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Abstract

The article seeks to reassess the British focus on 'knocking Italy out of the war' and the way it shaped political and military discussions in London long before the American ally joined the combined planning. Between 1940 and 1941 Britain planned four major military operations having Italy as their main target. This complex process drove a wedge between an aggressive prime minister and a more conservative planning staff. A clear separation between a minimalist and a proactive stance marked the entire process, highlighting the existence of a sharp divide within the British planning establishment.

Journal Information

Published quarterly, War in History is a peer reviewed journal that publishes articles on war in all its aspects: economic, social, political and military including the study of naval forces, maritime power and air forces, as well as more narrowly defined military matters.

Publisher Information

SAGE Publications is an academic and professional publisher. We publish books, journals and software under the SAGE, Corwin Press, Paul Chapman Publishing, Pine Forge Press, SAGE Reference, SAGE Science and Scolari (US and Europe websites) imprints.

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