Generally speaking, the history of American sociology from World War I to the mid-1930s, spanning approximately 20 years, is regarded as the history of the sociology department at the University of Chicago. According to L. A. Coser, during this period, the sociology department "shaped the general currents of sociological research and published the only specialized journal of sociology, the American Journal of Sociology. Most of the leading sociologists who became presidents of the American Sociological Association received their education here. The professors in this department wrote the most influential monographs and textbooks" (Coser, 1978=1981, p. 91). However, this so-called "golden age" of the Chicago school extended only until the mid-1930s. As structural-functionalism, centered around T. Parsons, began to dominate as the main paradigm of American sociology, the Chicago school rapidly declined and gradually faded from the American sociological landscape (Yoshihara, 1994, p. 53, 73). After a gap of several decades following the war, the spotlight once again turned to the Chicago school. This trend can be seen as the "rediscovery of the intellectual legacy of the Chicago school," as described by Faris (Faris, 1967=1990, p. 16, 17). According to Naoki Yoshihara, this trend is worthy of being called the "Chicago Renaissance" because it not only aligns with one stream of post-Parsons sociology but also holds the potential to intersect with various frontiers of contemporary sociology (Yoshihara, 1994, p. 53).[3] The "Chicago Renaissance" can be seen as comprising two streams. One of these streams is the "Fourth Generation" of the Chicago school, centered around M. Janowitz, which is said to have contributed to the revival of theoretical and empirical research in urban sociology. The other stream is none other than symbolic interactionism, represented by Herbert Blumer (1). In the realm of contemporary sociology, often described as a state of "intense competition and diverse voices" (Aoi, 1993, p. 602), symbolic interactionism is considered to be "one of the major currents in modern sociology" (Funatsu, 1993, p. 45). It has been noted to have had explicit and implicit influences on various schools and streams within sociology and social psychology, such as phenomenological sociology, ethnomethodology, interpretive sociology, role theory, labeling theory, and gender theory (Goto, 1991, pp. 274-275). According to Mamoru Funatsu, who is regarded as "providing the most precise and systematic discussion of symbolic interactionism" in sociological theorizing in Japan (Ehara, 1986, p. 64), symbolic interactionism encompasses various perspectives. For example, there are the "Chicago school" that seeks to theoretically clarify the subjective existence of individuals, the "Iowa school" that engages in empirical and evidence-based research, the "Illinois school" that reexamines Mead's theory in relation to Watsonian behaviorism and aims to develop its own social behaviorism, and the "drama school" that views human actions and the structure of society as performances and seeks to elucidate them in concrete interactional contexts (Funatsu, 1995, p. 4). However, among these numerous branches of symbolic interactionism, Herbert Blumer's symbolic interactionism is regarded as "the epitome of the characteristics of contemporary symbolic interactionism, surpassing others in comprehensiveness and systematicity, and as the monumental tree that contemporary symbolic interactionism should aspire to" (Funatsu, 1976, p. 40). Denzin also considers Blumer's symbolic interactionism as representing the essence of "traditional symbolic interactionist thinking" (Denzin, 1989b=1992, viii).[4]
Herbert Blumer's symbolic interactionism is well known for its critique against T. Parsons' structural functionalism and G. A. Lundberg's sociological positivism (operationalism), as well as its development of alternative analytical frameworks and research methods. Particularly, its analytical framework, which presents a perspective of the "dynamic society," has been highly evaluated in previous studies in our country (Funatsu, 1976; 1989, pp. 211-247; 1993; 1995; 1998b, see references). In other words, the understanding of society as a "fluid process" or a "dynamic, generative, and developmental" entity shaped and reshaped by "active individuals" (Funatsu) has been prominent. For instance, Funatsu introduces the main argument of Blumer's seminal work, Symbolic Interactionism, as follows:[5]
According to Blumer, human beings engage in 'self-interaction' through[a] their possession of a self, in which they represent and interpret objects to themselves[b]. From this perspective, people become active agents who actively interact with objects, and society is constituted and undergoes dynamic and processual change through human action. Blumer criticizes functionalist sociology for treating people as passive organisms who merely react to forces such as social systems and social structures, and for portraying society as fixed and static. (Funatsu, 1998b, p. 517)
Furthermore, according to Goto, post-war American sociology cannot be discussed without considering such a picture of society as Blumer's (Goto, 1991, p. 274).[6]
This thesis primarily focuses on the aspect of the analytical framework of Blumer's symbolic interactionism, aiming to explore the underlying essence of its perspective, namely the notion of a "dynamic society" (2). It does not intend to be a historical study in the sense of presenting Blumer's assertions of symbolic interactionism as they are. While Blumer acknowledged his reliance on the ideas of George Herbert Mead, who laid the foundation for the approach of symbolic interactionism, he also emphasized that his own theory explicitly addressed numerous issues that had only been implicitly discussed by Mead and other scholars, as well as important matters they did not address (Blumer, 1969b, pp. 1-2). He referred to it as his "personal version" (Blumer, 1962=1969a, p. 78). Similarly, this thesis strongly embodies the character of being a "personal version" concerning symbolic interactionism based on Blumer's ideas. Therefore, this thesis does not aim to present a neutral depiction of Blumer's symbolic interactionism or claim that such an undertaking is fundamentally possible.[7]
As Blumer points out, presenting the neutral depiction of a thing in its true form--presenting a thing in the raw-- is, strictly speaking, an inherently impossible act. It inevitably involves a process of coloring or processing by the perspective of the interpreter (3). This is an unavoidable characteristic of the act of "interpretation" carried out by humans, and the act of research is also nothing more than one of these acts of interpretation, referred to as the "Research Act." In this sense, the act of research cannot escape the destiny associated with the act of interpretation by humans (4). In the case of research on theoretical studies in sociology, the equivalent of the "thing" is undoubtedly the theory itself, which is the product of the "interpretation" by the sociologist who presented it. In a sense, research on theoretical studies is the endeavor of researchers to engage in further acts of "interpretation" towards the product of that "interpretation" process. In other words, conducting research on theoretical studies means putting forth a "reconstruction of constructions" of interpretation by the researcher.[8]
However, just because that is the case does not mean that any interpretation is considered valid in the act of research interpretation. In particular, what is required in the act of research interpretation is for the researcher to clarify (or be aware of) the perspective or viewpoint from which they are attempting to approach the subject matter (in this case, the theory). This process involves explicitly stating (being conscious of) how they are approaching the matter under study. Creative interpretation based on this is precisely what constitutes the act of research. (5)[9]
Let us clarify our point of view here. This thesis aims to approach Herbert Blumer's symbolic interactionism, which is considered to be the prototype among various symbolic interactionist theories, from the viewpoint of how the "relationship between individuals and society" is understood (or logically can be understood) in symbolic interactionism. More specifically, this thesis seeks to address the following three questions through Blumer's symbolic interactionism:
How is the "socialization" of individuals understood in symbolic interactionism?
How is "society" perceived as being formed by individuals, through what mechanisms, according to symbolic interactionism?
Furthermore, why is it considered that such a society is subject to continuous reshaping?[10]
The aim of this thesis is nothing but to clarify these three questions. In a sense, this thesis attempts to elucidate the "fundamental issues of sociology" from the perspective of Herbert Blumer's symbolic interactionism. In my opinion, it can be said that in previous studies on Blumer's symbolic interactionism in our country, research focused on these fundamental issues has not been sufficiently conducted.[11] In previous research in our country, it seems that there has been a strong tendency to excessively focus on the contrast between Parsons' sociology (or post-Parsons) and Blumer's symbolic interactionism. As a result, Blumer's perspective, which should serve as an analytical framework for understanding society in its inherent role, has been treated primarily as a means to attack Parsons' sociology or establish a distinct position separate from Parsons' sociology. One could say that Blumer's perspective has been utilized as a slogan in the academic power struggle (which, to some extent, took the form of a proxy war in American sociology). For example, Funatsu Mamoru, through a series of essays (Funatsu, 1976; 1983; 1993; 1995), repeatedly criticizes the sociological perspective (and research methods) of structural-functionalism based on the arguments of Blumer and other symbolic interactionists. Particularly in Fnatsu's work, the most frequently cited being "Symbolic Interactionism" (Funatsu, 1976), he states that "Symbolic interactionism is in direct confrontation with Parsons-centered structural-functionalism" (Funatsu, 1976, p. 24), positioning his own stance based on symbolic interactionism as being in "direct opposition to structural-functionalism, taking a different path" (Funatsu, 1976, p. 25).[12]Taking into account this trend in Japan's symbolic interactionism centered around Funatsu, Tominaga provides the following evaluation. Namely, "In Japan, symbolic interactionism has not yet moved beyond the introductory stage, but as seen in Funatsu Mamoru's Symbolic Interactionism (1976), a Blumerian attitude of solidifying it as an 'ideology' is uncritically followed. There is no need to engage in a proxy war of the conflict that unfolded in the United States within Japan" (Tominaga, 1995, pp. 342-343). Additionally, in Japanese research, there has been a predominant assertion Blumer's symbolic interactionism is historically and theoretically justified, citing its intellectual origins in American sociology's classical presence, such as the Chicago School of Sociology, pragmatism philosophy, particularly the ideas of G.H. Mead (6).[13] However, on the other hand, it can be argued that the task of thoroughly examining and refining Blumer's symbolic interactionist perspective exactly as a perspective, that is, as an analytical framework for understanding society, has not been sufficiently carried out. In previous studies, the theoretical and methodological differences with Parsons' sociology, which was designated as the virtual enemy, were emphasized, while the examination and refinement of the intrinsic nature of Blumer's symbolic interactionist perspective itself were neglected. Is it not the case that, as evidence, in previous research in our country, the pursuit of the mechanism by which individuals are socialized within Blumer's symbolic interactionism has been insufficiently conducted (7)? Although it has been argued that society is formed and reshaped by "subjective individuals," it is difficult to claim that the mechanisms of its formation have been thoroughly elucidated (8). Furthermore, it is also difficult to argue that the logical necessity of why society must be understood as something that is continually reshaped has been clarified (9).[14]
However, the aforementioned research tendencies in our country regarding Blumer's symbolic interactionism cannot be solely attributed to our national scholars. It can also be attributed to the characteristics of Blumer's works on symbolic interactionism.
One reason why the task of thoroughly examining and refining Blumer's symbolic interactionist perspective as an analytical framework for understanding society has not been fully accomplished is the uniqueness of Blumer's writings. Firstly, in Blumer's case, instead of elaborately and systematically discussing his own position when developing symbolic interactionism, he adopted a discourse style of conducting "comprehensive criticisms on opposing positions" and sketching "outlines of methods and theories that are considered more valid" (Goto, 1991, p. 308). Secondly, as commonly mentioned, Blumer's writings contain excessive repetition and duplication of arguments and claims (Tominaga, 1998, p. 50). Furthermore, Blumer's depicted perspective was positioned as a "sensitizing concept" rather than a fully developed systematic theoretical generalization, serving as a starting point or premise (foundation) for theoretical development through empirical research (Blumer, 1954; 1969b).
Due to these characteristics inherent in Blumer's writings on symbolic interactionism, the task of thoroughly examining and refining his perspective as an analytical framework for understanding society has been relatively neglected (10).[15]
Furthermore, there is an important issue that should not be overlooked in order to achieve the aims of this thesis. It concerns the question of what mechanisms are involved in the socialization of individuals, how individuals shape society, and why such society should be understood as having the destiny of its own reconstruction (and how the logical necessity of this reconstruction is explained). These three questions need to be addressed in relation to the concept of "self-interaction," which serves as a conceptual cornerstone in Blumer's symbolic interactionism. It is crucial to establish a solid connection with this concept in clarifying these issues. But, why is it imperative not to overlook these aspects?[16]
First and foremost, from the perspective of social formation and reconstruction, to ignore these aspects would ultimately lead to perceiving the operating principles of society as detached from the actions of individuals and reduced to the mechanisms inherent in society itself. But it was precisely such a viewpoint that Blumer criticized. Blumer vehemently criticized the perspective that sees society as "operating according to its own principles" or as "a kind of self-operating entity" or "possessing the character of a system" and labeled it a "serious error" (Blumer, 1969b, p. 19). According to Blumer, the networks and institutions of a society do not function automatically on the basis of some internal principles or system requirements that the society possesses. They work because people in different positions engage in certain activities. And what they do depends on how they define the situations in which they must act through self-interaction (Blumer, 1969b, p. 19). From routine actions in everyday life to collective actions that bring about significant social change, the process of human self-interaction is always involved. As Ito also points out, the major problem that Blumer consistently emphasizes is the "meaninglessness of discussing social interaction and the formation, existence, and change of society at the macro level without considering these processes of self-interaction" (Ito, 1995a, p. 120). Therefore, in order to make Blumer's point explicit, it is necessary to elucidate the logic of social formation and reconstruction in relation to the concept of self-interaction.[17]
Furthermore, from the perspective of individual socialization, neglecting the interplay between self-interaction and the social aspect means partially abandoning the purpose of Blumer's concept, which is to elucidate the essence of the interplay between the two parts of the "self", i.e. the "I" and the "me" (Blumer, 1993, pp. 185-186) (here, according to common understanding, the "I" represents human subjectivity and the "me" human sociability) (13). Funatsu, for example, interprets Blumer's concept as revealing the nature of the "I" in Mead's discussion of the self (Funatsu, 1989, p. 224). However, as mentioned above, Blumer did not intend to clarify only the aspect of the "I" while neglecting the aspect of the "me". Due to a lack of understanding of these aspects, discussions on the premises of symbolic interactionism based on Blumer's perspective have been perceived, both nationally and internationally, as advocating a standpoint of "subjective individualism" (14).[18]
The dissertation is structured as follows. In the following chapter 1, the nature of the concept of 'self-interaction', which serves as the conceptual cornerstone of Blumer's symbolic interactionism, is elucidated. Furthermore, the concept is thoroughly examined in relation to the social aspect. Through this examination, the phenomenon of individual socialization as understood in Blumer's symbolic interactionism is revealed, including how it can be logically conceptualized. In addition, this chapter explores how Blumer perceived the 'relationship between the individual and the world' mediated by self-interaction. Building on this understanding of 'relationship', the chapter reveals how Blumer conceptualized an individual's 'action.'
Chapter 2 focuses on how Blumer conceptualized "society" itself. It explores how Blumer sees society and how it is formed by "people" who are agents of self-interaction, and by what mechanisms (or how it can be logically understood). The essence of these aspects is revealed.
Then, in Chapter 3, the logical necessity of perceiving the revealed "society" as open to reformation is clarified within a firm connection with Blumer's concept of self-interaction.
It should be noted that Blumer's social perspective (the perspective of a "dynamic society") examined in this dissertation is positioned within the framework of "sensitizing concepts" in his methodology. Therefore, an investigation of this social perspective cannot be fully carried out without considering the means of empirically verifying and developing it. The concluding chapter therefore empirically tests and develops the insights gained from the discussions in the previous three chapters. In doing so, the dissertation discusses the "actor's point of view" approach, which becomes the guiding principle of the research methodology (the methodology of verification and development), and identifies various considerations and issues to be addressed when implementing this approach. The aim is to clarify our future challenges.[19]
[1] Doctoral Dissertation submitted to Tohoku University.
<Original version in Japanese>
<Chapter 1> under construction!
<Chapter 2>
<Chapter 3>
<Chapter 4>
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Summary in English(Cited in *)
[3] Originally written in Japanese[【魚拓】 (archive.md)];
Translated into English by https://chat.openai.com/
[9] 【魚拓】 (archive.md) Translated into English by: https://chat.openai.com/c/f9a194a8-f0aa-4697-a34c-aa2fbbe9e06b
[a]by virtue of
[b]point out various objects to themselves, then interpret them