless, it seems clear that the Soviet Union is in the process of establishing prece­dents and testing U. S. resolve over this issue. Possible reasons for this behavior are explored in the following section.

Clearly, this series of submarine visits is not ex­plained by the usual operational reasons, such as repair and replenishment, for sending naval vessels into foreign ports. If nothing else, it is most unusual for strategic submarines to make calls in foreign ports. There are no other instances in which Soviet strategic submarines are reported to have visited foreign nations. And the writers are aware of only one visit by a U. S. strategic submarine to a foreign state—aside from the usual Polaris visits to established operational bases at Holy Loch, Scotland, Rota, Spain, and Guam. The U. S. visit, in fact, provides an interesting analogy and possible precedent for the "Golf” class visits to Cuba. In April 1963, a Polaris submarine, the USS Sam Houston (SSBN- 609), made a port call at Izmir, Turkey. This visit followed closely on the heels of the U. S. removal of Jupiter missiles from Turkey.¹² It was clearly intended to demonstrate to various interested governments that despite the withdrawal of her land-based ballistic mis­siles, the United States would maintain her commitment to the defense of Turkey and, in fact, still retained a strategic capability in the region.

Moreover, the fact that the Soviet Union has con­tinued to send submarines into Cuban ports following the tempest raised in 1970 and, in fact, has escalated the types of submarines making those calls—thus risk­ing a renewed controversy with the United States— indicates that Soviet decision-makers may have purposes of wider impact than those associated with everyday naval operations. What then are the alternative explana­tions for this Soviet behavior?

It is possible, of course, that the Soviet Union evalu­ates the military advantage stemming from the estab­lishment of a submarine facility in Cuba as being sig­nificant enough to warrant the risks it is running with regard to the U. S. reaction to these visits. These military advantages are quite real and would apply both | to offensive and defensive missions of the Soviet Navy-

A base in Cuba would permit a reduction in the amount of time spent in transit between port and patrol area by "Yankee”-class strategic submarine^ which now cruise in the mid-Atlantic near Bermuda. This reduction would permit a corresponding increase in the number of submarine-launched missiles alert and on station, without an increase in the number of sub­marines maintained in the Soviet inventory. More im­portant, a Cuban base would permit the Soviet Navy to reduce the frequency with which her strategic sub­marines have to transit between the Atlantic patrol areas and their normal bases on the Kola Pensinub near Finland. Such transits must pass through relatively narrow zones between Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom (known as the G.I.-U.K. gap) and are a point in the strategic patrol cycle in which the submarines are relatively more vulnerable to detection by NATO antisubmarine systems.

Similar benefits would accrue to submarines desig­nated for defensive missions; a base in Cuba would permit them to operate with greater on-station times and fewer transits through the G.I.-U.K. gap. This would be particularly important for attack submarines whose mission is to intercept or trail U. S. aircraft carriers based in Norfolk, Virginia, and Mayport, Flor­ida, or U. S. strategic submarines operating out of Charleston, South Carolina. For submarines with these missions, a Cuban base also would permit a reduction in expected reaction time—a benefit which could be important in various scenarios. For example, during Middle East crises, the United States typically deploys additional carriers and amphibious assault forces to the Mediterranean from bases on the U. S. East Coast. A Cuban base would permit the Soviet Navy to muster larger anticarrier forces on short notice in such contin­gencies.¹⁴

Thus, both for offensive and defensive missions, the military implications of a Cuban submarine base pertain mainly to greater operating efficiencies. The Cienfuegos facility would not give the U.S.S.R. a new capability! it would permit her to exercise an existing capability with fewer resources (and therefore lesser cost), of achieve marginally greater capability with the sam^c resources. Because of this, it seems unlikely that the Soviet Union would be willing to run the political risks of continued submarine visits, as evidenced by the U. S- reaction in 1970, solely for reasons of military advan-

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^as been suggested elsewhere that because both °h -class submarine visits occurred near critical ^lnt^ *ⁿ the SALT (strategic arms limitation talks) ^|°tiations, they may have been an element in the ^ ' S R ’s bargaining strategy.¹⁶ At various times the _fr^<)Vlet Union has pressed the United States to withdraw _m°^m ^^er Polaris bases at Holy Loch and Rota. Establish- i ^nt °f a similar Soviet facility in Cuba would serve, ^ ^th*s sense, as a bargaining chip to trade for the U. S. ^^ases- Similarly, the threat to increase on-station time ^ operating strategic submarines out of Cuba, implied y the "Golf” class visits, would bolster Soviet argu- ts that their relative geographic disadvantage neces- ^{e<1 an} advantage on their side in the number of pa ^marine'launched ballistic missiles permitted to each £ y- Of finally, a "Golf” class operating facility in ^a could provide additional leverage to Soviet negoti- ^rs in their efforts to have U. S. forward-based ^ems—tactical nuclear weapons deployed in ^urope-i_ncluded

in future strategic arms limitation

dements.

. ^hile it would be foolish to discount SALT bargain-

Hen ^taCt^^{CS as a mot}i^ve behind the visits, SALT would

l ^seem to have been a primary motive. Although both          i • • ^r i '    •              .

⁴ vjolt class visits occurred near important points

A ”Kildin”-class DDG was one of three surface warships that accompanied the two "Foxtrot” submarines to Fiavana in 1969. Four years later, a Canadian journalist photographed a Kresta II” CLGM, which he reported was accompanied by a submarine as she entered Fiavana harbor.

in the formal negotiations, they were a little too late to have had a major impact on the back-channel bar­gaining. In 1972, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger visited Moscow secretly between 20 and 24 April; key U. S. decisions were taken in the next few days. In 1974, Kissinger was in Moscow on 24-27 March. Thus, if the SALT negotiations were a primary motive of the submarine visits, they would seem more likely to have been staged during March of each year. Also, in view of U. S. sensitivities regarding Cuban bases, Soviet decision-makers might have perceived the submarine visits as risking a stiffening of the U. S. position at the talks, rather than a greater willingness to enlarge the potential agreement. Besides, with regard to the 1972 visit, it was the United States which pressed to have strategic submarines included in the first SALT agree­ments. The Soviet Union was apparently content with an agreement which included only land-based missiles and didn’t concede this point until the Kissinger visit.¹⁷

It is possible that the submarine visits have been initiatives of the Soviet Navy and not fully endorsed by the U.S.S.R.’s political leadership. There is some evidence that the Soviet Navy was unhappy about aban­doning the Cienfuegos facility so quickly on the heels of the White House warning in 1970. In fact, the 1970 "understanding” seems to have been reached in two stages. In late September, the U. S. issued her warning and most of the Soviet vessels left; the official Soviet denial was published on 9 October. The submarine tender remained, however, and behaved in a fashion (going in and out of various ports for brief intervals) which could indicate that the Soviets were unsure of what to do next. More convincingly, the statement by

President Nixon concerning the nature of the "under­standing” referred to the agreement as having been reached on 13 October—long after the Soviet ships had departed and four days after the Soviet denial.¹⁸

Thus, one could reconstruct events as follows: (1) Soviet vessels arrive in Cuba; (2) the United States protests; (3) the Soviet leadership orders a withdrawal;

(4)      the Soviet Navy delays by keeping the tender in the area and leaving the barges, tug, etc. at Cienfuegos;

(5)      the U. S. renews its protests; and (6) on 13 Octo­ber, a final agreement is reached. If this sequence of events is near accurate, it is plausible that the Soviet Navy has been continuing to press to reestablish the Cienfuegos facility through the vehicle of gradually escalating submarine visits.

Unfortunately, we know too little about Soviet deci­sion-making to make an assessment of the likelihood of such bureaucratic independence. Arguing against such an explanation of events is the highly centralized nature of decision-making in the U.S.S.R. and the tight control of the military exercised by the Communist Party through various means. On the other hand, while the general policy of sending submarines to Cuba is almost certainly the sort of decision likely to have been reviewed by political authorities, the specific content of any individual visit—class of submarine, port, activ­ity—might well be left strictly to military officials. Also supporting the case that the "Golf” class visits were independent Navy initiatives are reports that in 1972 Admiral S. G. Gorshkov, the Soviet Navy’s Com­mander-in-Chief, was aligned with conservative ele­ments in the party, such as Ukrainian Communist leader Pyotr Shelest, in advocating a tougher policy toward the United States. One example of this stance concerned reaction to the mining of Haiphong.¹⁹ Thus, we cannot reach any firm evaluation of this possible explanation for the submarine visits.

The Soviet decision to back off from the establish­ment of the facility at Cienfuegos, even if it reflected only a tactical withdrawal, must have been worrisome for the Cubans. While certainly not so important nor so sharp a retreat as the 1962 Missile Crisis, the 1970 decision could have reminded Premier Fidel Castro of Soviet reluctance to confront the United States in this hemisphere and, therefore, renewed his concerns as to the strength of Soviet commitments to Cuba’s security should the United States become more threatening. Additionally, the 1970 withdrawal would have re­minded the Soviets themselves—particularly Admiral Gorshkov, who has been Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy since 1956 and thus had to direct both withdrawals—of the humiliating retreat in 1962. Thus, the continued submarine visits and probing of the 1970 "understanding” could be aimed at:

►  Reassuring Castro of Soviet power and, more impor­tantly, Soviet will to exercise that power in the Carib­bean.

►  Bolstering the Soviets’ own self-esteem.

In this regard, it is intriguing that both "Golf” class visits began on exactly the same date, 29 April. While this certainly could be no more than a coincidence, J it also is possible that the date is of some significance- ; And, in fact, one can construct a reason for selecting 29 April. The 1961 invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs occurred on 15 April. Cuba celebrates her victory ; over the invaders by a two-week labor holiday, known j as "Quincena de Giron,” when students and urban . laborers are mobilized, go out to the countryside, and ■ help to harvest the sugar cane crop. The two-week period ends on 29 April.

The coincidence of the "Golf” class visits with this holiday period would seem to indicate that Soviet motives stem primarily from a desire to bolster relations with Cuba. Making visible to the Cubans tangible evidence of Soviet power, on the anniversary of the most ambitious attempt to overthrow the Castro re­gime, could be a means of reassuring the Cuban gov­ernment of Soviet support and determination not to permit similar attacks in the future. The "Golf” class would have been chosen for this purpose because ^lC is a strategic weapon system, and thus would contradict some of the doubts as to Soviet will raised by the 1962 and 1970 retreats. At the same time, because the "Golf’ class is not nuclear powered, and because it carries fewer and less powerful missiles than more modern Soviet strategic submarines, it would be less likely to provoke a strong response by the United States—a prediction which indeed has turned out to be accurate.²⁰

The final alternative explanation of Soviet behavior is the most worrisome from the perspective provided by U. S. foreign policy. Put simply, this explanation holds that the U.S.S.R. is using the series of submarine visits as means of testing the strength and endurance of U. S. will and commitments. Probing the margins of the 1970 "understanding” provides one means of examining the degree to which the United States is willing to take risks in her broad set of relations with the U.S.S.R. in order to prevent the Soviets from achieving a shift, no matter how small, in the two sides’ relative military capabilities. If this indeed has been the Soviet motive, then the U. S. response to the visits^ essentially an endorsement of the Soviet behavior—can only encourage future actions by the Soviet Union of a similar nature. The implications of this assessment are discussed in the concluding section of this article.

No doubt, the reasons why the Soviet Union has

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ntinued to send submarines to Cuban ports are com­at ^C|^ate<^ ^and °f ^multiple origins. They may well include ^ ^Ca^^{t e}lements of all the alternative explanations ^cri ed in the preceding section and possibly other ^lves which have not occurred to the writers. Deter- *ⁿg which motives have been uppermost in the sol ^S ^^ovlet decision-makers is a problem whose

tion would provide more than intellectual satis­faction • ■ i       •

. > ^u also would aid the establishment of more _a ^tta'ⁿ guidelines for U. S. policy. Unfortunately, it is Problem most unlikely to be solved, k ° ^r“^e degree that the visits are motivated primarily f-ub°^nS'de^ra^ti°^ns °f ^SALT bargaining tactics, of Soviet- _$uk ^an Nations, or of Soviet bureaucratic politics, the _c Marine visits can be looked upon with relatively less ^ ^cern by the United States. These sorts of motives _to°^{U d} *ⁿdicate that the U.S.S.R. is unlikely to continue mak^{SCalate C}^^{C v}'^sits *^{n terms} of the types of submarines _t ^ln8 the visits, the frequency of visits, or the degree QuJ^t-h the submarines actually are "serviced” in ^ a, except within narrow boundaries. At least, it _th°^{U d seem} unlikely that the U.S.S.R. would challenge 'j^terms of the 1970 "understanding” in a fully direct ^and_T overt fashron.

^side° ^de£^{ree c}^^{at t}f‘^e visits are motivated by con- 5 tations of military advantage or of broader U. S.- haj*^{et re}^^atlons’ however, the series of submarine visits j very different implications. There is a model of ^rit^ ^^edav‘^or encountered quite commonly in the _tj_ajj ^lnS^s °f Western specialists on Soviet affairs. Essen- y> this model postulates that the Soviet Union

unremittingly hostile to the West and con-

te^^tadsm- At the same time, the Soviet leadership grazes certain weaknesses in the Socialist camp ^ch make measures to reduce the risk of physical

conflict desirable at present. Thus, the Soviet Union is now willing to reach certain measures of arms con­trol, for example, or to adopt a generally conciliatory posture in world affairs. These are merely tactical de­vices, however, the model warns, which will be dropped whenever it appears expedient. In the mean­time, the model continues, the Soviet Union presses for tactical military or political advantages wherever possible. And in this regard, nothing encourages the U.S.S.R. to press for an advantage so much as signs of western weakness.

Applying this model to the series of Soviet sub­marine visits to Cuba, one emerges with the following explanation. The Soviet retreat in 1970 can be under­stood as a tactical withdrawal traceable to two factors:

►   A confrontation with the United States would not be desirable in the Caribbean at any time because this is an area in which geographic factors alone made it difficult for the U.S.S.R. to match U. S. military capa­bilities.

►   The tangible military advantages of a submarine base in Cuba would not seem to be commensurate with the negative consequences of a confrontation for broader U. S.-Soviet relations.

Nonetheless, taking one step back in 1970 does not imply by any means that the Soviet government aban­doned its objective of establishing a base in Cuba.

Rather, the U. S. protest indicated only that more sub­tle, less direct, and more gradual tactics were required. Instead of establishing the base in one fell swoop, precedents for submarine operations out of Cuba needed to be established. Thus, over a protracted period of time, submarines would make visits to Cuban ports, each visit representing a gradual increase in the offen­sive nature of the visit. Because each step would be a very small one, and individually of little significance, it would be difficult for the United States to justify a meaningful protest. Yet, taken as a whole, the series of visits represented an important alteration of the earlier "understanding.” And future steps eventually could achieve what was desired in 1970—the establish­ment of an operating submarine base in Cuba.

The timing of the "Golf” class visits seems most appropriately selected when examined in light of this explanation. In both cases, the visits occurred at times when the U. S. reaction was likely to be muted. In 1972, the United States was preoccupied with events in Southeast Asia as a result of North Vietnam’s Easter offensive. In fact, two aircraft carriers—likely to consti­tute the backbone of any U. S. counter-deployment to the Caribbean—had been shifted from the Atlantic to the Pacific in order to help combat the offensive. The 1974 visit occurred eight weeks before President Nixon’s second visit to Moscow. An administration in its terminal phase because of the Watergate scandal— and clinging desperately to the hope that a successful summit meeting would ease its domestic difficulties— would seem most unlikely to cause a controversy over a visit by a single submarine to a foreign port.

If this model of Soviet behavior is accurate, the series of Soviet submarine visits to Cuba since 1970 poses a difficult problem and a deliberate challenge for U. S. foreign policy. As we have noted, this is not strictly a challenge in military terms. Even over the longer term, the establishment of a submarine base in Cuba would not pose qualitatively new military threats to the United States. The Soviet submarine visits to Cuba, by gradually encroaching upon previous "under­standings,” more significantly pose a political challenge to U. S. security. Potentially, and if successful over the long term, this sort of activity could help to bring into question, in the eyes of Soviet decision-makers and leaders in other nations, the credibility and impact of U. S. statements, warnings, and other forms of verbal behavior. And without such credibility, the fabric of the U. S. posture in world affairs could be undermined seriously.

One implication of this viewpoint is the idea that the United States should adopt a tough-minded atti­tude toward Soviet military operations in this hemi­sphere. Obviously, this does not mean that each opera­tion should become a cause celebre. Some forms of military activity are routine and sanctioned by modern- day state practice. Periodic naval operations in interna­tional waters, port visits by naval vessels, their replen­ishment and minor repair on a commercial basis, clearly fit into the category of "legitimate” operations. Ocean­ographic research, the staging of aircraft flights, and military assistance programs are other activities which, within limits, generally fit this description.

On the other hand, the establishment of naval facili­ties—whether under Soviet sovereignty or not—should be resisted by diplomatic and, if necessary, by other means. The U.S.S.R. must come to understand that the process of normalizing U. S.-Soviet relations requires concessions on the part of both parties. If the Soviet Union desires further reductions of tensions in out general relations and the eventual removal of pressure in regions close to its borders, it must be prepared to refrain from activities in regions proximate to the United States which for reasons of security (real or imagined), history, domestic politics, or public opin­ion, the United States finds provocative. Furthermore, the Soviet Union is unlikely to come to such a conclu­sion unless the United States is willing to confront such situations in a direct fashion.

Of course, applying this guideline to any specific situation involves a good deal of subjective evaluation- Two specific recommendations do, however, come to mind.

The first concerns U. S. policy toward Cuba. The process of normalizing U. S. relations with Cuba has been set in motion. Several statements, tentatively and cautiously expressing at least the possibility of normal­ization have been made by both sides; other events, such as the recent visits to Cuba by Senators Jacob Javits, Claiborne Pell, and George McGovern, lend substance to this view. As the process continues, the United States should expect various commitments and restraints from the Cuban government in exchange for the relaxation of our own policies. One of these com­mitments should involve a pledge not to permit Cuba to be used for military operations by extra-hemispheric powers. The pledge should be public and explicit, and its enforcement must be taken seriously by all con­cerned parties.

The second recommendation applies regardless of progress, or the lack thereof, in U. S.-Cuban relations- Any further steps leading to the support of submarine deployments from Cuba should be assumed to consti­tute a violation of previous understandings. While apparently it is too late to prevent the servicing of some submarines in Cuba, any measure to expand the type of weapon system supported in this fashion, or the scope of support granted to these now "approved”

systems, should be resisted strenuously. To accomplish ^ls> the United States must be prepared to make a ^jor issue of what will appear to be a very minor parture—a port visit (without servicing) by a nu- ^{c ear}-powered, but older and not very capable "Hotel”- ^ass strategic submarine, for example—and to receive considerable criticism from domestic and foreign sources because of this resistance. The United States ⁰ niust be prepared to slow progress in other areas— ^arms control negotiations or technology exchanges, for example—as means of gaining leverage to force a Soviet ^ckdown.

ic is only by demonstrating a willingness to make ^rnai^or issues of single events which, in isolation, some- |.^lrnes appear relatively insignificant, that the United th^^{65 Can} k^r*ⁿ£ the Soviet Union to understand that process of normalizing our mutual relations requires concessions on the part of both sides.

Dr. Blcchman holds a Ph.D. in political science from Georgetown Uni­versity. He is now a senior fellow and director of the Defense Analysis Project at the Brookings Institution. Before joining the Brookings staff in 1971, he was affiliated with the Center for Naval Analyses for nearly six years. During that time, he participated in studies of U. S. antisubmarine warfare forces and strategic policies, in addition to directing a study of U. S. military options in the Indian Ocean. For the past several years, Dr. Blechman has co-authored Brookings’ annual review of the federal budget, Setting National Priorities. His other writings published by Brookings include Strategic Forces: Issues for the Mid-Seventies, The Changing Soviet Navy, and Controlling Naval Armaments: Prospects and Possibilities.

Ms. Levinson is an international economist who was a member of the Brookings Institution foreign policy staff from 1972 through 1974. She assisted with the fiscal year 1975 edition of Setting National Priorities and with the forthcoming Facilitating Economic Change: Adjustment Assistance and United States Trade Policies. She received a bachelor’s degree in economics from the Sarah Lawrence College in 1968 and a master’s degree in interna­tional economics from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in 1970. Ms. Levinson is now economics editor with CBS network news; she is based in Washington, D.C.