OTTAWA — Canada’s leading independent researchers on Beijing’s aggressive repression networks have started to map out how Chinese agents target and attack critics on Canadian soil, and identify the perpetrators, with the goal of ultimately liaising with Ottawa’s underperforming enforcement and intelligence agencies to offer their expertise and implement a “kill chain” framework to disrupt Beijing’s attacks before victims are harmed.

The Bureau interviewed independent researcher Sze-Fung Lee after her team launched its groundbreaking report on repression in Ottawa this week.

Lee and disinformation researcher Marcus Kolga worked with Digital Public Square, a Toronto-based non-profit, on a new project revealing the growing reach of Beijing’s agents in diaspora communities. Their research sums up the chilling experiences of 25 Canadian community leaders from Chinese, Hong Kong, Taiwanese, Tibetan, Uyghur, and Falun Gong backgrounds. They found 85 percent of respondents reported direct threats against Canadian activists, deployed by Beijing’s proxies to intimidate and control these communities. Eighty percent noted coercive threats targeting family members in China, 70 percent identified political pressure, and 75 percent observed financial incentives swaying community members. Nearly half of respondents experienced harassment—including threatening phone calls and online abuse—at least monthly.

Lee, whose research on transnational repression networks was featured this week in a major New York Times investigation exposing Beijing’s tasking of a Chinese mafia leader for United Front interference operations, said that, as a Hong Kong diaspora member, she wasn’t shocked to learn that almost 90 percent of diaspora community leaders experienced direct threats.

Highlighting the potential dangers these threats pose in Canada, Fung’s research revealed that a “non-profit” run by the Beijing-sponsored mafia leader mentioned in the New York Times report hosted a so-called “pop-up” outpost. This temporary outpost allowed Chinese consulate officials in Brooklyn to reach out to diaspora members.

These ad hoc missions represent an evolution of the brick-and-mortar Chinese police stations exposed by the NGO Safeguard Defenders in 2022. According to The Bureau’s national security sources, these entities are linked to Chinese mafia leaders in Toronto and Vancouver and Beijing’s security apparatus.

Beyond its survey of diaspora leaders, what distinguishes Lee’s collaboration with Kolga, she noted, is its focus on identifying Chinese proxy networks and predicting tactics used in Canada to surveil Beijing’s targets. These tactics include identification and prioritization of targets, media disinformation attacks, so-called “lawfare” (lawsuits apparently backed by Beijing), and even physical actions to silence critics, Fung said.

Where Canadian agencies have failed, as recent studies and inquiries have shown, civil society can step in to bridge the gap, Kolga and Fung suggest, writing:

“A comprehensive kill chain framework is proposed to systematically counter PRC operations, enabling government, law enforcement, civil society, and Canada’s democratic allies to both individually and collaboratively address threats at every stage of their development and execution.”

The report extends its focus to prominent case studies involving Members of Parliament, including Kenny Chiu and Michael Chong, whose experiences reflect the PRC’s calculated use of cyber espionage, disinformation campaigns, and political interference. Chiu, a Conservative MP, faced a PRC-orchestrated disinformation campaign during the 2021 federal election.

Kolga and Lee were among the first to publicly identify Chiu as a target of Chinese disinformation in 2021, prior to the election. Despite this, Justin Trudeau’s government took no action, as Chiu later testified in the Hogue Commission.

Kolga also presciently detailed Beijing’s attacks on former Conservative leader Erin O’Toole in a September 17, 2021 editorial, just days before the election.

In an interview, Lee said her group is prepared to offer data and analysis to Canadian enforcement agencies, ensuring interference of this scale can no longer operate unchecked.

“I do think the community leaders have to fend for themselves and they go to the RCMP, CSIS, and other police agencies, and they're getting bounced around with no idea if threats are investigated,” Lee said. “If we share information on networks in cities like Boston and Toronto to bridge gaps between enforcement, intelligence, and independent researchers, enforcement agencies should be able to identify perpetrators and prosecute their activities.”

While Canada implemented new foreign interference laws following media exposure of Ottawa’s inaction, Lee expressed skepticism that prosecutions akin to those in New York and Massachusetts will occur in Canada. These prosecutions targeted United Front networks closely tied to actors operating in Canada, as The Bureau’s investigations have shown.

Until Canada prosecutes Beijing proxies, Lee said supportive strategies, such as multilateral cooperation among democracies and coordinated sanctions through G7 and NATO, will remain essential.

“It is difficult for the community leaders in Canada to protect themselves against China’s hybrid warfare with just the legal framework,” she said.

The report, co-authored by Lee, Kolga, and human rights lawyer Sarah Teich, found that Beijing leverages Chinese-language media, social media platforms, and community organizations to amplify pro-CCP narratives and suppress dissent. At least 14 Canada-based media outlets are members of the Global Chinese Media Cooperation Union, an entity controlled by the PRC’s United Front Work Department.

This type of activity was identified by Kolga in the weeks leading to Canada’s 2021 election, when he documented a CCP-owned media platform publishing threats against the Conservative Party.

“The threat of foreign interference in this election has already been detected,” Kolga wrote. “A Chinese Communist Party-owned media platform, Global Times, published an article last week to discredit Conservative leader Erin O’Toole and his party’s platform. The anonymous article threatened Canadians with a ‘counterstrike’ if they elect a Conservative government. The article is the very definition of foreign interference.”

The report further warns that social media platforms like WeChat, Weibo, and Douyin (TikTok’s Chinese counterpart) serve as critical tools for disinformation and surveillance. By tailoring propaganda to specific groups, the PRC effectively shapes perceptions while marginalizing critics. Meanwhile, PRC-sponsored community events and influencer engagement foster pro-Beijing narratives and stifle dissent.

According to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, it adds, the United Front Work Department infiltrates community organizations to sway politicians and align them with CCP policies. A leaked CSIS report detailed bribery, cyberattacks, and “honey pot” schemes aimed at compromising officials and undermining Canadian democracy.