[–] ▶ №9247671Quote>>9253169>>9256675>>9256679
𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 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𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛
𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛
▶ №9247703Quote>>9253169>>9256675>>9256679
𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 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𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛
𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛 𝚗í9𝚐𝚎𝚛
▶ №9248510Quote>>9248576>>9253169>>9256675>>9256679
>MERRY CHRISTMAS
:hearts: :gift: YOU TOOOOO!!!!!!
▶ №9248602Quote>>9248610>>9253169>>9256675>>9256679
>>9247662 (OP)Left wing right wing, authoritarian, liberalism, all that raisin doesn't matter. What matters is that white people exist and that we continue making the world a good place. Something the turd chucking masses can't do.
▶ №9248604Quote>>9248611>>9253169>>9256675>>9256679
>>>9248510
>Can we be friends
That would be Wholesome and heckin awesome
▶ №9248610Quote>>9248625>>9253169>>9256675>>9256679
>>9248602consumerism is the enemy of the white race
▶ №9249686Quote>>9253169>>9256675>>9256679
HOHOHO! I wanna annoy polgood boys
▶ №9249993Quote>>9253169>>9256675>>9256679
wrenchlet pissbaby poorfag hands made this bread
▶ №9251045Quote>>9251058>>9253169>>9256675>>9256679
on leftysoy there will be site mandated ra ids
▶ №9251290Quote>>9251312>>9253169>>9256675>>9256679
>>9247662 (OP)No, commie, no. For you there is bunkerchan (lefty/pol/).
▶ №9251306Quote>>9253169>>9256675>>9256679
>>9251160This, however, gift made me unironically communist right now.
▶ №9251326Quote>>9253169>>9256675>>9256679
>>9251312>>revisionist websites funded by bourgeoisiecucksProofs?
▶ №9251373Quote>>9253169>>9256675>>9256679
Unironically this. Ban good boys too btw
▶ №9251857Quote>>9251907>>9253169>>9256675>>9256679
santa claus do this in the new boards event
▶ №9253198Quote>>9256675>>9256679
>>9247662 (OP)we don't need an /lgbt/ board
▶ №9255487Quote>>9255490>>9256675>>9256679
capitalism and jack frost won or whatever
▶ №9255490Quote>>9256675>>9256679
>>9255487> Z.O.G is filtered to Jack Frostblvd
▶ №9255538Quote>>9256675>>9256679
Believe in the magic of christmas!ffffffff
▶ №9256654Quote>>9256675>>9256679
Oh nyet leftypol is trying to snowball fight soyelf
▶ №9256662Quote>>9256675>>9256679
All marxists are damned into an eternity of suffering
▶ №9256682Quote
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
▶ №9256685Quote
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
..
▶ №9256692Quote
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
….
▶ №9256697Quote
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
▶ №9256703Quote
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
..
▶ №9256704Quote
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
….
▶ №9256706Quote
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
▶ №9256709Quote
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
..
▶ №9256712Quote
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
….
▶ №9256718Quote
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
▶ №9256721Quote
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
..
▶ №9256723Quote
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
….
▶ №9256725Quote
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion
Synthese
the question this way Im a metaphysician Speaking as metaphysician I have affirmed
the following two positions this is not a made up example I am on record as endorsing
both positions
8 Fictional characters exist
9 Tables do not exist 43
Suppose I had said instead
8 It is not the case that everything is not a fictional character
9 Everything is not a table
There would no doubt have been certain rhetorical or pragmatic disadvantages in
so expressing myself but I should nevertheless have endorsed precisely the same
ontological theses Sentence 8 and sentence 8 express the same proposition thesis
philosophical position doctrine and sentence 9 and sentence 9 express the
same proposition At any rate the members of each pair come as close to expressing
the same proposition as do The present king of France is bald and Something is
male and now reigns over France and everything that is male and now reigns over
France is identical with it and it is bald In short the distinction Carnap is trying to
make by opposing
and
the concept of existence spoken of by the sentence There is an m between 7 and
13 which is prime
the ontological concept of existence or reality
does not exist 44 I insist that ontology that is what Thomasson calls hard ontology
and more generally metaphysics could get by perfectly well no other existential idiom
than it is not the case that everything is not a Descartes could have said I think
therefore it is not the case that everything is not I Aquinas could have said And
therefore it is not the case that everything is not something that moves others and is
itself unmoved The Fool could have said in his heart It is not the case that it is not
the case that everything is not God
8 Nominalists like Goodman and Quine are therefore simply philosophers who deny
the existence of abstract entities That is they deny that there are any That is they
deny that At least one is a correct answer to the question How many abstract entities
Footnote 42 continued
concept of existence or reality presumably
therefore she attaches special importance to it Immediately
following her quotation of the passage she speaks
of that nonontological concept of existence that
Carnap accepts
43 That is to say I endorse the positions
propositions the sentences 8 and 9 express in the context of
utterance inscription called the ontology room See van Inwagen 2014a
44 I do not deny that many ontologists would reject
the thesis that sentences like eg Universals exist
or Universals have real existence or Universals
really exist or Universals are among the constituents of
reality or Whatever else the world may contain it
contains universals mean no more than differ only in
rhetorical force from It is not the case that everything
is not a universal Well being an ontologist does
inoculate one against meta ontological
error or semantical illusion