FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE 12/21/2024
The PRC Sends a Message to the International Community with Its
December 2024 Naval Exercise
By: John Dotson
John Dotson is the deputy director of the Global Taiwan Institute and associate editor of the Global Taiwan Brief.
From December 9-12, the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) People’s Liberation Army (PLA) conducted a large-scale aviation and naval exercise in the air and sea spaces around Taiwan, as well as in waters farther eastwards into the Pacific Ocean. This was the third large-scale PLA exercise of 2024 in the areas around Taiwan (not counting smaller exercises, and growing routine levels of PLA presence operations around Taiwan). The first major exercise of 2024, Joint Sword-2024A (聯合利劍-2024A), was conducted on May 23-24—per PRC narratives, in reaction to Republic of China (ROC) President Lai Ching-te’s (賴清德) inaugural address—and featured a symbolic encirclement of the island by the PLA Navy (PLAN), as well as an increased role for patrols by the PRC Coast Guard (中國海警). [1] The second major exercise, Joint Sword-2024B (聯合利劍-2024B), was conducted on October 14—again, per PRC messaging, in response to the October 10 National Day address by President Lai—and was smaller in scope than its predecessor, though distinguished by intense levels of aviation activity and the provocative declaration of exercise areas that crossed into Taiwan’s contiguous zone (the sea area just outside of territorial waters, ranging 12-24 nautical miles from the shoreline).
While PRC military activity around Taiwan, and in the Taiwan Strait, has been on a steady uptick since 2020, a watershed event came with the unnamed August 2022 PLA military exercise around Taiwan, conducted in the immediate wake of a visit to Taiwan by then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi. The August 2022 exercise (see previous GTI articles here and here) was the most provocative yet conducted: it included missile firings over Taiwan and into Japan’s exclusive economic zone, and a nominal naval blockade exercise that has been repeated (with changes in operating areas) over the course of the subsequent two years. The blockade scenario was maintained in the inaugural Joint Sword (聯合利劍) exercise of April 2023, which involved both a symbolic encirclement of Taiwan and a series of simulated strikes directed against key node targets on the island.
The PRC routinely employs such military exercises around Taiwan and other intimidating military “gray zone operations” (灰帶行動) as part of its ongoing political warfare directed against Taiwan. [2] This pattern has been noted by the US Department of Defense, which noted in its December 2024 annual report on the PLA that “Beijing [has] continued to erode longstanding norms in and around Taiwan by employing a range of pressure tactics against Taiwan, including maintaining a naval presence around Taiwan, increasing crossings into Taiwan’s self-declared [Taiwan Strait] centerline and [air defense identification zone], and conducting major military exercises near Taiwan.” [3]
While it exhibited continuity in many respects with recent preceding PLA exercises, the unnamed December 2024 exercise was noteworthy for the ways in which it departed from many standard PRC practices. The most salient of these elements included: the scale of the naval component in terms of ship numbers; that the exercise area appeared to extend farther out into the Pacific than previous exercises; and that PRC government outlets toned down the heavy propaganda that ordinarily accompanies such exercises. This article will seek to examine some of the major factors surrounding the exercise, and draw possible conclusions as to what they might mean for PLA military pressure on Taiwan in the coming year.
Lai’s International Trip to Diplomatic Partners in the Pacific
The nominal prompt for the PRC exercise was an international trip conducted by President Lai from November 30 – December 6, during which time he visited three of the ROC’s official diplomatic allies among island states of the Pacific (Republic of the Marshall Islands, Tuvalu, and the Republic of Palau). In the course of the trip, Lai also conducted “transit stops”—the diplomatic legerdemain employed to allow for senior Taiwan leaders to make brief visits onto US soil—in Hawaii and Guam. In Honolulu (November 30 – December 1), Lai met with Governor of Hawaii Josh Green and Mayor of Honolulu Rick Blangiardi, in addition to giving a speech at the East-West Center think tank. On the US territory of Guam (December 4-5), Lai visited the territorial Legislature of Guam and attended a luncheon for Taiwanese expatriates. (See references here, here, here, here).
Image: Taiwan President Lai Ching-te (center) visiting the Guam Legislature, December 5. Speaker of the Guam Legislature Therese M. Terlaje (front, center-left) stands next to Lai; also visible in the background is American Institute in Taiwan Managing Director Ingrid Larson, who met with Lai in Hawaii and Guam. (Source: ROC Presidential Office)
The PRC predictably issued condemnations of Lai’s trip, and of the US transit stops in particular. At a PRC Foreign Ministry press conference on December 5, Spokesperson Lin Jian (林劍) responded to Lai’s trip, and news that Lai had engaged in a phone call with US House Speaker Mike Johnson, as follows:
[W]e have made clear our serious opposition more than once to the US’s arranging for Lai Ching-te’s “stopovers” and having official interactions with the Taiwan region. […] [T]he Taiwan question is at the core of China’s core interests, and the first red line that cannot be crossed in China-US relations. We urge the US to fully understand the grave damage that “Taiwan independence” separatist activities do to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait […] [to not support] “Taiwan independence,” stop interfering in China’s internal affairs, and stop sending any wrong signal to “Taiwan independence” separatist forces. China will take resolute and strong measures to defend our nation’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Despite such boilerplate rhetoric, PRC rhetoric surrounding Lai’s trip—and the subsequent exercise—was actually relatively muted overall, and PRC state media sources initially refrained from playing up the exercise as a punitive measure against Taiwan. This was a departure from standard PRC practice, which has consistently been to portray its exercises around Taiwan as a necessary reaction to political events connected to Taiwan’s political leaders.
The PLA Exercise of December 9-12
Even prior to Lai’s trip, in late November Taiwan officials had begun to signal that a significant PLA exercise was likely shaping up for the early-mid December timeframe, following Lai’s overseas trip. Some observers speculated that this would become a “Joint Sword 2024C,” continuing the named series of encirclement/blockade exercises around Taiwan that first commenced in spring 2023. PRC officials did not make an announcement of a named exercise as such, but deployed a large number of vessels—both PLA Navy and PRC Coast Guard—forward in early December, and declared restricted areas of airspace for flight operations off the Chinese coast (see details below).
Aviation Activity
The PRC declared seven “temporary reserved airspace zones” (空域臨時保留區) to be in effect from December 9-11, in coastal areas ranging from eastern Guangdong Province in the south to the vicinity of Shanghai in the north (see graphic below). In a December 10 press conference, ROC Air Force Lieutenant General Hsieh Jih-sheng (謝日升), head of the Ministry of National Defense’s (MND) Office of the Deputy Chief of General Staff for Intelligence, noted the scope of these zones (extending up to 1,000km into the Pacific), and opined that they were part of “anti-access / area denial” (反介入／區域拒止) efforts directed at other states beyond Taiwan.
Image: The PRC’s declared areas of restricted airspace for the December 9-11 exercise, as well as the declared operating areas for the two PLA Joint Sword exercises conducted earlier in 2024. (Source: ROC Central News Agency)
The overall level of flight activity during the December exercise appeared to be more modest than the intensive surge seen during the single-day Joint Sword-2024B exercise in October (which saw 153 sorties). The heaviest flight activity was seen on December 10, which saw 53 PLA sorties in the vicinity of Taiwan (including seven that crossed the Taiwan Strait centerline). [4]
Image: A graphic of PLA aircraft types and operating areas on December 10, the day of heaviest aviation activity around Taiwan during the exercise (53 total reported sorties). The most intensive aviation activity occurred in the boxes designated #1 and #4, bracketing the north and south ends of the Taiwan Strait. (Image source: ROC MND)
Naval Activity
The exact number of PLA vessels involved in the exercise, as revealed in open reporting, was indeterminate. However, on December 9 the Reuters news agency cited an unnamed Taiwan security official who indicated that the PRC had deployed a total of nearly 90 ships—in a rough ratio of two-thirds naval, one-third coast guard—in a broad ocean area encompassing the vicinity of Taiwan, the vicinity of Japan’s Ryukyu Islands, and the East and South China Seas. The number of vessels reported to be operating in the more immediate environs of Taiwan was much smaller—with, for example, the MND reporting that on December 10 there were “11 PLAN vessels and 8 official ships” (the latter designation likely referring to the PRC Coast Guard) in the waters around Taiwan. The vague data, and the expansive reported operating areas, produce competing ways of interpreting the scale of the exercise. It is also likely that the larger figure of approximately 90 vessels includes ships already deployed for routine training, who may not have had a significant role to play in an organized exercise scenario. However, if the larger figure of 90 vessels is accepted, this would make the December exercise the largest maritime exercise that the PLA has conducted since the Third Taiwan Crisis of 1996.
The specific deployment areas and operations of these vessels have not been made clear from publicly disclosed information. However, Lt. Gen. Hsieh further indicated to media that PRC naval forces had been deployed in two maritime “walls”—one around Taiwan, and a second situated outside the “First Island Chain” (extending from the Japanese Ryukyus, to Taiwan, to the northern Philippines). Lt.Gen. Hsieh opined that that the PRC intended to send a message that “The Taiwan Sea is internal waters, [and] the topic of the Taiwan Sea is for the Chinese Communists to manage” (臺海內水化，臺海議題由中共處理). He further commented that the deployments required vigilance as to whether “training could turn into an exercise, [and] an exercise turn into war” (訓轉演、由演轉戰), and that such PRC operations were intended “to influence and impact surrounding regional countries” (對周邊區域國家的影響與衝擊).
Unusual Aspects of the December Exercise
Many aspects of the December exercise remain unusual by historical PLA standards. Although the exercise did immediately follow President Lai’s early December trip to the Pacific islands—and it is a staple of PRC propaganda to depict its coercive military exercises against Taiwan as a necessary reaction to Taiwan provocations—the PRC’s public propaganda directed against Taiwan’s political leadership was relatively restrained. [5] It is also somewhat unusual (although not unprecedented) that the exercise was not given a public name. Together, this may indicate that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership wished to somewhat downplay the usual confrontational messaging posture surrounding this event.
If so, the reasons for this are not entirely clear. It may be that the CCP leadership decided to adopt a more cautious narrative posture during the transitional phase from the Biden Administration to the second Trump Administration in the United States. [6] It is also possible that the CCP and the PLA are currently preoccupied with ongoing purges in the PLA’s senior leadership—to include the recent sacking of Admiral Miao Hua (苗華), director of the Central Military Commission Political Work Department—and wished to avoid unduly provocative messaging at a sensitive time within the PLA. It is also possible that cross-Strait political events, such as the Shanghai-Taipei City Forum (held in Taipei on December 16-17), may have encouraged the CCP leadership to pursue a less confrontational propaganda posture. Some defense scholars—such as Su Tzu-yun (蘇紫雲), a research fellow at Taipei’s Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR), the MND’s official think tank—have also speculated that the PRC’s quieter posture in relation to the exercise could itself be a form of psychological pressure, intended to sow uncertainty in Taiwan and the region. However, these possibilities are all speculative.
What is clear is that the December exercise was intended to send a message far beyond Taiwan, to other states in the region. The reported second naval “wall” of ships posted beyond the First Island Chain is likely intended to send a deterrent message in particular to the United States, Japan, and the Philippines (with whom the PRC is engaged in serious ongoing maritime clashes around Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea). While PRC messaging was relatively muted, this provocative naval deployment provides an implicit warning to Taiwan’s potential allies that the PLA is prepared to deploy maritime assets to fend off any international intervention in the event of a Taiwan crisis. This will make it all the more interesting to observe what the PLA does in any potential Joint Sword-2025, or other significant exercise, in the year to come.
The main point: The PLA conducted an unnamed, large-scale naval and aviation exercise in December 2024, operating both in the vicinity of Taiwan, and further eastwards past the “First Island Chain.” This exercise appeared to be largely directed at signaling the PLA’s readiness to fend off any outside intervention in a Taiwan Crisis.
[1] The PRC Coast Guard, though outwardly a law enforcement agency, operates under military authority: it is treated as a component of the PRC’s paramilitary People’s Armed Police, and is subject to the Communist Party Central Military Commission. It functions, for all practical purposes, as an adjunct of the PLA Navy. See: Katsuya Yamamoto, “Concerns about the China Coast Guard Law – the CCG and the People’s Armed Police,” Sasakawa Peace Foundation (Feb. 25, 2021), https://www.spf.org/iina/en/articles/yamamoto_02.html.
[2] For discussion of this, see: John Dotson, The Chinese Communist Party’s Political Warfare Directed Against Taiwan: Overview and Analysis, Global Taiwan Institute (May 2024), pp. 11-13, https://globaltaiwan.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/OR_CCP-Political-Warfare.pdf.
[3] US Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2024 (December 2024), p. 124,
https://media.defense.gov/2024/Dec/18/2003615520/-1/-1/0/MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2024.PDF.
[4] Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense no longer publicly discloses specific data on PLA aircraft types and flight paths around Taiwan, instead identifying general operating areas, and overall numbers of “main fighters” (主戰機) and “auxiliary fighters” (輔戰機). Addressing this issue in mid-December, Defense Minister Wellington Koo (顧立雄) acknowledged the inherent dilemma between, on the one hand, providing greater transparency to the public; and on the other, maintaining the secrecy of collection sources. See: “Transparency on ADIZ Difficult: Koo,” Taipei Times (December 19, 2024), https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2024/12/19/2003828761.
[5] This author has previously expressed skepticism about the CCP’s “carefully planned outbursts of indignation”—manifested as military exercises—over speeches and visits made by Taiwan political leaders. See: John Dotson, “The PLA’s Joint Sword 2024B Exercise: Continuing Political Warfare and Creeping Territorial Encroachment,” Global Taiwan Brief (October 30, 2024), https://globaltaiwan.org/2024/10/the-joint-sword-2024b-exercise/.
[6] When asked about this specifically, PRC outlets have been studiously vague. At a PRC Foreign Ministry press conference on December 11, an AFP reporter asked whether the “apparent military drills conducted by China this week around [Taiwan] are aimed at drawing a red line ahead of the incoming US presidential administration of Donald Trump.” The spokesperson ducked the question, stating that “I would refer you to the competent Chinese authorities for your specific question. Let me say that the Taiwan question is the first red line that cannot be crossed in China-US relations and this has always been our position. Upholding the one-China principle is the key to ensuring peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. China will firmly safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity.” See: “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning’s Regular Press Conference on December 11, 2024,” PRC Foreign Ministry (December 11, 2024), https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/fyrbt/lxjzh/202412/t20241217_11495833.html.
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