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MEMORANDUM FOR Senior Instructor, Group Room L05, Fort Bliss, TX
79918-8002

SUBJECT: Domestic Terrorism

1. Thesis Statement. The United States Government is not taking appropriate steps to protect its citizens against the threats of Domestic Terrorism.
2. Discussion. The United States Government is not totally committed to fighting domestic terrorism. The Department of Justice is caught in a web of bureaucratic red tape between legal, investigative and intelligence agencies; it lacks the clear leadership, funding and policy enforcement required to protect its citizens.
3. Conclusion. After extensive research, we found our law enforcement and intelligence gathering agencies were extremely committed to their efforts to stop domestic terrorism. The major obstacles standing in their way are ineffective policies, government bureaucracies, and overlapping agency responsibilities.
4. Haines Award. I (do do not) request that the Haines Award Selection Board consider this paper for the General Haines Award for Excellence in research. *Writing Research Papers*, Ninth Edition by James D. Lester, is the guide used in the preparation of this research paper.


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Thesis: The United States Government is not taking appropriate steps to protect its citizens against the threats of Domestic Terrorism.

- I. Terrorism defined
- II. Review of U.S. terrorism policy
 - a. United States does not follow its own policy
 - b. Countering the changing threat of terrorism
(report of the National Commission on Terrorism)
- III. Political Terrorism
 - a. Bureaucracies between government agencies
 - b. Anti-terrorism Act
- IV. Militia groups
 - a. Murrah Building (Oklahoma City)
 - b. Political fallout resulting from Oklahoma City bombing
- V. Cyberterrorism
 - a. U.S. Vulnerability
 - b. Threats
 - b. Government
- VI. Opposing View

Domestic Terrorism

There is no single, universally accepted, definition of terrorism. Terrorism is defined in the *Code of Federal regulations* as "...the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives (Terrorism in the United States 1998 (28 C.F.R. section 0.85))." Charley Reese goes on to add in an article in the Orlando Sentinel, "Terrorism is a political act, a response to U.S. policy. "It is an act of war waged by people too weak to have a conventional army or one large enough to take on the United States" (Reese 1). The Department of justice divides terrorism into international or domestic. For the purpose of this report, we will focus mostly on the United States Policy, Political Terrorism, Militia groups, and cyberterrorism, and how they correlate to Domestic Terrorism.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines domestic terrorism as: "...the unlawful use, or threatened use, of force of violence by a group or individual based and operating entirely within the United States or Puerto Rico...(Terrorism in the United States, 1998).

Call it and define it as you may, the bottom line is we cannot expect to completely eradicate terrorism; however, the United States Government is not taking appropriate steps to protect its citizens against domestic terrorism. It is now, and will remain, a persistent national and international problem. However, we can through our policies as a nation significantly reduce the impact terrorism has on our national life. We can make the terrorist's vicious work more difficult, and we can make it more costly for those people who support terrorists.

Our nation's counterterrorism policy was initially developed during the 1970s. The basic principles remain as valid today as when first articulated. The policy revolves around four pillars: **First**, *make no concessions to terrorists and strike no deals*. We will not pay ransom, release convicted terrorists, or pressure other countries to give into terrorist demands; in other words, "no deals". **Second**, *bring terrorists to justice for their crimes*. Terrorists are neither freedom fighters nor romantic warriors; they are criminals. **Third**, *isolate and apply pressure on states that sponsor terrorism to force them to change their behavior*. Together with the State Department, the President of the United States will impose sanctions on countries that support terrorist activities. We will continue to pressure states that support terrorist groups and use terrorism as a tool of their foreign policy. **Fourth**, *bolster the counterterrorism capabilities of those countries that work with the United States and require assistance*. The United States will provide for countries that support our policy, but do not have the means; either through U.S. dollars or in terms of technical, intelligence or investigative support, the United States will lend assistance. (Busby 3(Kupperman and Trent 112)).

Most experts would agree that the United States' counterterrorism policy is sound. Some experts however disagree. According to Charley Reese (a nationally syndicated columnist), "capturing an individual terrorists does not even address the problem. People who execute terrorist actions are expendable, replaceable soldiers. Catch one, and kill one, and two will take his place." He goes on to say, "Maintaining cruel sanctions on Iraq that already have cost half a million innocent lives? Those sanctions alone are enough to spawn terrorism for the next 40 years" (Reese 1).

Many in the State Department and the Department of Justice will argue that our policy is sound and it is not in need of revision. Few will argue however that the Clinton administration follows its own counterterrorism policy, take for example President, Clinton's decision to grant clemency to the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN) terrorists. The FALN is a Puerto Rican terrorist group that sought to win independence for Puerto Rico through an unprecedented terrorist spree during the 1970s and 1980s. The FALN carried out 130 bombings of key political and military locations throughout the United States (Current Resolution 180). Hundreds of people were injured to include three New York City Police Officers. Later Congress deplored President Clinton for his actions in a joint resolution action sponsored by Mr. Trent Lott (SJ33PCS).

With regards to Sinn Fein and the Irish Republican Army (IRA), Ronald Rouhier writes: "The United States government allows political asylum for persons who have well-founded fear of persecution should they be returned to their home governments. A few members of the IRA have found their way into the American judicial system and have applied for asylum; because the British government will subject them to further persecution. Their belief is in a fight for a united Ireland free of British rule. "The U.S. government could rightfully claim a separation of powers when the court upholds a request for asylum from a suspected terrorist, but not when the U.S. leaders take a direct involvement in granting visas to allow known terrorists to raise funding. The British government under John Major was vocal that the United States government should not allow any meeting between the U.S. government and the leadership of Sinn Fein under Jerry Adams lest it give a tacit recognition. This President Clinton did when overturning the State

Department visa denial and through executive authority allowed a 'reformed terrorist' to visit the White House for personal talks with the head of state (Rouhier 2).

It was quite embarrassing for the Reagan administration when light came to bear on the Iran Contra Scandal. Although the Iran Contra scandal was much more politically complicated than the preceding two examples, it still boiled down to this: Does the United States follow its own anti-Terrorism policies?

If we learn to follow our own policies, will our policies prove sound and reduce terrorism throughout the United States and overseas? The United States Government has always taken a hard-line approach to dealing with terrorism abroad and at home. Nevertheless, History has shown us that a hard-line approach is not always the most effective way of dealing with terrorists. This is especially true if the terrorist group is defending a cause considered legitimate by a significant part of the local population. Take what happened at Ruby Ridge and Waco, Texas as two prime examples of this. Had the FBI not taken a hard-line approach in handling these situations, would the Oklahoma Federal Building have been blown up? According to some, this hard-line approach may be contributing to the problem rather than solving it. Moreover, therein lies the threat of terrorism towards open societies. Normally, an open democratic society such as ours will not be overthrown by revolution, because there is an outlet for political discontent in the normal process of governing. Only a very small minority of extremists will turn to violent methods; however, it has happened that democracies destroy themselves in the process of fighting terrorism. As Lynch states: "if the response to terrorism involves suspension of democratic freedoms, this will play to the advantage of terrorists" (Lynch 13).

Along with our country's policy makers, there has to be the appropriate laws and legislation in order to empower our law enforcement and intelligence gathering agencies the necessary tools to get the job done, this is not happening! Complex bureaucratic procedures now in place send an unmistakable message to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officers in the field that recruiting clandestine sources of terrorist information is encouraged in theory but discouraged in practice. Inside information is key to preventing attacks by terrorists. The CIA must aggressively recruit informants with unique access to terrorist's plans. That sometimes requires recruiting those who have committed terrorist acts or related crimes, just as domestic law enforcement agencies routinely recruit criminal informants in order to pursue major criminal figures. Inside, the CIA has always had a process for assessing a potential informant's reliability, access, and value. However, the CIA issued new guidelines in 1995. This was in response to concerns about alleged serious acts of violence by Agency sources. The guidelines set up complex procedures for seeking approval to recruit informants who may have been involved in human rights violations. In practice, these procedures have deterred and delayed vigorous efforts to the recruitment of essential, if sometimes unsavory, terrorist informants and forced the United States to rely too heavily on foreign intelligence services. The adoption of the guidelines contributed to a marked decline in Agency morale unparalleled since the 1970s and a significant number of case officers retired early or resigned.

The Director of the CIA should issue a directive that the 1995 guidelines will no longer apply to recruiting terrorist informants (Terrorism in the United States 9-10).

The FBI, which is responsible for investigating terrorism in the United States, also suffers from bureaucratic obstacles in obtaining terrorism information.

The FBI's terrorism investigations are governed by two sets of Attorney General guidelines. The guidelines for Foreign Intelligence Collection and Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations (FI guidelines), which are classified, cover the FBI's investigations of international terrorism, defined as terrorism occurring outside the United States or transcending national boundaries. Domestic terrorism is governed by the Attorney General guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations (domestic guidelines). The domestic guidelines would apply, for example, to an investigation of a foreign terrorist group's activities in the United States if the FBI does not yet have information to make the international connection required for the FI guidelines. Both guidelines set forth the standards that must be met before the FBI can open a preliminary inquiry or full investigation. The domestic guidelines authorize a preliminary inquiry where there is information or an allegation indicating possible criminal activity. A full investigation may be opened where there is a reasonable indication of a criminal violation, which is described as a standard "substantially lower than probable cause" (Terrorism in the United States 10).

The domestic and FI guidelines provide the FBI with sufficient legal authority to conduct its investigations. In many situations, however, agents are unsure as to whether the circumstances of a particular case meet the criteria allowing their authority to be invoked. This lack of clarity contributes to a risk-averse culture that causes some agents to refrain from taking prompt action against suspected terrorists.

In 1995, largely in response to the Oklahoma City bombing and indications that confusion was inhibiting investigations, the Department of Justice (DoJ) issued a memorandum to the FBI field offices attempting to clarify the circumstances that would merit opening a preliminary inquiry and full investigation under the domestic guidelines. Nonetheless, there is still considerable confusion among the FBI field agents about the application of the guidelines. Neither the DoJ nor the FBI has attempted to clarify the FI guidelines for international terrorism investigations.

The Attorney General and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation should develop guidance to clarify the application of both sets of guidelines. This guidance should specify what facts and circumstances merit the opening of a preliminary inquiry or full investigation and should direct agents in the field to investigate terrorist activity vigorously, using the full extent of their authority. . (Schelling 12-13).

Without clear policy and guidelines, the U.S. is leaving itself vulnerable to a myriad of preconceived threats from a variety of sources. One of these threats is political terror.

Political terrorism involves the waging of organizational terror inside the United States by a group of individuals seeking specific objectives. Such acts would normally be directed against highly visible targets. Political terrorist relies on surprise, violence, shock, and publicity to intimidate or coerce a government for their political or social objectives (Motley 105). A terrorist action is an event that

affects many levels of society. In the aftermath of bloodshed, there will be a flurry of responses from politicians, a claiming of credit by the terrorist group, fears of copycat actions, and the well publicized police investigations. All of these consequences extend the meaning of a given terrorist act and demonstrate its far-reaching effect. During my discussion, I will discuss two areas that the United States (U.S.) is not taking appropriate steps to protect its citizens against the threat of Domestic Terrorism (POLITICAL). The points are: Bureaucracies between agencies, and the Anti-terrorism Act.

A political terrorist who is determined at all cost to obtain specific political objectives from the US government has at their disposal an array of options. A single act of domestic political terrorism may cut across several governmental agencies jurisdictional lines of authority. The following government agencies are responsible for the prevention of political terrorism: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Central Intelligence Agency; US Secret Services; Federal Protection Services; Federal Aviation Administration; Inspections Division of Immigration and Naturalization Services; and the Department of Commerce (Motley 46-47) These agencies have developed plans to detect, prevent, and neutralize political terrorist acts, but plans cross over the jurisdictions of several organizations. Here we have the classic case of decentralization required by government, running head long into the requirement of coordination. The standard operating procedures, concern for uncertainty, moreover, resistance to change hinders the need for cooperation. United States leaders should set guidelines to allow

agencies to respond to terrorism regardless of jurisdiction. The essentials to dealing with political terrorism are policy planning, crisis anticipation, and rehearsal. Here is an example of agencies not working together. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) feels that their organization is severely restricted in infiltrating known extremist groups. The FBI has no terrorism database like the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to stop extremist groups (FBI Domestic Center Terrorism Program). If the FBI and CIA were willing to share information about known terrorist, they would be one step closer to eliminating the terrorism threat. US lawmaker must appoint appropriate personnel in these agencies to make critical decisions so these agencies can work together. These agencies are the experts on battling political terrorism. They must keep the president informed on the known activities of political terrorist groups. There are eight active political terrorist groups in the US..

- 1.The Weather Underground,
- 2.Black Liberation Army,
- 3.The New World Liberation Front (NWLFL),
- 4.George Jackson Brigade,
- 5.Armed Forces of Puerto Rican National Liberation (FALN),
- 6.Omega (Anti-Castro),
- 7.Sam Melville-Jonathan Jackson Unit,
- 8.The Jewish Armed Resistance.

The most active of these groups is the Puerto Rican National Liberation (FALN). Since 1974 the Puerto Rico independent movement (FALN) has claimed responsibility for more than one hundred and thirty bombing in Chicago, Miami, New York, and Washington, DC that left six dead and many injured. FALN, a nationalist group that wants to disrupt lives of political leaders in the United States (Motley 7). This nationalist group is also responsible for shooting five members of congress at the US House of Representatives. Sixteen of these group members were pardoned by

President Clinton in August (FALN a Threat). Since the decision was made to release FALN members, the FBI has declined to comment on what advice it may have given the president. Someone had to gain something from the FALN member's release. The word on the street is the President released them to help his wife New York Senate campaign. Only weeks after the release, Attorney General Janet Reno stated.. "the release of the FALN members would heighten the risk of political terrorism". Keep them in prison and reduce terrorism. The release of these members was a shock to society. US leaders cannot continue to allow this to happen. Political terrorists will assume if they are caught, they will not be punished. US leaders must assume terrorist attacks will continue to be used to seek political goals. All agencies and the President must work together to stop political terrorism. Many of our citizens believe these agencies are not working together to prevent political terrorism.

The problem in combating political terrorism is a serious and difficult one confronting policymakers with a number of unaccustomed problems. First, the terrorist adversary does not follow the establish rules of warfare or diplomacy. Thus, dealing with terrorists poses different challenges than attempting to negotiate with other governments. Second, the terrorist is intermittent. Third, terrorism tends to fall between the recognized missions of the US agencies. Finally, there is an absence of mutual cooperation and understanding between US agencies, the law-enforcement and the President (MOTLEY 53). To deal effectively with political terrorism requires preparing and pre-testing a broad range of realistic scenarios and contingency plans. There must be greater cooperation between US agencies, law enforcement at the federal level and local governments. One important step the FBI did for the upcoming

millennium was a strategic assessment of domestic political terrorism in the United States called Project Megiddo. The project gave FBI members an insight on terrorism so that they can get a better understanding of the threat of terrorism. This information was shared with other agencies. Project Megiddo, is intended to analyze the potential for extremist criminal activity in the United States by individuals or domestic extremist groups who profess an apocalyptic view of the millennium or attach special significance to the year 2000. The purpose behind this assessment is to provide law enforcement agencies with a clear picture of potential extremism motivated by the next millennium. The report does not contain information on domestic terrorist groups whose actions are not influenced by the year 2000. There are numerous difficulties involved in providing a thorough analysis of domestic security threats catalyzed by the new millennium. Quite simply, the very nature of the current domestic terrorism threat places severe limitations on effective intelligence gathering and evaluation. Ideological and philosophical belief systems, which attach importance, and possibly violence, to the millennium, have been well articulated. From a law enforcement perspective, the problem therefore is not a lack of understanding of motivating ideologies. The fundamental problem is that the traditional focal point for counterterrorism analysis-- the terrorist group-- is not always well defined or relevant in the current environment. The general trend in domestic extremism is the terrorist's disavowal of traditional, hierarchical, and structured terrorist organizations. Even well established militias, which tend to organize along military lines with central control, are characterized by factionalism and disunity. While several "professional" terrorist groups still exist and present a continued threat to domestic security, the overwhelming majority of

extremist groups in the United States have adopted a fragmented, leaderless structure where individuals or small groups act with autonomy. This report gave all law enforcement agencies an ideological perspective on terrorism. The challenge to the agencies is to understand these extremist theories and be prepared to respond to the crises (Project Megiddo).

Congress passed, and President Clinton signed into law, the 1996 Anti-Terrorism Act. This Act grants federal authorities one billion dollars to combat terrorism. The new law expands the federal government powers; however, critics argue that it violates citizen's constitutional rights (Domestic Terrorism). One problem with the Bill is the Habeas Corpus Act. The Habeas Corpus Act is the only way that most criminal defendants ever get a federal hearing on their constitutional claims (McGuckin 100). This law became effective in 1867. Habeas corpus petitions involve a review by the courts as to whether prison inmates are unjustly confined. Inmates on death row often use them. Some lawmakers believe that inmates' opportunity to appeal the death sentence repeatedly and forestall execution for an extended period of time lessens the threat of punishment. The Anti-Terrorism Act by contrast gives death row inmates only six months to file a petition. The American Civil Liberties Union believes this provision is a violation of constitutional rights and that prisoners wrongly convicted will not have enough time to overturn the verdicts against them. Supporters of the law say that this provision will eliminate long, costly appeals, which at times run into many years. They argue that speedy executions will be a deterrent to terrorists. The Supreme Court will ultimately rule on the constitutionality of the provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act. The legal principle argues that there are certain human rights that cannot be violated even if the other

party has done so. No matter how atrocious the terrorist act is their rights have to be respected. Not all citizens believe in this legal principle. When an individual or group engages in terrorism, they have forfeited their right to have rights. If this law is not passed it will hamper effective anti-terrorism methods in the US. An earlier provision in the Anti-Terrorism Act that would have given the federal government power to wiretap suspected terrorist groups' phones without a warrant was removed from the final Bill. The Act would have allowed the information obtained in any way to be used in court. Rep. Bob Barr (R-Ga) said: "We do not need to give our government vast new powers." Members of civil liberties groups agreed, saying that this provision would have violated people's right to privacy. Other lawmakers argued that tragedies such as the Oklahoma City bombing make it essential that the federal government be allowed to monitor militia groups more closely by virtue of the Constitution and the laws of the United States (Domestic Terrorism). State and local governments have responsibility to protect citizens. Would this provision help stem the tide of terrorism if it was left in the Anti-Terrorism Act? Perhaps, but it would give the federal government unchecked power. It would also allow political spying on non-violent domestic groups. The Clinton administration argues that such a measure is needed because it sometimes has classified information that it would like to use without having to reveal the source or specific content. Nevertheless, the government faces this situation every day in criminal courts across the country. They must choose between revealing the source and not using evidence. The rule applies no matter how heinous the crime, and no matter how sensitive the information. There simply is no other way to administer a fair system of justice, because it is impossible to defend oneself against secret evidence (MCGUCKIN 101). There is no question

that these measures violate well-established principles of freedom of association and due process. However, their proponents contend that the new world order requires a rethinking of these constitutional underpinning. "The Constitution is not a suicide pact," as Justice Arthur Goldberg once said, and as members of government have not stopped quoting since. Nevertheless, are these constitutional sacrifices necessary? Critics state that the US open society makes it especially vulnerable to political terrorist attacks. Nevertheless, one of the principle benefits of an open society with substantial political freedom is that it provides peaceful ways to express opposition and to work for political change. Repressive government tends to breed rather than contain violence. Since the World Trade Center Bombing, Oklahoma Bombing, and the Atlanta Olympics Bombing, the US stepped up its stance on all domestic terrorism. Passing the Anti-terrorist Act and establishing that the FBI will head domestic and political violence in the US is a positive step. However, lawmakers and US citizens must look at altering the constitutional balance between government power and personal freedom. One need only look at Israel, or Great Britain, to see what happens when the threat of terrorism strikes home. Personal liberties are often sacrificed in the name of security (Terrorism The Constitution). Here are some appropriate steps that the US can use to prevent terrorism. First, the death penalty for political terrorist who commit violent acts against the government. Second, death row inmates who have been charged with acts of terrorism should have only six months to file a petition against their death sentence. Third, the federal government should have the power to wiretap terrorist groups' phones without a warrant. Fourth, airport security should be tightened regardless of the inconvenience it may cause. Lastly, set guidelines to allow government agencies to work together.

Political Terrorism is unpredictable and its apparent randomness makes it impossible to protect all potential victims. These attacks create a public atmosphere of anxiety and undermine confidence in government. The U.S. has all these agencies battling terrorism but friction between them causes problems. Past experience shows that cooperation is another step in combating terrorism. Lawmakers must strengthen the Anti-Terrorist Act to send a message to potential terrorist. The preceding, are just a few steps that the U.S. can take to improve on preventing political terrorism. Political terrorism remains high on the FBI's priority list; in fact, experts in domestic terrorism suggest the next act of terror in the U.S. will come from some sort of Political group (Tunner). We must not forget the threat from Militia groups.

Various Militia Groups create bitter discussions and have for many years. Aryan Republican Army, Ku Klux Klan, White Aryan Resistance, Irish Republican Army, Islamic Salvation Army, Hamas, Palestinian Liberation Organization are a few examples. But, how about Randy Weaver (1992 incident at Ruby Ridge, Idaho), or David Koresh (1993 incident at Waco, Texas), and finally Timothy McVeigh (1995 bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma). Did the United States Government do everything in its power to protect Oklahoma City and its citizens from this bombing disaster?

On the morning of April 19, 1995, an explosion occurred at the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building killing 168 people, including 19

children and injured more than 500 (Hamilton 2). In November 1994 an undercover informant for the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms, warns her superiors that a German Security Director has declared, " It is time to go to war," and, " It is time to start bombing federal buildings. She then tells them the German has joined an Aryan/KKK leader from Tulsa, "Oklahoma to case the Murrah Building in Oklahoma City as a potential target. Then, immediately after the bombing, she tells the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the ATF investigators that she had seen Timothy McVeigh, and the suspect identified as John Doe No.2, at the same backwoods compound as the German and the Aryan/KKK leader from Tulsa. This compound is known to the ATF and FBI as Elohim City and is on the Arkansas/Oklahoma border. Later it is discovered that McVeigh called the compound two weeks before the explosion asking for the German ex-soldier who serves as the compound director of security (Jasper 1). This call was placed on a calling card purchased by Timothy McVeigh under the pseudonym "Daryl Bridges " (Jasper 2). This German was later identified as Andreas "Andi" Strassmeir. Strassmeir later had his car impounded by the Oklahoma Highway Patrol and curious papers were discovered in his briefcase. Soon after, phone calls came in from the State Department and the Governor's office and said Strassmeir had diplomatic immunity. Within nine months of the bombing, Strassmeir had fled the US and slipped into Mexico and then back to Germany. Meanwhile, in Herrington, Kansas where Terry Nichols was being investigated, witnesses were found who knew " Andi the German " as a friend of McVeigh (Jasper 1). During the same time, before the bombing, a murderer named Richard Wayne Snell, convicted of killing a black Arkansas State Trooper, repeatedly "predicted a bombing or an explosion on the day of his death " (Jasper 1). Snell was to be put to death on April 19th and had ties to Elohim City founder Robert Millar,

Snell's spiritual advisor. Furthermore the ATF undercover informant, now known as Carol Howe stated... "Reverend Millar was working the people of Elohim City into a frenzy about a holy war that would come by the anniversary of Waco" (Jasper 1). Of course April 19th, the day Richard Snell was to be executed, is also the anniversary of the Waco Texas incident and the OK City bombing. With the prior knowledge of the bomb plot, why was nothing done to prevent this tragedy? Was it due to incompetence or lack of communication between Federal Agencies? Credible evidence existed to detain certain Elohim City residents that were considered suspects in the bombing, so why did these agencies refuse? We are told the explosion was caused by one Ryder truck loaded with 4800 lbs. of Ammonium Nitrate Fertilizer and fuel oil (ANFO), as determined by the FBI/ATF. The first compelling challenge was logged by retired Air Force General Benton Partin one month after the bombing. General Partin delivered a detailed analysis to congress, which said "I can say with a high level of confidence that the damage pattern of the reinforced concrete superstructure could not possibly have been attained from the single truck bomb without supplementing demolition charges at some of the reinforced column bases, " (Jasper 3). His forensic findings indicated demolition charges were used. Physicist Samuel Cohen, inventor of the " Neutron Bomb," supported the General's conclusions by stating " I believe that demolition charges in the building, placed inside at certain key concrete columns, did the primary damage. It would have been absolutely impossible and against the laws of nature for a truck full of fertilizer and fuel oil, no matter how much was used, to bring the building down " (Jasper 3). Joe Harp, a retired CIA operative, flew to OK City with good friend Woody Lemons in Lemon's private plane to look for his friend Mickey Maroney, a Secret Service Agent that worked in the Murrah Building.

Arriving at 11:00 am, Harp stated " I knew right away that the explosive device that had caused the building damage was not an ANFO bomb for two reasons: (1) There was a strong sulfur smell in the air that was very reminiscent of the gas-enhanced 'Daisy cutter' bombs I am familiar with from my tours of duty in Vietnam, as well as other military experience. It was not an ANFO smell. (2) I could see right away from the bomb signature, (the damage to the structure of the building) that there must have been explosive charges inside the building. The truck bomb could not have done that damage from out on the street". Mr. Harp also stated "I observed members of the fire department EOD removing two devices and placing them in the bomb disposal unit. The devices were military olive drab in color, and the size of five-gallon drums, with black lettering designating the contents as fulminated mercury, a high grade explosive. I was also close enough to see what looked like mercury switches on the devices, which I presumed were for detonation purposes. I have had significant experience with these materials in the military and so readily recognized them "(Jasper3). Mr. Lemons also took residue samples from the site and scrapings from a building across the street from the Murrah building, to a laboratory for analysis. The analysis showed fulminated mercury residue and other chemicals. He was going to take the results to the Oklahoma County Grand Jury but found out there was a leak from District Attorney Macy's office and Macy was working with the Clinton-Reno Justice Department to scuttle the investigation. A couple of weeks later, a representative from Mr. Macy's office, a Texas Ranger, and a US Marshall, showed up with a subpoena for his test results and materials

relating to the bombing. However on May 12, Mr. Harp, during a telephone interview with a magazine, stated that Woody Lemons also had a copy of the report and other documents to verify the story. Four days later Mr. Lemons, his wife and his mother were killed when his private plane crashed under mysterious circumstances. Mr Harp was sure it was not an accident and said more than one attempt had been made on his life. Could this possibly be political pressure run a muck, or a political agenda to suppress evidence and witnesses, in order to cover up the leadership mistakes that ignored the warnings before the bombing? Additionally, why hide the facts that we know more people are involved in this terrorist act then the two being prosecuted, who are we protecting, citizen or terrorist?

Arlene Blanchard also suspects a hidden agenda. Sgt Blanchard works as an Army Recruiter in the Murrah Building and was there when the bomb went off. When briefly interviewed two days later for ABC's Nightline program, she mentioned that the suspect depicted in the sketches of John Doe No. 2 looked " very familiar" and that her colleague, Sgt Marilyn Travis, had seen and conversed with Timothy McVeigh inside the building. The next day her Battalion Commander, FBI, ATF, and Army Criminal Investigations Division (CID) agents grilled her. Furthermore, she and the other recruiting office personnel received a direct order not to speak to the press and were threatened with a court martial if they did (Jasper 3).

These different accounts from very credible witnesses, eyewitnesses, and a Federal informant show that the FBI and ATF had enough information to handle this situation in a more proactive way. Furthermore, FBI, ATF, and other Federal agencies are satisfied that this act of terrorism was committed by only Terry Nichols and Timothy McVeigh, instead of a

terrorist group not yet named. With the facts, they knew beforehand, the narrow-minded focus on only two suspects, finding other explosive devices, and the political arrogance to suppress witnesses and evidence, it is clear the United States Government is not taking appropriate steps to protect its citizens against the threats of Domestic Terrorism.

The final aspect of terrorism we will discuss is the newest, and according to some, potentially the costliest form of domestic terrorism. Welcome to the cyberspace zone.

Barry C. Collin of the Institute for Security and Intelligence coined the term "CyberTerrorism" over a decade ago and described in this way. "The face of terrorism is changing. While the motivations remain the same, we are now facing new and unfamiliar weapons. The intelligence systems, tactics, security procedures and equipment that were once expected to protect people, systems, and nations, are powerless against this new and very devastating weapon. Moreover, the methods of counter-terrorism that our world's specialists have honed over the years are ineffectual against the enemy. Because, this enemy does not attack us with truckloads of explosives, or with briefcases of Sarin gas, nor with dynamite strapped to the bodies of fanatics. This enemy attacks us with ones and zeros, at a place we are most vulnerable: the point at which the physical and virtual worlds converge"(Collin). An example of this is the "I Love You" virus that was estimated to have affected tens of millions of users and cost billions of dollars in damage.

The government faces many challenges in combating CyberTerrorism, some of which will be hard to overcome unless legislative laws are changed. This is the area that the United States is failing to do enough

to protect its citizens and critical infrastructures from cyberterrorists. Under United States Code, Title 5, there is a restriction to the amount of money that can be paid to a government employee. In an interview with Special Agent Ford, Federal Bureau of Investigations, El Paso, he stated, "until the government changes the law to remove the salary cap, the government is not able to compete with salaries and incentives the private sector can offer"(Ford). This leads into the government's lack of manpower and qualified technicians in order to combat the increasing number cyberattacks. For example "The Defense Information Systems Agency launched 38,000 test attacks against its own systems to check the agency's vulnerabilities, the report said: Only four percent of the people in charge of the systems realized they were under attack. Of those only 1 in 150 reported the intrusion to their bosses"(Friel). In a statement to the Senate Subcommittee for the Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information, Louis J. Freeh, FBI Director stated, "Before discussing the FBI's programs and requirements with respect to cybercrime, let me take a few minutes to discuss the dimensions of the problem. Our caseload is increasing dramatically. In FY 1998, we opened 547 computer intrusion cases; in FY 1999, that had jumped to 1154. At the same time, because of the opening the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) in February 1998, and our improving ability to fight cyber crime, we closed more cases. In FY 1998, we closed 399 intrusion cases, and in FY 1999, we closed 912 such cases. However, given the exponential increase in the number of cases opened, cited above, our actual number of pending cases has increased by 39%, from 601 at the end of FY 1998, to 834 at the end of FY 1999. In short, even though we have markedly improved our capabilities to fight cyber intrusions, the problem is growing even faster"(Freeh).


The last failing of the government is the inability to foster a harmonious working relationship/partnership with the private sector. Over the years, because of regulation and governmental controls, the private sector, which controls over "90 percent of our nation's critical infra-structures"(Hunker), a lack of trust has been established. Many private companies experience cyberattacks that go unreported to the government. They feel by releasing the information to the government, that it will promote bad publicity and the information will be made available to their competitors. Until the public and private sector can bridge that gap, the government will not succeed in protecting our infrastructures from cyberattacks. "Protecting America's infrastructures is neither an entirely public or private interest. Vulnerabilities pose risks to government, business, and citizens alike. Reducing those, risks require coordinated efforts within and between private and public sectors. The need for infrastructure protection creates a zone of shared responsibility and potential cooperation for industry and government. (The President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection Critical Foundations: Protecting America's Infrastructures. October 1997).

The threat of a major cyberattack is imminent. The United States has a false sense of security largely because a catastrophic attack has not occurred. Although the United States has committees and task groups, there is still a need to properly fund and resource these agencies in order for them to be successful. Until that happens, the United States will continue to be at the mercy of cyberterrorists.

Many people would disagree with the statement that the United States Government is not taking appropriate steps to protect its citizens against Domestic Terrorism; in fact, it is much easier to take the opposing view. Take for example the 1998 Terrorism in the United States Counterterrorism Threat Assessment Report the United States Congress. In 1998, alone (the latest report available) 12 acts of terrorism in the United States were prevented. Nine planned attacks were prevented because of the several members of the white supremacist group "The New World", based in Illinois were arrested. Also in 1998 international terrorist Ramzi Ahmed received a lengthy prison sentence for masterminding the February 26th, 1993 World Trade Center bombing; in addition, a number of domestic terrorist and extremist were convicted and/or sentenced for their illicit activities throughout the year. These included Terry Nichols, who was sentenced to life in prison for his role in the Oklahoma City bombing, and 21 individuals convicted of charges related to the 1996 Montana Freemen siege.

The graph on page 24 shows how America's law enforcement agencies have done an impressive job of preventing terrorist act through tough and old-fashioned investigative work (Terrorism in the United States):

TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES 1990-1998



According to all the persons involved in this research paper, the most difficult part of research was supporting the thesis statement. Our government remains very committed to the policies and efforts involved in all aspects of intelligence, law enforcement, and the pursuit of bringing suspected terrorist to swift justice. We have the up-most respect for the men and women of our law enforcement and intelligence gathering communities for their everyday efforts. We only hope that our lawmakers and politicians provide effective laws and clear the un-needed bureaucracies to allow these brave men and women the freedom to exercise their duties without unneeded hindrance.

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