

SLAVICA HELSINGIENSIA

41

BALKAN ENCOUNTERS

OLD AND NEW IDENTITIES IN SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE

Editors:

Jouko Lindstedt & Max Wahlström

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Editors' Foreword

This book contains eight scholarly articles whose aim is to analyze the origins, maintenance, and changes of some of the ethnic, linguistic, and regional identities in Southeastern Europe. Both majority and minority groups are discussed; the modern countries dealt with include Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Greece, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Montenegro. In addition to the main languages of the region, the articles discuss smaller languages and varieties such as Balkan Turkish, Pomak, and Romani, as well as Montenegrin, the newcomer among the Balkan standard languages. In these articles, Southeastern Europe presents itself as a multifaceted and multilayered scene, where boundaries between different languages and ethnicities, or indeed borders between countries, are much less ancient and much less permanent than they are often conceived.

New linguistic identities are discussed in the articles by Željko Jozić, who reports on the attitudes of students in Bosnia and Herzegovina with regard to the fact that there are three officially distinct, yet very similar constitutional languages in their country, and Jaakko Kõlhi, who interviewed students of two Montenegrin universities about their attitudes towards the newly drawn distinction between the Serbian and Montenegrin languages. In her article, Johanna Virkkula describes how Bosniak ethnicity is reflected in the present-day name-choice practices of Bosnian Muslims.

Tanja Tamminen's article reports on the Balkans Peace Park project in the border region of Albania, Montenegro, and the newly established state of Kosovo. One of her conclusions is that in order to succeed, the project must seek to empower the local population rather than serve as a tool of the Europeanization process, often "understood as a simple one-way street of transfer of norms and practices."

The local minority groups of Greece are discussed in two articles based upon innovative fieldwork. Evangelia Adamou analyzes the reasons for language shift and language maintenance in the Pomak-Turkish-Greek-speaking community and the Romani-Turkish-Greek-speaking community of Thrace. Kira Kaurinkoski describes the social organization and collective identity of the Muslim communities living on the islands of Kos and Rhodes.

Finally, two thematically connected articles by Jouko Lindstedt and Max Wahlström investigate the role of Greek language and scholarship during the national revival of the Slavs of Bulgaria and Macedonia.

This collection of articles owes its existence to the research project *Updating the Sociology of Language in the Balkans* at the Department of Modern Languages, University of Helsinki. The project was granted funding

by the Academy of Finland for the five-year period from 2009 to 2013. Most of the articles originated as papers presented at a common seminar of the project, which was organized at the Finnish Institute in Athens in May 2011. We would like to express our gratitude to the Institute and its director Martti Leiwo for their support and for the smooth organization of the seminar. Special thanks are also due to Professor Juhani Nuorluoto, who had a substantial role in initiating the research project in Helsinki before moving to his present post at the University of Uppsala.

Helsinki, 3 December 2012

Jouko Lindstedt & Max Wahlström

Evangelia Adamou¹

Social Networks in Greek Thrace: Language Shift and Language Maintenance

In the second part of the twentieth century, several Pomak- and Romani-speaking communities living in Greek Thrace shifted to Turkish, the dominant local minority language. This paper attempts to trace the process that led to a shift in some communities but not in others, despite the fact that both types of communities were confronted with a reduction in the use of their languages in the domains of public life. I argue that in highly transitive networks, a shift takes place when some highly connected individuals decide to shift to the dominant language. Although the decision of these individuals who start the shifting process is related to language functional domains and language ideologies, it is important to note that a shift may or may not materialize due to reasons that are independent of the abovementioned factors. Namely, the ideological background of the external network will have a significant influence on the speech community members and is a decisive factor in whether or not to shift.

Background on Greek Thrace

East Macedonia and Thrace (see Map 1) is an administrative region (περιφέρεια) of 611,000 inhabitants in Greece with a century-long presence of several linguistic communities. This is the setting of a nowadays bilingual Turkish-Greek-speaking community (approx. 55,000²) and of three major trilingual communities: a Pomak-Turkish-Greek-speaking community (approx. 36,000), a Romani-Turkish-Greek-speaking community (approx. 20,000), and a small Armenian-Greek- (partly Turkish) speaking community (see Table 1). Next to and within the traditional multilingual communities, multilingual individuals also exist, but they are not the focus of this paper.

¹ Centre national de la recherche scientifique, Lacito (Paris).

² Numbers taken from several sources cited in Kostopoulos (2009, 290–291).

Greek		
Turkish		Greek
Romani	Turkish	Greek
Pomak	Turkish	Greek
Armenian	Greek	Turkish

Table 1: The monolingual, bilingual, and trilingual communities in Greek Thrace (with a focus on the Romani- and Pomak-speaking communities).

The communities having Turkish as their first language (henceforth L1, for the language learned in the family or within the main socialization process) have a century-long presence in the area, ever since Ottoman times, but also from earlier settlements. Slavic-speaking populations arrived in the Balkans as early as the sixth and seventh centuries, but as far as the Pomaks are concerned, a debate exists as to whether they are descendants of Slavic origin or non-Slavic populations who shifted to Slavic (see Demetriou 2004 for an overview of the various approaches on the issue, largely depending on the nationality of the researchers). The Roma first arrived in Thrace within the Byzantine Empire in the tenth-eleventh centuries. Part of them settled in the Greek peninsula, others moved towards northern and western Europe. Among the Roma now settled in Thrace, several arrived from Turkey in 1923, others from present-day Romania at the end of the nineteenth century, while still others appear to have been settled in the villages of Thrace for several centuries. Lastly, Armenians arrived from Turkey in Thrace in 1914–18 under dramatic conditions, but only a minority of them settled in Thrace.

During Ottoman rule (15th–19th centuries), Turkish was the most widespread vehicular language in the Balkans, used for trade, administration, and education (whether religious or not). In the Balkans in general, after Ottoman rule collapsed, only Muslim communities retained an intense contact with Turkish. In Greece, the Muslims of Greek Thrace were the only community to be exempted from the mandatory population exchange that took place between Greece and Turkey, being recognized as a minority in the Greek state. In 1923 (according to the Treaty of Lausanne), this minority was guaranteed the right to receive bilingual education in Greek (the state language) and Turkish (the language that was taken to be representative of the minority). The population exchange took place on a religious basis and was independent of the language traditionally used in the communities as L1. Therefore, the right to bilingual education applied to various com-

munities, the majority of which, at the moment of the treaty, had Turkish (Turkic) as L1, while others had Pomak (Balkan Slavic) or Romani (Indo-Aryan) as L1.

The linguistic profile of the communities was modified in this new political frame. During the second half of the twentieth century, an influential homogenization process affected the Muslim Roma and Pomak communities of Greek Thrace both linguistically, with Turkish progressively becoming the communities' first language, and religiously, with the Sunni majority prevailing over the Shia minority. Within this process, several Romani- and Pomak-speaking communities shifted to Turkish.



Map 1: Greek Thrace.

Social Networks and Language Shift

A widespread hypothesis explaining language shift in the case of minority languages has been the reduction of the functional domains in which the minority languages were traditionally used and the addition of new domains from which the minority languages are excluded (Dorian 1981; Matras 2009, 52). One problem that arises with this approach in the Greek Thrace context is the fact that the Romani- and Pomak-speaking communities did not shift to the language of the state and administration, Greek, but to a local minority language, Turkish. Moreover, despite such a generalized domain reduction of Pomak and Romani, some communities continued the process of in-group language transmission, while others shifted to Turkish. One hypothesis might be that all of the communities will eventually shift to Turkish and that there is merely a difference in the speed of the shift. Nevertheless, it is important to attempt to identify the factors responsible for the differences in speed that can be observed, for example, in urban settings as opposed to isolated villages, or in peasant communities as opposed to trade-related communities, in more or less religious communities, in more or less educated communities, or even in communities geographically closer to Turkey or not. But it rather seems that the language shift has spread in some prefectures and not in others independently of sociological factors other than the ideological orientation of the communities and the allegiances at the level of politics.

Following studies that take social networks to be a crucial component of language maintenance and language shift (Milroy & Margrain 1980; Milroy 2002 on endangered and minority languages), in this paper I will compare the types of networks that can be found in the communities that shifted and in the communities that did not shift to Turkish. As shown, both communities form in-group social networks with high transitivity, which means that most of a person's contacts have contact with one another. This is often the case for minority-language speaking communities and more true of rural communities showing such *dense* and *multiplex* networks (Milroy & Margrain 1980). I argue that in this type of highly transitive networks, language shift can easily take place when some highly connected individuals make the decision to shift to another language. Such a choice rapidly affects the entire community and may lead to a complete language shift within two generations. Moreover, I argue that no direct correlation can be observed between functional domain reduction and language shift. Rather, language ideology furnishes the conditions for some highly connected individuals to

start the shifting process. Lastly, the type rather than the frequency of contact with outsiders seems to be relevant for language maintenance or shift. For instance, language maintenance occurs both among Pomaks and Roma, although only a small number of Pomaks have one-to-one contacts with Greek- or Turkish-speaking co-workers, while on the contrary, practically all Roma have this sort of everyday interaction with outsiders.

Muslim Pomak Communities in Greek Thrace

Pomak is a Balkan Slavic vernacular spoken by Muslim inhabitants of the Rhodope Mountains in Greece, who often migrated to other cities or countries during the second half of the 20th century. During the Ottoman period, the Pomak speech communities were composed of a majority of monolingual speakers with little contact with Turkish, mainly through Koranic schools. This strong Muslim culture is reflected in the type of borrowings to be found, as Pomak speakers make use of a large number of religious terms for greetings and expressing thanks, which are either borrowings from Turkish or terms used broadly in Muslim-Arabic culture and borrowed through Turkish:

Greetings: *salam alekum* (Arabic); *meraba* ‘hello’ (Turkish < Arabic); *hoš geldin* ‘welcome’; *igjedželer* ‘good night’. Expressing thanks: *allah kabulele* (Arabic); *bereket vārsin*.

Pomaks were traditionally semi-sedentary cattle-breeders and farmers, living in the Rhodope Mountains. Some of those mountainous areas remain hard to access even today, especially in winter. Pomaks would practice seasonal grazing, spending winters in the winter settlements (which correspond to present-day villages) and migrating in summer to nearby summer settlements, along with their families and cattle. This way of living involved little contact with outsiders, and effective bilingualism with Turkish was limited to the elites and those few who for professional reasons were part of Turkish-speaking networks. This relative isolation was accentuated by the borders of the Greek state, which relegated the Rhodope Mountains to the periphery. Moreover, during the second half of the twentieth century, the area had the special status of the so-called *epitirumeni zoni* (Gr.), ‘surveillance zone’, implying military control of the areas bordered by the neighboring Communist countries (Bulgaria in this area). In practice, this meant limited access to the closest Greek cities, while the border with Bulgaria restricted any mobility to the north.

Today, the situation has considerably changed, and contacts between the Pomak villages and the closest Greek Thrace cities have intensified, making it possible in many cases for men to commute to the city for work. Owing to the reopening of the roads, it has also become possible to cross the border to neighboring Bulgaria on a daily basis. Visits to neighboring Turkey are equally common, for shopping or tourism, facilitated by the Egnatia freeway.

Within the Greek state, contact with Turkish takes place through primary school (the most common school type in the villages), mass media, and increasing contact situations due to travel, migration, and urbanization. Religious life remains at the center of the Pomak communities, and boys and girls attend the Koranic School, *kuran kursu*. Even though Koranic Arabic is taught, Turkish is the classroom language.

Contact with Greek also takes place at both bilingual and monolingual primary schools the latter being found more frequently in urban zones. Greek is not only the state institutional language but also the language of the local high schools that most of the young Pomaks attend.

A significant distinction has to be pointed out between Pomak women and men with regard to language contact. It is important to keep in mind that until very recently, only a small part of the community had access to high school education and that up until the early 1990s, girls did not pursue their studies beyond primary school. Moreover, women did not usually have working activities outside the village, nor did they have any sustained contacts outside the Pomak-speaking area (for instance, they would rarely go to the closest city market). It was possible even during the time of my research to meet old women who were still monolingual, and most of the Pomak women over 50 only have basic communication skills in Greek and Turkish. For men, the situation has been different because of military service (obligatory in Greece until recently for a period of two years) or for employment reasons, and of course given their better access to education, either public (in Turkish and Greek) or religious (Koranic school, involving Turkish and Koranic Arabic).

Greek and Turkish television and music are both present in village life. In everyday interactions Turkish is the most important communication language for the traditional markets, *bazaar*, in the cities. Turkish is also the language of communication in several social events, such as wedding parties and other religious ceremonies involving Muslim communities in general.

Another source of contact with Turkish is the migration for work and education to Turkey and Germany. In the 1980s Pomak migrants would

settle in Germany with their families, become integrated in the immigrant Turkish communities, and would frequently shift to Turkish. Contact between relatives would remain intense, either by telephone or visits. In the last decade, reorganization in working migration politics has made it rare for entire Pomak families to migrate to Germany. Today, young men (the so-called *Gastarbeiter*) have temporary working contracts limited to a few months, after which they return to their original villages and take up other sorts of professional activities.

I will now take a close look at the current sociolinguistic situation in a Pomak village in the Xanthi prefecture in which Pomak is still transmitted to the younger generations.

Even though the Turkish influence was and remains important, nowadays Greek seems to have become the main contact language in the villages that still transmit Pomak. One can note the frequent code-switching to Greek as well as an increasing number of lexical borrowings from Greek. A very interesting example demonstrating the importance gained by Greek in the village is the adversative marker, correctly claimed by Matras (1998) to be one of the grammatical markers most susceptible to borrowing. In this variety of Pomak, the main adversative marker is nowadays the Greek *ala* 'but', which has replaced the Arabic and Turkish *ama*, acquired by most Balkan Slavic languages. In contrast, in the Pomak vernaculars whose speakers shifted to Turkish, *ama* is well preserved by the older speakers (Adamou, fieldwork notes 2006). This case confirms the tendency that Matras (1998, 295) described in the Romani dialects, which in a first contact situation acquired one adversative marker and then, following migration, abandoned the older adversative marker in favor of the new contact language marker. For Pomak, it was not migration that determined this change but a change in everyday language contact.

Table 2 shows the profiles of five female speakers from local elite families in a Pomak-speaking village in the Xanthi prefecture. As observed earlier in this paper, Pomak female speakers had little access to a second language until very recently. This effect is balanced for the speakers described below by the fact that as members of one of the wealthiest families, they had better access to education than average Pomak females and thus also had better access to the contact languages. This table shows that the eldest female Pomak speaker of the family, born soon after the integration of the area with Greece, is monolingual. The 55 year old female speaker has some basic communicational skills in Greek and Turkish, but

Pomak remains her everyday communication language. The 33 year old female speaker, who has attended a bilingual Greek-Turkish primary school, has a better knowledge of these languages, even though everyday contact with Greek or Turkish speakers is rare. This context is significantly modified for the 14 year old female speaker, who has not only attended a bilingual primary school but also pursues secondary school studies in a local Greek high school. She has more frequent access to the closest town, and her network includes more trilingual speakers (owing to intermarriages in the family with members of the Greek and Turkish monolingual communities). The youngest generation includes children who are now residing in the closest town because of their parents' professional activities but who maintain close contact to the Pomak village community.

Speaker	Languages	Education	Mobility
F, 80	Pomak		
F, 55	Pomak: first language Turkish, Greek: basic communication skills	Koranic school (Turkish, Arabic)	
F, 33	Pomak: first language Turkish, Greek: good communication skills	Primary school (Turkish, Greek) Koranic school (Turkish, Arabic)	Sometimes visits the nearest town's market (Xanthi) Rarely visits other Greek towns
F, 14	Pomak: first language Greek: fluent (code-switching) Turkish: fluent English: a few hours in school	Primary school (Turkish, Greek) Currently in high school (Greek) Koranic school (Turkish, Arabic)	Frequent visits to the nearest town, Xanthi Rarely other Greek towns Trilingual social network
F, 7	Pomak: first language Greek: fluent Turkish: Koranic school English: private courses	Currently in primary school (Greek) Koranic school (Turkish, Arabic)	Living in Xanthi; frequent visits to the village Bilingual social network

Table 2: Transgenerational sociolinguistic profiles of female Pomak speakers in a village in the Xanthi prefecture.

Contact with speakers of Bulgarian has been increasing in the area since the early 90s, mainly with Bulgarian itinerant merchants and seasonal workers. In many cases Bulgarian speakers come from the neighboring Bulgarian Rhodope Mountains, often sharing a common dialectal background with the Pomak varieties of Greece. They may also share the same contact language (Turkish), an equally dynamic minority language in Bulgaria in Muslim communities. During my fieldwork I had the opportunity to observe how communication takes place between Pomak speakers and Bulgarian merchants, and it is worth mentioning that any verbal exchange was minimal. Turkish numerals, which have replaced the inherited Pomak numerals after four, are used among Pomak speakers when discussing prices. These uses were strongly stigmatized by the Bulgarian speakers, who corrected the Pomak speakers by using Bulgarian numerals. Social interaction between the female Pomak population (which forms the majority in the village since Pomak men are usually working abroad) and the male seasonal workers is extremely rare. The workers, mostly employed in wood exploitation, are considered to be economically inferior and seen as not respecting the local, Muslim customs as far as clothing or alcohol consumption is concerned.

Figure 1 illustrates a domain-based approach to the network of an average adult Pomak speaker residing in a Pomak-speaking village in the Xanthi prefecture. The Pomak speaker, in the center of the figure, entertains contacts with a number of individuals who have been classified according to the type of interaction they have (village, work, city, etc.). The length of the connecting line roughly indicates the frequency of interaction: a short line signals frequent contact, and a long line more casual contact. The main communication languages in the interactions are indicated in parentheses (pmk standing for Pomak, tur for Turkish, ell for Greek, Ø for minimal verbal interaction). This figure shows that the Pomak speaker has everyday contact within the village community (mainly in Pomak) as well as with Turkish-speaking Muslim family members. Contacts with the neighboring villages are also relatively frequent: Pomaks from the area intermarry, and given that the communities are patrilocal, Pomak couples settle in the husband's community. The wife's family and friends maintain contact and therefore extend their village's network. Contacts with the urban network are placed on the same level, being mainly Greek-speaking (most shops, administration, and health institutions, but also contacts with the neighbors of the Pomak families who are settled in the city). The Turkish-speaking

network is also important (through the traditional market and religious authorities, but also through contacts with artisans). Contacts at work often take place in Greek, while both Greek and Turkish are school languages. Contacts with Turkish-speaking family members settled in Germany or with Greek-speaking members due to intermarriage are much rarer because of geographical distance.




Figure 1: A Pomak speaker’s interactions based on language domains.

Although the everyday Pomak-speaking network remains significant in community life, a closer look at the language domains points to a reduction in the traditional domains of use of Pomak. An example of this is the domain of oral tradition. Folktales were traditionally narrated in late afternoon reunions combined with collective work. Those “working sessions” were frequently organized in the villages and were named *mezje* or *poprjelka*. The Pomaks still recall singing and storytelling sessions that took

place during those reunions. In spite of the active social life in today's villages, such reunions are not very common nowadays. Until 2010 tobacco-related activities gave occasions to such formal or informal sessions, where any friend or family member could join in the working group for a while and help out with tobacco needling. In 2010 the tobacco culture in the Rhodope Mountains, no longer subsidized by the European Union, diminished if not completely ceased. Owing to the scarcity of these working sessions, no oral transmission occurs any longer, and the tales' stylistic register is not transmitted to the youngest inhabitants by other means, either.

The loss of oral tradition has an effect on the language and is, for example, a main explanatory factor for the loss of the specialized grammatical forms of fictional narratives (Adamou 2008). Older Pomak speakers use a specialized verbal form for evidentiality, that is, to indicate the source of information (Aikhenvald 2004), while the younger ones have replaced it with the perfect form. The formal difference between the two lies in the presence (for the perfect form) or absence (for the evidential form, known as "renarrative" in Slavic studies) of the auxiliary, which distinction is also the typical expression of evidentiality in other Balkan Slavic languages. Thus the older speakers say:

(1)

na ¹ aniš	ima-l-o	sfadba
once	have-EVID-3SG.N	marriage

'Once upon a time there was (-AUX) a marriage...'

[Adamou 2008]

Though grandparents are still in charge of storytelling, the forms used by older people, marked for indirect evidentiality, are reinterpreted as perfect forms by children (in my study, the children were 7 to 14 years old). The younger ones used the perfect form with the auxiliary 'be', even in the stereotypical introductory formula:

(2)

najanuš	je	ima-l-o	jano	aiše
once	AUX(be).3SG	have-APTCP-N	one	Aishe
	{ _____ PRF _____ }			

'Once upon a time there was (+AUX) a certain Aishe...'

[Adamou 2008]

This change goes through a short stage of variation between the old specialized indirect evidential and the perfect form, which is therefore age related (concerning speakers aged 30 to 40). The speakers in their forties, who recall and are willing to transmit a folktale or one of the famous Nasreddin Hodja stories, can be described as “storytellers”: although it is not an explicit status in the community, people who have this gift are recognized. Those speakers are particularly attentive to stylistic effects and to the linguistic specificities of the oral tradition, such as indirect evidentiality and its use in different contexts according to syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic criteria (Adamou 2008).

I will now present the social network structure of a female Pomak speaker in her thirties living in a village in the Xanthi prefecture. Figure 2 illustrates her social network, including family members (parents, spouses, children, and siblings), close friends, and coworkers. The female speaker, dubbed S, is 34 years old; she lives in the city of Xanthi while working in a nearby Pomak-speaking village where most of her family members, live. She speaks three languages fluently: Pomak, which is her first language (L1), and Greek and Turkish, which are her second (L2) and third (L3) languages, respectively. As can be seen in Figure 2, her Pomak-speaking network is characterized by a high transitivity, that is, most of her contacts also have contact with one another. Moreover, the Pomak speaker S has strong ties (that is, intense lifelong ties) with the Pomak-speaking members of her network, who are family and close friends. In contrast, she has weak ties (casual, ephemeral) with the Greek speakers, who are mainly her coworkers. Indeed, connections with the Greek-speaking network are one-to-one and do not have high transitivity. S is also fluent in Turkish, a language that she has everyday contact with at work and through TV, tourism, or in the traditional market, among others.

This type of network is quite typical in this Pomak community, which still transmits Pomak and uses it in everyday interactions. Even though Greek and Turkish are the languages dominating work places and parts of public space, this does not seem to be a strong enough factor to initiate a shifting process. Ideological factors and representations are underlying these uses, namely a complex identity combining the Pomak language, Greek citizenship, and the Muslim religion.




Figure 2: A female trilingual (Pomak, Greek, Turkish) speaker's (S) social network: coworkers in rectangles, family in circles, and close friends in triangles. The lines represent ties between two persons and the color represents the dominant language in everyday interactions between them. Black stands for Pomak, gray with white dots stands for Greek, gray for Turkish.

Now, let us observe what would happen if the female Pomak speaker decided to shift to one of the two contact languages, namely Turkish or Greek. As can be seen in Figure 3, a shift to Turkish or Greek could take place in this community quite rapidly if some of the members of the highly connected Pomak-speaking network decided to shift. If one highly connected speaker shifts, the whole network is affected. First this change takes place in direct, one-to-one interactions with other individuals. A female speaker who shifts has a more dramatic impact on the offspring to whom she transmits the language. The two children in turn will have direct interactions in their new L1, in this case Turkish, and therefore increase the number of exchanges in Turkish within the previously homogenous Pomak-speaking network. They may acquire a passive knowledge of Pomak, since Pomak will still be in use in the rest of the community.




Figure 3: Female speaker S shifting to Turkish: coworkers in rectangles, family in circles, and close friends in triangles. The lines represent ties between two persons, and the color represents the dominant language in everyday interactions between them. Black stands for Pomak, gray with white dots stands for Greek, and gray for Turkish.

Besides the one-to-one contact that will be altered by this one speaker's shift, in reality this shift will have an even more significant impact than the one shown in Figure 3. According to the so-called Three Degrees of Influence Rule (Christakis & Fowler 2010 and references therein), an individual has an impact within three degrees of relations: for instance, on a family member (one degree), on the family member's friend (two degrees), and on this friend's family member (three degrees). This means that highly connected individuals may influence the network as a whole because of their centrality in the network (they have many ties to members of a network that also have many ties) and propagate language shift through some sort of "contagion". In this language shift, individuals who are peripheral in the network are the least likely to shift: such may be older female speakers, individuals located in the periphery of the village, individuals with small families and few friends, etc.

Although such a shift cannot be documented in real time in this community and for the particular female speaker S, a shift to Turkish actually took place in several Pomak-speaking communities during the second half of the twentieth century. I argue here that this shift was not due to a larger domain reduction of Pomak than the one that took place in the community that did not shift. Neither did the Pomak-speaking members have closer or a higher number of contacts with Turkish speakers: the Pomak networks in the communities that shifted to Turkish were similar to the network shown in Figure 2. Parallel fieldwork in the formerly Pomak-speaking village of the Evros prefecture which had already shifted to Turkish confirms the similarity of the networks of the Pomak speakers in both communities. Then how did the shift take place?

A facilitating factor for a language shift of a Pomak-speaking community as a whole is the pre-existence of bilingual speakers. Even though an individual may decide to reduce her or his practice of two languages to the effective use of only one, this may only be possible if she or he interacts with other bilinguals who are capable of interacting in the new language of communication. In the case of the Pomak communities, this sort of language shift was possible not only because Turkish was a trade and religious language during the Ottoman Empire, but also because of the development of the bilingual Greek-Turkish education system established in 1923. This meant that during the twentieth century, an increasing number of individuals of the Pomak-speaking network had acquired at least some basic knowledge of Turkish, making it possible for the individuals who shifted to Turkish to propagate the shift. This was the case in the Pomak community in the Evros prefecture, whose process of shifting is similar to that in Figure 3, but also in several other previously Pomak-speaking communities (such as the communities located in the Komotini prefecture).

A second facilitating factor for language shift may stem from the increase in marriages between members of different language communities. In networks with high connectivity, when an individual with a different first language enters the core network—in this case the family network—the whole Pomak-speaking network is likely to be affected by the language interaction. For instance, if one member of the Pomak-speaking network has a non-Pomak-speaking spouse, the members within three degrees will be influenced by this fact. If two or three other individuals of the Pomak-speaking network also have this sort of a strong tie, the whole network may eventually be restructured. This is shown in Figure 4, which represents the

cases of two Turkish-speaking spouses entering a Pomak-speaking network and having everyday interactions within three degrees of separation from the spouse in question: for instance, at the first degree with their own spouse, at the second degree with the spouse's sister, and at the third degree of separation with the sister-in-law's spouse.




Figure 4: A Pomak social network: coworkers in rectangles, family in circles, and close friends in triangles. The lines represent ties between two persons and the color represents the dominant language in everyday interactions between them. Black stands for Pomak, gray with white dots stands for Greek, and gray for Turkish.

One question that arises is how newcomers will affect and be affected by the Pomak-speaking network. The answer lies not only in each member's language competence (Pomak speakers already know Turkish, but Turkish speakers do not know Pomak) but also on the social value of the languages in contact. Turkish and Greek are highly valued for being languages connected to larger networks, such as urban networks or networks in workplaces. Therefore, although Pomak will have an impact on Turkish-speaking newcomers, the language that further connects most individuals in the most highly valued networks, that is, Turkish, will most likely become the interaction language among the newcomer and the spouse's network.

These are two language shift processes that took and are taking place in the Pomak-speaking communities of Greek Thrace. This analysis of language shift accounts for rural communities which have remained relatively homogeneous and have not undergone a great change in their socio-economic structure. In cases of urban migration or diaspora, the shift model is completely different, since the whole network structure is modified, and new languages are added in everyday interaction. This situation is not examined here.

Muslim Romani-speaking Communities in Greek Thrace

I will now examine the Romani-speaking networks of the Muslim communities settled in Greek Thrace. Romani is an Indo-Aryan language spoken throughout Europe, in the Americas, and in Australia. The migrant Roma, who belonged most probably to service-providing castes (Matras 2002), arrived from India during the Byzantine era, around the 10th century. Romani was considerably influenced by Greek during this period. At the end of the Byzantine era, some groups migrated towards western and northern Europe, and new contact languages were added.

The dialects currently spoken in Greece belong to the Balkan and Vlax Romani branches. The presence of Balkan Romani speakers is documented as early as the 11th century and has been continuous since then. Vlax groups, on the contrary, arrived more recently, mainly in the 1920s following the Lausanne Treaty, from present-day Romania.

Demographic information concerning the Ottoman period is scarce, although the Roma are mentioned in some sources such as the *tahrir* registers. But linguistic and ethnographic evidence seems to indicate that the Vlax Roma living in Greek Thrace were most likely itinerant craftsmen, at least in the late Ottoman times, while their status in earlier times is unclear. It is documented that Vlax Roma were subjugated to serfdom and sometimes slavery while residing in what is now Romania. The elders report traditional occupations similar to those commonly found for the Southern Vlax Roma in general. According to them, their ancestors used to work as horse and donkey traders, comb makers, and makers of sieves. Women would also practice fortune telling.

Matras's (2005, 29) diffusion model of Romani dialect classification shows that itinerant Roma "appear to have traveled within the containment of specific regions" which correspond roughly to the Ottoman and Austrian zones of influence. The change in the political boundaries that resulted from

the formation of the modern Greek state had an impact on the Komotini Roma's mobility (as was the case for other nomads, such as the Greek-speaking Sarakatsani shepherds). The Vlax Roma of Thrace became semi-sedentary and adjusted their working activities to the new borders. Modern Greek was added to their linguistic competences, while Turkish remained their trade language in Thrace. Today, the Roma of the Komotini neighborhood work as seasonal workers in agriculture, in trade, or occasionally as cleaning staff for domestic or city services.

In this study I have used data from two Romani varieties of the Vlax branch, spoken in two cities in Greek Thrace: one is spoken by a small Muslim group (of approx. 200 people) settled in the suburbs of the city of Komotini (close to a larger Roma neighborhood, Ifestos, that is not examined here) and the second by a larger Muslim group (of approx. 4,000) settled in the suburbs of the city of Xanthi. Both varieties have been heavily influenced by contact with Turkish ever since the Ottoman times (Adamou 2010). The speakers of these varieties are typically trilingual in Romani, Turkish, and Greek, with differing degrees of competence in the three languages. They use Turkish and Greek for trade and other professional activities, and Romani mainly at home and as the community language. Most of the Komotini Roma have received practically no formal education in any of their languages and are not literate in Romani. The two groups have close links with each other and intermarry. They are among the groups in the Balkans who term themselves *xoraxane roma* 'Muslim, Turkish Roma', as opposed to the *dasikane roma*, which is the name for the 'Christian Roma, Greek Roma' in the area.

Figure 5 illustrates the domains of interaction of a Romani speaker. The length of the lines indicates the frequency of contact, while the interaction languages are marked in parenthesis (rmn standing for Romani, tur for Turkish, ell for Greek). It shows a complex trilingual network involving Romani, Greek, and Turkish. The trilingualism produces interesting effects on the language: besides code-switching, combinations of influences from Turkish and Greek may be observed. This is, for example, the case for the Turkish evidentiality marker, *-miş*, borrowed as a free morpheme, phonetically realized as [muʃ], and either preceding or following the verb, native or Turkish. Interestingly, this Turkish-origin morpheme has the same function as the Greek lexical means and reports on the truth of the statement, rather than on inference and hearsay as it does in Turkish (Adamou 2012):

(3)

phendas muj i fatma
 said.3SG allegedly the Fatma
 oti e xurd-es voj lja sas pe-sa
 that the.OBL child-ACC he took.3SG with herself-INSTR
 ‘Fatma said, allegedly, that she took the child with her.’




Figure 5: A Romani speaker’s interactions in different language domains

Despite the increasing influence of Greek on Romani, Turkish is the language which most affects the Romani of the Muslim communities of Greek Thrace. The intensive and extensive contact of Roma speakers with Turkish since Ottoman times has given birth to heavy borrowing, or what Auer (1998) names a *fused lect*, i.e. stabilized code-switching, with a high number of borrowings (verbs, nouns, adverbs, conjunctions) and a variety of borrowing strategies (such as complete verb paradigm transfer, borrowed

inflection for masculine nouns, etc.). Romani is indeed one of a handful of languages that are known to have borrowed the verb together with the TMA (tense, mood, and aspect) and person markers from Turkish, as can be seen in the following example from Komotini Romani in Greece (Turkish in bold type):

Komotini Romani < Turkish *emret-iyo-lar*

(4)

e **patišaja** ep **emred-iyo-lar**
 the kings all the time give orders-PROG-3PL

‘The kings, they are giving orders all the time.’

[Adamou 2010] [Excerpt from the tale “The Louse and the Rom” (Sentence 3); the recordings, annotation and translation of the complete texts are available online: http://lacito.vjf.cnrs.fr/archivage/languages/Romani_fr.htm]

This is a characteristic of many Romani varieties of the Balkans, though the extent of paradigm transfer varies from one variety to another (e.g. Muzikanta, Nange, Varna Kalajdži; for a more complete list, see Friedman 2010).

Paradigm transfer with Turkish loan verbs is a very frequent strategy in the Komotini and Xanthi Romani varieties. A great number of Turkish verbs are borrowed, among others motion (*koyul-* ‘to approach’) and posture verbs (*uzan-* ‘to lie’), perception-cognition verbs (*düşün-* ‘to think’, *alna-* ‘to understand’, *konus-* ‘to talk’), emotion verbs (*begen-* ‘to like’, *aci-* ‘to pity’), and several action verbs (*oku-* ‘to read’, *yaz-* ‘to write’). The Turkish loan verbs are sometimes used in variation with their inherited Romani equivalents, although no pragmatic or other factors can explain such variation. The variation rather seems to be linked to the speakers’ active knowledge of other, less heavily influenced, Romani varieties.

In Komotini and Xanthi Romani, all Turkish loan verbs are transferred with the entire paradigm of Turkish person markers and, as we will see in detail, with most of the Turkish TMA markers. Turkish phonology is generally respected, including borrowed phonemes accompanying the borrowed item such as /y/, /ø/, and /w/. Phonological adaptation might take place in some cases, e.g. metathesis of /nl/ to /ln/, as in the Turkish verb *anlamayacak* > Komotini Romani [alnamadzak] ‘he will not understand’. Contrary to the Turkish verb-final canonical order, the borrowed verbs follow the Romani verb-initial word order, although object and subject fronting are possible for topicalization and focus (Arvaniti & Adamou 2011).

At the level of nouns, Turkish borrowings generally bear Indic morphology markers:

(5)

o gadžo tumafil-eske pare pakav kaj ni del
the non.Gypsy car-DAT money believe-1SG that NEG give.PRS.3SG
'The non-Gypsy, I believe that he doesn't give the **money** for the **car**.'

[Adamou 2010]

However, borrowed masculine nouns generally use borrowed inflection. Such is the case for the Turkish borrowings *ap-ora* 'pills', *dev-ora* 'giants', *eteklik-ora* 'long skirts', etc. that take an older language contact plural, the Romanian *-uri*. This phenomenon is found in many Romani dialects. The nominals bearing foreign morphology (often of Greek origin) are called *xenoclitic* and are distinguished from the oikoclitic names taking native morphology (for a detailed description of this complex system, see Matras 2002).

Despite the intensive contact with Turkish and despite the heavy borrowing affecting predication, a shift did not take place in all Romani-speaking communities. As is the case for the Pomak communities living in Thrace, only some Romani-speaking communities shifted to Turkish, while others maintained language transmission. Among the communities that shifted, we count those that settled in mixed Romani-Turkish neighborhoods, such as Kirnos. In these cases, the Romani-speaking members adopted the most prestigious language, namely Turkish, and interrupted the transmission of Romani to the children. Here is an example of the interactions where Roma of Kirnos who have shifted to Turkish visit Roma of a homogeneous Roma neighborhood and families that still transmit and use Romani. In an interaction that is taking place in the local Turkish-Romani variety, the child calls for the mother in Turkish:

(6a)

Child: ane 'Mom!'

The mother responds in Turkish to the child:

(6b)

Mother: tʃok gyzel 'Very nice!'

After a brief interaction in Turkish, the conversation is restarted in the Turkish-Romani variety by one of the participants who addresses the mother of the child (note the Turkish verb with the Turkish TMA markers):

(6c)

tʃe but ʃukar jazijor
 INTERJ very nice write.PROG.3SG
 ‘Hey, he writes nicely.’

The use of Turkish or Turkish-Romani is clearly participant related. Here is an example of one female speaker who addresses her friend in Turkish (both women live in Kirnos and have shifted to Turkish) and immediately translates the question to Romani when addressing a child who lives in the neighborhood where Romani is still (at least partly) transmitted:

(7a)

yzgjanən kəzə dilmi bu mar
 PN.GEN girl.POSS NEG.INTER this INTERJ
 (To her friend): ‘Hey, isn’t she Yzgjan’s daughter?’

(7b)

yzgjanaki i tʃei naj san tʃe
 PN.GEN the daughter is.NEG is.2SG INTERJ
 (To the girl): ‘Hey, aren’t you Yzgjan’s daughter?’

Note that, unlike in the Turkish-Romani variety, all the elements in (7a) come from Turkish: the genitive, the possessive, the negative interrogative marker, and the demonstrative. The interjection preferred is a common interjection for Balkan languages in general, from Greek *mori*. On the other hand, in the Romani sentence, the genitive has the Indic form; the Romani article of Greek origin is used. The lexical item, the negative particle, the verb, and the interjection are all Romani.

The social network of a female Romani speaker, P, aged 34 and living in the city of Komotini is presented in Figure 6. As shown, the Romani-speaking community has a high transitivity, similarly to the Pomak network presented in Figure 2. Nevertheless, unlike Pomak speakers, all individuals of the Romani-speaking network have everyday interactions for work purposes with individuals having different interaction languages. Even though these contacts are casual and ephemeral, like those of the Pomak individuals, they affect the Romani-speaking network as a whole.




Figure 6: A Roma social network: work relations are in rectangles, family in circles, and close friends in triangles. The lines represent ties between two persons, and the color represents the dominant language in everyday interactions between them. Black stands for Romani, gray stands for Turkish, and gray with white dots for Greek.

As in the Pomak network with high transitivity, if a highly connected community member decides to shift, the whole Romani-speaking community is affected. The decision of this member is closely related to the ideological and political background of the external networks in which this speaker participates.

Conclusion: How Does the Shift Start?

In this paper I argued that the shift to Turkish, the dominant local minority language, did not take place in Pomak- and Romani-speaking communities because of a language domain reduction, as is frequently argued in the literature. In the rural communities, a shift to Turkish rather took place through the individual shifts of highly connected individuals. But if this is so, then why did the shift take place in some Pomak communities and not in others? What motivated some individual speakers to shift and not others? As I have shown, the frequency of contact with outsiders does not seem to be a relevant parameter. Pomak speakers have contacts with outsiders, but these contacts are ephemeral and casual, such as contacts with co-workers. This is also the case for the Romani speakers who are in contact with Greek speakers: the ties are not intense and lifelong.

The reasons for a shift taking place for a given individual are clearly related to identity factors (as *acts of identity* according to Le Page & Tabouret-Keller 1985). I would also suggest that the social networks of the individuals with the highest centrality in the community network are similarly responsible for the shift. In the case of Greek Thrace, it is well known that political networks strongly correlate with the language shift. Several community representatives (elected or not)³ developed close links with the Turkish authorities, for instance through the Turkish consulate in Thrace and the Turkish minority representatives. Other community representatives (elected or not) developed close links to the representatives of the Greek authorities, for instance, through the Greek Foreign Affairs Ministry's Department for Political Affairs in Xanthi and through the Greek and Greek-oriented elected representatives. The complexity and significance of these networks are thoroughly described in the work of social anthropologists and journalists (among others Tsibiridou 2000, Demetriou 2006, Kostopoulos 2009, Papanikolaou 2008) and will not be discussed here.

Nevertheless, it is important to note that a decision of the Pomak elites and the political representatives of the Pomak communities to ally with the Turkish or the Greek authorities seems to be coupled with the decision to shift to Turkish or not. Those Pomak representatives who kept close political relations to the Turkish political networks chose a language shift to Turkish, whereas those who entertained relations to the Greek political networks opted for language maintenance. Pomak representatives, for as the most highly connected individuals in Pomak networks, have a great impact on the whole community. When they decide to shift, the whole network is rapidly affected, and a language shift spreads. When they decide to maintain Pomak, the whole network continues with language transmission and adapts to modern communication networks by becoming trilingual.

Even though there are no official political representatives of Roma communities (most being illegal settlements and therefore not fulfilling the requirements to elect official representatives), there are some highly connected individuals who act as the link to the official authorities. This was, for example, the case when the Greek state offered the opportunity to

³ The villages traditionally counted on elected representatives, such as the *mihtar*, who were in charge of relations with the outsiders. Nowadays, this function has been replaced by municipal representatives. The role of religious representatives (*hodza*) was and remains equally important.

apply for mortgage loans. As many Muslim Rom are illiterate or have little formal education, filling out the complex administration forms required assistance, which was not provided by the Greek administration. This sort of intermediary role was played by the most educated individuals, who also qualify as being the Romani communities' most highly connected individuals.

To conclude, in language shifts of highly transitive networks, language domain restriction and identity factors, though relevant, do not provide a full account of the shifting process. One has to pay close attention also to the type and the structure of the networks in order to understand the shifting process.

Acknowledgments

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List of Abbreviations

1,2,3SG – first... person singular	INTERJ – interjection
1,2,3PL – first... person plural	N – neutral
AUX – auxiliary	NEG – negation
APTCP – active participle	OBL – oblique
DAT – dative	PMK – Pomak
EVID – evidentiality	PROG – progressive
GEN – genitive	PRS – present
INSTR – instrumental	TMA – Tense, Mood, Aspect
INTER – interrogative marker	TUR – Turkish

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Željko Jozić¹

Linguistic (Un)reality in Contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina

This paper is a preliminary report on my research in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a country with three official languages, Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian. I wanted to find out how the present linguistic situation influences the students of Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian philology and their perspectives after graduation. I placed the emphasis on what young people about to graduate think about the language policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and what they think about the new trends in the language they study. I asked about the other languages in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well, and what brought about this linguistic situation in their country, and finally, where this all will lead to. I thought that it was important to investigate what they thought of possible solutions; what, in their view, could be done to improve the situation; and what are the realistic chances of qualitative changes in the linguistic situation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Birth of Bosnia and Herzegovina

In the early 1990s, as the result of the disintegration of Yugoslavia, a number of new states were founded. Autonomy and independence was first declared by Slovenia, then by Croatia, and finally by Macedonia in 1991. Bosnia and Herzegovina did the same in 1992. The independence of Montenegro was declared much later, in 2006—this was the result of the dissolution of a common state called Serbia and Montenegro. Kosovo, which was not a republic but an autonomous province of the former Yugoslavian federation, declared its independence from Serbia in 2008.

The period of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina lasted from 1992 to 1995 (in Croatia from 1991 to 1995). The war ended in Croatia after Croatian military and police operations and in Bosnia and Herzegovina after

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bombings by NATO and military operations by joint Croatian and Bosniak forces against the Serbs.

In November 1995, a tripartite peace agreement was brokered in Dayton, USA, between the Croats, the Serbs, and the Bosniaks (represented by the heads of states: Franjo Tuđman, Slobodan Milošević, and Alija Izetbegović). The peace deal, called the Dayton Agreement, was signed by the three parties a month later in Paris. The Dayton Agreement divided Bosnia and Herzegovina into two parts called “entities”: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (which is controlled by the Bosniaks and Croats) and the Republic of Srpska (controlled by the Serbs). There is also a special administrative unit, Brčko District, jointly administered by the three nationalities.



Map of Bosnia and Herzegovina

The appearance of these constitutional units was formed by the war, although there were certain territorial concessions. For example, the Croats handed over a part of central Bosnia, Mount Ozren. Serbs, in return, gave up the city of Odžak in Posavina, and the Bosniaks gained the capital Sarajevo, except for the eastern part of the hills around Pale, which is now called Eastern Sarajevo, renamed after being called Serbian Sarajevo by the Serbs during the war. But for the most part, the Dayton Agreement map was based upon the front lines of the three-year war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the map divides Bosnia into two parts. In the Republic of Srpska the majority of the population are Bosnian Serbs (including Serbs from Croatia who fled Croatian forces in August 1995), with the city of Banja Luka as their capital. In the other part, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the majority of the population are Bosniaks and Croats, with Sarajevo as the capital. Sarajevo is also the capital of the entire state of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Background to the Current Linguistic Situation

It is impossible to talk about Bosnia and Herzegovina and its language without taking a look at the situation in neighboring Croatia and Serbia. As a result of the dissolution of the common state, new states began to create their own language policies. Croatian became the official language in Croatia in 1990, and Serbian in Serbia a year later.

Until the collapse of the former Yugoslavia, many Croatian (only rarely Serbian) scholars of the main standard language of Yugoslavia disputed over its name: it was known as “Serbo-Croatian”, “Croato-Serbian”, and even “Serbian or Croatian” and “Croatian or Serbian”. The official name always included both a Croatian and Serbian component until the fall of the state.

The dispute over the name of the main language of Yugoslavia culminated in 1967 when “The Declaration on the Name and Status of the Croatian Language” (*Deklaracija o nazivu i položaju hrvatskog književnog jezika*) was published in Zagreb. It was supported by all the concerned cultural and scientific institutions in the former socialist Croatia, and met with strong political conviction. Croatian scholars, led by a constellation of distinguished linguists such as Dalibor Brozović, Stjepan Babić, Ljudevit Jonke, Tomislav Ladan, and many others, required that the official language in Croatia should carry the name of the nation and therefore it needed to be called the Croatian language. Shortly after that, in a response to the views expressed in the declaration, a group of Serbian writers published a

pamphlet called “A proposal for consideration” (*Predlog za razmišljanje*) demanding the same level of independency for all languages in Yugoslavia.

However, Bosnian political circles criticized the Croatian Declaration even before the Serbian writers did. The Bosnians were already much concerned about the Croatian-Serbian linguistic and terminological disputes. Specifically, the elite of Bosnian linguists felt they were losing ground because of the disintegration of the Serbo-Croatian language. Most of Croatian linguists claimed that the Serbo-Croatian language was the result of a linguistic and political compromise in the 20th century and it actually never existed as a common language of both nations: Croatian and Serbian. A claim like this would mean the evaporation of the language identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina where the language was called “the Bosnian variety of the Serbo-Croatian standard language.” It was a variety with (I)jekavian² standard pronunciation, with a large number of Orientalisms and wide lexical and morphological variation, being a mixture of elements from the Croatian and Serbian languages.

As early as the war year of 1993, the Sarajevo authorities released statutory provisions on language policy providing that “both the Serbo-Croatian and Croato-Serbian (I)jekavian language pronunciation is in official use in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina” (*Službeni list republike BiH* 1993a; my transl.). However, the law was changed only half a year later, and the authorities avoided naming the official language, which could be named Bosnian, Serbian, and Croatian after any one of the three constituent nations: “The standard language with (I)jekavian pronunciation of the three constituent peoples which is called by one of three names: Bosnian, Serbian, Croatian, should be in official use in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina” (*Službeni list republike BiH* 1993b; my transl.).

In Croatia, language policy became an integral part of nation building. The consolidation of the specific characteristics of the Croatian language was brought about by going back to the roots of the Croatian language and drawing from its long tradition by resuscitating some archaic Croatian words, and by introducing some new ones. Serbia has also implemented a national language policy that has had nationalistic qualities (especially by promoting the Cyrillic alphabet as the only official script). These parallel

² Proto-Slavic phoneme *ě has three main reflexes in the South Slavic linguistic area: (I)jekavian (-ije- in long syllables, -je- in short syllables), Ikavian and Ekavian, which means that examples like *sěno* and *město* can be pronounced *sijeno*, *sino*, *seno*, and *mjesto*, *misto*, *mesto*.

developments led to an even greater rift between the Serbian and Croatian standard languages.

This linguistic nationalism has been part of the national turmoil in Bosnia. The change in the linguistic situation in Croatia and Serbia in the early 1990s affected Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the situation caused by the ethnic structure and the war was most complicated. The Bosniaks started to insist that their language should no longer be called the Bosnian variety of the standard language, nor was it Serbo-Croatian or Croato-Serbian, but rather—the Bosnian language.

We should now, however, look briefly at the centripetal forces characteristic of both the Croatian and Serbian communities in Bosnia, since in questions of language policy they have leaned heavily on the developments in Zagreb and Belgrade, respectively.

From the very beginning of the war, standard Croatian as used in Croatia was introduced in the Croatian parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Most of the Croatian linguists and politicians thought that it was unacceptable to create a separate Bosnian Croatian standard language that would be different from the Croatian used in Croatia. However, there was some resistance to such thinking, especially in literary circles. Some Croatian linguists did try to point out the harmful effects of, for example, the low acceptance of the new or restored words (neologisms and archaisms), which were more or less unusual even for the Croats in Croatia, let alone the Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They warned about depriving the Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina of their rights to their own linguistic characteristics, meaning primarily the Orientalisms but also some similarities with the Serbian standard language.

Serbian language policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina had its peculiarities, too, the primary concern having been the relationship between the Ekavian and (I)jekavian pronunciations. At first (that is, in 1992), the only pronunciation used was the (I)jekavian, which is the typical pronunciation (with some phonetic variation) for all the nationalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. A year later, still during the war and under the aegis of the unity of the Serbian language in Serbia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, only the Ekavian pronunciation was allowed in official use in the Republic of Srpska (which was proclaimed in 1992, first, until August of the same year, as the Republic of the Serb People of Bosnia and Herzegovina).

However, this solution was not accepted by many Serbian linguists because it was thought to be an unnatural violation of the language of the

Bosnian Serbs. After five years (until 1998) in which the Ekavian pronunciation was the only official pronunciation in the Republic of Srpska, with a language law prescribing relatively high penalties for its breaching, numerous educational institutions and linguists succeeded in repealing such regulations in the Constitutional Court, meaning that now Ekavian and (I)jekavian pronunciation are equally used in the Republic of Srpska.

Simultaneously with the Croatian and Serbian efforts to introduce Croatian and Serbian languages in the Croatian and Serbian areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosniak linguists decided to write normative reference books for the so-called Bosnian language. In 1996, the Bosnian linguist Senahid Halilović published the *Orthography of the Bosnian Language* (1996), and four years later the same author wrote the *Grammar of the Bosnian Language* (2000) with Jahić and Palić. Alija Isaković's *Dictionary of the Bosnian Language* was published in 1995.

The name "Bosnian language" (*bosanski jezik*) is disputed both by the Serbs and the Croats (in and outside of Bosnia and Herzegovina) because it implies that it is the language of all citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, not only of the Bosniaks. In the Serbs' and Croats' view, it should therefore be called the "Bosniak language" (*bošnjački jezik*), since both the Serbs and Croats in Bosnia have their own official languages named after their nationality. Nevertheless, the majority of Bosniak linguists use "Bosnian" to denote the Bosniak-Muslim standard.

The result of these developments is that there are three official languages co-existing in Bosnia and Herzegovina today: Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian, and, in the linguistic sense, all the three languages have actually one, Neo-Štokavian³ basis. This language situation could be interpreted from a sociolinguistic point of view as a unique example of one language having multiple standards.

The formal linguistic situation in contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina is evidently an extremely complex one. The mere fact that the entire state operates with three standard languages raises numerous questions, posing the country a big challenge to ensure and respect the linguistic rights of every community and every individual. On the other hand, the linguistic situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is also a simple one, because in terms

³ The term "Neo-Štokavian" is borrowed from dialectology to differ from "Old-Štokavian" dialects, which are still in use in some part of Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro. The term "Neo-Štokavian" refers mainly to the prosodic characteristics of having four accents and post-accentual length, e.g. *kùća, nòga, môre, rúka, vîđim*.

of practical everyday communication, there are no difficulties since the pre-war common standard language remains virtually unaltered.

The actual problem is thus the large gap between what the linguistic reality in Bosnia and Herzegovina is and what the proponents and developers of the standard language would like it to be. In fact, it is completely clear that Bosnia and Herzegovina, linguistically speaking, is a particular area with many special characteristics that are determined by a variety of factors, but these linguistic traits do not generally coincide with ethnic divisions. This means that Bosnia and Herzegovina has its own characteristics of spoken and written communication shared by all of its inhabitants that are well known to anyone who in any way comes in contact with the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina. There are, of course, differences in language use that are, for example, related to the speakers' educational and social background, but such differences are inherent to any language.

The Survey

I conducted sociolinguistic interviews in all the universities of Bosnia and Herzegovina where the Bosnian, Croatian, or Serbian languages are studied. The following centers were included: in Sarajevo, the Department of the Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian language; in Banja Luka and Eastern Sarajevo, the Department of the Serbian language; in Mostar, the Department of Croatian Language and Literature (in the western part of Mostar); and in Bihać, Tuzla, and (eastern) Mostar, the Department of Bosnian language and literature.

The interviews were conducted in groups in college classrooms. No such intermediaries as teachers or assistants were present in order to attain a more realistic picture of the students' attitudes to the languages. The interviewees were second- to fifth-year students of one of the official languages. The first-year students were excluded because the research was conducted during the autumn time when they had practically just started their study. The interviews took place in 2010 and 2011. The interviews covered the majority of the student population (e.g. in Tuzla interviews covered nearly 80 % of all students of the Bosnian language). In a relatively short time, we succeeded in visiting the seven universities and in talking to more than 300 students of the official languages in Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁴ In the

⁴ I would like to thank again colleagues from all these universities for their kindness, cooperation, and help during this research.

interviews, special attention was given to the members of other nationalities than the local majority, although their number was small.

In addition to the interviews, students were also asked to complete a questionnaire that attempted to thoroughly cover all the topics relevant to this study. The results of this part of the study will be presented in a later publication. In this article, the questionnaires will be quoted only as a corroboration of the interviews. The questionnaire was administered in the three languages (Bosnian, Croatian, Serbian), and in both alphabets (Latin and Cyrillic).

The questions in the interview and the questionnaire included a number of important topics that were designed to elicit students' opinions about the linguistic situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. One of the most delicate issues in contemporary linguistics in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the naming of the languages. The naming of the language in Bosnia and Herzegovina is in fact the most significant issue, because the communication or identification issue does not exist; some authors believe that in everyday and even in more scholarly communication it was not possible to discern the nationality of the speaker in pre-war Bosnia and Herzegovina. Therefore, the issue of naming the language students use in communication with their family members, teachers, or members of other nationalities was one of the first questions posed in the interviews.

Another central topic of this study is the question about the degree of satisfaction with the language policy and the language situation both in their faculties and at the state level. Further questions address other problematic elements of the language policy such as the students' opinions about the other two official languages of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the practice of using two scripts, although the constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina does not explicitly prescribe the official language or the official script. The final question to all of the students was about their thoughts on the future of the language in their country.

The question of the official language and script has been left to the constitutions of the two entities, the Republic of Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. After the initial constitutions in which the Serbian language and Cyrillic script were excluded as official (in the Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina), or Croatian and Bosnian language were excluded as official and Cyrillic was confirmed as the official script (in the Constitution of the Republic of Srpska), a decision of the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina subsequently

determined that both the Latin and Cyrillic script (or Cyrillic and Latin) are the official scripts, the Latin script being primary in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Cyrillic script in the Republic of Srpska. The word “primary” implies the usage of a script in public communication (all signs, advertisements, notices, etc.). In practice the situation is very often exclusive, i.e., in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina the Latin alphabet is dominant and almost the only script (except for place name signs along the roads), and in the Republic of Srpska Cyrillic is dominant. For example, at the Faculty of Philology in Banja Luka not a single document on the bulletin board was written in Latin script, and students only use Cyrillic script when signing their names on the bulletin board. At the Faculty of Education in Bihać or at the Faculty of Arts in Mostar, on the other hand, the usage of Latin script is exclusive.

As for the definition of the official languages of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Amendment XXIX of the Constitution it is clearly stated: “The official languages of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina are the Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian languages,” while the name of any language in the amended Constitution of Republic of Srpska is avoided: “The official languages of the Republic of Srpska are: the language of the Serbian people, the language of the Bosniak people, and the language of the Croatian people” (*Constitution of the Republic of Srpska*, Amendment LXXI, Art. 7).

Results and Discussion

Students of the Bosnian language (in Bihać, Tuzla, and at the Bosniak University in Mostar) view, according to the interviews and the questionnaire, that the most appropriate name for the language they use is Bosnian (*bosanski jezik*). As almost all the students were Bosniaks, this result is to be expected since professors and teachers of those students, being Bosniak linguists, are exponents of the idea of the Bosnian language as a sovereign language under that name. Students (mostly Bosniaks) of the Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian language in Sarajevo were not quite so unanimous. In their answers some of them argued for the name Bosniak language (*bošnjački jezik*), thinking that the name is more correct because the language should be named after the nation—after the Bosniak nation.

The students of the Croatian language in Mostar, apart from the expected answers that the Croatian language is the best name, gave several new proposals for the name of their language: Bosnian (*bosanski jezik*), Bosnian-

Croatian (*bosanski hrvatski*), and even Herzegovinian (*hercegovački jezik*). The students of the Serbian language, on the other hand, had no doubt: their language is Serbian. However, this name also refers to the language of the other two nations and, in their view, the Bosniaks and Croats were wrong to call their language differently. The only correct name for the language(s) in Bosnia and Herzegovina should be Serbian.

The answers about the degree of satisfaction with the linguistic situation at the universities vary greatly: the students of Serbian were all very pleased with the linguistic situation in their universities, and they gave their professors credit for this. However, the students of the Croatian language in Mostar did not give excellent marks for the language policy at their university. A large percentage of them were only partially satisfied, their discontent being directed towards their teachers, but also to the leadership of the faculty and linguists in general. Like the Croats, the students of the Bosnian language were only partially satisfied with the linguistic situation at their universities, and this is primarily attributed to their professors and the faculty leadership, but also to politicians and linguists. Examining the results regardless of the students' ethnic background in Bosnia-Herzegovina reveal the following overall attitudes towards the language situation and policy at the national level: more than 90 % of students of all nationalities express great dissatisfaction, and almost none of them are pleased with the linguistic situation in their country. They blame primarily politicians and linguists, and, to a lesser extent, the international community (mainly the Croats chose this option).

On questions about attitudes toward the other two official languages, the answers are quite diverse, too. The students of the Serbian language (in Banja Luka and Eastern Sarajevo) often express attitudes that could be summarized in the following kind of statements: "The other two 'languages' are based on the Serbian language. In fact, it is a single language which now has several new names." Or: "I think there is an insistence among Bosniak and Croatian linguists that there are three separate languages in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is not in fact the case." Some students of the Serbian language were worried not about the Croatian, but the Bosnian language: "I am appalled at the Bosnian language and the Bosniaks who want to name all languages in Bosnia and Herzegovina the Bosnian (*bosanski*) language, which is completely wrong." The general impression is that students of the Serbian language do not see any significant differences between the three

languages. In their view, the existing differences are artificially created and intentionally emphasized and all this is controlled by the politicians.

The students of the Croatian language mainly think that they do not know enough about the other two languages, which implies that their teachers do not speak about the languages from a comparative perspective. This happens although the languages could be, as one Croatian student writes, "...interesting because, despite being considered different languages, they are similar to Croatian. It would be interesting to observe the differences among these three languages." The majority opinion seems to be characterized by answers like the following: "Every nation has the right to use their own language," or: "I respect both other languages," or: "I am glad that they are similar to my language and that I can understand both of them without problems, though we all learn just our own language," but also: "The other two languages are in a better position than Croatian." One student expressed the issues with other languages like this: "I think that the Bosnian language is a hybrid language between Croatian and Serbian," and, as a solution, one student of the Croatian language proposed: "I think they [Bosnian and Serbian] are just as valuable as Croatian, and, in the future, they should unite as one common language."

Students of the Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian languages at the Faculty of Philosophy in Sarajevo emphasize the fact that they study only the Bosnian language, and that their professors do not teach the other two: "We study the B/C/S language here, but the emphasis is on Bosnian. I respect the Croatian and Serbian language, but more attention should be paid to the equality between all the three languages." One student writes about the differences between the languages: "I think these three languages are actually one language, Central South Slavic," and another student writes: "People who have lived in Croatia and Serbia really talk Croatian and Serbian, but those Croats or Serbs whose parents were born in places where the Bosnian language is spoken actually speak the Bosnian language, but they call it Croatian or Serbian."

The general impression is that the students of the Bosnian language at the other universities (Bihać, Tuzla, and Mostar) are aware of how detrimental it is to "artificially create differences" between the three official languages. Students were very critically disposed towards all language issues in contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina. They criticized the actions of the other constituent nations (Serbs and Croats) regarding their language policies, the Croats promoting the Croatian language spoken in Croatia, the

Serbs the Ekavian dialect and the Cyrillic alphabet. However, they also criticized the language policy of the Bosniak people, especially some linguistic features that were not familiar to them (using phoneme *h* in some words as *lahko* ‘easy’, *mehko* ‘soft’, *sahat* ‘hour’, even *hudovica* ‘widow’, *hlopta* ‘ball’,⁵ which is different from former Serbo-Croatian (and present Serbian and present Croatian) standard forms *lako*, *meko*, *sat*, *udovica*, *lopta*, preferring the Orientalisms and the like). They are aware of how policies at the state and entity level played a crucial role in the division of language in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and they believe that the differences between Bosnian, Serbian and Croatian in Bosnia and Herzegovina are very small and that in the last 15 years artificial differences between these languages were created in order to emphasize the singularity of each language (Bosnian, Croatian, Serbian).

Students at the universities of Bihać and Tuzla were especially unhappy with the rejection of the curriculum of their universities and with the fact that their degrees are not accepted at the University of Sarajevo so they have very uncertain prospects of employment outside their region.

Answers to the questions about the linguistic future of Bosnia and Herzegovina largely correspond to the views on the language policy and the linguistic situation in that country. The answers are pessimistic because the situation, according to the opinion of the majority of students of all official languages in Bosnia and Herzegovina, is very complicated and, in the long run, unsustainable.

The opinion of most students of the Bosnian language is expressed in statements like these: “I think that the situation will not significantly change in the future because politicians play a central role.” “You can do something, but only after all the three nations first agree on something.” “Without the dialogue of the three nations the situation won’t improve.” “I hope that the three languages will be united in the future.” “This language policy only leads to the destruction of all three languages.” There are, however, those who think positively; one student pointed out: “It can’t get worse—just better.”

The Croats are mostly concerned about the vitality of the Croatian language in Bosnia and Herzegovina: “I am afraid that the Croatian language will disappear from Bosnia and Herzegovina if we do not fight for

⁵ Most Štokavian dialects do not have a phoneme *h* in their phoneme inventory and it is replaced with the phonemes *v*, *j*, *k* or it is just lost: *suh* > *suv*, *snaha* > *snaja*, *grah* > *gra* etc.

it.” “One language will prevail at the expense of the other two.” “It is not possible to create a unique language of all citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, although it would be the best solution.” “If politicians didn’t interfere in the language policy, it would be much better.”

The Serbs were also very pessimistic about the preservation of their language because they think that the Bosnian language is favored: “I think it will not be easy to preserve the Serbian language because the Bosniaks and Croats lay claim to it and want to corrupt it.” “We, as inhabitants of the Republic of Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina, would be forced to accept the Bosnian language as an official language or we will be forced to move into areas where the Serbian language is accepted.” “I don’t see a bright future.”

The interviews and the questionnaire achieved their original purpose: they uncovered the opinions of the young generation of future teachers of the official languages in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the future generations of linguists in this linguistically fragmented Balkan state. In their answers students of the official languages of Bosnia and Herzegovina expressed their dissatisfaction with the linguistic situation in their country and blame the politicians and to a lesser extent linguists for that. The vast majority of students of Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian do not envision a positive future owing to the linguistic fragmentation of their languages, mainly because of the views of the politicians representing the three nations.

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Kira Kaurinkoski¹

The Muslim Communities in Kos and Rhodes: Reflections on Social Organization and Collective Identities in Contemporary Greece

Kos and Rhodes are the main islands of the Dodecanese. They are home to a Muslim minority who have been present there since 1522, as subjects of the Ottoman Empire. During the Italian administration, the Muslims were recognized as a religious community. The incorporation of the Dodecanese into the Greek state in 1947 and the Cyprus conflict, which took the form of a military confrontation in 1974, pushed large numbers of Muslims into Turkey. Among those who left, many were deprived of their Greek citizenship and property. Among those who stayed, many abandoned the Turkish language and Islam. Property, which had formed an important part of the community, was then sold or rented. The political changes in Europe in the late 1980s led to the arrival of large numbers of migrants from the Balkans, Asia and the Middle East. These political events, in tangent with pressure from various EU institutions and the recent rapprochement between Greece and Turkey, have resulted in changes for the Muslim population. Today, the Greek Orthodox and Muslims of Turkish origin in Kos and Rhodes live in the same neighbourhoods, do the same jobs, and all pupils attend Greek public school. Religion, however, remains a distinctive feature. On the island of Kos mixed marriages between Greek Orthodox and Muslims remain rare. The Muslim population also remains less visible within the public sphere than their Greek counterparts. The aim of this paper is to reflect on the social organization of Muslims in Kos and Rhodes, the relationships between Muslims and Christians and the Greek state in two island communities in contemporary Greece.

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Introduction

According to one of the founding myths on which the history of modern Greece is based, the establishment of the Greek state in the 19th century illustrated the atemporal continuity of a nation, the official history of which goes back to the foundation of the first cities in antiquity. In official Greek historiography the superiority of Hellenism and its continuation throughout the centuries are constant themes.² Meanwhile, the influence of the Ottoman Empire, the Balkans and the Middle-East on contemporary Greek society is presented in a negative manner, denied or omitted, and there is no reference to the multiethnic past of the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires (Clogg 2002; de Rapper & Sintès 2008, 10).

The perception of Turkey, in particular, is strongly influenced by collective perceptions of Ottoman Turkey, ‘Tourkokratia’, which in collective Greek imagination starts in 1453 and ends in 1821. In popular speech and imagination, this period is perceived as a time when the Greeks were persecuted, denied an education and reduced to slavery while their children were taken away from their families and transformed into Janissaries who became enemies of their own families and countrymen (Kirtzoglou & Sistani 2003, 194). Historical facts such as the existence of the *millet* system, the power and privileges granted to the Orthodox Church and the Greek domination of the *millet-i-Rum* (the Orthodox population of the Ottoman Empire) are often omitted.

The perceptions of the past tend to organize and construct the present (Tonkin, McDonald & Chapman 1989, 4–5). This is particularly true in the case of the Greeks where the past is present in the everyday life and experiences of its people (Sutton 1998, 4). In popular discourse the beliefs concerning the Ottoman past tend to define and justify the attitudes and perceptions of contemporary Turks as expansionist, and capable of both harassment and brutality (Just 1989, 74; Sutton 1998, 38; Hertzfeld 1985, 19). The present is not only informed by the past, it also informs the past with which it has a dialectic relationship (Tonkin, McDonald & Chapman 1989, 5; Sutton 1998, 16). Here, we are considering two countries whose

² School programs, especially Greek language, and history and geography school books are important conveyors of official ethnocentrism; this has been demonstrated by recent research. Cf. E. Avdela, Η συγκρότηση της εθνικής ταυτότητας στο ελληνικό σχολείο: «εμείς» και οι «άλλοι», in A. Fragkoudaki & Th. Dragona (eds.), «Τι είν’ η πατρίδα μας;», *Εθνοκεντρισμός στην εκπαίδευση*, 1997. Athens: Alexandria, 2nd ed., 27–45.

recent past is marked by military conflicts, namely the Asia Minor Catastrophe in 1922, the Cyprus conflict which took the form of a military confrontation in 1974, and the events of Imia (*Kardak*) in 1996. Since 1999 there has been a rapprochement between Greece and Turkey, and between the European Union and Turkey more generally (Grigoriadis 2008; Kurban, Tsitselikis 2010, 5). Minority politics, especially in the Balkans, are often influenced by broader issues in international relations. Ethnic policy is heavily conditioned by the initial conceptualization of the relationships between various groups, and between groups and the state (Horowitz 1989, 48). This paper will reflect on the Muslims in Kos and Rhodes, the social organization and the collective identities of this particular ethnic group in two island communities within contemporary Greece.

Methodologically, this research is based on ethnological fieldwork, semi-structured conversations and interviews with members of the Muslim communities in Kos and Rhodes,³ representatives of the Orthodox Church in Kos and Rhodes, local authorities and the Turkish state. In my research, I adopt an approach 'from below'. This approach emphasizes the experiences of individuals, and attempts to understand the meaning that people attach to events, ruptures and actions.⁴

The Many Faces of Kos and Rhodes: Official Homogeneity Versus Actual Diversity

Kos and Rhodes are the most important islands of the Dodecanese from an administrative, demographic and economic point of view. Because of their geopolitical location, history and diversity of cultural and religious influences throughout time, this island group is a particularly interesting

³ Amongst my interlocutors, some are personalities in the local Muslim communities. Age and the level of education vary and both genders are represented. However, most are adult men. With some interlocutors several meetings took place. These enabled me to go back to some questions in more depth and also to raise new themes. In total, semi-structured conversations and interviews were conducted with twenty Muslims in Kos and Rhodes; ten on each island. Four interviews with Muslims whose roots go back to Kos were conducted in Bodrum. Most interviews and conversations were conducted in Greek; interviews with representatives of the Turkish state were conducted in English.

⁴ My first period of field research in Kos (October 2008) was enabled by a grant from the French School of Athens. Later field research in Kos (September 2010, May 2011), Rhodes (September, November 2010) and Western Turkey (May 2011) has been carried out in the framework of the BALKABAS project, supported by the 'Young Scholars' programme of the French National Research Agency (ANR) since January 2009 (ANR-08-JCJC-0091-01).

place for fieldwork. In the Middle Ages, the Dodecanese belonged to the Knights of Saint John (1309–1522) and from 1522 to the Ottoman Empire. In 1912, after a war between the Ottoman Empire and Italy, the Dodecanese were under Italian administration (1912–1943). During the Second World War, they were occupied by Germany and then subjected to British control. The Dodecanese island group was the last region to be incorporated into the Greek state in 1947.⁵

There are, however, substantial differences in the manner that these islands have developed during the course of the 20th century. The Italians undertook important infrastructure work on the main islands of Rhodes and Kos, created a naval base, and installed 14,000 colonists in Leros. Nonetheless, they did little to retain the inhabitants of Kalymnos, Symi and Kastellorizo after prohibiting sponge fishing on the Libyan coast, and when the cultivation of land in Asia Minor, where many had their fields, was no longer possible. As a consequence of these events, many inhabitants (in particular from these islands) emigrated overseas. According to Emile Kolodny, the Dodecanese is the only Greek island group where internal migration between the islands can be observed (Kolodny 2004). From the smaller islands, many find seasonal work in Kos and Rhodes. Emigration from this region has mainly been directed to continental Greece, Egypt, North America and Australia. After the incorporation of Kos and Rhodes into the Greek state, migration has also been directed to Western Europe, South Africa, and in the case of some Muslims, to Turkey.

During the last few decades, Rhodes and Kos have mostly followed a development pattern that has responded to the demands of the tourist sector. Both islands have an international airport and have been reachable by international charter flights since the 1970s. The other islands have followed a different development pattern in the field of tourism. Patmos is mainly known as a place of pilgrimage for Greek Orthodox and Roman Catholics. Kalymnos is the only island where sponge fishing is still practiced, and it has gained international fame as an important meeting place for rock climbers.

A fair amount of literature has evolved around the Dodecanese, Rhodes in particular. Henry Miller's 'The Colossus of Maroussi' and Lawrence

⁵ After the War of Independence, the Greek Kingdom was recognized by the sultan by the Treaty of Adrianople of 14.9.1830. The Greek state then acquired the Ionian Islands in 1864, Thessaly in 1881, Epirus, southern Macedonia, Western Thrace, Crete and the Aegean Islands in 1913, and finally the Dodecanese Islands in 1947.

Durrell's 'Reflections on a marine Venus', which is named after one of the 4th century B.C. statues in the local archeological museum called 'the Aphrodite of Thalassia', stand as seminal classics in foreign travel literature. Recently, a documentary film was made on the practice of *kamaki*⁶ in Rhodes during the golden years of mass tourism. This film was 'The colossi of love' by Maria Koufopoulou.⁷

In 1988 the old town of Rhodes was classified as a part of UNESCO World Cultural Heritage and ever since this event important restoration work has been undertaken which mainly uses European and private funding. What we see today is a mesh of Byzantine, Ottoman and Latin architecture. During the Ottoman era many churches were converted to mosques and many more were built from scratch.⁸ The most notable of the functioning mosques in Rhodes is the newly renovated Suleiman mosque (*Süleymaniye camii*), erected soon after 1522 on the site of the Church of Apostles and rebuilt in 1808. Opposite is the Hafız Ahmed Aga Library (*Hafız Ahmed Ağa Kütüphanesi*), which was founded in 1793 and contains Arabic, Persian and Ottoman manuscripts. A little farther away are the Turkish baths, the mosque of Sultan Mustafa (*Sultan Mustafa camii*) which was built in 1765, and the Redjep Pasha mosque (*Recep Paşa camii*) from 1588. The Redjep Pasha mosque is considered to be the most notable mosque built by the Ottomans in Rhodes. This mosque has Persian faience decoration, but today the mosque is in very bad shape. Also nearby is the Ibrahim Pasha mosque (*Ibrahim Paşa camii*) from 1531. In Kos there are five mosques, four of these are in Kos town. The two most notable mosques are the Gazi Hassan Pasha (Lontza) mosque (*Gazi Hasan Paşa Lonca camii*) from 1786 which is situated opposite the plane tree where Hippocrates⁹ supposedly used to teach, and the Ibrahim Defterdar mosque (*Ibrahim Defterdar camii*), situated in the main square of Kos town. All these mosques as well as the

⁶ The term *kamaki* literally means 'harpoon' or 'fish-spear', but is colloquially used for 'gigolo'. On *kamaki* in the Greek context, e.g., S. Zinovieff, Έλληνες άντρες και ξένες γυναίκες: το «καμάκι» σε μια επαρχιακή πόλη, in E. Papataxiarchis, Th. Paradellis (eds.), *Ταυτότητες και φύλο στη σύγχρονη Ελλάδα*, Athens: Alexandria, 1998, 3rd ed., 251–276.

⁷ The titles of several of these works are a tribute to the Colossus of Rhodes which was destroyed by an earthquake in 225 B.C..

⁸ In the Late Ottoman era there were twenty-three functioning mosques in the old town of Rhodes (Savorianakis 2000, 53).

⁹ Hippocrates is considered the greatest physician of antiquity and was born in Kos in 460 B.C.

Ottoman library and baths in Rhodes are sources of pride for the local Muslim populations.

The rich and culturally diverse histories of Kos and Rhodes are reflected not only in their monuments but also in their populations. Today, the great majority is Greek Orthodox but there are also Muslims, Roman Catholics, Lutherans and a small Jewish community. The Jewish community consists of all in all seven families in Rhodes and one in Kos; most are Greek Jews from continental Greece. The synagogue, located in the old town of Rhodes and restored in 2003, has a commemorative plaque to the many members of the Jewish population who were sent to Auschwitz during the Nazi occupation. A commemorative service is held every year on the 23rd of July. On this day, which marks the date of the deportation of the Jews of Rhodes, descendants of the Jews of Rhodes, better known as *Rhodeslis* or *Rhodites*, who are today scattered all over the world, gather in Rhodes (Sintès 2010). More recently, Rhodes has also become a home for large numbers of foreign residents, as well as economic migrants and refugees. The foreign residents are mainly Western and Northern Europeans, whereas the economic migrants and refugees mainly come from Eastern Europe, Asia and the Middle East.

In the Greek context where considerable emphasis is put on the cultural and linguistic homogeneity of its population, the religious diversity we find in Rhodes, and to a lesser extent, also in Kos is a rare phenomenon. Nevertheless, here as elsewhere, most public attention seems to be channeled to cater to the majority of the population, neglecting the linguistic and religious minorities present in the region.¹⁰ For example, official tour guides rarely (if ever) mention events or sights linked to the Ottoman past or the once significant Jewish community. This tendency is also visible in the case of Greek diaspora tourism, promoted in the Dodecanese by an association called *the Dodecanesian Dream*. During the first meeting of the International Dodecanesian Diaspora which was organized in Rhodes in August 2008, not a single event was organized to commemorate the ethnically, linguistically and religiously heterogeneous past of this island (Sintès 2010, 44).

¹⁰ Internationally, Greece has the reputation of a country that does not recognize the existence of minorities on its territory with the sole exception of the Muslim minority in Thrace. France is another example. EUMC, *Les Musulmans au sein de l'Union européenne. Discrimination et islamophobie* (2006, 13).

The Muslims in Rhodes and Kos: From Ottoman Subjects to Greek Citizens

The ethnic Turks or the ‘Muslims’, according to the official Greek terminology in use today,¹¹ have been living in Rhodes and Kos since 1522, as subjects of the Ottoman Empire.¹² In the late 19th century, significant numbers of Muslim Turks from Crete settled on these islands (Savorianakis 2000, 88). During the Italian administration, the Muslims were recognized as one of the three existing religious communities with the right to elect their own councils. After the incorporation of the Dodecanese into the Greek state, the great majority automatically became Greek citizens.¹³ Although the Dodecanese Muslims were not recognized as a minority, because they were deemed as not falling under the protection of the Lausanne Treaty,¹⁴

¹¹ In this paper, I use both terms in parallel.

¹² According to the Ottoman population census of 1884–1886, Rhodes then had a population of 30,606 inhabitants, out of whom 20,711 were Christians, 6,467 Muslims, 2,690 Jews and 738 were ‘foreigners’. Kos had a population of 12,965, out of whom 10,449 were Christians, 2,439 Muslims and 67 were Jews (Savorianakis 2000, 74).

¹³ In 1912, when the Dodecanese island group was ceded to Italy, these islands had an estimated Muslim population of 11,000, the great majority of whom resided in Kos and Rhodes. During the Italian administration, the Muslims had a choice between three different citizenships: Turkish, Italian and Aegean. According to estimations from some members of the local Muslim communities, approximately 1,000 chose Turkish citizenship, 100 chose metropolitan Italian citizenship, whereas the vast majority of 10,000 chose Aegean citizenship. When the Dodecanese were incorporated into the Greek state, those who had Aegean citizenship automatically became Greek citizens. Those with metropolitan Italian citizenship left for Italy. The Turks were allowed to stay but remained Turkish citizens who were obliged to renew their residence and work permit on a regular basis. This last category of persons was exempted from military service in both countries. Usually, the choice of citizenship depended on different family traditions and decisions. There are still approximately 50 persons in Greece with Turkish citizenship since the Ottoman period. Information concerning the Turkish citizens was provided by Mr. Ihsan Yücel, Consul General of the Republic of Turkey in Rhodes, in November 2010. According to figures presented by K. Tsitselikis, after 1943, there were 9,000 Muslims in the Dodecanese (Tsitselikis 2006, 379).

¹⁴ The Lausanne Treaty sets the legal framework for minority protection in both states regarding ‘non-Muslims’ in Turkey, and Muslims in Greece. The Treaty does not enumerate the ‘non-Muslim’ minorities in Turkey and the ‘Muslim’ minorities in Greece. It grants legal protection to all non-Muslim communities in Turkey and all Muslim communities in Greece. In practice, Turkey has limited the protection of the treaty to Greek Orthodox, Armenian and Jewish communities. Likewise in Greece, Muslims of the Dodecanese Islands have been deemed not to fall under the Lausanne protection system (Kurban, Tsitselikis 2010, 7).

special status was acknowledged for the waqf and the Turkish schools (Georgalidou 2004).

The Muslim population in the Dodecanese is, today, estimated at 5,000, out of which 3,000–3,500 are in Rhodes and 1,500–2,000 are in Kos.¹⁵ In Kos the Muslims mainly live in Kos town and in the village of Platani (*Gkerme/Kermentes*). The latter is situated a few kilometres outside Kos town; it is the last village before the archaeological monument of Asklipeio. This monument is one of the most important tourist attractions on the island. The Turkish name of the village, Gkerme/Kermentes most probably derives from the homonymic place of origin of its inhabitants on the other side of the Aegean, who settled there in the 16th century (Savorianakis 2000, 58). Today half of the population of Platani is Greek Orthodox and schools are mixed. All teachers are Greek Orthodox. In Rhodes, the Muslims are not concentrated in one particular place but scattered all over the island. Many live in the old town of Rhodes, others live in Iyalissos, Kandili, Sgouros, Salakos, Lindos and Katavia. Since the 1970s all pupils attend Greek public school. The Turkish language is mainly used for purposes of oral communication within the communities. In practice, there are important differences as far as the level of maintenance and knowledge of Greek and Turkish languages are concerned; these differences are explained by age, origin, place of residence and participation in different social networks (Georgalidou 2004).

A community, according to Dortier, is ‘a group of people who are united by relatively close ties of sociability, a common sub-culture and the feeling of belonging to the same group’ (Dortier 2004). Despite the existence of a community it is only recently that the Muslims in Kos and Rhodes have attracted the attention of researchers. In 1997 an article on the school education and social integration of Muslims in Rhodes was published by Stelios Chiotakis.¹⁶ More recently, socio-linguistic research on the Muslim community in Rhodes has been carried out by a team of scholars from the University of the Aegean in Rhodes, where one of the members is a member of the local Muslim community (Georgalidou 2003; Georgalidou 2004; Georgalidou, Spyropoulos, Kaïli et al. 2011). In 2008 a book on Rhodes and its Muslim community was published in Turkey by Sadi Nasuhoglu, who is

¹⁵ S. Chiotakis, *Σχολική εκπαίδευση και κοινωνική ενσωμάτωση των μουσουλμάνων της Ρόδου, Σύγχρονα θέματα* 1997, p. 63–64 and p. 79–83.

¹⁶ Sadi Nasuhoglu, *Rodos (Anılar ve Tarihçe)*, Muğla 2008.

also a member of this community.¹⁷ In many ways, the Muslims in Kos and Rhodes are still ‘a people without history’ according to the denomination proposed by Eric Wolf (1982). This particularly concerns the Muslims in Kos.

The incorporation of the Dodecanese into the Greek state and the Cyprus conflict, which took the form of a military confrontation in 1974, forced large numbers of Muslims to leave their native islands and migrate to Turkey. In many cases migration was motivated by economic considerations. In connection with the Cyprus conflict, migration was largely a reaction to the discrimination that Muslims in Kos and Rhodes faced in Greece. Field research suggests that the 1960s and the 1970s were particularly difficult years for the Muslims in Kos and Rhodes, marked by sabotage of shops, fields and cattle; discrimination in the fields of education and health continued even later. One informant said the following:

During those years, especially after 1974, we were often attacked in different ways. From our fields, they stole our aubergines and our cows, from our shops they stole products. They broke our shops. In our fields, we have seen our cows and sheep slaughtered. I have seen this with my own eyes. To me they said that they would slaughter me too. [...] People got scared. [...] In the Greek public school we were not encouraged to continue our studies. There were teachers who told us to go back to the cows, who asked us what we were doing in school. If somebody managed to continue his studies at university he was asked what he was doing there and told that no matter what ... there was no position for him afterwards, that he was a Turk. [...] Everything was more difficult for us. We are subjected to compulsory military service but in the army we were not given arms. We did the work of a servant. Even in hospital, when somebody got ill, we had to pay important sums of money to get attention, to be taken care of. [...] Things were difficult here, life was difficult. A lot of people left for Turkey, mainly for Izmir. Later most stayed there.

Usually, those who left Greece were deprived of their Greek citizenship, and in many cases, also of their property. According to Article 19 of the Greek Nationality Code, established by Legislative Decree 3370 in 1955, ‘A Greek citizen of non-Greek descent who left the Greek territory with no intent of return may be declared as having lost his Greek citizenship’. This provision explicitly discriminated against minority members compared to citizens of Greek descent whose citizenship could not be removed on that basis. Article 19 remained in force until 1998 and served as the legal basis for the removal of Greek citizenship from approximately 60,000 citizens, the

¹⁷ Sadi Nasuhoğlu, *Rodos (Anılar ve Tarihçe)*, Muğla 2008.

vast majority of whom were members of the Muslim minority in Western Thrace (Grigoriadis 2008, 25–26). According to estimations by some Muslim community members, approximately 4000 Muslims in Kos and Rhodes lost their Greek citizenship in this manner.¹⁸ Not everyone acquired another nationality, some remained stateless.

Until the late 1990s, and even later in Greece, the respect for minority rights used to be seen ‘as a burden imposed by the Treaty of Lausanne’,¹⁹ which was bound by the principle of reciprocity. In other words, the respect for the rights of the minority of Western Thrace was conditional upon Turkey’s respect for the right of its Rum minority in Istanbul, Imvros (*Gökçeada*) and Tenedos (*Bozcaada*),²⁰ especially as far as waqf foundations, schools and religious leadership were concerned (Grigoriadis 2008, 30; Tsitselikis 2006, 383–384; Tsitselikis 2008, 72, 79, 96; Kurban, Tsitselikis 2010, 8). It has been suggested that the Muslims in Kos and Rhodes, who are not protected by international treaties, have been the most severely affected by tension between the two countries.²¹ As I will argue further on, *de facto*, today it seems that the Muslims in Kos and Rhodes are better integrated into the surrounding Greek society and economy than the Muslims in Western Thrace who are protected by the Lausanne Treaty and benefit from formal minority rights.

In practice, the recognized minorities – the Rum in Istanbul, Imvros and Tenedos on the one hand and the Muslims in Western Thrace on the other hand –, became hostages to alternations in Greek-Turkish relations as the management of the minority populations by the two states was dependent on larger geopolitical issues, international relations and domestic politics in Greece and Turkey (Hirschon 2006, 170–171; Tsitselikis 2008, 75; Kurban

¹⁸ According to oral testimonies, the vast majority of Muslims who left their native island and migrated to Turkey were from Rhodes.

¹⁹ In Greek historiography, the exchange of populations has been presented as a success story that made the population of Greece ethnically, culturally and linguistically more homogeneous. It has also been characterized as ‘the greatest peaceful achievement of the Modern Greek state’ (Mavrogordatos 1992, 9; Voutira 2006, 240). On the other hand, it has also been suggested that the separation of people who formerly lived together diminished social contact between them and as the shared lived experiences diminished, ignorance of the ‘other’ followed. Thus, the understanding of difference and respect for the other was replaced by doubt and continuous anxiety, which then lead to alienation. The case of Cyprus where a *de facto* exchange of population took place in 1974 provides another example (Aktar 2006, 149).

²⁰ In the interest of readability, from here on, reference will be made to Imvros and Tenedos.

²¹ PACE on Turkish minorities’ rights in Greek Aegean islands, 12 August 2008.

& Tsitselikis 2010, 5). For 80 years, the states on whose territory they lived, never considered the minorities as their own people; usually they were obliged to live separately and were subject to persecution. The negative attitudes of the Greek and Turkish states with regard to their minorities have not changed over time. On the contrary, with the Cyprus issue in the 1960s, the lives of the minorities became even more difficult and pushed great numbers to leave their homes and migrate to their national homelands. Some became refugees and stateless persons (Oran 2006, 294–295). In Kos and Rhodes, the Muslims have not been subjected to political objectives linked to Greek-Turkish relations to the same extent as those in Western Thrace (Tsitselikis 2010, 243).

Three different types of Muslim communities emerge, each with its own specific traits and integration agendas. For example, in Western Thrace, which has been the subject of much study and falls beyond the scope of this paper, there are special minority schools and the Muslim law, *sharia*, is observed. In Kos and Rhodes the marital strategies observed are not the same; there are also differences as far as knowledge of the Turkish language and Islam and the maintenance of ethnicity is concerned.

In Turkey, most Muslims from Kos and Rhodes settled in Bodrum, Izmir, Marmaris and Nazilli. Some also settled in Istanbul. In the 1960s and 1970s, when the economic and political situation in Greece was difficult some others migrated to Western European countries in search of work or study. Eventually the Greek authorities encouraged the Greek Orthodox migrants to return to Greece, e.g. economic subvention was available for those who wanted to open a hotel. This was not the case for the Muslims. Many lost their Greek citizenship and others were turned away by the Greek consular officers when they tried to register their children who had been born abroad as Greek citizens.²² Amongst those who stayed, especially in Rhodes, many abandoned the Turkish language and Islam. Mixed marriages with Christians became common-place. One informant said the following:

After the Cyprus events, in the 1960s and especially after 1974, the situation was difficult [...] A bomb was put in the mosque [...] People got afraid. [...] Little by little, mixed marriages with Christians became common. Now we already have the second round of mixed marriages.

According to estimations by some local Muslims in Rhodes, during the last thirty years in Rhodes approximately 60 mixed marriages have been

²² Later most returned to their native island (Rhodes) either with Greek or foreign passports. Some remained in their new host countries or migrated to Turkey.

concluded between Greek Muslims and Greek Orthodox or foreigners, – mainly British, German and Scandinavian citizens.²³

In terms of state policy the elimination of minority protection started in 1964, in connection with the Cyprus crisis and the expulsion of the Greeks from Istanbul. The Turkish schools in Kos and Rhodes were closed in 1971 as a counter-measure against the shutting down of the Greek schools in Imvros and Tenedos in 1964 and the Greek Orthodox seminary of Chalki (*Heybeliada*) in 1971 – all were links in a chain reaction to mutually repressive measures (Tsitselikis 2008, 80, 93). There have also been restrictions in the religious field. Over the years a number of mosques have been transferred to the Greek Orthodox Church in Rhodes and have become churches. Others have been rented and have become storage spaces or are slowly turning into ruins. From the twelve mosques still in existence on Rhodes, only one, the Ibrahim Pasha mosque, is open for prayer on a daily basis. A religious service is held every Friday. The recently restored Suleiman Sultan mosque opens only on special occasions. The private visit of the Turkish foreign minister Ahmed Davudoglou to Rhodes in August 2010 and the celebration of Kurban Bayram in November 2010 were such occasions. In this context, the opening of the mosque can be considered as part of a joint agreement between Greece and Turkey regarding the celebration of religious services in Orthodox churches in Turkey and mosques in Greece. The celebration of an Orthodox service by the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomeos in the monastery of Panagia Sumela on the Turkish Black Sea coast on 15 August 2010 for the first time in 80 years is yet another demonstration of this new policy of rapprochement between Greece and Turkey. A third mosque, the Sultan Mustafa mosque, is used for wedding ceremonies.²⁴ In Kos two out of five mosques are operational and open for prayer on a daily basis: the Defterdar mosque in the main square of Kos town and the Gazi Hasan Pasha mosque in Platani. The latter opens five times a day and prayer is assured daily.

On both islands, there are also Muslim cemeteries. In Rhodes the contemporary Saint Dimitri cemetery is located outside the town of Rhodes and has four different sections: Greek Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Jewish and Muslim. In some villages there are also old Muslim cemeteries. In Kos

²³ Some other local Muslims estimate the number of mixed marriages in Rhodes at 300. However, this seems to be an overestimation.

²⁴ Until 1974, the Sultan Mustafa mosque was a functioning mosque. In the late 1970s, it was reopened for the administrative registration of wedding ceremonies. In the Islamic world, mosques are not used for the celebration of wedding ceremonies.

there are two functioning Muslim cemeteries, both are located in Platani. These Muslim cemeteries cater to the needs of the local Muslims and the recent migrant population of Muslims. This is noteworthy as the capital of Greece, Athens, which is home to the great majority of the country's Muslim immigrants, estimated to be 250,000 excluding the Albanians, still does not have a Muslim cemetery (Tsitselikis 2010, 234–235).²⁵

This brings us to yet another important institution within the Muslim community, the waqf foundation. This is an organization for the management and restoration of Muslim community property. The waqfs in Greece (in Thrace and in the Dodecanese) are regulated by special laws that are part of the broader minority protection measures designed for Thrace.²⁶ However, in practice, the established laws have not always been implemented. Over the years and even today, the waqfs have often been subject to mismanagement and un-transparent practices which had political goals. Since the military coup d'état of 1967, members of all waqf boards in Greece have been appointed by Greek authorities. The new law on waqf foundations, adopted by the Greek Parliament in February 2008 (Law No. 3647), allows the election of board members. However, this law only applies to Western Thrace. In the Dodecanese, where the Italian laws have been retained in force until now, there are no provisions for the election of waqf foundation members (Kurban, Tsitselikis 2010, 9–14).²⁷

According to a general pattern, the state attempts to control the internal organization of foundations and the management of their property as tightly as possible. This is at the expense of the autonomy granted to minority communities under the Lausanne Treaty. In Turkey the situation is no different (Kurban, Tsitselikis 2010, 9). As a consequence, during the past decades, an important part of real state that once belonged to the community has been sold or rented. In Kos and Rhodes many properties have been turned into storage spaces, shops, cafes or playgrounds. Others have become dilapidated or are turning into ruins. In Katavia, a village in southern Rhodes, the mosque has been turned into a café. In Kritika, outside Rhodes

²⁵ The construction of a Muslim cemetery on the outskirts of Athens is planned, following the donation of a plot of land by the Church of Greece (Tsitselikis 2010, 240).

²⁶ Under the Lausanne Treaty, as well as the national laws of Greece, minority foundations have a fundamental right to possess property and to dispose it for their benefit. Acquisition of property takes place through purchase or donations by members of the community.

²⁷ Decree No. 12, 1925 has been retained in force by Article 7 of the Royal Decree of 9 May 1947, Official Gazette no. 97 A 1947.

town, the minaret is about to fall down.²⁸ In this respect the situation in Kos is a little better. Evidence suggests that pressure on the local Muslim population has been particularly strong in Rhodes where the Muslims were more numerous and the waqf property more important in terms of quantity and wealth. It has also been suggested that in Kos the Muslims were better organized and the community more united. It may also be suggested that their leaders were stronger and managed to defend their cause better.

During the Italian administration the Italians nominated the ‘mufti’, the president of the community, and the president of the waqf. The mufti made decisions about marriages and the court of justice, about divorces. There was no sharia. Until the mid-1980s, there was a formally recognized Muslim community in Rhodes. Since that date the Greek authorities have not nominated a new president. The last mufti of Rhodes died in 1974 and no mufti has been nominated since.²⁹ For its religious needs today, the Muslim population in Rhodes is served by an imam and a muezzin. In Kos, where the population is smaller there is an imam, a vice-imam and a muezzin. Both imams are Muslims from Western Thrace whereas the vice-imam and the muezzins are local Muslims.

The non recognition of the institution of the mufti of Rhodes by the Greek authorities is a part of larger inconsistencies in the functioning of the Greek state with respect to minorities. Despite formal provisions given by the state after the exchange of populations the muftis in Greece have never been elected by the people. As a rule, they are nominated by the Greek authorities. From the mid-1980s, this practice has been contested by the Turkish state, and also by a part of the minority population. As a consequence, in Komotini and Xanthi (two of the three existing mufti institutions in Greece) there are two muftis – one that is nominated by the Greek authorities and one that is elected and recognized by the people. Finally, in Didimoticho, the institution of the mufti does not work appropriately (Tsitselikis 2006, 383).

²⁸ According to the President of the Association of Muslims in Rhodes, Mr. Mehmet Samantakis, in Rhodes, out of 600 waqf properties only 35 are left today. Interview in November 2010. In the PACE report from 2008, reference is made to 450 properties out of which 40 are left. PACE on Turkish minorities’ rights in Greek Aegean islands, 12 August 2008.

²⁹ Oral communication from members of the Muslim community in Rhodes.

Developments in the Muslim Communities in Kos and Rhodes Since 1990

After the political changes in Europe since 1990, in tangent with pressure from various European institutions³⁰ and the recent rapprochement between Greece and Turkey, the situation of Muslims in Greece is now changing. There is also a new sense of vitality in the local Muslim communities in Kos and Rhodes. In 2000 local Muslim associations were founded in Kos and Rhodes; both bear the name of 'Muslim Brotherhoods' (*Musulmaniki adelfotis*). These are cultural and educational associations of Muslims of Turkish origin whose main aim is the maintenance and promotion of their culture and traditions. A first attempt to organize local associations on these islands was made in the late 1980s. In 2000 the associations were recognized by the Greek authorities. Meanwhile, the active members of the communities engaged in an informal exchange of information and manifestations of solidarity under the vigilant eye of the authorities. According to their representatives, the Muslim association in Rhodes now has 650 registered members and the one in Kos has 890 members. In the framework of these associations, the celebration of various festivities and Turkish language and dance classes are organized.³¹ One of the latest initiatives of the Muslim association in Kos concerns the opening of a private, bilingual Greek-Turkish kindergarten.³² Both associations also organize excursions to Turkey. Usually these excursions are organized in cooperation with Turkish associations in Bodrum and Izmir; occasionally they are organized with the

³⁰ In 2009 a motion for a resolution on 'the situation of the Turkish minority in Kos and Rhodes' was presented by Mr Andreas Gross to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) (Doc.11904, 6 May 2009). In 2010, the PACE criticized 'the recurrent invoking' of the 'principle of reciprocity' by both Greece and Turkey and pointed out that it is 'first and foremost the countries in which the minorities live that are responsible for their own citizens, including the members of the respective religious minorities'. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, *Freedom of Religion and Other Human Rights for non-Muslim minorities in Turkey and for the Muslim Minority in Thrace (Eastern Greece)*, Resolution 1704, 2010, paragraphs 5 and 8, quoted in Kurban, Tsitselikis 2010, 8.

³¹ In Rhodes, Turkish classes are organized throughout the school year. All in all, approximately 10% of the local Muslim school children of Turkish origin take part in these classes. In Kos, Turkish classes are mainly organized during the summer months. The teachers are from Western Thrace or local Muslims who have studied in Turkey. As far as dance classes are concerned the situation is the opposite. In Rhodes, Turkish dance classes are organized a few weeks before an important community holiday, whereas in Kos they are assured throughout the school year.

³² The difficulty of finding a suitable kindergarten teacher has prevented the project from materializing.

support of the Turkish Consulate General in Rhodes. In 2004 an association of friendship and cooperation between Bodrum and Kos was founded in Bodrum.³³ In practice, we could also speak of a form of educational exchange; offspring of Dodecanesian Muslims who have settled in Turkey come to Greece to see Kos, Rhodes and other islands whereas Muslims in Kos and Rhodes send their offspring to Turkey to see the Turkish coast and various historical and cultural sites. Izmir, Ankara, Bursa and Cappadocia are usually part of the programme. However, the organization of these excursions is not free from problems. Field research suggests that difficulties arise in connection with the visa applications of the Turkish guests.³⁴

Recently, the associations in Kos and Rhodes have strengthened their communities with new *Hocas*³⁵ from Western Thrace. The latter assist the official imams and the vice-imam in Kos in their duties. They also hold Koran classes. Both *Hocas* have received their theological training in Turkey (and Saudi-Arabia) and read the Koran in Arabic and Turkish. The new *Hocas* are paid by the local Muslim associations and recognized by the people but not by the waqfs or the Greek authorities.

Today, the main issues on the agenda of the associations concern the institutionalization of Turkish language and religious education in Greek public schools in Kos and Rhodes with a large number of Muslim pupils. According to the representatives of these associations, ‘the problem, especially in Rhodes, is that the younger generation no longer knows its language, culture and religion’. Over the years, the associations in Kos and Rhodes have presented several formal requests to the Greek authorities (the Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs) for Turkish language and classes in Islam to be made part of the regular school programme.³⁶ In one of their latest petitions the association in Kos asked for two hours of Turkish

³³ Oral communication: Ms Güler Birol, President of the association of friendship and cooperation Bodrum – Kos, Bodrum May 2011.

³⁴ According to the President of the association of friendship and cooperation Bodrum-Kos, in 2007 when their association was invited to Kos, several persons who were included in the delegation did not receive a visa from the Greek authorities. Thereafter, the association has not organized excursions to Greece.

³⁵ ‘Hoca’ is a Turkish term for teacher and in this case, religious instructor.

³⁶ Rules relating to education in the minority’s mother tongue are provided under international human rights laws such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 27) ratified in 1997 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (Article 30) ratified in 1992, by which Greece is also bound (Tsitselikis & Mavrommatis 2003, 9).

and two hours of Islamic religious instruction to be introduced at primary school level in the village of Platani on a weekly basis.³⁷ In Rhodes the association has asked for office space from the waqf. Other requests concern the opening of mosques and the nomination of new *Hocas*. Most of these requests have not received any attention. In many cases it seems that the requests of the associations are not supported by the waqfs.³⁸ At the waqf in Rhodes, the recent interest in language and religion is seen as something which is confined to a small minority of Muslims, whose aim is to introduce the ‘regime of Western Thrace’ in the Dodecanese. In Western Thrace Muslims have official minority status; in minority schools Turkish language and Islam are part of the school programme. In 2006 the Turkish language was introduced as a foreign language in certain Western Thracian public schools. Nevertheless, evidence proves that the number of Thracian minority Turkish speakers is also declining. In the wider Greek society, until recently, Turkish was not perceived as a prestigious language like English, French or German (Tsitselikis & Mavrommatis 2003, 7–8). Slowly the situation is changing. During the last fifteen years, in local communities in Western Thrace, the presence of the Turkish language in public sphere has increased in a significant manner (Baltsiotis, Tsitselikis 2008).

In Rhodes another topical issue concerns the restoration of the Murad Reis cemetery complex in the Mandraki harbour. This is an important historical site with tombs dating from the 16th century.³⁹ Until 1974 the Murad Reis complex also housed the residence of the Mufti of Rhodes. Two preliminary scientific studies of the cemetery complex have been made: one in Greece, which was commissioned by the municipality of Rhodes, the other in Turkey by a research team from Ankara University. However, collaboration or dialogue between the two sides has not been institutionalized. Recently, the territory has been rented to the Municipality of Rhodes for the construction of a music school.

³⁷ Oral communication: Mr. Mazloun Païzanoglou, President of the Association of Muslims in Kos, May 2011.

³⁸ Conversations with representatives of the waqfs in Kos and Rhodes; ‘Σύλλογος Μουσουλμάνων με Δημοσιογράφους για: Μουφτή Ξάνθης (παρερμηνεύτηκε), Σχολείο Τουρκικής γλώσσας (κανείς δεν νοιάζεται) ΒΑΚΟΥΦ (καμία συνεργασία), Aegean News, 7.6.2011, http://www.aegeannews.gr/default.asp?id=27&lg_id=1&Records=Details&_id=38165 (24 August 2011).

³⁹ Tens of thousands of Ottoman soldiers were buried here after the siege of Rhodes in 1522. However, a significant number of these tomb stones were removed by the Italians in 1928 (Savorianakis 2000, 54–55).

Another future project, relevant to the current study, concerns the establishment of a museum of Ottoman history in the clock tower of the old town of Rhodes (*Fethi Paşa Saat Kulesi*). This is an initiative of a Turkish foundation based in Istanbul.⁴⁰

In total, the Greek ICOMOS has registered 2,300 Ottoman monuments and public buildings (minarets, mosques, Islamic schools, bridges, fortifications, fortresses, irrigation channels) in Greece without taking into account churches and monasteries built during that period. Today 90% of the Ottoman monuments belong to the Greek state. In addition to this figure, 8,500 private buildings which were once inhabited by Ottomans have been registered. Today most public buildings are in a bad state of preservation. In comparison with the situation in mainland Greece, in the Dodecanese and Crete, the Ottoman buildings are rather well-preserved. It has been suggested that both the Greek and Turkish governments are at fault for the current situation due to both sides counteracting every effort to study or restore monuments belonging to the ‘other’ culture (Agriantonis 2006, 457–460, 465).

Migration and Transnational Livelihoods: A Consequence of Discrimination or a Choice?

In the past, the decision to move to Turkey was often motivated by economic and sociolinguistic considerations. In connection with the Cyprus crisis, departures were mainly motivated by the insecurity that Muslims faced in Greece. Among the wealthier social strata, a certain number have invested in land and property in Turkey since the 1970s.⁴¹ Many families sent their children to be married in Turkey. Others sent their children to Turkey for their secondary and university education. Few returned to Greece after the completion of their studies. Partially, this can be explained by the non recognition of Turkish university diplomas in Greece until 1994,⁴² and also, by the difficulty of finding employment befitting their qualifications (Oran 2006, 301).

⁴⁰ Oral communication: Mr. Ihsan Yücel, Consul General of the Republic of Turkey in Rhodes, November 2010.

⁴¹ Oral communication: Mr. Ihsan Yücel, Consul General of the Republic of Turkey in Rhodes, November 2010; members of the Muslim communities in Kos and Rhodes.

⁴² This practice, pursued by DIKATSA (the Greek institution for the recognition of foreign university diplomas) was abolished in 1994, with the exception of two disciplines: Turkish language and theology.

Since the mid-1990s, important changes have taken place in Greek society and state policy with regard to the Muslims in Western Thrace. These changes are reflected in the situation of Muslims in Kos and Rhodes. Over the years, entrance to Greek universities has been facilitated by laws and quotas of positive discrimination. Since 1997, 0.5% of student places in universities are available to Muslims from Western Thrace and the Dodecanese (Tsitselikis 2010, 240; Notaras 2008, 75). As a consequence of these measures, an increasing number of Muslims pursue their education in secondary schools in Greece, and later in Greek universities. In parallel, studying in Turkey is not incompatible with further career opportunities and a good life in Greece.

During the last decade, there have been a few cases of young people, both males and females, who after completion of their university training in Turkey have returned to Greece and found a place at their level of qualifications in the context of the wider Greek society and economy. According to the estimations of the local Muslim community members in Kos, among the thirteen Muslim students from Kos enrolled in a university during the academic year 2010–2011, three studied in Greece and ten in Turkey. Earlier, mainly boys and young men pursued their studies in Turkey. From 2000 Muslim girls have also been documented as continuing their studies in Turkey.⁴³

Generally speaking, the Muslims in Kos and Rhodes now wear the same clothes,⁴⁴ do the same jobs and take their children to the same schools as their Greek Orthodox brethren. All in all, the Muslims constitute a young population. As a rule there are 1–3 children in every family.⁴⁵ Young men are subject to compulsory military service in Greece. Since 1998, like the ethnic Greeks, they too bear arms. Lately, they have also been allowed to serve on their native island. However, it seems that they are not recruited to the Military Academy.⁴⁶

⁴³ In 2010 four students (two from Rhodes and two from Kos) were selected to pursue their University studies in Turkey. All four were female.

⁴⁴ Atatürk's reforms, in particular with regard to clothing and secularism were implemented in Kos and Rhodes in the 1920s. This was not the case in Western Thrace. In Western Thrace the head scarf is widely worn by women.

⁴⁵ Oral communication: Mr. Mazloum Païzanoglou, President of the Association of Muslims in Kos, May 2011.

⁴⁶ Until the late 1990s, the Muslims were not exempt from military service. They were, however, discriminated against in various manners. For example, they had to serve unarmed and were mainly asked to carry out auxiliary tasks.

Locally, the Muslims have a reputation of being hard workers. One of my Greek Orthodox informants in Kos said the following,

[...] here in Kos, the Muslims are not marginalized like in Western Thrace. They are rich. [...] Here, people live from tourism. Here, money is all that counts.

Traditionally, many Muslims used to work in agriculture and cattle-breeding. Today, the great majority are self-employed and work in the agricultural or tourist field. Many occupy professions such as mechanics, technicians, shop and restaurant keepers or specialists in the construction field. Businesses are usually passed down from father to son. Some work in the lower categories of the public sector. Among those who have finished university, a few occupy positions in public administration or in education. Some others have opened their own businesses: for example, a female Muslim university graduate opened a private language school in Kos.

As far as the rather successful integration of Muslims in Kos and Rhodes into wider Greek society and economy is concerned, this can partially be explained by economic development, in particular the expansion of the tourism sector and the effects of globalization which have benefited the entire population on these islands. However, what seems equally if not more important is the fact that the Muslims in Kos and Rhodes pursue their education in Greek public schools together with the majority population. The public school is, here, identified as an institution which provides the pupils with Greek language instruction. They are also exposed to Greek national consciousness. However, as the Turkish minority schools in Western Thrace have shown, in these schools pupils usually acquired a Turkish national consciousness which facilitated their socio-economic integration in Turkey. In these schools the pupils did not always acquire the necessary skills to facilitate their socio-economic integration in Greece, which was their country of citizenship (Mavrommatis 2006, 365–366). Moreover, often the level of education and the level of knowledge of both Greek and Turkish in these schools were low.

Since 1997 increased attention has been given to Greek language education through different state programs. With the change in attitude of the authorities, there is also a change in the attitude of the minority population. Today, an increasing number of West Thracian Muslims send their children to Greek public schools from an early age. In parallel with this, there is an increasing tendency for minority kindergartens and primary schools to operate in two languages: Turkish and Greek. This is easily explained: competence in Greek is perceived as the main means to social

integration and mobility in Greek society (Notaras 2008, 75–76; Baltsiotis, Tsitselikis 2008). Nevertheless, recent research shows that, generally speaking, the level of education, socio-economic status and level of integration within broader Greek society and economy of Muslim minority families in Western Thrace all remain low (Baltsiotis, Tsitselikis 2008; Notaras, 2008).⁴⁷

As far as the Muslims in Kos and Rhodes are concerned, ironically, their improved social status is also explained by the consequences of the political changes in Europe since the late 1980s, in particular, the arrival of migrants from the Balkans, Asia and the Middle East who do the ‘worst’ jobs. With the increased crime rate, the migrants have become the scapegoat for all evil. In Kos and Rhodes, the reputation of Albanians and Bulgarians seems particularly bad. On a national level, it has been suggested that the Albanians in Greece are now being accepted; it is the Muslim immigrants from the Middle East and south-east Asia that have become the ‘disturbing other’ and ‘a cultural threat’ to Greece (Tsitselikis 2010, 243).

Reflections on the Meaning of Identity in the Context of Today

Identity, according to Stuart Hall, is a process of identification: ‘something that happens over time, that is never absolutely stable, that is subject to the play of history and the play of difference’. In addition, identity is also and partly ‘the relationship between you and the Other’, hence the construction of difference, which is an unfinished process that happens over time (Hall 1996, 344–345; Ting 2008, 473). As far as the collective identity of the Muslims in Kos and Rhodes is concerned, Marianthi Georgalidou writes: identity appears as a dynamic process ‘which is not shaped only on the basis of the bipolar conception of us and the others, but also on the basis of dynamic internal processes in the framework of the in-group, which though aware of its specificities, in no way constitutes a static entity of people with fixed world views that are shared by all its members to the same degree. Development processes involve dynamics that develop inside and outside the group continually redefining the identities of its members and their

⁴⁷ Concerning the situation of the Muslim minority in Western Thrace, namely the marginalized position of this group in the wider Greek society and economy, see e.g. *The ECRI report on Greece, the fourth cycle of monitoring*, 2009.

relations with their environment; this is expressed in the minority discourse⁴⁸ (Georgalidou 2004).

Language and religion are important elements of identity. With regard to language, recent sociolinguistic research shows that the language spoken by the members of the local Muslim community in Rhodes is a Greek-based pidgin variety of Turkish (Georgalidou, Spyropoulos & Kaili 2011). According to Hasan Kaili, Vassilios Spyropoulos, Marianthi Georgalidou et al., ‘older speakers use a contact vernacular of Greek, based on the local Greek dialect of Rhodes with substantial interference of Turkish. Later generations use a variety of Greek with less interference’ from Turkish whereas the younger generations speak near or completely native varieties of Greek. As far as the Turkish varieties spoken by the community members are concerned, interference from Greek is noteworthy and direct translations of Greek idioms to Turkish are common (Kaili, Spyropoulos, Georgalidou & Celtek 2009). Thus, in the last 50 years, almost the entire Muslim community has shifted from near monolingualism in Turkish to bilingualism in various types of Turkish and Greek (Georgalidou, Spyropoulos & Kaili 2011).

In addition to the local Muslims who have their own dialect, there are also other groups of Muslims and/or Turkish speakers in Kos and Rhodes. There are Cretan Muslims, among whom the great majority were Greek speaking already in the 19th century, a small number of Muslims from Western Thrace, Greeks from Istanbul and Imvros, as well as recent migrants from Turkey. The latter are mainly spouses of local Muslims who work in Kos and Rhodes.⁴⁹

However, not everyone has come to terms with their double linguistic and cultural identity. Some see their Greek Turkish identity as a burden, thinking that it diminishes them in some way. They would prefer to have

⁴⁸ In the original: «η αξία της θεώρησης της ταυτότητας ως ενός δυναμικού συνόλου στοιχείων που συχνά ετεροκαθορίζονται αλληλοσυγκρουόμενα είναι ακόμα περισσότερο προφανής στην περίπτωση της συλλογικής μειονοτικής ταυτότητας, η οποία δεν διαμορφώνεται μόνο με βάση το δίπολο εμείς και οι άλλοι, αλλά και με δυναμικές εσωτερικές διαδικασίες, στο πλαίσιο της ενδο-ομάδας, η οποία έχει μεν συνείδηση της ιδιαιτερότητας της, αλλά με κανέναν τρόπο δεν αποτελεί ένα στατικό σύνολο ανθρώπων με παγιωμένες κοσμοαντιλήψεις της οποίες μοιράζονται στον ίδιο βαθμό όλα τα μέλη του. Διαδικασίες εξέλιξης οι οποίες αφορούν δυναμικές που αναπτύσσονται εντός και εκτός της ομάδας διαρκώς επανακαθορίζουν τις ταυτότητες των μελών της και τις σχέσεις του με το περιβάλλον τους, γεγονός, που γίνεται εμφανές κατά την εκφορά του μειονοτικού λόγου.»

⁴⁹ According to the Immigration Service of the Greek police in Kos, in September 2010, there were 15 Turks in Kos with a valid residence permit.

just one identity, usually to be 'pure Greeks'. In Greece, as in all Balkan countries, bilingualism was for many years considered a handicap rather than a merit or advantage, since the 'other' language was considered to be a link with the national culture of a neighbouring and not always friendly state, and a potential conveyor of an antagonistic national ideology that might threaten territorial integrity (Tsitselikis & Mavrommatis 2003, 24).

Those who have worked or studied in Turkey often consider the years spent in Turkey as 'a rite of passage' which enabled them to improve their knowledge of the Turkish language and to reflect on identity issues, to understand who they are. One of my informants summed up his reflections in the following manner:

I am not Turkish, I am not Muslim. I am not merely Greek either. I define myself as Greek-Turkish [...], officially I am Muslim. However, if somebody congratulates me for my good knowledge of Greek as if I was a recent immigrant here, then I get angry.

When I was in Turkey, there were a lot of small things that bothered me. Some people would have liked to hear 'how we suffer here in Greece because of discrimination'. Our situation here is not that bad. In the end, I prefer to be different here than an ethnic Turk from Greece in Turkey. After all, we have more democracy in Greece even if there are problems too.

Many watch Turkish satellite television and read Turkish newspapers. Visits to Turkey are frequent whether for personal, professional or recreational purposes. Some also have their medical doctors in Turkey, usually in Izmir, a city with two university hospitals. Field research suggests that consulting medical doctors in Turkey is common not only for Muslims but also for Greek Orthodox. This practice is, in part, explained by economic considerations, and particularly concerns ophthalmologists.

As far as religion is concerned, the celebration of Ramadan⁵⁰ and Kurban Bayram⁵¹ as well as the five *kandils* (*ragayip, mevlut, berat, miraç* and

⁵⁰ Ramadan is the ninth month of the Islamic calendar and lasts up to 29 or 30 days. It is the Islamic month of fasting in which participating Muslims refrain from eating, drinking and sexual relations from dawn until sunset. Fasting is intended to teach Muslims about patience, humility and spirituality.

kadir),⁵² are important events in the local Muslim communities and attended by large numbers of people. The Friday midday prayer, however, is mainly attended by migrants from Egypt, Syria, Pakistan and Albania and a small number of older men from the local Muslim communities. Women attend the mosque less frequently and mainly during the bayrams. As a rule, male children are circumcised; this practice is considered to be an important element of their Muslim identity. To this end, some travel to Turkey to perform the rite, while others wait for a Muslim doctor to come from Western Thrace. Mixed marriages are not very common. In some cases, problems arise with the birth of children. In Rhodes there have been several cases where the Greek Orthodox parent secretly took the child to the Orthodox church to be baptized. In parallel with this, the Muslim parent secretly took the male child to Turkey to be circumcised. In some cases, children grow up with no religion.⁵³ When they reach adulthood, they are free to decide for themselves. The more conservative members of the community show a fair amount of scepticism with regard to mixed marriages. According to them, the current trend is to marry within one's own religious community. In Kos, mixed marriages with Greek Orthodox and other Christians are relatively rare. In the case of Muslim women they are considered socially unacceptable.⁵⁴

According to most of my interlocutors, the ideal case is marriage within one's own community. It is considered easier as far as the education of children is concerned. Marriage with a Christian, with a person of another religion, or an atheist is a less desirable solution. Marriages with Turks are relatively rare in Rhodes; usually this is explained by the absence of a common language and by differences in mentality. In Kos marriages with

⁵¹ Kurban Bayram is an important Islamic holiday celebrated by Muslims worldwide. It is also known as the 'Sacrifice feast' and commemorates Ibrahim's (Abraham's) willingness to sacrifice his eldest son Ishmael (Ismail) as an act of obedience to Allah and Ismail's acceptance of this command, before Allah intervened to provide Ibrahim with a ram to sacrifice instead. During Kurban Bayram, the custom is to sacrifice a goat, sheep, cow or camel. Traditionally, the meat is divided into three parts; the family retains one third, another third is given to relatives, friends and neighbours, and the last third to the poor and needy. Today, it is also common to send money to a developing country; locally this practice is justified by the fact that there are no poor people on Kos and Rhodes anymore. Field work suggests that one third of Muslims in Rhodes and the great majority of Muslims in Kos celebrate Kurban Bayram.

⁵² These are festivals of Ottoman tradition.

⁵³ Oral communication: Father Emmanuel, Metropolitan of Rhodes, and Hoca Ilter, Rhodes, November 2010.

⁵⁴ Oral communication from members of the Muslim community in Kos.

Turks are more common. Whereas marriages with Turkish women started in the 1990s, nowadays there is also a demand for male spouses from Turkey. Migrants from the Balkans, Asia and the Middle East usually get married to their countrymen, to other migrants or with Greek Orthodox people. In the eyes of the local Muslim communities they are ‘foreign’ (*xenoi*) and not acceptable as marriage partners.

We could argue that, in the context of today religious practice and Turkish language are losing their importance amongst the younger generations, especially in Rhodes.⁵⁵ Nevertheless, most seem to think of themselves as Muslims and ethnic Turks, and also as members of a specific Muslim community. Donald Horowitz observed a similar phenomenon in a different, multiethnic and assimilatory context of the United States in the 1980s. Horowitz writes: ‘So, as ethnicity is drained of cultural content, as pluralism is accepted, as barriers to intermarriage fall, as minorities fast learn English and improve their material conditions – as all of these things happen – ethnicity nevertheless becomes more important’ (Horowitz 1989, 53). As far as the relationship between ethnicity and culture is concerned, the case of Muslims in Kos and Rhodes also proves the thesis of E. K. Francis, according to whom ‘an ethnic group can modify and change its culture without losing its identity’ (Francis 1947, 396).

Concerning Relations Between Christians and Muslims and the Greek State

As far as neighbourly relations are concerned, many Muslims in Kos and Rhodes emphasize that with their Greek Orthodox co-islanders, *today*, they live like brothers.⁵⁶ Some others claim that ‘their best friends are Christians’. Their children go to school together, they are invited to each other’s marriages and respect each other’s religious holidays. Official relations between the confessional groups are mutually qualified as very good and, in some cases, as excellent. In Rhodes, large celebrations of the Greek Orthodox Church and the Jewish community are attended by the Muslim

⁵⁵ Field research suggests that this loss is a consequence of the social and economic pressures that have been put on the Muslims since the 1960s. It is also explained by the dispersion of the Muslim population in Rhodes. In Kos where most Muslims are concentrated in the village of Platani, the latter have remained a relatively united and conservative social group which has maintained its distinctive beliefs, language and social norms.

⁵⁶ On relations between Christians and Muslims in Rhodes, see also Georgalidou (2003; 2004).

representatives. Representatives of the Greek Orthodox Church mainly come to musical and philanthropic celebrations organized by the Muslims.⁵⁷

Moreover, some Muslims of Turkish origin told me that their best friends are Greek Orthodox. Some others maintain colloquial social relations with each other. In the end, it seems that relations between members of different confessional groups and people *per se* are characterized by a *savoir-vivre* where everybody knows his/her place. Adults and older people, who have experienced the difficult years and the discriminations of the past, often make a point by saying that they have always maintained a low profile in their relationships. Others go a little further, emphasizing the fact that their problem is not with individual people but with the Greek state. Often the representatives of the Greek state in local public administration are not locals but people who have been sent over from other parts of Greece and are unfamiliar with the local history. In parallel, evidence proves that in every-day life discrimination still goes on, namely in the fields of administration and taxation, reminiscent of the measures taken by the Turkish state with regard to its Greek Orthodox population.⁵⁸ An older gentleman who lives in an Ottoman house said the following:

One day, the tiles fell down from the roof; so, I wanted to repair the damage. Very soon the archaeological services intervened; they asked me what I am doing and pointed out that it is a historical building that is concerned. They said that they would come and see, also that I must pay taxes. Next door from me there is a similar house where the owner is a Greek. He has bought the house little by little and thus he has been able to enlarge his domain. Nobody ever stopped him ... It is not quite the same if you are a 'Greek' or a 'Turk' even today.

Among those who have settled in Turkey, many are now coming back to visit family. In Rhodes, a few people have come back after their retirement, ostensibly as citizens of another country. In Kos there are some cases where Muslims who migrated to Turkey have married their daughters back to men from Kos. Attachment to the native island, either Kos or Rhodes, is strong.

⁵⁷ Oral communication: Mr. Serif Damadoglou Sükri, Imam of Platani; Mr. Ismail Tsakir Samoglou, Imam of Rhodes; Father Emmanuel, Metropolitan of Rhodes and Father Vasileios, Metropolitan of Kos, Septemer 2010–May 2011. It is worth noting that in the Dodecanese, the Orthodox Church is under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. According to K. Tsitselikis, there is no inter-religious dialogue between officials of the Greek Orthodox Church and representatives of the Muslim communities (Tsitselikis 2010, 243).

⁵⁸ On the Turkish state and its Greek Orthodox population, e.g. the collection of essays edited by K. Tsitselikis (2006), in particular the contribution by B. Oran; also the work of A. Alexandris.

An older gentleman, who returned to Rhodes after his retirement in Germany, said the following:

Our home is here. I was born here. I love Rhodes. I lived ten years in Turkey, in Istanbul. There I did not feel that I was at home, in my country. I am from Rhodes. I was born here and went to school here and it is here that my parents are buried. [...] In Turkey I had a good life. I know a lot of people who left Rhodes 40–50 years ago. Even after such a long time, they are nostalgic. Their country, their home is here in Rhodes.

Others emphasize that their homes, their roots, their lives and their achievements are linked with Greece, and in particular, with their native island.

It is not that we don't like Greece. Greece is unjust towards us. We live, eat and drink here. It is here that we have constructed our homes, our businesses. This is our country. Our clients are Greek. This is where our grandparents are buried. I have buried my child here. Our roots are in Kos. Our only hope is that Greece and Turkey get along.

As these examples show, home (and homeland) is defined in terms of family history, belonging to a community and locality. Home-making is the result of family reunification, safe life circumstances, and self-made achievements. The feeling of being at home also stems from contacts with other community members, the exchange of information, mutual aid, and maintaining and performing old traditions and remembering the past. These practices contribute to a kind of 'homely' feeling which is rooted in 'the celebration of small nationalisms and regionalisms' according to the definition of David Morley and Kevin Robins (1993, 8), and more specifically, in 'the celebration of localism' as proposed by Jasna Čapo-Žmegač (2010, 190).

Among those who have lost their Greek citizenship there is a strong feeling of *Heimatlosigkeit*. Today some people do try to retrieve their lost Greek citizenship and their property. After difficult and expensive bureaucratic and legal procedures a limited number of people have been able to get back their Greek citizenship.⁵⁹ The restitution of property seems to be a more complicated matter. If this was to happen, a number of requests from Muslims, Jews and others would follow. Though the situation is difficult there may be some hope. In this context the current crisis, which is not only economic but also a crisis of values, concerns everybody and may contribute to greater social cohesion, at least on a local and regional level.

⁵⁹ The laws in Greece and Turkey allow double citizenship.

The relatively recent decision of many EU countries, including Greece,⁶⁰ to allow Turkish citizens with Green passports (*Yeşil Pasaport*)⁶¹ to travel to EU countries without a visa is a positive step that facilitates border-crossing between the two countries. In the summer time Greek and Turkish excursion boats and private yachts are frequently seen in local harbours on both sides of the Aegean. These are some signs of new dynamics in border-crossing that are economically beneficial for both sides. As these examples show, globalization has had an effect on people's minds contributing to the openness towards 'otherness'. This should be seen as a positive step away from the reciprocity principle which has never been limited to the legal framework only. As a matter of fact, the reciprocity principle is frequently referred to in political debates and media coverage (Kurban, Tsitselikis 2010, 22), and also in colloquial discussions with state officials at different levels of governance as well as ordinary citizens.

Conclusion

The Muslims in Kos and Rhodes are part of a historic minority, present on these islands since 1522 as Ottoman subjects. During the Italian administration, the Muslims were recognized as a religious community. The incorporation of the Dodecanese island group into the Greek state and the Cyprus conflict, which took the form of a military confrontation in 1974, pushed many to leave their homes and migrate to Turkey. Usually, those who left Greece were deprived of their Greek citizenship and their property. Turkish schools on these islands were closed by the Greek state in 1971 as a counter-measure against the closure of the Greek schools in Imvros and Tenedos in 1964, and the closure of the Greek Orthodox seminar at Chalki in 1971. The last mufti of Rhodes died in 1974 and no mufti has been nominated since. In many fields, discrimination against the Muslims continued even later.

Since the mid-1990s, the situation in the Muslim communities in Greece (Thrace and the Dodecanese) is changing. An increasing number of Muslims continue their secondary and university education in Greece. Article 19 (Law 3370/1955) which formed the legal basis for the elimination of Greek citizenship from Greek citizens of non Greek origin was abolished in 1998.

⁶⁰ In the case of Greece, this decision came into force on 28 July 2010.

⁶¹ The Green passport allows its bearer to travel visa-free to some countries. It is issued to 1) former members of the National Assembly; 2) first, second or third grade public servants; 3) pensioned first, second or third grade public servants; 4) mayors; 5) spouses of special passport holders; and 6) unwed children of special passport holders who live with their parents until they turn 25.

In the same year the situation of Greeks of non-Greek origin changed in the Greek army; until then they were subject to compulsory military service but had to serve unarmed. In 2000 local Muslim associations were founded in Kos and Rhodes. These are cultural and educational associations of Muslims of Turkish origin.

As far as settlement patterns and marriage strategies are concerned, there are some differences between Kos and Rhodes. In Rhodes, the Muslims are dispersed throughout the island and mixed marriages with Greek Orthodox and other Christians are not uncommon; marriages with Turks are relatively rare. In Kos, the Muslim community is smaller, more united and more conservative. Mixed marriages remain rare and are socially unacceptable, especially in the case of Muslim women. On the other hand, marriages with Turks are more common. As a consequence, there is also a better command of the Turkish language.

Notwithstanding some differences between them, in comparison with the Muslims in Western Thrace, the Muslim communities in Kos and Rhodes are smaller and their incorporation into the Greek state more recent. They also seem to be better integrated into the surrounding Greek society and economy than the Muslims in Western Thrace. This can be explained by the economic development of the region that has benefited the entire population of these islands. However, it is also explained by a different education policy in comparison with that pursued in Western Thrace. Muslim pupils in Kos and Rhodes have pursued their education in Greek public schools together with the majority population since the 1970s; this has not been the case in Western Thrace. The cost of the integration process, especially in the case of Rhodes, has been the loss of language and religion. Moreover, there is a dependency on the Muslim community in Western Thrace; the imams in Kos and Rhodes, the medical doctors needed for the performance of certain religious rites (circumcision) as well as language teachers often come from Western Thrace.

Relations with Turkey have always been important, whether for economic, security, linguistic or religious reasons. In the past the difficulty of securing one's livelihood and constructing a meaningful life in Greece were the main reasons to move to Turkey. Today, visits to Turkey are frequent and are mainly for personal, professional or recreational reasons. Some Muslims also watch Turkish satellite television and read Turkish newspapers, usually online.

Among those who have settled in Turkey, some come back to visit family, in most cases in the capacity of tourists with a visitor's visa. Today, some try to retrieve their lost Greek citizenship and also their property. All in all, the developments in the Muslim communities in Kos and Rhodes over the last decades show that 'ethnic groups, their self-definitions, their claims, their aspirations and expectations are not, after all, foreordained. They are the product of complex interaction between group members and their environment; and they are not static – they change. Some of the most important features of this interaction are official conceptions and governmental policy' (Horowitz 1989, 58).

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Jaakko Kõlhi¹

Language and Identity in Montenegro

A Study among University Students

Introduction

This paper explores Montenegro's complex language situation from the point of view of identity. I present the results of a study based on interviews of Montenegrin university students who were asked about their views and attitudes with respect to the language they speak and the various aspects of the language situation in Montenegro as a whole. From the interviews, four types of linguistic identity emerged. I grouped these as strongly Montenegrin, moderately Montenegrin, moderately Serbian, and strongly Serbian. I argue that the most significant factors explaining the adoption of a certain linguistic identity are nationality, family background, and primary and secondary education.

In the first part of the paper I briefly introduce the basic theoretical concepts of the study, paying special attention to the notion of linguistic identity. I also give a quick overview of Montenegro and the Montenegrins, which I think is necessary in order to understand the specific context in question. The language situation is described by focusing on its most significant single element, the new Montenegrin standard language. In the paper's second part, I present the results of the interviews. Giving voice to my informants, I introduce the four types of linguistic identity. Then I analyze the factors behind the adoption of a particular linguistic identity and show how these factors work. Finally, I present some concluding remarks.

Preliminaries

I will begin by addressing the relationship between language and identity, focusing on the notion of linguistic identity which, although relatively new

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and still somewhat ambiguous as a concept, has become an important aspect of analysis especially in multilingual contexts. I will also provide a brief overview of Montenegro, the Montenegrins and the language situation in the country. The focus will be on the multiple identities existing among the country's inhabitants as well as on the creation of the new Montenegrin standard language.

Language and Identity

The relationship between language² and identity is significant and multifaceted. Identities are constructed in discourses, thoughts and meanings expressed through language. In addition to this communicative function, languages play an important role in identity construction through their symbolic function. This is especially true for national identities. Nineteenth-century Romantic nationalism, as formulated by some of its most influential advocates—the German philosophers Herder and Fichte—focused considerably on language, seeing it as a natural factor distinguishing and forming nations (Joseph 2004, 110; Hobsbawm 1992, 67–68). The influence of this type of thinking was so strong, particularly in Europe, that even though nations like Switzerland have not needed a common language, most emerging nations, especially the smaller groups living within larger empires and striving for political independence, adopted language as a central element in their nationalism (Wright 2004, 33–34). Thus for the Romantics, languages created nations although later it became common, as now in ex-Yugoslavia, that the equation is turned the other way around and nations themselves create languages.

The key concept of this study is linguistic identity.³ I use it to refer to identification with a certain language, as a speaker of that language and as a member of the group speaking that language. Linguistic identity is the part of an individual's or a group's identity which is connected to the language(s) they speak (Bugarski 2010, 34). Essential to linguistic identity are the values and meanings attached to the language that, for their part, have to do with wider social and political processes. I use the concept in a sense that also

² I will not go any deeper here into what is a language and what is a dialect, and the difference between them. Suffice it to say that in my view, languages are not only defined linguistically but socially as well. Ultimately it is up to the people belonging to a linguistic community to define for themselves which language they speak.

³ In order to avoid confusion, I will consistently use the term “linguistic identity” instead of “language identity”, which is sometimes used to refer to the exact same thing, but sometimes also to “identity” i.e. the characteristics of a certain language.

includes many aspects of the notion of language attitude, or the feelings people have about their own language or the languages of others. I believe that for the purposes of this study a broad definition is needed that takes into account all aspects of identifying with a language. Thus in addition to simply expressing an attachment to a certain language, linguistic identity can be weak or strong, explicit or vague, significant or unimportant.

Like all identities, linguistic identity is connected to its social and historical contexts but also reacts to changes in its environment. In addition to the group with which one shares one's linguistic identity, important too are those groups that are thus excluded. Collective identities are often constructed against the Other, and here linguistic identities make no exception. Often the boundaries and their permanence are actually more important than what is within or outside of them. As the boundaries have become formed, the group membership as such becomes essential and the shared experience of one's own distinctiveness appears as one of the most important uniting factors (Edwards 2010, 25).

However, different communities attach different meanings to language. There are cases where linguistic identity is a more or less meaningless concept whereas in others linguistic identification is at the heart of the collective identity. The connection to the actual linguistic realities might vary as well. For example, the relatively unified language that used to be called Serbo-Croatian has produced several different linguistic identities whereas the large number of people identifying themselves as Arabic speakers often have trouble understanding each other's spoken varieties. Finally, it is important to remember that connecting a language to a certain nation or state and emphasizing its uniqueness are in the end political acts that do not necessarily follow any naturally occurring differences between languages and cultures (Jukarainen 2001, 148).

Montenegro and the Montenegrins

Montenegro was a component part of Yugoslavia but has a relatively long independent history of its own. After the Slavic tribes arrived in the Balkans at the end of the Migration Period, several short-lived state formations were born in and around present-day Montenegro. By the end of the twelfth century the area became part of the Medieval Kingdom of Serbia. By this time at the latest, these lands came under the influence of Eastern Orthodoxy after having been more closely connected to Roman Catholicism (Rastoder 2003, 109). The coastal areas, however, remained under the influence of the

Venetians for several centuries. During the fifteenth century the land now called Montenegro (from Italian, meaning ‘black mountain’), as with most of the Balkans, became part of the Ottoman Empire. The Montenegrins, however, refused to accept Ottoman rule and often rebelled, using their mountainous terrain to their advantage. Ultimately they managed to achieve a partial autonomy within the Empire. During the last decade of the eighteenth and the entire nineteenth century, the area controlled by the Montenegrins was enlarged several times and the principality became *de facto* independent (Rastoder 2003, 118). In 1878, under Nicholas I, the independence of Montenegro was internationally recognized by the Congress of Berlin.

During the First World War Montenegro was occupied by Austro-Hungarian forces and King Nicholas was forced to leave the country. After the war a National Assembly gathered in Podgorica in 1918 and decided to unite the country with the Kingdom of Serbia which then became part of the newly founded Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (from 1929 the Kingdom of Yugoslavia). Many Montenegrins considered the decision to be against both the constitution and the will of the people. A violent guerilla war ensued for several years in which the Greens (*zelenaši*) fought against the supporters of unification, the Whites (*bjelaši*), ultimately losing the battle for Montenegrin independence. However, this division of the population prevailed and can be seen to have implications even in the present day. (Rastoder 2003, 128–131.)

In Tito’s Socialist Yugoslavia Montenegro became one of the six republics and Montenegrins were often over-represented in politics, the army and in other public offices. During the 1980s, however, the poorer economic situation began to affect everyday lives and by the end of the decade tensions between Yugoslavia’s national groups began to emerge. As the country proceeded to fall apart, the question of Montenegro’s future status was also raised. In March 1992 a referendum was held in which an overwhelming 95 % of Montenegrins expressed their desire for their country to remain, now joined only with Serbia, as part of Yugoslavia. According to Malešević & Uzelac (2007, 705), the social dissatisfaction prevailing at that time was successfully channeled into pro-Serbian nationalism. Following the Yugoslav wars, however, the relationship between Montenegro and Serbia became more complicated as the unfavorable international reputation of Serbia and its leader Milošević was increasingly seen as a burden for Montenegro, particularly by Prime Minister Đukanović, who started openly

criticizing Milošević. Đukanović won the critical elections of 1997 and 1998 and from then on began to more openly advocate independence for Montenegro. A referendum on Montenegrin independence was finally organized in May 2006. The campaign was fierce and the outcome remained quite unclear. In the end, 55.5 % of the voters were in favor of independence (Morrison 2009, 218).

The Montenegrin Identity

Montenegro's inhabitants are in many ways divided into two factions, not always directly opposite to each other, but still clearly separate. This split is very evident when it comes to the Montenegrin identity, that is, what it really is and means to be a Montenegrin. To be sure, many people living in Montenegro consider themselves Serbs in ethno-national terms. For them, "Montenegrin-ness" is a geographic-historical subcategory of "Serbian-ness". On the other hand, for many the Montenegrins constitute a nation of their own, separate from the Serbs. Montenegrins do share for the most part the same ethno-religious background with the Serbs. Separate "Montenegrin-ness" is, however, backed up by political history, a unique mountain lifestyle and a traditional society based on clan and tribe membership⁴ (Pavlović 2003, 88). A Montenegrin cultural identity can be said to have existed already for centuries.

In Socialist Yugoslavia the Montenegrins formed one of the constituent nations (*narod*), a category which most residents of the republic in various censuses declared themselves as belonging to. From the point of view of identity, the political situation at that time was balanced: Montenegro was a republic of its own but still belonged to the same federation with Serbia. During those times a third, Yugoslav, identity was also adopted by many. However, even though in the official censuses only one nationality was allowed to be declared, in the socialist republic of Montenegro the categories of Montenegrin, Serb, and Yugoslav were not directly opposite each other and in certain situations it was possible to identify with all three at the same time (Malešević & Uzelac 2007, 704).

In the 1991 census, 62 % of Montenegro's population reported Montenegrin nationality, 9 % Serbian, and 4 % Yugoslav.⁵ By 2003 the

⁴ The tribal system was probably introduced by the Vlachs and Albanians who were assimilated by the Montenegrins in late medieval times (Roberts 2007, 2–3).

⁵ All statistical information is from the Statistical Office of Montenegro (www.monstat.org).

figures had changed to 43 % Montenegrin, 32 % Serbian, and 0.3 % Yugoslav. Some population movements had been caused by the wars in the 1990s but most of the changes can be explained by the dramatic turns in the political and social reality that made people question their previous identities. Not only were the categories of Montenegrin, Serb, and Yugoslav now mutually exclusive, they were also connected to competing nation and state building processes (Malešević & Uzelac 2007, 706). According to the first population census in independent Montenegro carried out in 2011, 45 % of the citizens reported themselves being Montenegrin by nationality, 29 % Serbian, 12 % Bosnian/Bosniak, 5 % Albanian, and 1 % Croat; 5 % of the population gave no nationality⁶. Although the situation has somewhat stabilized since the turbulent 1990s, the question of national identity continues to divide the people of Montenegro into different fractions. As we will see, this split is also clearly visible in the question of language and linguistic identity.

The Language(s) of Montenegro

Two main dialects are spoken in today's Montenegro. As elsewhere in the former Yugoslav lands, the differences in dialects do not follow ethnic or political boundaries. The northwestern part of Montenegro belongs to the same Ijekavian Neo-Štokavian speech territory as the areas across the border in southwestern Serbia, eastern Herzegovina, and southernmost Dalmatia (Ivić 2001, 175–176). These dialects formed the basis of the Serbo-Croatian language as it was first defined in the 1850 Literary Agreement. The dialects of southeastern Montenegro are known as the Old Štokavian or the Zeta-Lovćen dialects. They are separated from the Neo-Štokavian dialects mainly by their more archaic accentual patterns (Ivić 2001, 76–77). Common to all dialects spoken in Montenegro are the Ijekavian reflexes of the Proto-Slavic *jat'*, making Montenegrins the only ethno-national group in the Štokavian

⁶ The census was accompanied by intensive campaigning from various groups trying to encourage people to declare a certain nationality and a certain mother tongue. Many people were intimidated by this, and in the end it was decided that answering the questions on nationality, mother tongue, and religion was not compulsory.

speech territory whose members are all Ijekavian speakers⁷ (Greenberg 2008, 91–93).

As for the literary use of the language, the situation in Montenegro has, historically, largely followed developments in the neighboring regions. The first modern pieces of literature created on the territory of today's Montenegro formed part of the epic poetry of the nineteenth century. The greatest and most famous example is *Gorski vijenac* ('Mountain Wreath') by the prince-bishop Njegoš from 1847. The present-day proponents of the Montenegrin language see the literature of those times and especially the works of Njegoš as an example of the uniqueness of the Montenegrin linguistic tradition whereas Serbs count Njegoš as part of their literature. All and all, the literature created in Montenegro during the nineteenth century constituted part of the South Slavic Orthodox tradition and was thus intertwined with the Serbian tradition (Greenberg 2008, 94–97).

With the establishment of Yugoslavia in 1918, the Serbo-Croatian language became the official language in Montenegro as well. The Novi Sad agreement of 1954 restored the unity of the Serbo-Croatian language after the turbulence of World War II but at the same time acknowledged the existence of two different varieties of the language, Eastern and Western⁸. The Montenegrins were mentioned in the agreement, along with the Croats and Serbs, as one of the nations speaking the language.⁹ The Montenegrins were not, however, assigned with a variety of their own, as was done with the Croats and Serbs. Furthermore, none of the two recognized varieties of the Serbo-Croatian language represented the language of the Montenegrins, which was phonologically akin to that of the Croats but lexically more similar to that used in Serbia (Greenberg 2008, 88). However, such linguistic separatism including own grammars and orthographies that was common in Croatia in the 1970s and 1980s never occurred in Montenegro.

As Montenegro and Serbia formed the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1992, the Montenegrin constitution declared Serbian in its Ijekavian

⁷ The Štokavian dialects are divided into Ekavian, Ikavian, and Ijekavian according to the modern reflexes of the Common Slavic *jat*'. For example, the word for 'milk' in Ekavian is *mleko*, in Ikavian *mliko*, and in Ijekavian *mlijeko*. The Croatian, Bosnian, and Montenegrin standard languages are based solely on the Ijekavian pronunciation. The Serbian standard includes both Ekavian and Ijekavian pronunciations of which Ekavian is the most dominant. Ikavian is not part of any standard language.

⁸ The text of the original agreement and a translation into English can be found in Greenberg 2008.

⁹ Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) were granted the status of a separate nation only later.

pronunciation as the official language. Thus Montenegro was the only republic situated on the former Serbo-Croatian speech territory where the language did not receive a new name based on the dominant ethnic group. Just like elsewhere, the choice was explained by the political situation (Lakić 2007, 329). Independence was not high on the agenda in Montenegro at that time, and people instead wished to ally themselves with Serbia and the Serbs. Soon after things began to change, however. Individuals who considered Montenegrins to be a nation of their own began talking about Montenegrin as a separate language. This tendency gained popularity as the relationship with Serbia became more complicated in the late 1990s.

The New Montenegrin Standard Language

Vojislav P. Nikčević (1935–2007), professor of literature at the Faculty of Philosophy in Nikšić, became the most prominent advocate of a separate Montenegrin language. During the 1990s, he published several books where he outlined a Montenegrin standard language, including the impressive two-piece volume *Crnogorski jezik* ('Montenegrin Language'). In it, he introduced the characteristic features of the Montenegrin language which, according to him, included the so-called late jotations¹⁰ that produced two new phonemes, *ś* and *ź*; a third new phoneme *dz* that exists in a number of Montenegrin dialects; and certain adjectival and pronominal endings that had not been previously part of the standard language. These features, together with some lexical elements drawn mostly from peripheral and archaic dialects, were supposed to validate the existence of a distinct Montenegrin language, and, quite importantly, separate it from Serbian.

Nikčević began to gain support for his ideas but not so much from other linguists as from different organizations and groups promoting the Montenegrin cause. Most of the supporting arguments centered on national identity, Serbian hegemony, and every nation's right to have its own language (Okuka 2002, 41; Greenberg 2001, 21). Nikčević himself stated that "the Montenegrins cannot exist, can have neither an independent state, nor be a people and nation speaking a foreign tongue" (Greenberg 2008, 88). The most vociferous opposition to the Montenegrin language came from linguists led by professors at the Faculty of Philosophy in Nikšić. According

¹⁰ These late jotations occur when spirants and dentals are followed by *je*: *s + je > śe*; *z + je > źe*; *d + je > đe*; *t + je > će*. Thus, 'axe' in Serbian/Ekavian is *sekira*, in Bosnian and Croatian *sjekira*, and in Montenegrin *śekira*. See Greenberg 2004, 60 and Greenberg 2008, 103 for more examples.

to them, the language spoken in Montenegro is and always has been Ijekavian Serbian, a fact that, in their view, can be scientifically proven (Greenberg 2008, 177–178). Being pro-Serbian, they did not accept the arguments based on national identity either. In the end, the language question became one of the aspects of a wider debate concerning the future of Montenegro.

In 2004 Prime Minister Đukanović stated that he was a speaker of the Montenegrin language. At this point, at the latest, promoting the Montenegrin language became associated with certain political groupings that aimed at strengthening a separate Montenegrin identity and with the ultimate goal of complete political independence from Serbia. In turn, the pro-Serbian parties strongly defended the Serbian language and opposed the establishment of a Montenegrin standard language. When Montenegro finally gained independence in 2006, the language question became one of the most difficult issues to resolve when drafting a new constitution for the country. Finally in October 2007, after long negotiations the Montenegrin parliament adopted a new constitution where it was declared, in article 13, that the official language of Montenegro was Montenegrin, the Cyrillic and Latin scripts were equally valid, and other languages in official use were Serbian, Bosnian, Albanian, and Croatian.¹¹

After being granted official status, a committee was set up to properly standardize the Montenegrin language. The committee was internally divided on certain issues but eventually in 2009 an orthography (*pravopis*) and in 2010 a grammar (*gramatika*) of the Montenegrin language were published. Nikčević's work was taken into account in the process but some of his more radical proposals, like the phoneme *dz*, were left out. The main feature that separates Montenegrin from the other Neo-Štokavian-based standard languages is the so-called late jotations that produce two new phonemes, *ś* and *ź*, and change the spelling of many words (*Gramatika crnogorskoga jezika* 2010, 15, 50–51; *Pravopis crnogorskoga jezika* 2009, 52–54). However, it is still possible to also use the non-jotated forms of the words: *šekira* or *sjekira*, *ženica* or *zjenica*, *đevojka* or *djevojka*, *čerati* or *tjerati*, and so on. In addition to the new phonemes, the grammar and the orthography include some archaic lexical items and grammatical endings

¹¹ “Službeni jezik u Crnoj Gori je crnogorski jezik. Ćirilčno i latinično pismo su ravnopravni. U službenoj upotrebi su i srpski, bosanski, albanski i hrvatski jezik.” The text of the whole constitution can be found on the website of the Montenegrin parliament (www.skupstina.me).

that were not part of the written standard before. The grammar has faced strong criticism, mainly for the archaisms as well as for its similarity with Croatian grammar. Of the three authors of the grammar, two were Croats.¹²

The Situation Today

The most recent debate concerns the language used in primary and secondary schools. It had been decided that starting from September 2011 Montenegrin would be introduced as the sole language in the schools. However, at the very last moment the government backed down. Through political horse-trading with the pro-Serbian opposition, a change was made in the law on education. The reformulated article 11 states that teaching will be in the Montenegrin language and, “having in mind the common linguistic basis”, also in Serbian. This formulation, however ambiguous, in a way elevates Serbian to the same level as Montenegrin, thus giving it a different status than that of the other languages. Furthermore, it leaves room to interpret that Montenegrin and Serbian are actually one and the same language. The outcome, which on the other hand does correspond better to the actual sociolinguistic situation, was criticized by the more staunch supporters of the Montenegrin language. For example, in January 2012 the Montenegrin cultural organization *Matica crnogorska* filed an initiative in the constitutional court claiming that the new formulation of article 11, instead of respecting the constitution according to which Montenegrin is the official language of Montenegro, is avoiding its implementation.¹³

As for the speakers themselves, according to the 2011 census, 37 % of Montenegro’s population considers Montenegrin to be its mother tongue. This is significantly more than in the previous census from 2003 when the figure stood at 22 %. Serbian is spoken by 43 % of the population which is less than before but still makes it the largest language. Bosnian is spoken by 6 %, Albanian 5 %, and Croatian 0.5 %. Those considering Serbo-Croatian as their mother tongue were 2 % whereas 4 % were unwilling to answer the question. Comparing these figures to those on nationality presented earlier, it seems that many identifying themselves as Montenegrins still consider Serbian to be their mother tongue. Of the Slavic-speaking Muslims, half

¹² Ivo Pranjković is a professor and Josip Silić a professor emeritus of Croatian language in the University of Zagreb. The third author, Adnan Čirgić, is a Montenegrin linguist currently heading the Institute for Montenegrin language and linguistics.

¹³ The initiative can be downloaded from the *Matica crnogorska* website: <http://www.maticacrnogorska.me/files/Inicijativa.pdf>

report Bosnian and half either Montenegrin or Serbian as their mother tongue.

Linguistic Identity Among Montenegrin University Students

In March 2011, I interviewed fifteen 19 to 29 year-old university students in Montenegro. The interviews were semi-structured: I had ready-made questions to which the students answered in their own words.¹⁴ All students were interviewed individually. The questions were mostly asked in the same way and in the same order, allowing for some variation from interview to interview. The idea was to make the students elaborate on their answers as much as possible. This is what often happened, although some of the students chose to answer the questions more tersely. Obviously, these themes were not important or of interest to everyone. In addition to the actual interview questions, I collected background information on the students' age, home town, nationality, mother tongue and field of studies as well as their parents' home town, nationality, mother tongue and occupation. Of the fifteen interviews, two were conducted in English and thirteen in Montenegrin/Serbian.¹⁵ Five of the students were men, and ten were women. Four were studying in the Cetinje-based music academy and eleven at the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Montenegro located in Nikšić. All of the students were born and raised in Montenegro. I asked the people helping me in arranging the interviews to find students with different backgrounds, but other than that I had no preliminary knowledge on their standpoints concerning the language question.

I chose university students as the target group for several reasons. First of all, some limitation was unavoidable since, within the scope of the study, it was not possible to interview a sufficiently large number of people that the greater population of Montenegro would be represented. Secondly, students constitute an interesting group for the study of the phenomenon in question, since they have lived through the recent changes in the language situation of

¹⁴ The questions, or themes, that were addressed in each interview included the meaning of one's mother tongue for one's identity; the relationship between the Montenegrin and Serbian languages; the official language(s) of Montenegro; the language in schools; views on the general language situation in Montenegro; and the political status of Montenegro.

¹⁵ During the interviews, no comments were made on what the language of the interview would be called. I myself used the variety I am most familiar with, standard Serbian with Ekavian pronunciation. Two of the interviews were conducted in English because the informants were students of English language and literature and preferred it so.

Montenegro and have also had to reflect on these changes while constructing their own identity. Furthermore, as young and educated individuals, they can be seen as having both the willingness and the ability to discuss these issues. Thirdly, several similar studies have been conducted among student populations making it possible to compare the results with earlier research.¹⁶ In addition to these theoretical considerations, choosing university students was also motivated by some practical realities. I happened to know people connected to the University of Montenegro who were able to help me in arranging the interviews.¹⁷

Four Types of Linguistic Identity

Based on the analysis of the interviews, I have distinguished a matrix with four different types of linguistic identity that were found to exist among my informants. The basic division is based on the language itself. Seven students reported their mother tongue to be Montenegrin whereas eight said it was Serbian. However, looking deeper at the students' answers, this simple division into Montenegrin speakers and Serbian speakers clearly did not tell the whole story. The stances and attitudes the students expressed on different aspects of the language question varied greatly, from pragmatic to fundamental and from concerned to somewhat indifferent. Therefore, paying special attention to the importance and meaning of one's own mother tongue, the views on certain critical points concerning Montenegro's language situation such as the official language of the country and the language in schools, and the attitude towards the other language and its speakers, I found it necessary to further divide the identities into strong and moderate.

¹⁶ When preparing my research, I found especially useful and inspiring Sanna Iskanius' dissertation (2006) on the linguistic identity of Russian-speaking students in Finland as well as Matthew Ciscel's monograph *The Language of the Moldovans* (2007). Ciscel writes on language and identity in Moldova where the situation in many ways resembles that of Montenegro.

¹⁷ I am especially grateful to Janko Andrijasević, Ivan S. Vukčević, and Violeta Salonen for all the valuable help and information they provided me.

Mother tongue / Stance	Montenegrin	Serbian
Strong (Fundamental)	MN+	SR+
Moderate (Pragmatic)	MN-	SR-

Table 1: Types of linguistic identities among Montenegrin university students.

I will now take a closer look at the different linguistic identities and their characteristics. I will also present personal stories of four students, each representing a different linguistic identity. Finally, I will turn my attention to the factors explaining the adoption of a certain identity.

Strongly Montenegrin (MN+)

JK: Are they (Montenegrin and Serbian) two separate languages?

Man, 29: Yes. Two separate languages, of course. Not different like Finnish and Italian, but... But they are two separate languages, as we are two separate nations.¹⁸

Four of the fifteen students had a strongly Montenegrin linguistic identity. Their mother tongue is Montenegrin which to them is definitely a separate language of its own. They believe the differences between Montenegrin and Serbian, and the other languages of ex-Yugoslavia, are small but real. By nationality they are Montenegrins, just like their parents who also speak Montenegrin. For these students their mother tongue is an important part of their identity. They think that every country and nation should have a language of its own and that this applies to Montenegro as well.

According to these students the official language of Montenegro should be Montenegrin and Montenegrin only. For them, being a speaker of Montenegrin is not just a matter of linguistic identity but an important part of being Montenegrin and supporting the Montenegrin identity. They think that the Montenegrin language should also be the language taught in the schools,¹⁹ although special attention needs to be devoted to the transition

¹⁸ All translations by JK.

¹⁹ At the time of the interviews it was still commonly believed that Montenegrin would be introduced as the sole language in primary and secondary school starting from September 2011. This was later changed (see above).

period so that there is no confusion for example with spelling rules. Even though they strongly support a separate standard language for Montenegro, they have certain reservations when it comes to the proposed reforms.²⁰ They think the overall language situation in Montenegro is complicated and difficult, mostly since people do not know how to deal with the changed situation and are confused which language to regard as their mother tongue. These students find it slightly problematic that so many Montenegrins identify with the Serbian language.

Moderately Montenegrin (MN-)

Woman, 20: I have a two-fold stance towards the [language] question. Considering that we have a country of our own, in that sense I think we should have our own language, but not the way it is done now.

The three students with a moderately Montenegrin linguistic identity considered Montenegrin to be their mother tongue but were less categorical about it. They are Montenegrins by nationality, like their parents. The parents of one of these students speak Serbian, those of the other two Montenegrin. For these students Montenegrin and Serbian are essentially one and the same language that is separated mainly by politics. They see the whole language question as mostly symbolic, but at the same time, however, recognize its great importance to some people. Even though they consider themselves Montenegrin speakers, they also understand those who consider their mother tongue to be Serbian. In the end, it is mostly about the name of the language.

These students think that the language question is very politicized and do not like the fact that declaring oneself a Montenegrin speaker is often considered a political statement. For them, being a Montenegrin speaker is more like a responsibility to their country and people. They are clearly critical of the new phonemes and other larger reforms that are planned for the Montenegrin standard language. They think that it is understandable that Montenegrins, if only formally, have their own language but that there is no need to artificially create differences. The way they see it, the dialect they speak will in any case differentiate them linguistically from the Serbs in Serbia.²¹

²⁰ Including the late jotations, the new phonemes, and the archaic lexical items (see above).

²¹ Hardly ever were the Bosnian or Croatian languages mentioned in the interviews. The situation in Montenegro was clearly seen as a dynamic between Montenegrin and Serbian.

These students agree with Montenegrin being the official language of the country as well as Montenegrin becoming the language of the schools. However, they believe that the people currently responsible for language planning in Montenegro are too nationalistically oriented. They think that the Serbian language could also have some sort of official status, at least in the schools. For them a more significant problem is the professors and teachers who come to Montenegro from Serbia and use an Ekavian dialect with their students that differs from the language spoken in Montenegro. As a whole, they consider the language situation problematic, not least for those older people who need to adjust to the new circumstances. These students also think that the debate surrounding the language question is unnecessarily pitting people against each other.

Moderately Serbian (SR-)

JK: Today the official language of Montenegro is Montenegrin. What do you think about it?

Woman, 19: You know what, it would not have bothered me if they had just changed the name. That would've been OK, if everybody has got their own then why not we, too. But since then they have changed everything, grammar and all that, and that I don't like.

Of all the students interviewed, the four who belonged to this group were the most uncertain of their linguistic identity. In some ways they resemble the moderately Montenegrin with the important exception that they consider Serbian to be their mother tongue. Their views were moderate and pragmatic. Looking at their backgrounds, they are the most heterogeneous group. Only one reported that both of her parents speak Serbian. One had a Macedonian-speaking mother, one gave Serbo-Croatian as the mother tongue of her parents, and one believed that her parents nowadays consider themselves Montenegrin speakers. By nationality, however, these students with a moderately Serbian linguistic identity are all Montenegrin, except for one Croat. Thus in their case, the relationship between national and linguistic identity is far from being straightforward. They did not necessarily consider this to be problematic even though they often mentioned it in their answers. Many considered Serbian to be their mother tongue first and foremost because they studied the language at school. Currently, even with the situation somewhat changed, they feel no need to change this view or their way of using the language.

These students believe that the entire language question is political in nature and that Montenegrin is a political language. On the other hand, they understand the idea that each country should have its own language. Therefore they do not directly oppose the official status of the Montenegrin language, and in a way even support it. Personally, however, they cannot identify with it even though they do identify with Montenegro as their homeland. They believe that the reforms proposed for the standard language are completely unnecessary. Many would be happy with a compromise where the name of the language would change but the substance would remain essentially the same. When it comes to the spoken language, the local features would in any case distinguish Montenegrins from the Serbian Serbs. As for the language used at school, they believed no greater changes were necessary, no matter what the language would be called. All and all, the moderately Serbian were looking for some sort of golden mean between the two sides. As a whole, they think that the current language situation is an absolute catastrophe and that the people in charge of the language issues are not educated or professional enough, which has led to many problems.

Strongly Serbian (SR+)

Man, 24: I don't think any Montenegrin language should exist at all. We can have our own country, Montenegro, with the same language, Serbian. It doesn't matter.

Four of the fifteen students had a strongly Serbian linguistic identity. Their and their parents' mother tongue is Serbian. By nationality, two are Montenegrins and two Serbs. Although they were, like all the informants, born in Montenegro, many had parents who were originally from outside the country, typically from another ex-Yugoslavian republic. Judging from their backgrounds, they are the least "Montenegrin" group. These students were the only ones who were clearly critical of the Montenegrin language as a whole, believing it should not exist at all. The official language, in schools and elsewhere, should be Serbian, as it was when they grew up. It is a matter of one and the same language, actually of one and the same people.

These students think that the idea of each and every country having its own language is erroneous. People in Montenegro can speak Serbian just as people in the United States speak English. The creation of the Montenegrin language has to do with politics and politics only. They believe that the over-politicized language situation has already had a negative impact on relations between neighboring countries, particularly when it comes to Serbia. They like to emphasize the similarities between the countries and

peoples of the region and are quite upset about how the relationships have lately deteriorated. The current language situation in Montenegro is so complicated, they feel, that it is very difficult to adjust to. One of the students said that with all the reforms and changes, all she could do anymore is laugh about it.

The Students' Stories

I will now introduce four students who each represent a different type of linguistic identity. The idea is to display examples that I find to be representative of their group. When choosing the stories to unveil here, I have also paid attention to the students' ability and willingness to elaborate a bit further on the themes in question.

Ana²² (MN+) is 20 years old and studies English language and literature at the Faculty of Philosophy in Nikšić. She is originally from the Montenegrin coast and by nationality Montenegrin, like her parents. Her and her parents' mother tongue is Montenegrin. In addition to English, Ana also speaks some Italian and Spanish.

Ana answered the questions quite tersely but firmly. For her, mother tongue is an important part of identity, for she thinks that culture exists through language. Nowadays she considers Montenegrin and Serbian to be two separate languages. Every country in her view aims at having its own language and therefore Montenegro as well deserves its own. Ana thinks that the official language should be Montenegrin. She also thinks it is a good idea that Montenegrin be introduced in the schools; however, she has some reservations about the practical implementation. She is still a bit uncertain what would be the best solution in the long run. Concerning the language situation as a whole, Ana thinks that it is complicated. Many people do not know how to deal with the changes. She thinks that it is often the family that defines the language: the father says he speaks a certain language and the children follow. She emphasizes that she finds the language situation to be very complicated.

What makes Ana strongly Montenegrin are her clear and resolute opinions. She does not mention the Serbian language but focuses on expressing her thoughts on the Montenegrin language. For her, being a Montenegrin speaker is very natural, just as it seems to be for her family.

²² All the names are changed.

Even though she thinks the situation is complicated, she is sure of her own opinions.

Marko (MN-) is 24 years old and lives near Nikšić. He studies Montenegrin language and literature at the Faculty of Philosophy. By nationality Marko is Montenegrin and speaks Montenegrin as his mother tongue, just as his parents who are also from the Nikšić area. He has also learned English and Russian.

Marko thinks that the whole language question is most of all symbolic. Even though he is studying the Montenegrin language, he thinks that, linguistically, it is a matter of one and the same language and that this applies not only to Montenegrin and Serbian but also to Bosnian and Croatian. He thinks that these languages are separated only by a symbolic function having to do with identity. This symbolic function is, however, important as such. Marko thinks that the Montenegrins have the right to call their language by their own name but that any major differences need not exist. He reminds that the language situation has always followed the political situation, and for example in the early nineties when there was a will to align with Serbia, Serbian was made the official language. After independence the situation changed again.

Marko thinks that the question of the language of the schools is important but difficult to resolve. Basically, he thinks that it is good that Montenegrin be introduced at school but at the same time thinks that the requirement that everyone studies Montenegrin is too nationalistic. This is why he thinks that it should be possible, if one wishes, to study Serbian and if necessary also Bosnian and Croatian, whatever it would mean in practice. Even though Marko is a student of Montenegrin and therefore involved in the language debate, he is critical of nationalistically oriented linguists who believe Montenegrin to be autochthonic and try to deny its connections with neighboring languages. He thinks that Montenegrin has, alongside Serbian, Croatian and Bosnian, developed from Serbo-Croatian. In the end it is a matter of the name of the language and not much more.

Marko is very Montenegrin through his background. For him it is also very natural to consider Montenegrin as his mother tongue. On the other hand, he is able to see the question from different points of view. He understands those who identify with the Serbian language, and all and all represents a moderate and pragmatic approach. For him, the most problematic factor in the language situation in Montenegro is the battle

between competing fractions on the future of the Montenegrin language and the uncertainty and difficulties caused by this.

Zorica (SR-) is 20 years old and is from Nikšić where she studies psychology. By nationality she is Montenegrin like her father. Her mother is from Macedonia. Zorica gives, a bit hesitantly, Serbian as her mother tongue. Her father is a Serbian speaker and her mother's native language is Macedonian, which Zorica speaks roughly. She also speaks English and some Russian.

Zorica says she considers Serbian to be her mother tongue because she has always spoken the language, gone to school in Serbian, and now feels no need to change her thinking one way or another. She is, however, by nationality Montenegrin since she was born and raised in the country. She believes that one's mother tongue is a large part of one's identity although at the same time she thinks that the whole question has in Montenegro become increasingly political. Being a Montenegrin speaker means, for some people, being a supporter of certain political parties. On the other hand she understands the need for a Montenegrin language—every nation should have its own language. Therefore she thinks it is completely acceptable that the official language of the country be Montenegrin and that the Faculty of Philosophy in Nikšić has begun teaching the Montenegrin language. But personally she does not feel that she speaks that language.

Zorica thinks that everyone should speak the language they wish to and call it what they want. In a way, it is a matter of one language, but at the same time people should understand that Montenegrins and Serbs are not one and the same nation. She thinks that some people have wanted, perhaps quite legitimately, that language become one of the factors that separate Montenegrins from other nations in the Balkans. Some people are, on the other hand, involved in the language question for more ulterior reasons. She thinks that a change in the language situation can be good for Montenegro: it is easier to be an independent country among others when you have not only your own borders but also your own language. The image of Montenegro might become stronger, which would be good for tourism and foreign relations.

Zorica reminds that debating language means at the same time debating many other things, including the re-interpretation of certain historical events. As an example she gives the arguing about Njegoš's works and heritage, which she strictly condemns. She feels that the question of the language taught in schools is one of the most problematic. It has been

difficult for her to adjust to the changes, let alone for teachers who have taught one language all their lives and now must start teaching another. On the other hand, referring to her younger sister, she thinks that for the next generation everything will be easier.

Zorica typically represents the moderately Serbian linguistic identity in the sense that her being a Serbian speaker is not so obviously connected with her Montenegrin-Macedonian background but rather with her own experiences and feelings. She understands the need for a Montenegrin language even though she cannot personally identify with it. She still identifies quite strongly with Montenegro as her homeland. Zorica wants to clearly distance herself from the political implications of the language question. In a way, she understands both sides and tries to manage without ending up in conflict with anyone. Although she has been able to analyze the situation deeply, her approach to the language question is in the end quite pragmatic.

Marija (SR+) is 19 years old and studies English language and literature in Nikšić. She and her parents are originally from the capital city Podgorica. Marija is a Serb by nationality and speaks Serbian, like her parents. She also speaks French, English, and Spanish.

For Marija, one's mother tongue is very important, especially now that people are trying to create a Montenegrin language. She talks of the Serbian language as "our" mother tongue, referring to a larger group. She makes the same point as some of the other students: if people in America speak English, why couldn't people in Montenegro speak Serbian. To her, the Montenegrin language and its official status is just politics. She thinks that Bosniaks, Croats, Montenegrins, and Serbs are all one people and speak one language. For her this language is Serbian. Introducing Montenegrin as the language of the schools is, according to her, very problematic. She points out that not one student has yet graduated from the newly established department of Montenegrin language and literature. She thinks the overall language situation is far too politicized.

Marija is one of only two students among the subjects who think that some sort of union with Serbia would be a better political solution for Montenegro than independence. She believes that the country was stronger during the Yugoslav times and that Montenegro had the most to lose in this political split. All and all, Marija is eager to look beyond the borders of Montenegro and see herself as part of a larger community, also when it comes to language. Regarding the Montenegrin language, she does not go

into detail but condemns it outright as a political construction. The language of her nation is Serbian and this nation also consists of people living in other ex-Yugoslav republics. Marija does not seem overly bitter about it but clearly in her view the situation in Montenegro is developing in a less-favorable direction.

Factors Explaining the Identities

After having distinguished and described the different types of linguistic identities it is time to take a look at the factors that can be found lying behind the adoption of a certain linguistic identity. Three factors stand out: nationality, family background, and school. There are, of course, other parameters at play. I took a careful look at, for example, the students' home towns, ages, and fields of studies. Montenegro is geographically divided when it comes to national and linguistic identity. However, in my small sample some regions were over-represented whereas others were not represented at all, which makes it impossible to draw definite conclusions. In the same way, age is certainly a significant factor but due to my choice of university students as the target group, there was hardly any variation here. The field of studies, for its part, seemed to have no influence on an individual student's linguistic identity.

Nationality

Three nationalities were represented among the students I interviewed. Of the fifteen students twelve were Montenegrins, two were Serbs and one was Croat. Montenegrins by nationality were found in all of the four groups. Of them, seven reported their mother tongue to be Montenegrin and five Serbian. Both Serbs, on the other hand, have a strongly Serbian linguistic identity. The one Croat falls into the category of moderately Serbian.

<i>Linguistic identity / National identity</i>	MN+	MN-	SR-	SR+	Total
Montenegrin	4	3	3	2	12
Serb				2	2
Croat			1		1
Total	4	3	4	4	15

Table 2: Linguistic identity and self-reported national identity among the interviewees.

The apparent but perhaps even surprising result is that the correlation between national and linguistic identity is not straightforward. Looking at the table above, one can see, for example, that the students with a Montenegrin national identity are quite evenly divided into the four categories of linguistic identity. However, certain observations can be made which, I believe, do demonstrate the significance of national identity in this matter. All the students with a Montenegrin linguistic identity, strong or moderate, were also by nationality Montenegrins whereas among the speakers of Serbian different nationalities were represented, and also when it came to the students' parents. So it appears to be perfectly possible to be a Montenegrin and speak Serbian. This, however, does not seem to work the other way round—in order to consider Montenegrin your mother tongue you also need to be Montenegrin by nationality. So, it appears that the Serbian language and linguistic identities are less connected to a certain national identity and more inclusive by nature whereas Montenegrin linguistic identities appear to be relatively exclusive.

An additional fact indicating the importance of nationality was that many students raised the issue in their answers. Nationality was brought up and discussed especially by speakers of Serbian who were not Serbs by nationality. Some of these students saw their situation in this respect as a bit difficult, but most thought it was totally fine to be at the same time Montenegrin and speak Serbian. They made reference to English as a language that is spoken among several different nations. Some students with a strongly Serbian linguistic identity brought up the idea that Montenegrins, Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks are actually all one and the same people. This can be seen as a trace of Yugoslavism but also, since these informants specifically spoke of the language as Serbian, as a variety of Serbian cultural imperialism.

Among the Montenegrin speakers the issue of nationality was raised twice. The first informant, a student with a strongly Montenegrin linguistic identity, considered language as one of the cornerstones of nationality and of being a nation. He made reference to Italy and Germany, which, as nations, are clearly based on one common language. For him, two nations, in this case Montenegrins and Serbs, cannot share the same language. The other informant, moderately Montenegrin, expressed a completely different view. She found it problematic that nowadays linguistic identity is automatically connected with the national one. According to her, declaring oneself as a Montenegrin speaker indicates an even stronger than usual national

identification, which is why she sometimes tries to avoid the whole question.

Many of the students having a more moderate stance, both Serbian and Montenegrin speakers, justified their support or understanding of the Montenegrin language by stating that each country should have the right to its own language. It is noteworthy that these informants explicitly used the term “country” or “state” (*država*) and not, for example, the terms “people” or “nation”. It seems that Montenegrin independence has had a major influence on the acceptability of and support for a separate Montenegrin language. All things considered, it can be said that just as in many other cases, nationality plays a role in the formation of linguistic identity. However, in the very specific and complex context of Montenegro, the correlation is not so straightforward.

Family Background

It is quite obvious that the family one is born into influences, among other things, the formation of one’s linguistic identity. With this in mind, I collected information on the students’ parents’ origins, occupations, nationalities and mother tongues, as reported by the students themselves. In addition, I took into account references to parents or family background in general that the informants made in their answers to the open questions.

Mother tongue and therewith linguistic identity is something that traditionally is inherited from one’s parents. The relatively complex language situation in Montenegro accompanied by the recent changes in the political and social reality of its people does not necessarily correspond to the usual pattern where one’s parents’ mother tongue is automatically also one’s own and at the same time the language which one emotionally identifies with. However, concerning the students I interviewed, this traditional correlation was very much present. Of the fifteen informants only three reported having a mother tongue different from that of their parents. One speaker of Montenegrin stated that her parents speak Serbian whereas one Serbian speaker believed that her parents nowadays consider Montenegrin to be their mother tongue. In addition to them, one Serbian-speaking student gave Serbo-Croatian as the mother tongue of his parents. Not forgetting the above-mentioned exceptions, it seems that being Montenegrin or Serbian speaking usually applies to the whole family.

I also collected information on the socio-economic background of the students’ families. Judging from this sample of fifteen, no particular

conclusions can be made on the influence of socio-economic factors on the students' linguistic identity. In all of the identity groups there were students whose parents were highly educated with relatively good positions in working life and those whose parents had traditional working-class jobs or were unemployed. Quite a number had at least one highly educated parent, which correlates with the fact that all of the informants were university students.

The national background and origins of the parents seem, however, to influence the students' linguistic identity. The parents of the Montenegrin speakers were all born in Montenegro and were Montenegrins by nationality, except for the mother of one of the students who was originally from Russia. On the other hand, the backgrounds of the parents of the Serbian-speaking students were much more heterogeneous. Of the eight students with moderately or strongly Serbian linguistic identity in three cases only both parents were Montenegrins. Otherwise at least one of the parents represented some other nationality, including Serbs, Croats, a Macedonian, and a Bosniak. I believe that this can be interpreted to mean that Serbian is the default language when parents are living in Montenegro but one of them comes from another ex-Yugoslav republic. Similarly, being a speaker of Montenegrin appears to be possible only when the parents are both born in Montenegro and by nationality Montenegrins. The only informant whose both parents came originally from outside Montenegro, one from Bosnia and the other from Serbia, mentioned several times how it is for her—"because of my upbringing"—impossible to adjust to the changed language situation and the idea of a separate Montenegrin language. These findings further testify to the relative inclusiveness and multiplicity of the Serbian linguistic identity as well as the relative exclusiveness and uniformity of the Montenegrin one.

School

Interestingly enough, school and its influence on the formation of one's linguistic identity was something that was brought up by many of the informants. The issue of the language taught and used in primary and secondary school was raised in any case since it was one of the themes I took up in each interview. This question, however, referred more to the current situation and the possible changes planned to the mother tongue teaching. Often the students mentioned school and the language they learned at school

already earlier in the interviews, but from a slightly different point of view, when reflecting on their own linguistic identity.

School and the language learned at school had had a particularly strong influence on the students with a moderately Serbian linguistic identity. The fact that they had during most of their school years studied the Serbian language and learned to read and write in it was one of greatest if not the greatest factor affecting their linguistic identification. When asked about their mother tongue, one of them thought out loud about the issue for a good moment, mostly describing the language he had learned at school. Finally he said that “I have studied Serbian and I will simply say [that my mother tongue is] the Serbian language.” Having been taught Serbian at school was the reason why he could not consider Montenegrin as his mother tongue. Another student, referring to the twelve years she had spent at school, said that she saw no reason why she should now change the language she has been using for so long. In addition, three other students identifying themselves as Serbian speakers mentioned the language they had studied at school. Two of them, on the other hand, referred to the next generation, believing that it might think differently if Montenegrin were introduced as the language of the schools. This, I believe, further points to the influence that the language used in the schools has on linguistic identity.

Thus far in Montenegro, however, the influence of school has been only one-way: strengthening the Serbian linguistic identity. This particularly applies to the students I interviewed since they attended school in the 1990s and 2000s when the language taught was simply Serbian. In 2005 the name of the school subject was changed to “mother tongue” and one could choose which name to have printed on one’s diploma, including for the first time Montenegrin. This did not, however, change the actual substance in any way. Most of the students continued to have “Serbian” written on their diplomas.

Thus among the students identifying themselves as speakers of Montenegrin, the language in school was not discussed the same way. It had not influenced their linguistic identity as it had with some of the Serbian speakers. The Montenegrin speakers addressed the subject of language in school more as a topical question of language politics. The students with a strongly Montenegrin linguistic identity in particular expressed their support for the introduction of Montenegrin as the language to be used in the schools. One stated that he believed many people who “actually” speak Montenegrin consider their mother tongue to be Serbian, since they have

studied this language at school. On the other hand, one of the moderately Montenegrin students found the question more complicated and believed that if the language in the schools would be Montenegrin and Montenegrin only then that could be interpreted as a nationalistic undertaking creating more problems than solving them. Therefore he thought it should be possible to study Serbian at school when the pupils and their parents so wish.

Some Concluding Remarks

The language situation in Montenegro is complicated and polarized, with a great part of the population divided into those who identify with the Serbian language and those who consider their language to be Montenegrin, a language which they feel deserves a standard of its own. The language question has become part of a wider discussion of history, identity, politics, and the future of the country, and many factors are simultaneously at play. Young people have found various ways to cope with and find their place in this fluctuating situation.

Of the fifteen university students I interviewed in Montenegro in March 2011 half considered themselves speakers of Montenegrin and half Serbian. In many ways, this was not the most essential difference between them. There was great variety among the students on how they view the importance and meaning of their mother tongue, how they view the general language situation and what their attitude is towards those who think and feel differently. Four main types of linguistic identity could be distinguished: strongly Montenegrin, moderately Montenegrin, moderately Serbian, and strongly Serbian. In a number of aspects, the moderately Montenegrin and moderately Serbian identities had much in common. Students belonging to these groups often expressed very similar views, although personally identifying with a different language. Students with a strongly Montenegrin and those with a strongly Serbian linguistic identity were, understandably, the most polarized when it came to such questions as the nature of the Montenegrin language and the status it should have. On the other hand, sometimes the students belonging to these two groups used very similar arguments to defend their opposing opinions.

When looking at the factors behind the adoption of a certain linguistic identity, three stand out: nationality, family background, and school. The correlation between national and linguistic identity is well-known, and considering the language-centered nature of European nationalism, quite

apparent. In the Montenegrin context, however, this correlation is less straightforward, and even though nationality clearly plays a role its influence on linguistic identity seems to be less strong than in most other cases. Some of the students explicitly rejected the traditional language-nation equation of Romantic nationalism. This was especially the case with some of the speakers of Serbian who had another national identity. The influence of parents and family background was found to be significant, too. In most cases, the parents and children, as reported by the students I interviewed, shared a similar linguistic identity, even though they had grown up in very different circumstances. Here again there was more diversity among the speakers of Serbian. From this point of view, the Serbian linguistic identities appeared more inclusive than the Montenegrin, which were more clearly connected to a certain background.

An important finding of this study is the great influence that the language taught and used in primary and secondary education has had on the formation of the students' linguistic identity. Particularly in the case of the students with a moderately Serbian linguistic identity, all non-Serbs by nationality, the fact that they had studied Serbian at school had a decisive impact. Furthermore, what makes the language of the schools an interesting question is that, of all the possible factors underlying the formation of linguistic identities, it can be easily influenced by politics.

In sum, it seems that the turbulence, uncertainty and fluctuation surrounding the language question in Montenegro are not about to end soon. The ultimate nature and status of the Montenegrin language remains an unresolved issue. The new standard has not been accepted by all of its potential speakers whereas the Serbian language and the linguistic identities connected to it have maintained their strong position. However, as shown by the results of this study, the acceptance of and identification with the Montenegrin language can be influenced top-down, particularly through education.

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Jouko Lindstedt¹

When in the Balkans, Do as the Romans Do —Or Why the Present is the Wrong Key to the Past

The history of the Balkans is mostly written as the history of the Balkan nations, especially in the historiography of the Balkan states themselves. This approach produces textbooks and national multi-volume history works that transfer a sense of national identity to ever new generations, but it also gives a skewed perspective on the past and hinders a proper understanding of the past in its own terms. National historiography stresses ethno-linguistic continuity as the main fabric of history and leads to empty quarrels about the ownership of ancient symbols and personalities, such as the violent megalomaniac Alexander the Great, whom both the Greeks and the Macedonians claim as part of “their” history. It also sees the present nation-states (at least the particular nation-state of each native historian themselves) as the necessary and predestined outcome of historical processes.

One of the three paradoxes of nationalism mentioned in Anderson’s (2006 [1983], 5) influential study is “[t]he objective modernity of nations to the historian’s eye vs. their subjective antiquity in the eyes of nationalists.” Although Anderson’s main argument of ethno-national consciousness being an essentially modern phenomenon is largely accepted in specialized studies of nationalism, it has not influenced the paradigm of national historiography in the Balkans to any significant degree. The newly independent Balkan states of the 19th century, such as Greece and Serbia, and later Romania and Bulgaria, were among the first states in the world that were ideologically based upon ethno-linguistic (as opposed to state-centered) nationalism, but their rise is still commonly described as a “national revival”, that is, a return to the imagined national identity and glory of the past.

In what follows I try to argue for an alternative view of understanding the age of “national revivals” in the Balkans as an age of *constructing*, not

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reviving ethno-linguistic consciousness. National identities in the Balkans, as elsewhere, I see as socially constructed institutions in the sense described by Berger and Luckmann (1967) in their classic book. Among the Christian population of the Balkans before the age of “national revivals” there were no various oppressed national identities to be revived, but a common and relative stable system of cultural values centered around the so-called Romaic identity.

My main sources of inspiration were the writings of the Ghent historian Raymond Detrez (2008; 2010), to which I try to add some linguistic arguments. I join Detrez in seeing the life and work of the Ohrid-born author Grigor Prličev (1830–1893) as a particularly apt illustration of what the breakup of the Romaic community meant at an individual level. My article should also be read in conjunction with, and as a complement to, Max Wahlström’s article in this volume.

1. Linguistic Constellations in the Romaic Community

The medieval East Roman Empire, known as Byzantium in later scholarship, was not an ethnically based state. Its Greek-speaking citizens did not call themselves “Greeks” or “Hellenes”, which would have identified them as “pagans” (meaning ‘country people’ > ‘non-Christians’), but as “Romans” (Ρωμαίοι; Haldon 2010, 15–16). In the Ottoman Empire, “Roman” (Ρωμαίος or Ρωμιός) was the word used of a ‘Balkan Orthodox Christian’. The European part of the empire was called *Rumeli* (as opposed to the Asian part *Anadolu*, Sugar 1977, 35), and the self-governing confessional community of all Orthodox Christians was called *Millet-i Rûm* in Ottoman Turkish, which can be translated as “the Roman nation”—but without the modern connotations of “nation”.

Even in English, the adjective *Romaic* has occasionally been used to refer to modern Greeks and their language. What is important to note, though, is that the Romaic community was not ethnically Greek; it was not ethnically based at all. It included not only ethnic Greeks but also Slavs, Albanians, and Vlachs (speakers of Balkan Romance), who were Orthodox Christians and used Greek as their language of higher culture. In Bulgarian lands, for instance, 1,115 different books in Greek circulated between 1750 and 1840, but only 52 Bulgarian book titles are known from the same period (Detrez 2010, 60, quoting Manjo Stojanov). In later Bulgarian historiography, the Bulgarian readers (and writers!) of books in Greek have often been seen as a “Hellenized” intelligentsia that consisted, in the best case, of misguided

individuals and, in the worst case, of traitors to the national cause. But this means attributing an ethnic character to a community that did not possess it at that time.

Raymond Detrez (2008) has convincingly argued that the Romaic community of the Ottoman Empire in the era before the modern national movements can be considered to have been a kind of proto-nation,² with several characteristics that later became associated with nations proper. It had a common name Ρωμαίοι ‘Romans’ and a common cultural identity ρωμιοσύνη ‘Romanity’; the ethnic name Έλληνες ‘Hellenes’ began to be used for Greeks only towards the end of the 18th century. The Bulgarians used the word *grāk* (pl. *gārci*) ‘Greek’, to be sure, but it often had a non-ethnic meaning of ‘a wealthy city-dweller, burgher’ (Detrez 2008, 156–157). The Romaic proto-nation was associated with a definite territory, that of the Ottoman Empire (Orthodox Christians outside the Empire were not called “Romans”), it had a common religion and a common language of higher culture, and it had common administrative institutions in the Roman *Millet*.

From the vantage point of modern non-Greek national histories, the Romaic community is often described as a manifestation of Greek hegemony over other Christian Balkan nations. However, the later Hellenic, that is to say, ethnically Greek national consciousness, was not its direct continuation; instead this new consciousness was, in the words of Socrates D. Petmezas (1999, 51), “as an imagined community [...] constituted at its expense.” The use of the Greek language did of course favor its native speakers, as the use of any ethnic language as a lingua franca always does, but it did not entail the assimilation of other ethnic groups into any kind of Greek ethnicity.

Greek as a language of higher culture was not completely opposed to all vernaculars inside the Romaic community. Both Ecclesiastic Greek and Church Slavonic were used as sacred languages, and the Greek-speaking hierarchy did not try to hinder the use of Church Slavonic before the 19th century (Detrez 2008, 160). As for the written Greek used by the learned, it

² Detrez’s concept of “proto-nation” is inspired by Hobsbawm’s (1992, 46–79) notion of “popular proto-nationalism”. Detrez defines “proto-nation” not only as something that later became a nation but as a stable entity in itself: “In order for the essence of the proto-nation to be fully comprehended, it has to be considered as a social formation in itself, with members exhibiting their specific identity—and not as a historical community that is transitional or marked by the absence of a national consciousness and whose essence is defined by what it is only going to be, i.e., a nation, and which deserves attention for that reason only” (Detrez 2008, 154, my transl.).

was opposed not only to vernacular Slavic, Albanian, and Vlach, but also to vernacular Greek (Horrocks 2010, 413–427). All these vernaculars could be written with the Greek alphabet, especially in Macedonia, where Cyrillic letters were no longer known even among the Slavic clergy (Lindstedt 2008b: 395–396).

This sociolinguistic situation is graphically seen in the manuscript of the *Konikovo Gospel*, a handwritten bilingual evangelarium (Gospel lectionary for Sunday services) created by an anonymous scholar in Southern Macedonia in the late 18th or early 19th century (Lindstedt, Spasov & Nuorluoto, eds., 2008). Each page has in its left column a Greek text, which is a translation of the New Testament *koiné* into vernacular Greek. This translation follows the vernacular Greek New Testament published in Halle in 1710 by Anastasias Michail of Naousa, or possibly its republication in a slightly modified form a century later in 1810 (Leiwo 2008). The right column on each page contains a line-by-line Slavic translation, written in Greek letters, of this vernacular Greek text into an Aegean Macedonian dialect of the Lower Vardar type.

The Slavic Macedonian text of the *Konikovo Gospel* is thus a translation not directly of the official Greek New Testament, but of its vernacular version. The manuscript contains two vernacular versions in parallel and shows how vernacular Greek and vernacular Slavic were regarded as being on the same level, as opposed to the high variety of official written Greek used by the Church, and also to Church Slavonic. What is more surprising is that the manuscript seems to have been actually used as a liturgical book. This is apparent not only by its beautiful layout, the use of red ink in titles and initials, and the liturgical instructions (in Greek), but also by the fact that the manuscript has been damaged by much use, as shown by numerous stains of candle wax and oil, and by the worn bottom right-hand corners of the folia from the turning of pages. We cannot know which of the two vernaculars was used when chanting the New Testament readings in the Divine Liturgy, but even if it was the Greek text, this must have been a radical step given the negative attitude of the Church authorities towards the use of the Greek vernacular (Leiwo 2008, 249–250). Vernaculars were more or less on a par with each other, including the Greek vernacular, because the Romaic community was not ethnically Greek.

Other Macedonian vernacular Gospels, such as the *Kulakia Gospel* (Mazon & Vaillant 1938), were translated directly from the official Greek New Testament (Lindstedt 2008b, 397), but they did not include the original

of the translation itself as the Konikovo Gospel did. However, an interesting parallel to the Konikovo Gospel is the bilingual Greek and Albanian New Testament printed in Corfu in 1827. It was originally translated by Vangel Meksi (Evangelos Meksikos, died ca. 1823) and later edited for print by Grigor Gjirokastriti, who became the Archbishop of Athens under the name Grigorios Argyrokastritis (Elsie 1991; Fiedler 2006, 65; cf. also Mazon & Vaillant 1938, 13). This New Testament is the first extensive Albanian text in the Tosk dialect. The Greek and Albanian texts of Meksi and Gjirokastriti's Gospel, both in Greek letters, have been arranged in two columns as in the Konikovo Gospel, and the Greek text is basically the same version in the vernacular (Lindstedt 2008b, 398, 402). Here we again meet the Greek vernacular on a par with another Balkan vernacular.

An interesting three-column arrangement of languages can be found in *Petre Kavajof's trilingual notebook*, written in 1839 in the Macedonian town of Struga. Georgievski (2003) published it in facsimile with an incomplete linguistic analysis. The notebook, written for the study of Greek, contains Old Greek sentences in the first column, translated word by word into Modern Greek and local Macedonian in the parallel second and third columns, respectively. The differences in the Greek versions in the first and second columns is at times minimal, and I leave the more precise characterization of their language varieties for a Greek scholar; the labels "Old Greek" (*starogrčki*) and "Modern Greek" (*novogrčki*) are suggested by Georgievski (2003, 15). But what is interesting is that Modern Greek and Macedonian are both used in the notebook as explanations of and tools for learning the Classical Greek text. Again, Modern Greek appears as one among the vernaculars of the Balkans.

A well-known apparent counterexample to my analysis is presented by Daniel of Moschopolis's Greek book *Introductory Instruction, Containing a Quadrilingual Lexicon of the Four Common Dialects, That Is, Simple Romaic, the Wallachian of Moesia, Bulgarian, and Albanian*, published in 1802 (Daniil 1802; Ničev 1977; Friedman 2008, 387–388; Cuvata 2002). Daniel, a Vlach by birth, tells us that the aim of his book is to make the Vlachs, Bulgarians, and Albanians speakers of Romaic, that is, Greek (Daniil 1802, 7). Clogg (1976, 91) translates the key passage into English as follows:

Albanians, Wallachians, Bulgarians, speakers of other tongues, rejoice,
And ready yourselves all to become Greeks,
Abandoning your barbaric tongue, speech and customs,

So that to your descendants they may appear as myths.
Honour your nations, together with your motherlands,
Making the Albanian and Bulgarian motherlands Greek.
It is no longer difficult to learn Greek [...]

Detrez (2008, 164–165) rightly points out that later in the same poem, Daniel also emphasizes the purely practical value of the Greek language in trade and other professions, but this does not explain away the beginning passage where Albanian, Bulgarian, and Wallachian (Aromanian) are called “Barbaric” languages (“Βαρβαρικὴν ... γλῶσσαν”; cf. also Wahlström in this volume). It is true that the quadrilingual part of Daniel’s book (the famous *Lexicon Tetraglosson*, though it is not really a lexicon or dictionary but a kind of phrase book) at least assumes that the speakers of those three languages know how to read their mother tongues (in Greek letters) and, therefore, does not confine literacy to Greek. But the fact remains that for Daniel, the Greek language was much more valuable than the Balkan vernaculars. Ironically, Daniel’s command of Greek was rather weak, and his textbook abounds with all kinds of grammatical mistakes, partly interference from his native Aromanian (Ničev 1977, 43–46).

Although the *Lexicon Tetraglosson* is arranged in four vertical columns for the four languages and is therefore graphically similar to the bilingual and trilingual works discussed above, Daniel’s book differs from them in that it does not make a conscious distinction between the high and low varieties of Greek; rather, the author seems to inappropriately mix different varieties in his text (Ničev 1977, 43). Therefore, this text glorifying Greek and belittling other Balkan languages comes from a man who did not know Greek sufficiently to fully understand its diglossia. For the anonymous author of the Konikovo Gospel, as for Grigor Gjirokastriti and for Petre Kavajof, the Balkan vernaculars had at least some value because they could be written in Greek letters and placed on a par with vernacular Greek, though not with the high variety of Greek. This way of valorizing the vernaculars through Greek diglossia was not open for Daniel of Moschopolis because he seems to have had a more monolithic view of Greek. Perhaps it is not an exaggeration to say that he downplayed his native Aromanian not because he had studied too much Greek, but because he knew too little of it.

As pointed out by Detrez (2008, 165–166), before the birth of independent Greece (1830) and the construction of a national Greek identity in the 1840s, the Greek language was not ethnically marked in the Balkans.

It would, however, be an exaggeration to assume that a harmonious Greek and vernacular bilingualism reigned all over the Balkans—the more so as the role of Turkish must also be taken into account and, at the other end of the prestige scale, Romani was not used in writing at all. It certainly was an advantage to be born as a native speaker of Greek, and in the long run a significant number of speakers of other Balkan languages would have shifted to Greek if the Ottoman Empire had been preserved. This is what actually happened to a great number of Vlachs or Aromanians (Mackridge 2012). But there was no significant movement of “Hellenization” in the Ottoman Empire before the 19th century, in the sense of consciously depriving other Balkan people of their national identities.

2. The Breakup of the Romaic Identity: The Case of Grigor Prličev

The Greek national movement arose earlier than that of the other Christian peoples of the Balkans. What Petmezas (1999) calls the “new radical republican intelligentsia” replaced the earlier proto-nationalist Romaic identity with a new nationalist Hellenic identity in the four decades preceding the birth of independent Greece (1790–1830). A great number of Bulgarians took part in the Greek national movement and in the War of Greek Independence in the 1820s (Sampimon 2006, 55–91).

The first representatives of the strictly Bulgarian cultural revival and national education, such as Petăr Beron (1799–1871; see Wahlström in this volume) and Najden Gerov (1823–1900), were born much later than the first representative of the Greek Enlightenment, Adamantios Korais (1748–1833), and the first important Bulgarian revolutionary Georgi Sava Rakovski (1821–1867) was born in the year of the first Greek armed revolts (Daskalov 2004, 178). It is true that the Bulgarian national revival is often seen to have begun with the writing of the *Slavo-Bulgarian History* (1762) by the monk Paisij Hilendarski (1722–1773), but his work spread only in handwritten copies, had little influence in its own time, and did not formulate any national political program (Daskalov 2004, 104).³

The birth of independent Greece made Greek a language of a nation-state, jeopardizing the Romaic identity even in lands that remained in the Ottoman Empire. In the 1830s, the Greeks and the Slavs (Bulgarians and Macedonians) started to come into conflict in the Orthodox Church, but the

³ “The puzzle is that the oeuvre of Paisii (in 1762) stands in isolation, being some sixty years ahead of Bulgarian development, both social-economic advance and the spread of national ideas” (Daskalov 2004, 157).

final breakup of the Romaic identity took decades. In 1860, in Istanbul, the Bulgarian bishop Ilarion Makariopolski for the first time publicly prayed in the Divine Liturgy for the Sultan, not for the Patriarch of Constantinople (Crampton 2005, 69–71). Ten years later, in 1870, Sultan Abdülaziz approved the Bulgarian Exarchate as the first nationally based Church organization in the Balkans.

The Exarchate was the first modern Bulgarian national institution that defined the boundaries of the nascent nation; before that, there was no administrative unit which could have been called “Bulgaria” (Lindstedt, forthcoming). Local Slavic church communities (*obštini*) were partly allowed to decide for themselves whether to join the Exarchate or whether to remain in the Patriarch-led church (Nikov 1971 [1929], 222–254; Istorija 2004, 651).

The establishment of a Bulgarian national church organization soon caused a schism in the Orthodox Church, because the Patriarch-led church administration did not accept the secession of the Bulgarian Exarchate. Macedonia witnessed bitter strife between the “Patriarchists” and the “Exarchists”, and the dividing line did not always follow the ethnic or linguistic identity of the faithful. Even brothers of the same family could assume different identities—Greek, Bulgarian, or Ottoman (cf. Mackridge 2012 on the Vogoridis family). As pointed out by Lory (2005, 181), this schism alienated one part of the Macedonian Slavs from the Bulgarian national movement. Some of the educated Slavs preferred to maintain a Romaic identity—that is to say, they wanted to remain part of the Greek-speaking civilization without necessarily adopting a Greek ethnic identity, but in the struggle among national identities no one would be able to remain neutral in the long run. Mazower (2004, 269) quotes the answer the British journalist H. N. Brailsford received in 1903 when he asked a wealthy peasant in the market of Monastir (present-day Bitola in Macedonia) whether his home village was Greek or Bulgarian: “Well, it is Bulgarian now but four years ago it was Greek.” Today, it would probably define itself as Macedonian.

As a general picture, the Slavic national movements in the Balkans both copied Greek nationalism and reacted against it, and the Albanian national movement reacted to all of these (Mackridge 2012). Although various Albanian tribes had fought against the Ottoman central government as early as in the 18th century, a modern national movement of all Albanians did not rise before the 1870s, when it became clear that the lands inhabited by

Albanians would otherwise be divided among Serbia, Bulgaria, and Montenegro (Hösch 2008, 157). This can be compared to the development in the Habsburg Monarchy where the division of the empire into a German-speaking Austrian and an autonomous Hungarian part (the *Ausgleich* of 1867) pushed the Slavs of the empire to develop their own national identities. The Ottoman Balkans did actually not lag behind Central Europe in the realization of a nationalist agenda—on the contrary, the Greeks, Serbs, and Bulgarians acquired their nation-states long before the Hungarians and the West Slavs (Poles, Czechs, and Slovaks).

The breakup of the Romaic identity and model of civilization can be very concretely observed in the life of the Macedonian Slavic writer Grigor Prličev, also known as a Greek author by the name Grigorios Stavridis (1830/1831–1893; see Prličev 1894; 2004; Detrez 2010; Dimitrovski 2004). He was born in Ohrid, Macedonia, where the upper class had a strong Romaic identity at that time; at his death (1893), the Macedonian Slavs were oriented towards independent Bulgaria, and not much “Romaicity” (ρωμοσύνη) remained. His literary career spans the era of the decline of cultural unity in the *Millet i-Rûm* and the rise of new national identities, and he actually never found an identity and community in which to place his literary production, which was written first in Greek and then in Slavic.

As a child in Ohrid, Prličev received a good primary education and learned to write excellent Greek—in his autobiography (Prličev 1894, 362) he states that he finally mastered literary Greek better than many a native speaker of the language. After reaching adulthood, he worked as a schoolteacher in Tirana and then went to Athens, the new capital of the Kingdom of Greece, in order to study medicine. The arrival in independent Greece was a great experience for him:

When [...] we had crossed the border between Turkey and Greece, a Greek trader, my fellow traveler, dismounted from his horse and kissed the soil. “We have trodden upon Hellenic ground,” he said.—My God! How red this ground is!—Yes! Because it is saturated with blood! I immediately made some verses, which I also declaimed with a prophetic inspiration. My intoxication intensified when I first saw the famous Parthenon from a distance. (Prličev 1894, 361, my translation; “Parthenon” written in Greek letters in the Bulgarian original)

Prličev never completed his studies of medicine but continued to write. In 1860, in Athens, he won the first prize in a state literary competition with his epic poem *Ὁ Ἀρματολός* (‘The Militiaman’). In small literary circles he was praised as a “new Homer,” but many ethnic Greeks despised him for his origins and non-native accent. He returned to his native Ohrid as a teacher.

In 1868, Prličev switched the language of instruction in his Ohrid school from Greek to Bulgarian and came into conflict with the local Greek-speaking clergy. However, to the end of his life he considered himself to be “weak in the Bulgarian language” (Prličev 1894, 399), meaning the Bulgarian standard language. His native Ohrid dialect was rather different from those East Bulgarian dialects upon which the emerging Modern Bulgarian standard language was being constructed, and today the Ohrid dialect is of course regarded as part of another language, Macedonian.

Representatives of the Bulgarian Reading-Room in Istanbul soon asked Prličev to translate the Iliad into Bulgarian. It was a natural request given his excellent knowledge of Greek, but he was unsure of his Bulgarian. In fact, he made use of a Greek-Russian dictionary and read Russian poetry in preparation for the translation. The first published parts of the translation were criticized for their bad Bulgarian, and Prličev burned this first version. In his autobiography he then gives an example of his second attempt, translated in “another style,” using “all cases and participles.” The example is written in an odd mixture of Bulgarian and Russian—Bulgarian and Macedonian had lost their case declension and the old participles almost completely hundreds of years earlier, so these grammatical forms were known to Prličev only through Russian. “I know,” he writes, “that this translation does not smell much like Bulgarian; but because I am weak in Bulgarian, it could not have become different” (Prličev 1894, 400). By using Russian forms he tried to create a kind of Slavic equivalent of Ancient Greek: “From day to day the spirit of the Russian language became more familiar to me, and as I could not write in Bulgarian, I began to write in Old Bulgarian” (ibid.).

After the establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate, Ohrid received a Slavic bishop, Metropolitan Natanail. Prličev wrote an ode praising Natanail upon his arrival (Prličev 1894, 400–401). But the two men soon came into conflict for reasons that are not clear in Prličev’s autobiography. He was first transferred to another school and then expelled from his position as a teacher in Ohrid altogether. He comments bitterly:

It was so strange: both my native country,⁴ which never and nowhere values its sons, and the Greek bishop Meletios, my most implacable enemy, tolerated my lessons, sermons, complaints, and reproaches for 18 long years, and they never

⁴ In the original, *otečestvoto*; later in the same sentence expressed with the synonym *tatkovinătă*. Prličev did not mean the whole of Bulgaria or Macedonia, but only the town of Ohrid (cf. Detrez 2010, 58).

expelled me, but the first Bulgarian bishop Natanail, the long-awaited Messiah, shamefully expelled Prličev from his native country! (Prličev 1894, 402; my translation)

Prličev wrote his autobiography in Bulgarian in 1884–1885 as a teacher of the Bulgarian Male High School in Thessaloniki. It appeared posthumously in 1894 in Sofia, in the new Principality of Bulgaria—not as *Avtoviografija* in the Greek fashion as he had named it, but as *Avto-biografija*, and with the Greek-style punctuation corrected to Slavic (Prličev 1894, 346). The modest stance of the text does not conceal the bitterness of a talented man who tried to affirm himself first as a Greek author, then as a Bulgarian author, but was rejected by the cultural leaders of both communities.

Raymond Detrez (2010, 53) writes that Prličev “remained all his life an outsider” and defines his personal tragedy as follows:

After the Orthodox Christian community was replaced with communities marked by ethnic nationalism, be it Greek or Bulgarian, Pärličev⁵ had become an ‘emigrant’ in a particular sense of the word: A person who did not move to another country, but feels alienated and confused in his or her own country[,] the moral, religious, political and aesthetic value systems of which have radically changed. (Detrez 2010, 61)

Prličev can thus be seen as a Ρωμαιοίς born tragically too late: in the old Romaic community he would have become a prominent community member, but the new reality divided among national movements did not have a place for him. Detrez (2010, 53) compares him with a writer in exile: “Pärličev ultimately continued to identify himself with the pre-national multiethnic Orthodox Christian community in the Balkans rather than with a particular ethnic or national community.” This may be an exaggeration because we do not have any evidence that Prličev regretted joining the Bulgarian national movement, despite feeling unjustly treated by some of its leaders. After all, Bulgarian (or Macedonian, from the present point of view) was his native language, and he was never ashamed of his background. He also wanted to enrich the Bulgarian standard language with Slavic elements taken from Russian. But his autobiography does show an emotional

⁵ Detrez uses the Bulgarian spelling of Prličev’s name (instead of the modern Macedonian spelling) and defines him as “a Bulgarian from Ohrid” (Detrez 2010, 53). This is certainly how Prličev himself would have wished to be defined, at least later in his life. But Detrez does not deny the *present* existence of the Macedonian nation and ethnic identity, as many Bulgarians do; in fact, Detrez has criticized the Bulgarians for still suffering from a historical “hangover” in the Macedonian question (Detrez 2009).

attachment to the Greek language—an attachment that the new reality required him to half-heartedly renounce.⁶

3. Dismantling the Discourse of “National Revival”

Why is it then that the Bulgarian national historiography of today still sees Priličev’s Greek sympathies as a delusion—and that Macedonian historiography as well sees his Bulgarian sympathies in the same way (cf. Detrez 2010, 61)? On what basis are the histories of the “national revivals” in the Balkans entitled to attribute false consciousness to past historical personalities who did not subscribe to the present national identities?

In my recent attempt to analyze the conflicting national discourses about language boundaries in the Balkans (Lindstedt, forthcoming), I have identified three false premises that give the wrong keys to history: the essentialist fallacy, the primordialist fallacy, and the fallacy of objective language boundaries. They pertain to various nationalist discourses in the Balkans, especially to those directly or indirectly connected with language as an essential part of ethnic identity.

The *essentialist fallacy* assumes that an identity is based upon the objectively observable properties of people and can therefore be contrary to what they say and think themselves. In reality, ethno-linguistic identities are social constructs and, at ethnic, linguistic, or cultural boundaries, these identities are even a matter of free choice. Especially when ethnic boundaries are being constructed in a historical process, people choose their identities and do not only passively acquire them (this is also the main thesis of Mackridge 2012 discussing the Hellenic / Greek identity).

The *primordialist fallacy* is linked to Anderson’s first paradox of nationalism, which was mentioned at the beginning of this article. Primordialism considers a long historical continuity and distinctness to be both necessary and sufficient conditions for a nation to exist. Therefore, the nation-building processes of the late 18th and 19th centuries had to, and still have to, be depicted as revivals of the medieval tsardoms for the Balkan Slavs, and of the Byzantine Empire or even older entities for the Greeks.

⁶ Cf. Mackridge’s (2012) conclusion: “It is probable that if Parlichev had been born a generation earlier, he would have remained an active propagandizer of Greek culture rather than simply retaining an emotional attachment to Ancient Greek poetry; yet if he had been born two generations later, he would no doubt have become a Macedonian nationalist.”

This always presupposes a selective view of history—the various past realms with the name “Bulgaria”, for instance, did not have a single square kilometer in common, so the ideologists of the Bulgarian national revival had to choose which past Bulgaria they would try to revive. (In fact, they finally simply defined the territory of the ecclesiastic jurisdiction of the Bulgarian Exarchate as “Bulgaria”; see Lindstedt, forthcoming.) Of course, the medieval realms functioned as a real inspiration for the “national awakeners”, such as Paisij Hilendarski, who was mentioned above, just as Antiquity served as an inspiration for the European Renaissance. But this historical continuity was a social construct, not a pre-given historical fact.

Finally, the *fallacy of objective language boundaries* assumes that every language is defined by an objective set of features that are shared by all of its dialects. Thus, entities such as “the Bulgarian language”, “the Macedonian language”, “the Romanian language”, or “the Albanian language” are seen as something which *acquired* a standard language, not as something that *were defined by* the constructed common standards. The dispute between the Bulgarians and the Macedonians on whether Prličev’s native language was Bulgarian or Macedonian, or what language the Slavic column represented in the *Lexicon Tetraglosson* by Daniel of Moschopolis, cannot be solved because both sides think there is only one correct answer to this question. A similar question would be whether Daniel’s native Aromanian was a dialect of Romanian or a language in its own right. A further complication comes from the view that a person can only belong to one language community, and that the artistic use of a language other than one’s native tongue (as in Prličev’s case) implies false consciousness.

On the other hand, not all Balkan languages are, in Kloss’s (1967) terms, only *Ausbau* languages (“languages by development”), but many of them are also *Abstand* languages (“languages by distance”), i.e., sufficiently different from their neighboring varieties to be recognized as distinct languages irrespective of the existence of a literary standard. Such *Ausbau* languages in the late Ottoman Balkans were at least Turkish, Greek, Balkan Slavic (usually called Bulgarian), Balkan Romance (usually called Wallachian), Albanian, Romani, Ladino (Dzhudezmo), and the languages of several smaller minorities, such as the Armenians or the Circassians. Therefore it cannot be said that the introduction of nationalism into the Balkans simply established boundaries where there had been none. And the use of Greek as the main written language of Balkan Christians would not

have satisfied the linguistic human rights⁷ of the native speakers of the other (Abstand) languages in the long run. But what has to be rejected is the traditional historiography of “double oppression” where the Balkan nations are depicted as having suffered under the double yoke of Ottoman political domination and Greek cultural domination (Daskalov 2004, 99; cf. Wahlström in this volume). Against the alleged Ottoman oppression it can be remarked that the Ottoman Empire was for centuries one of the religiously and ethnically most tolerant realms in Europe; against the concept of Greek oppression, the new analysis of the Romaic “proto-nation” by Detrez, as described above, proposes a corrective.

That the past role of the Greek language is difficult to reconcile with other Balkan nations’ nationalist views on history was shown by several episodes after the publication, by a Finnish and Macedonian group of scholars, of the manuscript of the Konikovo Gospel, described in Section 1 above (Lindstedt, Spasov & Nuorluoto, eds., 2008; see also Lindstedt 2008a). Macedonian commentators, enthusiastic about such an early translation of Gospel texts in vernacular Macedonian, more or less passed over the fact that it is a bilingual Greek-Macedonian manuscript. Some dilettantes did not hesitate to resort to outright forgery even in the Macedonian text: there is an unauthorized YouTube (!) version⁸ of the beginning of the Macedonian text in which the Greek loans *martiría* ‘testimony’ and *martirísa* ‘to testify’ have been replaced with the Modern Macedonian words *mačenik* ‘martyr’ (which is not an equivalent) and *svedočē* ‘to testify’ (which is actually *svedočī* in Modern Macedonian, but the forger has perhaps tried to use a form that looks dialectal). Even the “original” text given in this YouTube version in Greek letters is a forgery, making use of an orthography that is alien to the manuscript! This is an isolated example, to be sure, but at the same time illustrative of the extreme nationalist attitude towards history.

Biased attempts to explain the past in terms of the present nation-states are not confined to “anti-Greek” views, as “pro-Greek” views may likewise exhibit them. Seeing the Romaic community as a precursor to the Modern Greek nation is an instance of such a skewed view (Petmezas 1999). Another example would be seeing present-day Northern Greece, with Thessaloniki as its largest city, as a naturally pre-destined part of the Greek nation-state, as the histories of Modern Greece frequently do. This part of

⁷ For linguistic human rights, see Skutnabb-Kangas (2000).

⁸ <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6bp8vItDA1o>

the Balkans did actually not belong to Greece before the Balkan wars of 1912–1913, and its population was not predominantly Greek before that time. An Ottoman census in Macedonia in 1904 counted, among the Christians, 896,000 Bulgarians, 307,000 Greeks, 99,000 Vlachs, and 101,000 Serbs, but in terms of ecclesiastic jurisdiction, 649,000 (Greek) Patriarchists against 558,000 (Bulgarian) Exarchists (Mazower 2004, 269). As late as in 1913, the largest ethno-linguistic and religious groups in the city of Thessaloniki were the Sephardic Jews (almost 40 percent of the population) and the Ottoman Muslims, with the Christians—Greeks, Slavs, and Vlachs—being only the third confessional group by size (Mazower 2004, 303).

Had the Greek troops not arrived in Thessaloniki eight hours ahead of the Bulgarian forces at the end of the war (Mazower 2004, 296–297), its history could have been written otherwise. But it would not have been a “right” or “wrong” history.

What should be the goal of Balkan historiography is to understand the past in its own terms, to see the relative nature of national identities and boundaries, and to recognize the positive role that the Romaic community and the Greek language had in the pre-national and proto-national Balkans (as also stressed by Wahlström in this volume).

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Re-Establishing Cross-Border Cooperation Between Montenegro, Kosovo and Albania: The *Balkans Peace Park* and Local Ownership

Introduction

In the Western Balkans the current economic crisis is not only affecting the local economies but raises fears that the pace of European Union enlargement will slow down even further. Croatia's EU membership is due in 2013 and Serbia was given a candidate status in the EU Council meeting of February 2012. Negotiations with Serbia were, however, not opened, and regardless of the Commission's recommendation the decision on Montenegro's accession negotiations was postponed until June 2012.

Despite this set-back, Montenegro is well on its way towards the European Union, unlike its neighbours such as Albania and Kosovo. In Albania, the internal political battles have slowed down the necessary reform policies, and the EU road of Kosovo is blocked by the fact that five EU member states do not recognize Kosovo's independence. Thus Kosovo cannot have any kind of contractual relationship with the EU. The political future of this southern Balkan triangle thus seems quite questionable.

The EU membership is nevertheless underlined by the political elites of all three countries as their main foreign policy goal. All countries have declared they will share 'the common European values' and have engaged themselves in implementing (more or less actively) the reforms required by the European Union. This 'Europeanization' discourse is shared by all and the Commission progress reports and the European partnerships serve as roadmaps for further reforms to 'consolidate stability and raise prosperity' in the Western Balkans (Commission 2006).

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The European enlargement and the necessary conditions to be met by the potential candidates are seen as the main argument behind the 'Europeanization' process, but what does this really mean, if anything, on a village level, where a number of more or less technical support projects are being developed?

Border regions have received a special place in the European discourse as active spaces where links and contacts for deeper integration are being established. The EU Commission finances cross-border cooperation projects and regional cooperation, and good neighbourly relations are underlined by the European Council as necessary conditions for joining the EU.

This article proposes a critical look at the cross-border cooperation initiatives and poses the question, why would the international actors involved in these projects expect local people to act in ways that they (foreigners) want them to act? What kind of idealist discourse lies behind cross-border cooperation projects and what kind of resistance to 'subjugated knowledge' (as Michel Foucault would have put it) persists on the local level?

In the Western Balkans, the mountainous and remote border regions may not have been in the focus of the central Governments before, but in order to receive funds from the Commission the political elites of these countries are starting to see the importance of cross-border cooperation projects. At least on the discourse level the border regions are being looked at in a more positive way than for a long time in history. For regions marginalized in Communist times, some consider this to be a time for a new starting point. *Are we, however, just witnessing outside subscribed and elite-driven idealist models being transferred to the border regions without taking into account the interests, customs and habits of the local people, and how may this have an impact upon the final outcome of the process?*

In the field of anthropology (see studies by David Kideckel, Gerald Creed, Katherine Verdery and others) as well as in political sciences many studies exist on how the central planners failed to implement idealist discourses such as 'socialism with a human face' in Southeastern Europe in the 1980s. Today academic critics often target Europeanization discourse (see Tamminen 2011, 254–258). In the field of International Relations research David Chandler has called the EU 'an Empire in Denial'. Chandler notes that the European Commission assistance programmes, for instance, 'tend to bypass mechanisms of democratic accountability entirely. They involve the direct regulation of South-eastern European state governance

mechanisms'. (Chandler 2006, 111.) Highly critical of the outside funded civil society, Chandler sees the financing of the NGO sector merely as a way to buy legitimization for international community programmes (Chandler 2006, 113–115). Chandler's critical approach stresses the lack of social and political legitimacy of these processes. He notes that 'the Empire is not in denial because it is not regulating enough, but because the political power of decision-making elites seeks to clothe itself in non-political, therapeutic or purely technical, administrative and bureaucratic forms' (Chandler 2006, 9–11).

The report of the International Commission on the Balkans makes it clear that 'the real choice the EU is facing in the Balkans is enlargement or empire. Either the EU devises a bold strategy for accession that could encompass all Balkan countries as new members within the next decade, or it will become mired instead as a neo-colonial power in places like Kosovo, Bosnia, and even Macedonia' (ICB 2005, 11). A closer look at one of the border villages on the side of Montenegro, Vusanje/Vuthaj,² situated on the area of the so-called 'Balkans Peace Park Project' will give us a local perspective on these problems. Through an analysis of the European discourse on border regions and of its applicability in this particular border region, this article poses the question to what extent local ownership (and local knowledge) is taken into account when promoting cross-border cooperation.

European Discourse on the Border Regions: Cross-Border Cooperation as a Form of *Governance*

The European Union is often characterized as a normative power. It has a number of ways to transfer normative models of governance both inside the union (between the Member states) as well as towards its partner countries. The EU has a major role in reformulating the governance of political space starting from the promotion of integration and regional cooperation. Most countries adopt these EU-promoted normative models on practical grounds. These models however also imply identity politics. Adopting a European 'way of doing' is to prove one's 'Europeanism' – that one belongs to the European family. The enlargement policies of the European Union are based on this logic – if you want to be at least listed as a potential candidate or

² When referring to this ethnically Albanian village in Montenegro I use the name first in Montenegrin followed by the name in Albanian. The place names in Kosovo are written first in Albanian and then in Serbian.

have some kind of European perspective to be recognized as a European country, you need to start implementing the European *façon de faire*.

Border regions are dynamic areas when it comes to identity politics – different levels of governance meet at the borders. Also diverse identities, self-definitions and definitions of the ‘other’ cross paths in national border regions (Kaplan and Häkli 2002). Inside and outside are not as clearly defined on the border regions as inside the country – ethnic and linguistic groups living in these regions rarely respect national borders. Significations given to the borders differ and are sometimes contradictory: do the borders limit the nation or just a state territory? The whole border can be contested as in the case of Kosovo and Serbia, as Serbia does not recognize the border between these two states.

In brief, border areas are characterized by discontinuities and continuities, by the complexity of the political space, by borders that unite and divide at the same time. According to Delanty and Rumford (2005, 133), European borders (both EU borders and the borders between states) play a role in limiting a territory but also create new types of political spaces to administer, namely cross-border regions that connect neighbours. The subsidiarity policies of the EU (meaning that decisions should be made in close connection with those concerned) are linked with the creation of border areas, seen not as obstacles and limits, but as spaces to be governed.

Borders have to be managed. If within the EU the goal is to diminish the importance of the borders and border controls, on the outer border of the EU controls and surveillance are even strengthening (Delanty and Rumford 2005, 133). The Schengen agreement underlines the need to control the Union’s external borders. It is no longer a question of one member state deciding how to control its national borders, the regulations and ways of controlling are being defined on the EU level.

A number of instruments have been created to strengthen border controls on the Union’s outer borders. The *integrated border management* (IBM) tool is a good example of these kinds of EU-level decisions on how to deal with borders. The countries on their way to entry into the European Union have engaged in deep reform processes to implement IBM in their border controls. The ideal is that strict border controls will enhance free movement of people and goods while closing the borders to all kinds of criminal activities.

When we talk about border management, it is not the same thing as the *governance* of the border regions. Governance can be understood in a Foucauldian sense as normalization – the implementation of a new set of shared norms. The border regions were traditionally marginalized during the Communist period in the whole of Central and Eastern Europe, and Southeast Europe is not an exception. They were considered to be sensitive areas often facing ‘threatening’ neighbours. Today these regions are experiencing new openings.

Even though, on the one hand, the EU emphasizes on border controls when it comes to its outer borders, on the other hand European integration is all about cooperation. This discourse of cooperation has a spill-over effect on all levels of governance – supranational, national and local level. Simultaneous processes on different levels and in different fields produce norms and regulations when it comes to governing border regions in Europe. All these processes are based on an ideal perception that borders are ‘bridges’ that unite people and barriers which in the past have separated people living on different sides of the borders should be replaced. Thus borders enter identity politics and identity games when the notion of ‘we Europeans’ is being constructed on both sides of the borders.

Border regions become regions of cooperation where Europeanism and a number of shared norms that it consists of are constructed. What interests us here is the local level. Today the border regions on the local level are understood to be spaces that are appropriate for new forms of governance. Several new models and instruments on the European (supranational) level have been created to stimulate new openings towards neighbouring countries.

Some observers make a difference between border regions and cross-border regions. ‘A border region co-operates in individual cases and mostly when co-operation is required. A **cross-border region** acts consistently and long-term. Its sole task is the cross-border co-operation that must be successfully pursued by the region. Otherwise the region would become redundant. The work is based on **long-term** joint strategies including analysis of the strengths and weaknesses. Consequently, fields of action and projects are developed’ (Gabbe 2005). Thus the term ‘cross-border’ stresses the long-term perspective of the cooperation. It is also a way of overcoming old rivalries with long-lasting solutions like the French-German partnership.

Cross-border regions have come to the centre of the dominant discourse on integration – they receive new significations and represent new

opportunities (van Geenhuizen and Ratti 2001, 6). Remigio Ratti and Marina van Geenhuizen talk about 'active spaces' as the openness of border regions provides these regions with a certain capacity to absorb new ideas and integrate change. In this ideal, in an open space, the actors are capable of profiting from openness, using new resources and networks, yet keeping at the same time continuity of action as their main objective. Thus an open space is a space that implies learning and imagination (*ibid.*, 4). This concept stresses a new dynamism.

Thus the marginality of border regions no longer signifies inferiority if these regions manage to identify with a larger cross-border region – in the European framework the support given to cross-border regions makes it possible for a new innovation to emerge and opens up opportunities for action to local actors.

Even if cross-border cooperation is not a political priority in Western Balkan countries, this new discourse cannot be neglected on the political level. This discourse is an integral part of normative Europeanism when it comes to borders, and a number of actors participate in the construction of the dominant discourse on cross-border cooperation. By financing local and regional initiatives the European Commission also uses cross-border cooperation in the Balkans as an instrument of reconciliation and as a confidence-building measure. Concerning the integration process (the EU enlargement process) these instruments are used to support good neighbourly relations – one of the clearly stated conditions. This is seen as crucial for a region that has experienced conflicts in the recent past.

An Association of European Border Regions (AEBR) was established in 1971. Still today AEBR actively lobbies to strengthen cross-border cooperation and find favourable European funding. AEBR notes that the added value of cross-border cooperation includes contributing to the promotion of peace, freedom, security and respect for human rights. More concretely, the political added value of cross-border cooperation 'involves making a substantial contribution towards the development of Europe and European integration; getting to know each other, getting on together, understanding each other and building trust; the implementation of subsidiarity and partnership; increased economic and social cohesion and cooperation; preparing for the accession of new members; and using EU funding to secure cross-border cooperation via multiannual programmes, and ensuring that the necessary national and regional co-financing is committed in the long term' (AEBR s. a.).

This discourse is based on the assumption that cross-border cooperation is a solution to the negative effects of borders. According to ABER, '[t]he willingness of citizens, communities and regions to seek cross-border solutions together [...] aims to heal the “**scars of history**”, enable the population in the vicinity of borders to cooperate more effectively in all areas of life, improve living conditions for border residents and realise “a citizens' Europe”’ (AEBR 2004, 7). One has to cross, or better said, overcome the border – the boundary/barrier – to achieve prosperity. This discourse opposes the discourse of national construction, that is, the construction of a state for one nation, which traditionally was seen as the only way to answer to the needs of a nation and its prosperity.

Cross-Border Cooperation Models

Cross-border cooperation is promoted through a number of models to develop cooperative structures, procedures and instruments that facilitate the removal of historical obstacles and divisive factors. In the 1990s, the EU institutions and capitals talked passionately about the 'Europe of the regions' – a concept quite forgotten today. At that time it was important to stress the importance of local actors. The resolution adopted by the European Parliament on 18 November 1988 called on states to regionalize their internal structures (Delli Zotti 1996, 61). For a time multilayer governance was the word of the day (Aldecoa and Keating 1999). A number of institutions and forums exist since that time whose aim is to strengthen cooperation between local entities. On border regions, cooperation also changed levels and today it should no longer be under the control of the state, but should rather be cooperation between local actors. The dominating discourse on cross-border cooperation values local actors, both NGOs and local communities. The European Parliament also noted in 1988 that relations between borderland regions should not be seen as classical foreign relations but on the contrary as 'relations between neighbours' (quoted by Delli Zotti 1996, 60).

The most important actors formulating norms around the cross-border cooperation are the European Union and the Council of Europe. The European Union focuses on financial support for cross-border cooperation projects and programmes. Most initiatives are financed by the Structural Funds (including INTERREG programmes) but in these initiatives, at least one of the partners in the project has to be an EU member state. A new cooperation instrument at the Community level was created as part of the

reform of regional policy for the period 2007–2013: the *European groupings of territorial cooperation* (see EGCC online). The Instrument of Pre-Accession (IPA) now also has special funds focusing on cross-border cooperation even for projects between non-EU members.

If the European Union has the needed funds to finance cross-border cooperation, the power of the Council of Europe lies in its normative and conceptual work. It is one of the main standard setting actors in this field by producing Charters and Conventions that at least indirectly influence cross-border activities among its member states. The *European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation between Territorial Communities or Authorities* signed in Madrid on 21 May 1980 is a major example of such conceptualizing power to define what is transfrontier co-operation and to create a juridical instrument to promote it.

Both the EU and the Council of Europe see cross-border cooperation as an instrument to deepen European integration and to promote economic and social development. However, their means as well as their vocabulary differ. The Council of Europe prefers the term ‘Transfrontier Co-Operation’, whereas the EU uses the notion of ‘Cross-border Co-operation’ (Council of Europe 2006). The term cross-border stresses more geographic proximity (Bataillou 2002, 15).

Promoting transfrontier/cross-border cooperation has resulted in a number of institutionalized models for strengthening “good neighbourly relations”. If outside Europe cross-border cooperation is often based on private initiatives (see Papadimitriou and Phinnemore 2003), in Europe it has received more institutionalized forms such as the **Euroregions**. The first project called EUROREGIO has given its name to many others. In 1958 on the Dutch-German border the first Euroregion was established with an institutionalized multinational council to coordinate cooperation, working groups and a secretariat. Following this example other ‘Euroregions’ – inside and outside the EU – have been established (O’Dowd 2003, 18–19). The end of the Cold War multiplied the possibilities for cross-border contacts and links. In addition, the name ‘Euroregion’ acquired a certain level of respect and recognition. For example, in Bulgaria around ten Euroregions have been established during the last 15 years.

The Euroregion is an example of durable institutionalized cross-border cooperation in contrast to any ad hoc projects. Euroregions and other forms of transfrontier co-operation structures do not create a new type of government at the transfrontier level, the Council of Europe emphasizes.

They do not have political powers and their work is limited to the competences of the local and regional authorities which constitute them. But as normative models they do provide a form of ‘governance’. The Association of European Border Regions (AEBR) defines a Euroregion as (1) an association of local and regional authorities on either side of the national border; (2) which has a permanent secretariat and a technical and administrative team with its own resources; (3) is based on non-profit-making associations or foundations on either side of the border in accordance with the respective national law in force; and (4) is also based on inter-state agreements dealing, among other things, with the participation of territorial authorities (Council of Europe, ‘What is a Euroregion?’, s.a.).

One model that is not put forth by European organizations, but which is well known around the world, is the development of **peace parks** and Transboundary Protected Areas (TBPAs) linking environmental cooperation and peace. The first Peace Park was established by the Swedish and Norwegian Peace Movements in 1914 to celebrate 100 years of peace between Sweden and Norway.

The European Green Belt running along the former Iron Curtain is considered a Peace Park. It ‘lies along the former militarised frontier zones that were cleared of their populations and remained uninhabited during the Cold War. The IUCN (International Union for the Conservation of Nature) now promotes the preservation of as much as possible of this strip in the semi-natural state to which, fortuitously, it reverted between 1945 and 1990. Originally a purely German initiative, the programme now links conservation organisations along the entire line of the former Iron Curtain from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea and the Adriatic’ (Milsom 2010, see also Young 2008).

Peace Parks exist elsewhere in the world, too, among others in the Red Sea between Israel and Jordan, and there is a project for the Green Line Peace Park in Cyprus, between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot Territories. An important number of peace parks exist on the African continent.

These transfrontier conservation areas (TFCA) (or peace parks) are ‘defined as relatively large areas that straddle frontiers between two or more countries and cover large-scale natural systems encompassing one or more protected areas. Very often both human and animal populations traditionally migrated across or straddled the political boundaries concerned. In essence, TFCAs therefore extend far beyond designated protected areas, and can

incorporate such innovative approaches as biosphere reserves and a wide range of community-based natural resource management programmes' (World Bank 1996 quoted by Peace Park Foundation, s.a. online).

Balkans Peace Park Project (B3P)

Following the model of Transfrontier Conservation Areas, a group of active people (many of them foreigners and thus outsiders to the region but passionate about its future) have actively put forth an idea of a transnational protected area in the border triangle between Albania, Kosovo and Montenegro. This project has been named *the Balkans Peace Park* and according to its official web pages the project would be 'a symbol of peace and cooperation where communities from all three countries work together to protect their fragile environment, stimulate local employment and promote sustainable visitor activities in the region'. The Balkans Peace Park Project (earlier BPPP, today known as B3P) promotes the region where 'spectacular mountains and valleys of northern Albania, Kosovo/a and Montenegro share a landscape of wild beauty, exceptional flora and fauna, as well as a traditional lifestyle, that is almost unique in Europe and relatively unspoilt by modern development'. They also note the imminent threats to this region 'from declining population, illegal logging and other environmental destruction'. 'The establishment of a Balkans Peace Park would unite the existing communities of the three countries in preserving biodiversity and enabling local people to continue to live in the valleys, supported by sustainable tourism', note the project's web pages (Balkans Peace Park).

The project is not an innovation in itself as 'there are over 600 environmentally protected areas in the world which straddle international boundaries'. Over 20 of these are specifically called Peace Parks, 'symbols of peace and cooperation between countries where sometimes there has been serious conflict between them', notes the B3P leaflet. Even though Albania, Kosovo and Montenegro do show interest in creating environmentally protected areas, this 'peace park' proposal has not received official status. As an NGO (a UK charity, to be more precise³) the 'Balkans Peace Park' has for years organized hikes, summer camps and other grass-root level activities. In 2011 a sister organization, a local NGO under the name of

³ Since 2011 there is also a registered NGO on the Albanian side called the Balkans Peace Park Albania.

Balkans Peace Park Albania, was established in Shkodra in northern Albania.

The Balkans Peace Park Project is an interesting case to approach as a cross-border region. It is still quite a small project despite the potential of the region and the momentum of the border regions on the European agenda and it has encountered resistance both on the local level and among state officials. Today there is no transfrontier protected area in this region. In Albania, and since 2011 in Montenegro, protected areas have been established in these border areas of a potential peace park, but on the Kosovo side a National Park is still lacking. The plan put forward by the B3P would mean that 'the approximate 3000sq km of the Balkans Peace Park should include the Kelmend, Shala Valley and Valbona regions of Albania, the Prokletije and Komovi area of Montenegro and the Hajla-Rugova-Djeravica region of Kosovo/a'. Thus the three particular regions which concern us are the Rugova region of western Kosovo, the Montenegrin Prokletije Park and the Thethi National Forest Park in northern Albania. The Prokletije National Park is the fifth National Park in Montenegro. For a long time it was not seen as a Government priority, notes Antonia Young, the grand old lady behind the B3P project (Young 2008, 10).

In practice, the B3P is a grassroots network bringing together transnational actors, especially academics and environmental activists in the Balkans, the UK and around the globe, linking them with people living and working in the valleys and villages of the area. According to their vision, a truly international cross-border protected area in this region, which is one of the most spectacular and least-known mountain ranges in Europe, can both further the needs, interests and aspirations of the local communities, and help sustain biodiversity and ecological responsibility. The ultimate aim – reaching an established protected cross-border transnational park that would be governed together by the representatives from the three countries – is still to be achieved.



Map 1. Possible extent of the proposed Balkans Peace Park between Albania, Kosovo and Montenegro.⁴

Limits of Cross-Border Idealism

One of the grass-root level achievements of the B3P have been the cross-border hikes that have received special authorizations from the local authorities to cross the borders on non-official border-crossing points. The European Union is based on the ideal of free movement. Different EU instruments are used to strengthen the permeability of borders not only in practice (by funding border check-points among other things) but on a more mental level, too. These include cross-border cooperation initiatives such as Euroregions and financial means such as the EU Commission's Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) and support on infrastructural reforms. Sometimes other infrastructural projects are however prioritized by the EU rather than those proposed by the central governments. The Albanian government has recently focused on the building of a highway between the coastal town of Durrës (the main tourist destination of Kosovo Albanians) and the capital of Kosovo, Pristina. This highway was not seen as important from the Brussels perspective. Far away from the region, it is hard to see the importance of

⁴ Outlines of the proposed Peace Park from: <http://mappery.com/map-of/proposed-balkans-peace-park-map> (24 October 2012).

certain infrastructural initiatives. However, another smaller project promoted in the region of the Balkans Peace Park Project is a road that would link the capital of Montenegro, Podgorica, with Plava lake and the Prokletije mountain range in the north-eastern part of the country. The newly reopened road would pass through Albania, but as on the Montenegrin side the region is very mountainous, it would cut travel time significantly and promote the economic development of the border areas on both sides of the border.

If on the one hand, for infrastructural projects local knowledge is the key to understanding traffic flows, on the other hand the success of cross-border cooperation projects also depends on local engagement. Many projects launched in recent years in the Western Balkans have failed to respond to the high expectations of the donors. Euroregions (such as the *Ohrid Prespa Euroregion*) in Albania, Greece and (FYR) Macedonia have stumbled on political disputes and the name issue between Greece and Macedonia. Other projects have failed to raise local interest and engagement.

The Euroregion as a model presupposes a long-term engagement; the European Commission projects financed by the Instrument of Pre-Accession (IPA) have on the other hand a limited time span. IPA funds are now also open for cross-border cooperation project applications between non-member countries in the Western Balkans. A number of small grants have been granted to projects realized between Albania and Montenegro, ranging from environmental protection to tourism development. Between Albania and Kosovo the Commission have had a plan to use the cross-border funds for developing the border-crossing point on the new highway (even though the highway itself did not receive EU funding), but at this time the EU Commission is only able to fund bilateral projects. This is due to bureaucratic reasons, as the Commission delegations in each country need to manage the funds in their respective countries, which means that if there were three beneficiary countries involved, the project would also involve three Commission delegations. Thus the Balkans Peace Park Project would not be eligible as such for Commission funding.

Many foreigners including B3P volunteers or EU civil servants are well intended and even passionate about the future of these border regions. However, they are often unaware of the interests, habits and beliefs of the local people living in these regions, which have experienced a number of profound political changes during the last century. The concept 'Peace Park' itself is one of the greatest obstacles when it comes to establishing such a

cross-border region. As a model it presupposes that there has been a conflict in the region before. Local officials, however, underline that this region was not a scene of conflict during the 1990s wars in the Balkans. On the contrary, good neighbourly relations are stressed as Montenegro has recognized Kosovo's independence, unlike its other neighbours Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The concept of 'peace' in the name of the cross-border cooperation project has been criticized in the meetings of the B3P with the local actors.⁵ Promoting the 'Peace Park' might be seen as evoking rather traumatic memories of more historical conflicts.

Indeed, region-building (as an ultimate aim of cross-border cooperation) is always linked with identity politics. Today's priorities are seen by the local authorities as framework of European integration, rather than in the reconciliation with the past. At the end of the 19th century bloody wars were indeed fought on the borders between today's Albania and Montenegro, when Montenegro attempted to occupy Albanian-inhabited areas in the Ottoman Empire. Albania declared its independence in 1912 and its borders were drawn by the Great Powers in 1919. Kosovo and a number of Albanian-inhabited areas were left outside the newly-established Albanian nation-state. This cutting of traditional communication lines created a shared trauma for the Albanian nation. The Albanian clans living outside the newly established state fought for their areas to be included in Albania. Thus, they rarely identified themselves with the new state (Yugoslavia) in which they were living. Throughout the interwar period the Yugoslav government pressured the Albanian population either to emigrate or to assimilate (Vickers 2008, 127). The Yugoslav legacy is crucial for comprehending today's situation in the border region between Kosovo and Montenegro.

The end of the Second World War marked another traumatic experience for the Albanian population. The border established between Hoxha's Albania and Tito's Yugoslavia was totally closed. The state borders and the surrounding regions were considered to be somehow threatening to the integrity and safety of the state. Albanians living in the border areas (known for their patriotism towards the ideal of a Greater Albania) were a threat to the Yugoslav state builders. Many were killed and imprisoned in Tito's purges, which lasted long after the war had ended. This region, which in Ottoman times had flourished owing to the trading routes passing through the valleys between the mountains, was marginalized and suppressed during

⁵ Interviews by the author in the region in 2010 as well as with the Chair of the B3P Ann Kennard on 24 September 2011.

the Communist period. In Albania, Hoxha's rule was no better. The Communist ideology had been put forth by southerners, but the northerners were less enthusiastic about the new state system. Thus the northerners were closely monitored by the regime. For state security the border regions were considered unreliable and their development was neglected by the central government.

Today Albanians are experiencing a boom of cross-border networking – this is sometimes looked at with concern by the ruling elites of the countries where Albanians live as minorities, such as Macedonia and Montenegro. All in all, the political changes in the region since the collapse of Communism have been dramatic: the borders of Hoxha's Communist Albania that had divided families and prevented communication for 45 years were reopened. Roads and other communication channels were rebuilt. In a Summit organized in the city of Prizren in June 2010 the Presidents of Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro discussed the creation of a mini-Schengen area to promote free movement in the area (Collaku 2010, President of Montenegro 2010). On different levels, national unity is being redefined and reinterpreted in an acceptable Europeanist discourse in contrast to traditional wordings.

It is not rare in the Western Balkans that the inhabitants of a border region can in fact feel closer to those living on the other side of the border than to those among whom the borderlanders are actually living: indeed these nation-states are characterized by imagined borders that exist within these states. To establish more permeable borders would make it easier for this border population to cooperate with those they feel close to, but this perspective wakes up the fear of affecting or even breaking the integrity of the state.

Minority issues raise vivid emotions (see Roudometof 2002). During the last few years, the pace and magnitude of change have in fact awakened old threat images, conflicts and suspicions. However, at the same time European discourse is adopted by the political elites. Rarely can a politician talk against cross-border cooperation, free movement of people or decentralization, as these initiatives are openly based on Western and European values and the ideal of freedom.

The region under scrutiny in this article has been characterized by political and identity debates and statehood disparities. Montenegro gained independence in 2006 and Kosovo (though this was contested by Serbia and several other states) in 2008. Thus the border between Kosovo and

Montenegro in the Peace Park area did not exist as anything else than an administrative boundary until 2006. From 1999 to 2008 Kosovo was a UN protectorate. Decision making in this kind of situation, where the legality and legitimacy of the decision makers at the central level is put in question by some of the actors, has not made cooperation any easier. Today Kosovo's independence is recognized by both Albania and Montenegro, which makes the situation a little simpler. The lack of a united EU policy concerning the status of Kosovo has, however, made it difficult to acquire EU funds for this cross-border area.

To safeguard international financing and aid is today a priority on all levels of society. However, local projects remain under regulation and surveillance from the state level, and it seems that it is still quite difficult to get funding from the state budget for cross-border projects.

It would, however, be an oversimplification to think that the problems that the B3P project faces today would in fact exist because the area is inhabited by one ethnic population across the borders, the Albanians. On the contrary, it is **clearly a multi-ethnic area**. If in Albania the area participating in the B3P region is ethnically Albanian, on the Kosovo side the area is also mainly Albanian inhabited, but traditionally small Serb minority live especially in the municipalities of Peja/Peć and Deçani/Dečani (both with old Orthodox monasteries). On the Montenegrin side, this cross-border region includes a small Albanian population, but the ethnic map is more diverse than in the neighbouring countries, as described by John Milsom:

One of the problems anticipated in working in this area is its extreme political sensitivity. In both Albania and Kosovo, B3P is dealing with Albanian-speaking populations, in entities for which Albanian is the majority language. The Plav opština is home to three distinct communities, two of which speak variants of Serbian and one speaking Albanian. The part of the population that is Serbian-speaking and, by tradition if not by practice, orthodox Christian is most simply referred to as Serb, which is how most of its members would describe their ethnicity, if not their nationality. Albanians and Bosnjaks (Slav-speaking Muslims) make up most of the population in the southern part of the opština, closest to the Prokletije mountains and the Albanian border. The township of Gusinje has only a small 'Serb' population, and inhabitants of Vuthaj claim that it is the only entirely Albanian village in Montenegro. Remarkably, although the Albanian language is audible in Gusinje, it is almost invisible. (Milsom and Dworski 2010.)

This ethnic disparity in itself should not be an obstacle for cross-border cooperation that is in its essence understood as cooperation between 'us' and

‘others’. However, the existence of ‘us’ (Albanians) on all sides of the borders may be a factor which causes wariness among the ‘others’ – in the case of Montenegro the Slavic-speaking majority – whether Orthodox or Muslim. On the Montenegrin side, in this particular cross-border area the Albanians represent a small minority but may still be seen as a threat in the eyes of the central government – not in the sense of state security, but economically. They could, for example, profit more easily from the cross-border networks that they historically have with the neighbouring areas.

While a ‘borderless’ Europe may well be developing inside the EU, at the outskirts of the European Union the role of borders is continuously changing and not only towards more permeable forms. In the future, this cross-border region of the B3P may encounter a new obstacle brought about by European enlargement. Indeed, on the one hand the weakening inner border controls symbolize European integration and this ideal can be seen as one of the motors of cross-border cooperation also in the Balkans. On the other hand, the ever-strengthening controls on the EU outer borders characterize today’s EU. This can easily be seen on the borders between Slovenia and Croatia for instance, where until 2004 the crossing was fairly simple and where until 1991 there was no state border. Today the crossing of what has become an EU border is much more complicated.

The Balkan Peace Park may encounter a similar problem in the near future. The border controls between Montenegro and Kosovo, as well as between Montenegro and Albania, are pretty light and on the border between Kosovo and Albania the crossing has been made as easy as possible with no passport controls during the tourist season. However, Montenegro was given an official EU candidate status in December 2010, and it started membership negotiations with the EU in June 2012. Albania, on the other hand, was asked to perform better in its reform policies. Kosovo, however, cannot even dream of contractual relations with the EU as five EU member states have not recognized it as a sovereign state. It cannot yet negotiate a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU, which would be the first step in moving closer to the EU.⁶ Thus Kosovo’s EU accession lies farther away in the future when compared with Montenegro. If Montenegro joins the EU, these three countries will see the Montenegrin border

⁶ The representatives of Kosovo and Serbia agreed in February 2012 that even though Serbia does not recognize Kosovo, Kosovo can represent itself in the regional cooperation structures under the name of Kosovo. This raises hopes of opening the doors for Kosovo’s contractual relationship also with the EU.

implement much stricter EU outer border controls, leaving Albanian and Kosovo partners with a much more complicated situation concerning the development of cross-border activities.

How to Promote Local Ownership?

Today, the idea of European integration is based on the dismantling of borders – but in actual practice it often means the borders between EU member states. Europeanist discourse has, as we have noted, an impact on policies towards the border regions also in the neighbouring areas. Border regions represent new opportunities of cooperation and prosperity. Thus the Western Balkan countries that strive towards EU membership have adopted political discourse that promotes regional and cross-border cooperation. Ideally, cross-border cooperation should be seen as something which has been established – a long-term vision for the border region. But whose vision are we talking about? Governments, municipalities, NGOs and ‘diaspora often carry a completely different perspective’ on the issue as compared with those who remain in the region (Reich 2006, 21).

On the government level, despite the positive political talk, cross-border cooperation rarely materializes in the concrete action plans of the Western Balkan countries. Even though a Europeanist discourse may be adopted, it is rarely or only partially implemented (as in many other policy fields, too). Border regions – not least because they may be inhabited by ethnic minorities – are still, if not openly then at least in practice, considered with caution. In addition to the general vigilance, central governments lack an overall vision for these regions.

This can be observed in the north-eastern region of Montenegro close to the Kosovo and Albanian borders. Even though the Plava lake area could be very profitable for developing a tourism infrastructure, the Government has not allocated any public funding for tourism projects there over the last few years. Many ethnic Albanian investors are even denied building permits. The Montenegrin government rather focuses instead on the coastline, which is the obvious destination for tourists coming from Western Europe. In addition, eutrophication (which could be stopped by fairly simple means) is slowly killing the Plava lake. Untreated sewage effluent and agricultural run-off carrying fertilizers are the causes of eutrophication. Eutrophication promotes excessive plant growth and decay and causes a severe reduction in water quality. Very quickly eutrophication is decreasing the value of this beautiful lake for recreation, fishing and aesthetic enjoyment. However, the

Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development either does not know about or is unwilling to acknowledge the problems of this region.⁷ These policies of neglect are a long way from the European Union idealization of cross-border cooperation and the development of border regions.

Sometimes the ideas that the central Government might propose are strongly opposed on the local level. In the village of Vusanje/Vuthaj, for example, situated in the protected area of the Prokletije National Park, the local population has raised their voice against a power plant project that has been tendered by the state of Montenegro to tame the river passing through this village. The inhabitants of the village claim that this plan has been made at a central governmental level without taking into account the local reality. The village does not have access to a municipal water system, but its natural source and the river Gerla are the sources of clean drinking water for the village population. Moreover, the disputable gains of such a project will not benefit this village. What makes this local conflict complicated is that the project has been approved by the Plava municipality to which this village belongs.⁸

This dispute is a revealing example of the lack of dialogue between different levels of administration from the village level to the central level. An active civil society could promote transparency in decision-making processes and ensure information flow from the local level towards the capital. However, the north-eastern part of Montenegro is lacking NGOs. This has been noted even by the Centre for Development of Non-Governmental Organizations in Podgorica.⁹ Without civil society advocacy it is easy for the central Governments to neglect remote areas. The NGOs have concentrated in the capital area, a development which may strengthen David Chandler's argument: he sees the NGO sector as merely legitimizing the international/donor-oriented solutions proposed for local problems (Chandler 2006, 113–115). Even international organizations do not seem interested in the remote areas that do not have the structures to present their interests in a discursive framework that would be compatible with the international agenda and their stated goals – such as conflict resolution or European integration.

⁷ Interview by the author with the Deputy Minister of Nebojša Popović Ministry of Sustainable Development and Tourism of Montenegro, 18 October 2011.

⁸ See Friends of Vuthaj, the online petition.

⁹ Interview by the author of Ana Novakovic, the Executive Director of the Center for Development of non-Governmental Organizations, 17 October 2011.

On the European level, cross-border cooperation is presented as a way to overcome the conflicts related to nation-state building and a step towards European integration. The Patron of the Balkans Peace Park Project Graham Watson¹⁰ notes: ‘Whilst EU membership remains a beacon of hope for Balkan countries, schemes like the Balkan Peace Park Project are vitally important to peace in Europe. The Project rises above the politics that have plagued the region [...] this embodies both the spirit of liberalism and European integration’ (Balkans Peace Park).

Despite the stated good intentions, the Balkans Peace Park project presents a number of unexpected disadvantages to the people living in the border villages. The societies around the borders concerned are undergoing deep changes in almost all spheres of life. Village life is changing through *immigration* (many diaspora members just build houses in the villages around these borders leaving them empty for most of the year) and *urbanization* (young Albanians from the Montenegrin side are moving to cities in Kosovo). Even though in the countryside many see the USA, Europe and the West as the models to be followed, strong traditionalism still prevails in these societies.

The Balkans Peace Park Project is a good example of a well-intended ‘prescription’ which aims to overcome local challenges such as unemployment and environmental degradation. The Balkan Peace Park project aims to provide the borderlanders with new tools and mechanisms to cope with these challenges. The project promotes environmentally sound ecotourism, organizes hikes, visits and conferences and looks for practical ways of strengthening sustainable development in this region. Besides being a project which incorporates a number of concrete activities, it is also a conceptual framework to promote the added value of the border regions. The Balkans Peace Park Project is often understood as a tool for the local inhabitants to learn about the benefits of European cross-border ideals. John Milsom, a member of the B3P, noted when visiting Vusanje/Vuthaj village on the Montenegrin side that ‘the main need in Vuthaj is for some form of employment, and scope clearly exists for the development of eco-tourism. [...] However, the villagers have at present little understanding of the tourism potential and of the sorts of tourists likely to be attracted to the Prokletije. It is in this area that the greatest needs exist’ (Milsom and Dworski 2010, 11).

¹⁰ Graham Watson is a Liberal Democrat Member of the European Parliament for South West England and Gibraltar and a Patron of the Balkans Peace Park Project.

Outsiders have tried to understand why the villages in the peace park cross-border cooperation area have not been able to adapt themselves to profiting from the new situation when cross-border cooperation is very fashionable on the European agenda and could provide interesting opportunities. *Appropriation* is often described as the act of taking possession or assigning purpose to concepts or ideas. Thus a successfully appropriated discourse would be something that is genuinely owned by the appropriator, something that has become a part of his or her understanding and life. Ideally the Balkans Peace Park project could give a frame for different actors in the region to adapt to the new pre-EU situation in places where the borders are opened after the collapse of Communism; both Kosovo and Montenegro are now independent and all three states concerned have been given a 'European perspective'. The project could serve as a discursive frame for the actors to modify their dominant discourses and conceptualizations to attract financing, investment, jobs and political support to the region.

A number of these opportunities, such as the EU funding instruments, are unknown to many in the region, but the lacking appropriation of European discourse on added value of the border regions is due not only to the lack of access to information, but also to the fact that this discourse simply does not answer to the needs of the local populations. People feel neglected (as they had been in Communist times) and do not even want to take ownership of a discourse that in some way might promote their living areas but on the other hand threaten their traditional way of life and even their economic interests. The resistance to the new proposals that arises on the local level often stems from the strong traditionalism of the villages.

In northern Albania and the Albanian villages near the border on the Montenegrin side, a customary law called Kanun still survives in the local habits and beliefs. Often the name of Kanun evokes blood feuds, but rather than that Kanun is a customary law that organizes the life in the village. Nebi Bardoshi is the leading anthropologist in Albania studying the traditional life in the north and north-eastern parts of the country: 'The social structure of the Kanun village is composed of three integral parts which are the "brotherhoods" or "fraternity" (*vllazni* in Albanian), "womb" (*bark*) and "families" (*shpija, familja*).' The largest social unit, which includes a number of families in the village, is the brotherhood or fraternity (Bardoshi, s.a.) One village may consist of mainly one brotherhood or may contain families of a number of brotherhoods, depending on the origin of the

village. Sometimes, like in the case of Vusanje/Vuthaj, the origin of the village can be traced back to three brothers who are said to have established the village hundreds of years ago. Thus most of the families belong to the same brotherhood. Some researchers refer to the smaller social unit ‘womb’ as *mahalla*, a grouping of houses united by the same family name. The smallest unit, the family, can also be referred to with the Albanian word *shpija*, a household.

Even in the post-socialist time, people do not see intra-brotherhood marriages as appropriate and follow the local lore which explains the blood relations between the families. Compared to modern law, which allows marriages between the cousins, the old traditional law does not allow marriages inside the brotherhood. People do not marry among themselves within the village either even if they are not blood related. The justification that the people give for this practice is that ‘their ancestors left this rule and it is inappropriate [even] to *speak* about such an idea at all’ (Bardoshi, s.a.). The traditions are still very much alive in villages such as Vusanje/Vuthaj.¹¹

Bardoshi explains that ‘the whole system of village common ownership of *land* (forests, water, and pastorals etc.) is closely associated with the memory of origin. The genealogy of each family is learned by each and every member in everyday life. Remembering familial, kinship or tribal genealogy is a very important part of personal and collective identity. From an early age girls learn the reasons why they cannot marry within the village and that they will not benefit from immovable property of the family. The Kanun’s rules on village land regulate primarily the acceptance of newcomers in the village. Newcomers’ acceptance in the village depends, first and foremost, on whether they would behave according to local customs’ (Bardoshi, s.a.).

Selling property – especially land – is still very complicated from the traditional point of view and does not make outside investments easy. In the Albanian villages the traditional way of life makes it difficult to provide simple ecotourism services and products that visitors expect. Following the traditional way of life, it is difficult for many Albanian families to rent guest rooms in their own homes to hikers or other foreign visitors as this would mean having foreign men in the house together with the women of the family. The traditional hospitality makes it difficult to take money for simple services. One of the leading principles of the Kanun is in fact hospitality towards visitors. To overcome these dilemmas, the jobs and

¹¹ Interviews and discussions by the author in the village of Vusanje/Vuthaj in 2010.

economic opportunities promoted by any development project need to be in line with the villagers' way of life. Such a project cannot succeed without genuine local ownership of the business initiatives and development aims.

On the other hand, the Balkans Peace Park is meant to become a cross-border/transnational protected area. There is still great local concern about the detrimental consequences of such a park for individual landowners (Young 2008, 10). The local landowners fear that establishing of national parks would mean that they would not be allowed to chop fire wood from their own forests which had become part of the national park or to attract other investments. In fact, the restitution of the lands that were nationalized during the Communist times is not seen as having been done correctly (if at all) in some of the areas in Montenegro. This raises negative feelings against the Prokletije National Park that has now been established by the Montenegrin government. Many Albanian families consider that their lands have now been permanently nationalized and without rightful compensation.

As the Balkans Peace Park Project has been promoting the idea of the Prokletije National Park in the area, it has received the criticism of the local population. This criticism has to be overcome if the project is to succeed in its aims at providing sustainable development and livelihood for the borderland villages. In an optimistic note John Milsom writes: 'It is clear that the level of local opposition to this development would be reduced if it could be seen by the people living in the Park area as a possible source of income. There will undoubtedly be opportunities in servicing tourists as the Park becomes established and more widely known, and also opportunities for employment as rangers' (Milsom and Dworski 2010, 11).

Local knowledge and ownership is necessary to create a project which the local population can relate to that finds feasible ways to resolve local problems. In the field of development aid, experience has shown that projects are unsustainable if they are conceptualized and planned entirely by outsiders (Reich 2006, 6). According to Reich, sensitivity to cultural differences alone is not enough (ibid., 20). The focus should be put on the power relationship between international donors and local actors. 'Taken seriously as a guiding principle for action, local ownership would mean far more than a consulting or participatory role given to the local actors on behalf of the donors or external parties. Rather it means that local actors have the final decisive power over a project's process and outcome. Local ownership then means a power shift, which goes far beyond existing practices. Local actors would not only be involved in the information-

gathering process or strategy development, but should have the means to decide about the agenda, strategy and budget management themselves, even decide who the beneficiaries of the project should be' (ibid., 15). Reich notes that local ownership requires more than dialogue and calls for a 'mutual learning process' between insiders and outsiders (ibid., 22). Thus for an outside funded or initiated project to flourish, a framework is needed in which both information and ideas can flow unhindered in both ways.

Conclusions

For the Balkans Peace Park project to succeed, it is crucial that the initiative takes fully into account the needs and habits of the local inhabitants. It is clear that a positive discursive framework, such as one constructed through a cross-border cooperation project, can promote the local interests in a dialogue with the capital city authorities as well as with international donors. Local knowledge needs however to be taken into account and valorized. Only if the local realities are fully incorporated into the project can the local inhabitants use it to strengthen their own bargaining position at the national level as well as to attract international investment. The current B3P as a UK charity has a long way to go if it wants to establish a real cross-border cooperation project based on genuine local partnership with local actors deciding about priorities, strategies and budgetary questions. The establishing of a local NGO called Balkans Peace Park Albania is a first step towards this goal. In the future, the B3P with local NGO partners may be able to serve as a framework for 'mutual learning' between insiders (the local NGOs and inhabitants of the region) as well as outsiders interested in the region's development, such as the active members of the B3P, foreign donors and diaspora members.

The Balkans Peace Park Project also needs to find ways to overcome the negative connotations both of its name (mentioning peace may imply that there has been a conflict earlier) and of the National Parks that it has been promoting (national park implies the nationalization of private land). Linked directly with local identity politics, the B3P can only succeed if it manages to find solutions on these conceptual but at the same time emotional issues.

Furthermore, the B3P needs a long-term vision for the region it is promoting. This is needed to attract international and European funding for the region. The cross-border cooperation that the European Union supports may not be of a long-term nature, but may instead be linked with a limited temporary project cycle. In addition, EU-funded projects are currently

established only between two states. However, an established cross-border project including local authorities from all sides of the border would make it easier to propose smaller bilateral projects for EU funding as well as to continue the cooperation activities in the future despite the uneven pace of the European integration of the participating states. In the area between Montenegro, Albania and Kosovo this situation will be at hand when Montenegro starts negotiating EU membership and needs to focus more on border management than on governing and Europeanizing its border areas. Thus the Balkans Peace Park could serve as a frame for maintaining cooperation despite the uneven EU enlargement process. Before this can happen, however, the B3P or any cross-border cooperation project needs to find ways to give a voice to the local population and provide a platform for mutual learning rather than being a tool of the Europeanization process, understood as a simple one-way street of transfer of norms and practices.

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Muslim Names the Bosnian Way

Bosnia-Herzegovina is multicultural, multiethnic and multinational, and the majority of names mirror this diversity – a personal name in Bosnia-Herzegovina often (although not always) tells about the background of the person with this name. Such diversity produces diverseness in the cultural, ethnic and national background of individuals. Names, however, often lack the potential to hold multiple intended messages about individuals and might be subject to interpretations not intended by the name givers.

In this paper, one part of this multitude is examined: a Muslim naming discourse in Bosnia-Herzegovina is studied here with the aim of formulating a socio-onomastic description of Muslim naming in contemporary Bosnia-Herzegovina. ‘Socio-onomastic’ here denotes that the results are derived from the discourses in my materials and not an authority such as the Council of the Islamic Community (*Rijaset Islamske zajednice u Bosni i Hercegovini*).

As the materials used for the socio-onomastic study of this topic are obtained from the Internet, the aim of this paper is to discuss web discourse on Bosnian Muslim naming.

About the Terms ‘Muslim’, ‘Bosniak’ and ‘Bosnian’ in This Article

The terminology used in this presentation reflects the terminology in the sources used. Arguments for changing ‘Muslim’ and ‘Bosnian’ into ‘Bosniak’ could be made, as Bosnian Muslims often are Bosniaks, although there are small groups of Muslim Roma, Albanians and Turks in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In fact, thus far I have failed to find sources which discuss the religious composition of the Bosniak population in detail, probably because authorities have failed to agree on a census or a similar method of determining the exact ethnic and religious composition of the population of

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Bosnia-Herzegovina. Various sources cite that about 90 % of all Bosniaks are Muslim (see e.g. an estimation based on a US Department of State report from 2009).² The Bosnia-Herzegovina census now planned for 2013 will probably provide some answers to this question (Agencija za statistiku 2012a).

In the web discussions used in this article, ‘Bosniak’ and ‘Muslim’ seem to be used interchangeably with much the same meaning (albeit and notably so, they are not interchangeable for all individual writers). Some writers also seem to use ‘Bosnian’ in this sense, although the briefness of the contributions and the spontaneous nature of web writing will explain these instances.

In any case, Bosniak naming is predominantly Muslim, by tradition, culture and anthropological mores, and I have not tried to distinguish between Muslim and non-Muslim Bosniak naming in this article (and further, this material is not suitable for it). Furthermore, it is probable that the (possibly 10 % to possibly even up to 25 % of) Bosniaks who are not Muslim give similar names as the Muslims – mostly due to shared customs. Finding significant and systematic differences between two such closely related groups in the same environment is difficult, and this study does not focus on such findings.

This choice of terminology does not imply that ‘Bosniak’, ‘Muslim’ and ‘Bosnian’ are synonymous; in this article, however, separating Bosniak and Muslim naming is not feasible. Most of the literature available is on Muslim naming in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and literature on Bosniak names such as Lisičić (2006) includes the names of Muslim Roma within the Bosniak names as they do not differ (Lisičić 2006, 46).

Bosnia-Herzegovina Today

In Bosnia-Herzegovina today there is a very visible and natural turn towards the origins of Islam after the wars in the 90s. But how large are the differences and what kind are they in comparison with the situation of the 1970s or the 1980s? What has changed is visible in the rituals, attitudes and content of the daily life of individuals. To some extent it is a question of the **visibility** of the presence of Islam in daily life; it was not ‘cool’ to be a pious

² Note that the CIA World Factbook (2012) cites that 48 % of the Bosnia-Herzegovinian population is Bosniak and 40 % Muslim, which would make the religious composition of the Bosniaks significantly lower than 90 %, given that there are small groups of other Muslims in the country.

Muslim in the cities in the 1980s, and there was a vast gap between religious life in rural settings and religious life in urban settings – a gap which still exists (Pickering 2006, 83). Also, it seems that mostly non-Muslims – Christians, the irreligious, those who with fondness remember a multicultural, secular Sarajevo – comment on the growing visibility of Islam, not the devoutly religious Muslims themselves.

It seems, however, that there is less interaction between groups of different backgrounds now than there was before; schools that used to be totally integrated – what Tone Bringa (1995, 83) calls the Yugoslav element in people's lives – are now often segregated, and there is less respect for the customs and attitudes of 'others', often owing to the lack of knowledge and interaction.³ A similar situation is observed by Nora Repo⁴ for Muslim Albanian women in Macedonia; they feel that Macedonian society at large does not like the Islamic ingredients of their lives, such as their choice of clothes.

Apart from possible hardships in family histories in the 20th century, the overall economic hardships and political uncertainty make daily life more difficult (Merdzanic 2005). Thus luxuries such as understanding and tolerance for others are less prevalent than before. There are, however, some reports such as Paula Pickering's on mixed urban workplaces and specific civic organizations that promote positive interethnic relationships (Pickering 2006, 79–103). According to the Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 30 % of the working age population was employed in April 2011 (Agencija za statistiku BiH 2011, 25), and the average net wage was 818 KM in February 2012 (Agencija za statistiku BiH 2012b, 1), which is slightly more than 418 euros.

A further change is that the earlier diaspora of *gastarbeiters* is now a diaspora of former refugees and highly educated young professionals. It has been estimated that 1.35 million nationals of Bosnia-Herzegovina live abroad (Nikolić et al. 2010, 5).

Previous Documentation of Naming Practices

Amongst the sources for naming in the times before the 1990s, there are some which are exclusively linguistic, such as Smailović (1977), and others which are ethnographic, such as Bringa (1995) and Sorabji (1989). Hadžišehović (2003) is more anecdotal, a tale of an individual life.

³ On respecting 'others', see Toijonen 2010.

⁴ Personal communication (19 January 2012).

In 1977 linguistic scholar Ismet Smailović published the extensive *Muslim names of Oriental origin in Bosnia-Herzegovina* (my translation of the title) in which he differentiates between Muslim names in Bosnia-Herzegovina and names that Muslims have in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Amongst the names that Muslims have – note that in his time the term ‘Bosniak’ (*Bošnjak*) was not in use – Smailović includes, of course, Muslim names of Oriental origin, but also names of Slavonic origin, names of other origins (*Indira, Denis*) and names that have a ‘Muslim feel’ but are combinations or variations of Muslim names, as this kind of innovative naming was present in the 1970s (and perhaps at other times, too). Smailović does not dwell on religious matters but discusses how Oriental names have been adapted to the local language (he goes through vowel, consonant, accent and morphological adaptations) and discusses the orthography and pronunciation of names of Oriental origin in the Serbo-Croatian of his day. Smailović is quite decisively of the opinion that Oriental names should be adapted orthographically and in pronunciation.

Tone Bringa’s (1995) account focuses on other issues, but when she mentions the cultural or ethnic reality of naming in the setting that she studied, most of her comments on names and naming boil down to the point that names tell the heritage of the subjects, and in mixed marriages the children are given *narodna imena*, Slavonic names. Mixed marriages are largely avoided in rural settings, but in cities they are rather frequent. Amongst the Bosnian Muslims in Bringa’s study, the primary group of identification was the Bosnian Muslim community or the Muslims of Yugoslavia, and a secondary group of identification was the worldwide Muslim community, which only what Bringa calls the ‘small urban-oriented economic and religious elite’ identified with. But, as ‘war changes people’, Bringa writes, ‘many Bosnian Muslims are redefining both the content and function of their collective identities, and identifying with a wider world community of Muslims more than before’ (Bringa 1995, 197–198; 224–225).

The informants in Cornelia Sorabji’s (1989) study have a different understanding of their identity as Muslims; Sorabji describes how they have a dual identity, where belonging to the Yugoslav Muslim community and belonging to the worldwide Muslim community (*Umma*) is simultaneous. When commenting on names in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sorabji writes:

Names always were, and remain today, indications of the affiliation of individuals. Certain surnames (Imamović, Hadžijahić, Mujezinović, Begović,

Spahić etc.) are distinctively Muslim but it is above all the forename that bears witness to the individual's affiliation. (Sorabji 1989, 36)

Munevera Hadžišehović's (2003) account is an autobiographical story about her life, and as such does of course describe her experiences, although with the aspiration of representing a group (Muslim females in Yugoslavia – the title alone reveals this). She grew up in Sandžak, went to school in Sarajevo and Belgrade, and lived most of her adult life in Belgrade. Although her life has been lived mainly outside Bosnia-Herzegovina, I have included her here because many of her relatives were situated in Bosnia and she tells about how her family gave names to their children. Hadžišehović writes that Muslims after 1946 'continued to give Muslim names to their children', and so Muslims were recognizable in a crowd. Further, she states that all Muslims in Yugoslavia 'had names connected with Turkish sultans', and names that 'indicated divine features' such as *Rahima* (Mercy), *Adem*, *Ibrahim* or *Ismail* (Hadžišehović 2003, 122).

The name Muhamed was given less often because it was seen as obligating the bearer to be a true Muslim, which could be unsustainable during stormy times, especially under communist rule. Common female names were Emina or Ema after the mother of the Messenger, Fatima or Fata after his daughter, or Aiša after his wife. As time went on, those who worked in the cities began to seek more modern names. Mothers wanted their children to have similar names, like Alma for a daughter and Almer for a son, Jasmina and Jasmin, and others that had no real meaning but were merely concocted. (Hadžišehović 2003, 122)

All of Hadžišehović's relatives that she tells of had, obviously, Muslim names, and some names such as *Abdullah* would recur in every generation, because the family had a custom of naming at least one child *Abdullah* in each family unit (Hadžišehović 2003, 123).

Rules of Muslim Naming

Hadith Abu Dawud, one of the collections of the Prophet's sayings, includes the most important rule of Muslim naming. Here we have two versions of it in English:

On Doomsday you will be called by your names and the names of your fathers – so chose [sic!] beautiful (or, graceful) names! (Schimmel 1989, 14)

It is reported that the Prophet (peace be upon him) said: 'On the Day of Resurrection, you will be called by your names and by your father's names, so give yourselves good names.' (Muslim Baby Names)

In this context the phrase 'beautiful (or, graceful) / good names' is important, and it is translated as *lijepa imena* in Bosnian:

Vi ćete na Sudnjem danu biti prozivani po vašim imenima i po imenima vaših očeva, zato nadijevajte svojoj djeci lijepa imena. (Zukorlić 2004, 5–6)

There are a couple of other Hadiths where it is mentioned that you should not give names that denote ruler (*vladar*), because Allah is the only ruler, and in Muslim literature the names the Prophet preferred and which were unsatisfactory is well known.⁵

In the Bosnian context it is also a custom to give names that the local Catholic and Orthodox communities do not use. This is a cultural and spiritual tradition, as Zukorlić (2004, 7) has reported, and the following example from the web discussion forum *islambosna* illustrates this:

HUD-HUD: The only important thing about names is that they do not have an ugly meaning.

vjera_istine2: And that they are not characteristic of non-believers.

You cannot in Bosnia give a child a name like Marija or for example David, but Merjem or Davud are possible. (*islambosna*)

In the example *vjera_istine2* states that names should not be those typically used by non-believers. In the original *vjera_istine2* has *u jednoj Bosni*, in a (sic) Bosnia, which seems to imply that *vjera_istine2* knows this is true for exactly Bosnia and not necessarily for the rest of the world, and that parents in Bosnia should know this rule.

Current Name Books

Books on naming often aim to advise parents on the difficult task of giving appropriate names to their children. Here two contemporary guides for Muslim naming are compared, and a book on modern names in Bosnia-Herzegovina is presented.⁶

Both naming guides are published by El-Kelimeh in Novi Pazar, both start with advice for parents on naming and customs at the birth of a new child, and both include a longish list of names with their meanings explained. Zukorlić's (2004) *Muslimanska lijepa imena* includes the Arabic

⁵ Here name changes are not discussed, although they are a part of Muslim naming traditions, both when converting to Islam and if a name is unsatisfactory for other reasons.

⁶ Unfortunately I did not manage to obtain Sulejman Lisičić's *Nova imena Bošnjaka u BiH*, published in 2009, in time when writing this article (see K.K. 2010). It seems, however, to be fairly similar to Lisičić's *Savremena imena i prezimena Bošnjaka, Srba i Hrvata* (2006).

version of all originally Arabic names; Kurdić's (2008) *Muslimanska imena i njihova značenja* includes more names than Zukorlić's book.

The advice given to parents in these naming guides is very similar; both books (naturally) recommend giving beautiful names which were names of good examples or good persons. Both warn against giving shortened names as official names. Both, as expected, advise against names that the Prophet advised against. In addition to this, Zukorlić recommends going back to one's roots and giving names that show your nationality, whereas Kurdić specifically advises against names that are in fashion.

Name books such as these, of course, take a stand on the question on spelling, as the names are given in writing in the books, so in ambiguous cases the writer needs to choose among alternate spellings. In Kurdić we have an interesting example: in the introductory text part of his book he recommends giving the names *Abdullah* and *Abdurrahman* because these were reportedly the favourite names of Allah, but in the name list part of the book, the preferred spelling is *Abdulah* and *Abdurahman* without the double consonants (Kurdić 2008, 17–20, 40, 44).

Sulejman Lišičić's (2006) book *Savremena imena u Bošnjaka, Srba i Hrvata* describes names in Maglaj, a smallish town in the north part of the Federation. The book includes lists of names characteristic of these three ethnic groups and found in Maglaj in various sources, but predominantly in school registers. One could argue that Lišičić's division of names into Bosniak, Croat and Serb is problematic, but it does correspond to the current understanding of the differences between the ethnic groups.

Lišičić comments on how Bosniaks now do not necessarily know that names have a meaning and that their names have meanings, and that parents giving names trust their feelings and give names that sound Oriental but often do not have a meaning. Often, according to Lišičić (2006, 39), parents take care not to give Croat or Serb names, but give non-Muslim names from other languages, which he seems to think is not recommended. Lišičić gives corrected name lists in his book; the names are not the actual names of Maglaj dwellers, but their names as they should be, according to Lišičić.

In the web discussions, name books are mentioned only as a source when meanings are discussed (and then only generically without mentioning a specific book) and when Sulejman Lišičić's book *Nova imena Bosnjaka u BiH* (2009) was new and discussed in the news.

Material of This Study

My material is a selection of discourses on names on the web; most are derived from discussion forums of different kinds: forums for Muslims (*Muslimanka.net*; *Islambosna.ba*); for parents and parents-to-be (*bebano* and *ringeraja*); for the cool, hip and funny, or whoever joins a local forum (*sarajevo-x*; *dernek*; *tuzlarije*; *bljesak*); and for recovering drug addicts (*narkomanija*). In addition to these, some questions and answers on the Rijaset's web page *Questions and answers on birth and akika* (also *aqiqah*; the sacrifice of animals, usually sheep, on the seventh day after the birth of a child) have been included when these questions and answers are about names.

The full list of web materials used in this article is given at the end of the article.

How representative are web discussions on names and naming of the overall discourse on names and naming in the area? The question of whether a part of a social phenomenon is representative of the entire social phenomenon is often difficult to answer in any case; whether anything on the web can be representative of a social phenomenon is perhaps even more difficult to answer, since interaction in writing on the web leaves out many aspects of human interaction. Perhaps this material is comparable to sampling techniques such as snowball sampling; the selection is not complete, and what you get depends on where you start, as well as persistence, hard work, expertise and good sampling design – and luck.

A general characteristic of all of the web threads used is that most only list names without commentary. When Muslim naming (which comes up in all the threads; the Muslim forums are obviously all about Muslim naming) is mentioned, the most frequent question is: 'Is X a Muslim name?' Another general characteristic is that the tone of discussion on the Muslim, parental and drug addict forums is one of respect for the other participants on the forum, where offence is not intended and apologies are given when somebody has been hurt.

What then is Muslim in this context? There are of course no reliable discussion markers in the forums which are not explicitly Muslim whether the contributor is Muslim or not; I have made choices and interpretations and included into the 'Muslim pool' in my study only such posts that I feel discuss Muslim naming – not necessarily knowing what has been intended by the contributor.

Naming in the Discussions


The discussions on Muslim naming fall into three categories: 'real' Muslim names, traditional Bosnian Muslim names and neutral names. These three categories are described in greater detail below.

'Real' Muslim Names

In the web discussions parents, looking for Muslim names who do not trust their own interpretation of what is Muslim ask for help. In the most frequent situation seen in the discourses in these materials, the parents have found a name and wonder whether it is Muslim, as in the first example below. Some of these parents might have consulted a naming guide such as Kurdić and Zukorlić or a local Muslim authority and failed to find an answer; this is, however, not mentioned in the questions.

Ime Nora

Friday, 03 July 2009 10:32

 Share

Pitanje

Esselamu alejkum!

Molim Vas za pomoć, zanima me da li je Nora muslimansko ime. Za dvije sedmice, ako Bog da, treba nam se roditi kćerka, ime sam našla na jednoj od internet stranica (NORA- svjetlost) ali nismo sigurni da li je to muslimansko ime. Drugo ime je Lana- nježna.

Odgovor

U principu ne bavimo se tumačenjem značenja pojedinih imena budući da postoje djela na temu muslimanskih imena te onaj koji želi znati značenja pojedinih imena može se obratiti na ta djela. Ali kada je urednik već prihvatio Vaše pitanje, citirat ćemo Vam značenje riječi "NURA" kako ga je naveo Muftić u svom Rječniku. "NURA: žig, vapno, kreč, žitka smola, sredstvo za uklanjanje dlaka, žarulja, sijalica." Arapi ženskom djetetu nadjevaju ime NUR, što znači svjetlost. NORA je engleska verzija riječi NURA Samoglasnik "u" pretvara se u "o". Koliko nam je poznato kod nas postoji žensko ime Nura, ali ne i Nora.

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- Namaz musafira
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- Svadba i dženaza
- Učenje dova čitajući

Pitanja i Odgovori

Prof. dr. Enes Ljevaković
fetva-i-emin



Pitanja možete slati na mail:
pitanja@rijaset.ba

Question:

As-Salāmu `Alaykum!

Please help, I would like to know if Nora is a Muslim name. In two weeks, God willing, our daughter will be born, I found the name on one web page (NORA - light) but we are not certain that it is a Muslim name. The second name is Lana - delicate.

Answer:

In principal we do not deal with the interpretation of the meaning of individual names because there are volumes on the theme of Muslim names and those who want to know the meaning of individual names may turn to those volumes. But as the editor has accepted your question, we will cite the meaning of the word 'Nura' as Muftić has in his dictionary. 'Nura: stamp, lime, razor, light bulb, light'. Arabs give the name NUR to female children, and that means light. NORA is the English version of the word NURA, the vowel u changes into o. As far as we know the female name Nura exists in our community, whereas Nora does not. (rijaset.ba.)

The above example is a question on the *Rijaset's* web page; apparently this Prof. Dr. Ljevaković is the one who has answered the question on whether the name Nora is Muslim or not. In my opinion he is here advising against choosing that name. Amongst the other questions and answers on the *Rijaset's* family pages, there are many about names as well as a separate comment that people should consult books about Muslim names and not ask the *Rijaset* about this.

There are those who will inquire about whether a name is good or not at their local mosque, and the *rijaset* is probably a web version of the answer you might get there. In the web discussion it is not mentioned whether an imam was asked, but there are mentions of other people who have wanted to give the same name who received a negative answer.

Within this category there is a sub-group where participants in the naming discussions refer to an authority on Islam such as the international Muslim community, often represented by a website or the customs of a Muslim country.

X_Hidzab_X: As-Salāmu `Alaykum, could somebody tell me if Larisa is a Muslim name and if it is, what it means ☺

sejfuddin: http://babynamesworld.parentsconnect.com/meaning_of_Larissa.html
(islambosna.ba.)

This is a question in a thread on *islambosna*; here the answer to the question of whether Larisa is a Muslim name is probably no, because the link given in sejfuddin's answer does not go to a Muslim web page such as MuslimBabyNames.net.

Many of the questions in this category are also questions on spelling and pronunciation. Contrary to Smailović's categorical opinion mentioned earlier that names should be adapted to Bosnian linguistic conventions, it seems that names now do not need to be adapted, at least not in the opinion of all parents. Lisičić (2006, 40–41, 43) also discusses this and thinks of it as a

retrograde phenomenon. In the web discussions some of the more unusual spellings reflect a wish to adhere to Arabic.

A common comment in this category is seen in the excerpt below, where an individual experience of foreign Muslims is translated into something that is representative of Muslims elsewhere.

dana3: For almost all the names mentioned – they are not strictly Muslim (they are not given only to children of the Muslim denomination) because people from that region interpret that their name has the importance of a beautiful meaning and not which faith it belongs to.

With me at work is Abdulah, who is Catholic – Iran

Mahmud – Catholic – Afghanistan

We talked about my name, which is derived from Persian, and in translation would mean approximately Dušanka and so we talked about names [in general] and they thought it slightly strange that names are divided like that in Bosnia. (ringeraja.ba.)

Here a local foreign community (somewhere in the world outside Bosnia) has also discussed Bosnian naming and found it strange that names are divided between the nationalities as they are in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Traditional Bosnian Muslim Names

The subject of what is Bosnian, reclaiming Bosnian names and using names that are traditional comes up in some of the discussion threads, as the example below states:

Although, honestly, I think that we Bosniaks need to preserve and we have a right to Slavonic names ... Now I am not talking about the typical names Christians give, but names such as Badema ... etc.... are super names in my opinion. For instance, I do not know one Badema who is not Muslim, at least by birth, and Badema is a character in an old Bosnian tale (Badem djevojka). I remember an old grandpa whose name was Karanfil ... Also I see nothing bad in searching for names from the Bogumil times ... They are our forefathers, the Bosnian language is our language, and I do think it would be indifferent of us to give that up ... (islambosna.ba.)

This is part of an answer on *islambosna*; the whole thread discusses which names are Muslim and which are not, and this comment is about traditional Bosniak names.

A number of posts promote traditional Bosnian Muslim names (in addition to the Slavonic ones mentioned in this example) such as *Alija* instead of new, fashionable Muslim names with foreign spellings. Zukorlić (2004, 7), Lisičić (2006, 71ff) and Kurdić (2008, 10) point out problems

with giving untraditional names: they might mean something that was not intended, or do not mean anything, and are thus not good names.

In general, I would say that this category of traditional Bosnian Muslim names does not stand out in the web discussions. It is not probable that a Bosniak parent would need peer support on whether *Alija* or a similar, traditional name is Muslim or not. And I would expect that in a later analysis of web discourse, this category would be called traditional Bosniak names, but for now my general impression is that Bosnian Muslim better describes the discourse on these names.

Neutral Names

Many parents want names that are neutral, either because the parents are of different denominations (discussed further below), or because they do not want their child to be marked with a nationality or ethnic group. In the first example, the Muslimness of this post is unknown.

Yuna: I need a neutral international name for our second boy.

Help!

We would consider also religious names, but only neutral ones.

bebacha: Damir. (ringeraja.ba.)

This example comes from *ringeraja*; the discussion goes on to say that it is impossible to have religious names that are neutral. On the other hand, the name *Sara* has really gained in popularity in recent years in Bosnia-Herzegovina; it really seems to be both neutral (in the sense that *Sara* is common both internationally and within the different local groups) and religious. *Sara* is exceptional (also with regards to its history in the Third Reich). The name mentioned here, *Damir*, is also perceived as non-denominational, but (as parents on the forums have joked) it seems to be overrepresented in advertising in Bosnia-Herzegovina in recent years.

A common feature of neutral names is that they are intended to gather two different denominations in one name, as the following example shows:

Finding a name suitable for all parties involved can be tricky. All of the examples Vana here gives (*Nives, Ella, Mia, Naomi, Enea*) are generally perceived as international, including the way that they are spelled.

Some Thoughts

Comparing the web discussions with Smailović (1977), Bringa (1995), Sorabji (1989) and Hadžišehović (2003), it seems that only Smailović discusses the fact that Muslim naming in Bosnia-Herzegovina has not been entirely without variation. The others are rather direct: if you are Muslim, you will give your child a Muslim name. The current sociopolitical climate forces parents to choose between expressing a Bosniak Muslim identity (which Aldrin (2011) calls social positioning) or expressing an identity without a denomination. The discussion on mixed families is brief in these sources, similarly to Lisičić (2006), and gives no guidelines for those seeking to comply with several traditions at once. Zukorlić (2004) and Kurdić (2008) do not mention mixed situations, as would be expected of Muslim naming guides.

Also, in comparison with the books, the web now documents discussions that would not have been documented before – discussions between neighbours or friends would never have come into the hands of a far-away researcher. In the nature of web discussions, of course, lies the fact that they are not easily authenticated; for all we know there might be one person logged on as several persons discussing naming with themselves. But why would anyone do that? And would not such fictional writing still mirror the actual world in some ways? It would seem that parents and parents-to-be are using the web discussion forums for peer support and in order to exchange thoughts on a variety of subjects.

A bold interpretation is, however, that the earlier categorical ‘(first) name shows origin’ is going to become even more invalid as the children being named now grow up. Certainly, some names do show origin; others are not intended to.

Conclusions

The results of the socio-onomastic examination of Muslim web discourses on names in Bosnia-Herzegovina were that three categories were found. These categories are positions that the discussants seem to take when names are discussed. The first position is the belief that there are ‘real’ Muslim names, as defined by the Muslim community; however, the person writing

defines that community. The second position is the promotion of traditional Bosnian Muslim names, sometimes called Bosniak names. And the third position is the choice of neutral names that can be given in mixed families or when parents do not want the names of their children to mark them ethnically.

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Max Wahlström¹

Greek Cultural Influence on the Bulgarian National Revival: The Case of Petăr Beron’s “Fish Primer” (1824)

Introduction

In this article I explore the early 19th century Greek cultural influence on the Bulgarian National Revival² (*Vǎzraždane*) and the creation of the modern Bulgarian literary language. I approach the question by exploring the ideas surrounding the creation of the *Riben Bukvar*, or “Fish Primer”, by Petăr Beron, published in 1824. This was the first Bulgarian textbook, and in contrast to coeval Bulgarian literature, written consistently in language based on spoken Bulgarian. The early years of Beron’s adulthood that led to the creation of the Fish Primer offer an illuminating perspective on the role of Greek culture in the Balkan society of the era. Special attention will be given to the influence of the well-known Greek scholar and educator Konstantinos Vardalachos on the thinking of the young Petăr Beron.

One of the most recent contributions to the question of Greek influence is by Raymond Detrez (2008), who, by analyzing the shared “Romaic” identity of the Greek Orthodox *millet* of the Ottoman Empire, reaches the conclusion that the Greeks presented no threat to the emerging Bulgarian national consciousness. However, as some additional evidence points to the contrary, I begin by examining the conflicting interpretations of this much-debated question in Bulgarian historiography. I argue that instead of being a threat, the rapid development of Greek secular culture was a precondition for the creation of the “Fish Primer”. What has led to much misunderstanding is the fact that the new ideas were debated and propagated predominantly in Greek, although not only by those who are now considered ethnic Greeks.

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² For criticism of the term, see Lindstedt (this volume).

Greek Influence in the 19th Century—A Threat to Everything Bulgarian?

The nature of Greek cultural influence during the 19th century is a much-debated theme in Bulgarian historiography. In more nationalistically oriented literature this influence has often been dubbed a threat to the emerging Bulgarian national consciousness, leading to an assimilation of Bulgarians. The use of this kind of language sometimes entails the romantic and teleological presupposition that national belonging is something that always existed among the members of what is now perceived as an ethnic group, only waiting to be woken up at the right historical moment, but facing numerous external threats.³ Nevertheless, it should be possible to debate the role of the expanding Greek influence in the declining Ottoman Empire without falling victim to this fallacy. The following passage is illustrative of a rather somber interpretation:

Greek cell schools⁴ had long existed all over Bulgaria wherever there were Greek colonies. These schools were not much different from the Bulgarian cell schools, but they were dangerous centers of Greek influence in Bulgaria, because of the economic advantages of knowing Greek, which was the *lingua franca* of trade in the Balkans, and because of the misplaced snobbishness of certain wealthy Bulgars who considered it “cultured” and “educated” to speak Greek and live like Greeks. (MacDermott 1962, 118)

This quote from Marcia MacDermott’s *History of Bulgaria, 1393–1885* reflects a typical attitude of the earlier historiography of Bulgaria: the portrayal of 19th century Greek cultural influence forming a threat to the emerging Bulgarian national consciousness. However, as Raymond Detrez (Detrez 2008, 159–160) points out, contemporary Bulgarian scholars have mostly discarded the idea of *dvojnoto robstvo*, the “double yoke” imposed on Bulgarians by the Ottomans, on one side, and the Greeks, on the other, who, in contrast with the Ottomans threatened Bulgarians with cultural assimilation rather than political oppression. While this picture has been abandoned in most current research, traditional views still persist.⁵

³ These views, which disregard the now predominant notion of nations being essentially rather late and artificial constructs, emerge most often in nationalistically motivated historiography and are quite often coupled with the understandable human tendency of thinking that what we have now is good because an alternative outcome is unimaginable.

⁴ Cell schools, most often located within monasteries, offered rudimentary primary education with a curriculum of mostly religious content (Crampton 2007, 49).

⁵ For example Lindstedt (this volume) is slightly more pessimistic. For a recent example, see Borislav Borisov (2009, 60–61) referring to the Greek language before the Bulgarian national revival as the “language of the cultural invader” (*ezikāt na okupatora na kulturata*).

In his lucid and thorough article, Detrez discusses the common Greek Orthodox identity in the Balkans before the national awakenings. He sees the myth of the double yoke as an anachronistic projection of modern day Balkan states onto the past—a projection that disregards the relative novelty of an ethnicity-based nation state (Detrez 2008, 152). The “Romaic” (Gr. ρωμαίικος) multi-ethnic proto-national identity was not based on language but on religion, which conflicts with the later national romantic ideas that considered language and *Volk*, the nation, to be inseparable. Detrez reminds us also that, in the Romaic community, instead of being a sign of ethnic belonging or “misplaced snobbishness”, the use of Greek by those who did not speak it as a mother tongue was simply something natural for Romaic city dwellers of a higher social status (*ibid.*, 165).

While it can be asked whether the Greek cultural influence was a force counteracting the birth of a Bulgarian national consciousness, a further question is whether any of this cultural expansion was part of a conscious attempt to Hellenize the non-Greek Christians in the Balkans. Detrez claims that the diffusion of Greek culture resulted from a natural development within the Romaic culture and was no-one’s active goal. This would be easier to accept if it were not for certain individuals with seemingly clearly stated Hellenizing motives as early as in the beginning of the 19th century. Paschalis Kitromilides (1989, 156) quotes a letter from 1815 by one of the most prominent figures of the Greek Enlightenment, Neofytos Doukas:

[...] because our language has been, as it were, completely compressed and confined in the smallest possible area, Greece itself, the nation, inappropriately, has been lessened as well, so that it is larger, on its own, than almost no other nation in Europe; however inasmuch it is in this regard reduced, it could equally derive advantages in other respects if it receives the necessary care; because no other nation might to an equal degree extend its language as we can, on the one hand through intermixture with those around us in Bulgaria, Wallachia, Albania, Asia and everywhere else, and on the other hand thanks to the elegance and usefulness of our tongue. In view, therefore, of our many present wants, if someone supposed that there might be anything more in our interest or better serving our prestige than spreading our language, he would not seem to me thinking soundly.

In fact, Detrez does offer an interpretation of another text expressing similar intentions, the often-quoted preface of the Daniil of Moschopolis’s *Tetraglosson*⁶, a Greek-Vlach-Albanian-Bulgarian dictionary published in 1802. He quotes the following passage:

⁶ For another perspective on *Tetraglosson*, see Lindstedt (this volume).

[...] Peoples that before spoke alien tongues, but devout in holy matters
Acquire the tongue and speech of the Greeks.
Greatly benefited in your professions,
And in all your commercial undertakings,
Rejoice young Bulgarians, Albanians and Wallachians, [...] ⁷

Detrez (2008, 165) accounts for this reminding that at that time Bulgarian intellectuals, too, used to encourage the learning of Greek for the same, purely practical reasons without any ulterior ethnic motives.

However, Victor Friedman (2008, 387) gives a very different reading of the same preface. He quotes the beginning of it:

Albanians, Bulgars, Vlachs and all who now do speak
An alien tongue, rejoice, prepare to make you Greek,
Change your barbaric tongue, your rude customs forego,
So that as bygone myths your children them may know. ⁸

According to Friedman, Daniil's *Tetraglosson* constitutes an attempt at "Hellenization of the indigenous non-Greek speaking populations of Macedonia". While Friedman's view feels justified, Detrez's choice of quote does seem somewhat biased in the light of this passage from the same text. However, before presenting further arguments, a glimpse into the study of the Bulgarian literary language is needed.

Greek Influence as Interpreted by Scholars of the Bulgarian Literary Language

In the study of the history of the Bulgarian literary language, the predominant view after the Second World War was very negative towards the Greek influence. It considered the Greek cultural expansion during the Bulgarian national revival to have been a threat to the development of a Bulgarian national consciousness and the use of the Bulgarian language. At the same time, as a model and a source for inspiration, the Greek culture was seen to be of minor importance. This attitude was held for example by the great Bulgarian linguist of the post-war era, Ljubomir Andrejčin. Rusin Rusinov, who according to Roger Gyllin (1991, 25) often echoes Andrejčin's views, describes the Greek "threat" during the 19th century in the following manner:

The construction of the Modern Bulgarian literary language began amidst a battle against the proponents of mental tyranny—the Greek Phanariots. A national

⁷ Translated by Richard Clogg (1976, 92).

⁸ Friedman uses another translation by Wace & Thompson (1913).

culture in the mother tongue could not be created without putting an end to the assimilating endeavors of the Greeks, carried out through church, school, and literature, without waking up and strengthening the national consciousness of the Bulgarians. The battle against the Greek mental yoke was first and foremost a battle against the Greek schools and the Greek language in Bulgaria and for their replacement with Bulgarian schools where the education would take place in the mother tongue. (Rusinov 1980, 33–34.)⁹

Rusinov continues by giving examples of the “battle”, quoting passages from two letters from 1839 by Vasil Aprilov, the famous founder of the Bulgarian secular school in Gabrovo: one to Neofit Rilski, the author of the first Bulgarian grammar, and the other to Rajno Popovič, an important writer-to-be. The quotes do not actually mention the Greek language but do, however, endorse the use of Bulgarian.

Going further back to scholarship at the end of the 19th century, an example of the earlier Bulgarian historiography reveals a similar attitude. In his preface to the biography of the same Vasil Aprilov, S. Milarov (1888, 5–6) bitterly criticizes the notion of “good old days” in describing the 1830s:

“Good old days!” . . . When in most places in Bulgaria there were only Greek schools, when only rarely was Greek not heard, when practically all of the uppermost stratum of the city dwellers were becoming Greek, especially the most eminent and rich Bulgarians abroad: in Wallachia, in Russia, in Constantinople, who were taking pride in being Hellenes and who did not have the habit of speaking anything else than Greek!

Milarov’s account continues by describing the steps that eventually led to the appearance of a new figure in the Bulgarian cultural and educational domain, Aprilov, and the opening of the Gabrovo school. He credits, among others, the Russian Bulgarist Jurij Venelin and Count Ivan Ivanovič Dibič-Zabalkanskij, a hero of the Russo-Turkish war of 1828–1829. He even praises Sultan Mahmud II for the reforms he initiated in the Ottoman Empire, but carefully avoids mentioning anything Greek except for the Phanariot clergy of Constantinople, who at that time “did not know the terrible force of a yet unawoken nation from whom they would suffer later on, in our days”.

These two accounts expressing a strong anti-Greek attitude appear very interesting if set against the thoughts of one of the most prominent Bulgarian scholars before the Second World War, the literary historian Bojan Penev. Penev (1977 [1930], 413–414) describes in his exhaustive four-part history of Modern Bulgarian literature both Popovič and Rilski as Hellenophiles.

⁹ Translations by MW unless stated otherwise.

Furthermore, young Vasil Aprilov is even described as a “Hellenomaniac” (ibid., 484). For Penev, these characterizations stem, for instance, from the fact that Popovič saw in Greek erudition a main source for Neo-Bulgarian education (ibid., 414). As for Aprilov, Penev’s choice of words is explained partly by the fact that Aprilov actively supported the volunteers in the 1821 Greek War of Independence. For Penev, unlike for his late 19th century and post-war colleagues, someone being a Hellenophile and a Bulgarian patriot at the same time did not carry a contradiction.

To gain a better understanding of these conflicting views, let us now take a look at the case of Petăr Beron’s *Fish Primer* of 1824. If anyone, Beron would have been either the beneficiary or the victim of the increasing Greek cultural influence in the Balkans, being educated by some of the most prominent Greek enlighteners and patriots in the Princely Academy of Bucharest, whose earlier principals included the aforementioned Neofytos Doukas.

Fish Primer and Its Inspirers

Petăr Beron was born in the village of Kotel in Eastern Bulgaria as the youngest son of a weaver¹⁰. His father considered the education of his son to be important, and consequently Beron attended school in his childhood. After the economic devastation of his family, caused by the aftermath of the Russo-Turkish war of 1806–1812, Beron became an apprentice of a weaver. (Schischkoff 1971, 10–11.) In 1819, after first having moved to Varna, Beron was enrolled at the Princely Academy of Bucharest, a Greek school known also as the Lyceum of St. Sava (Báčvarova & Báčvarov 1993, 20–27).

Beron spent only two years in Bucharest because following the Greek War of Independence in 1821 the changed political situation forced him, like many Greeks, Bulgarians, and Romanians to flee to Braşov. The city was located in Transylvania just across the Ottoman Empire’s border and already hosted significant colonies of Greek and Bulgarian merchants (Báčvarova & Báčvarov 1993, 32–35). It is during these years in exile that Beron, with the financial support of a wealthy Bulgarian tradesman, Anton Ivanov, drafted

¹⁰ Sources suggest him being born sometime between 1793 and 1800, although most recent sources regard the years 1799 and 1800 as the most likely (Schischkoff 1971, 10; MacDermott 1962, 120; Božkov, Dimov & Dinekov 1966, 129; Sampimon 2006, 76; Báčvarova & Báčvarov 1993, 23).

and in 1824 published the book *Bukvar s različni poučenija*, better known as *Riben Bukvar*, the “Fish Primer”.

A number of inspirers have been proposed for the work, no doubt because Beron wrote it (probably) as early as in his early twenties and the book seems extraordinary in several ways. The Fish Primer is the first Bulgarian book not written by a cleric. It is written throughout in language whose linguistic choices closely reflect what became, after several decades of debate and attempts of varying quality, the Bulgarian literary language. Lastly, the outstanding suitability of the Fish Primer as a textbook is demonstrated by the fact that the last reprint was made as late as 1862, which means that the book remained in use for well over half a century (Báčvarova & Báčvarov 1993, 40).

The biographers of Beron, Neli Báčvarova and Mihail Báčvarov (1993, 35–39), offer an interesting insight: a year before the publication of the Fish Primer, in 1823, Beron visited the Mechitarist monastery island of San Lazzaro off Venice. The visit, sponsored by Anton Ivanov, is well described in the painstakingly precise daily records of the Armenian congregation of Benedictine monks inhabiting the island. They praise for instance Beron’s excellent command of “Slavic, Greek, French, and Transylvanian”. And from them, it also emerges that Beron discussed his upcoming book with the monks, known for their study and publication of ancient Armenian and other texts.

According to Báčvarova and Báčvarov (1993, 38), this single visit must have had special significance in the creation of the Fish Primer. Beron and his hosts discussed the content of the primer and Beron was shown some examples of similar works, published in Paris, Venice, and Constantinople. The Mechitarists, who owned a printing press, suggested that even a new type set be designed for the book, but did not, however, print the work, because Beron wanted to continue his studies as soon as possible somewhere in Western Europe and could not wait much longer. Báčvarova and Báčvarov do admit that exactly how the visit might have influenced the contents of the Fish Primer is hard to judge. They also admit that Beron was not satisfied with the textbooks he was shown, and insisted that the content of his book could not be copied from an already existing primer because of the unique needs of his audience. (Ibid., 37.)

Another parallel is highlighted by Dell’Agata (Dell’Agata 2004 [1977], 86): as Báčvarova and Báčvarov (1993, 38) also note, Beron includes in the Fish Primer some teachings from Dimitrios Darvaris’s book *Ἐκλογάριον*

Γραικικόν, published in Vienna in 1804. Darvaris was an author and pedagogue of Vlach origin from Klisoura, near Kastoria, who wrote both in Greek and in a dialect of Serbian. Also as an author of a grammar of spoken Greek (or simple Greek, *ἀπλοελληνική*, as he called it), Darvaris could naturally be seen as somebody whose ideas might have influenced Beron's linguistic choices.

Dell'Agata also sees a possible textual link between the preface of Vuk Karadžić's *Srpski rječnik* from 1818 and that of the Fish Primer. Both authors deplore the intolerable situation that, for centuries, nobody had embarked upon the task of writing books that would teach the spoken language of the Serbians and Bulgarians (Dell'Agata 2004 [1977], 86–87). Janette Sampimon (2006, 78) mentions a Serbian primer from 1812 by Pavle Solarić, unfortunately without citing her source. However, the influence of Solarić's textbook, although also entitled *Bukvar*, must be seen as superficial at most. It is written in a mixture of Church Slavonic and the Serbian vernacular, Slaveno-Serbian¹¹, and its content is much more religious in nature than that of the Fish Primer.

Konstantinos Vardalachos and the Fish Primer

I wish to discuss another possible influence in the creation of the Fish Primer that is mentioned, often in passing, by many.¹² In Petăr Beron's third and final year at the Bucharest Princely Academy, a previous principal of the Academy, Konstantinos Vardalachos (1755–1830), returned to his old post, having taught at a school on the island of Chios for more than five years and for a short period from 1820 onwards in Odessa.¹³ Vardalachos was an important figure of the Greek Enlightenment, a pedagogue, an encyclopedist, and a contributor to the famous periodical of the pre-War of Independence era, *Ἐρμῆς ὁ Λόγιος*.

After the Greek War of Independence in 1821, the paths of the two men were similar—they both ended up in Braşov, and remained in contact with each other (Sampimon 2006, 78). During the following three years Beron worked on his Fish Primer. Over these years, until 1825, Vardalachos was engaged in a very similar activity. The forced absence from his pedagogical

¹¹ For the use of the term, see Nuorluoto (1989, 30–32).

¹² Vardalachos's role has been examined perhaps most thoroughly by Penev (1977 [1930], 302–305).

¹³ Thus, contrary to what many sources suggest, Vardalachos was not the head of the school when Beron started there as a student. For the erroneous accounts, see e.g. Penev (1977 [1930], 302) and Dell'Agata (2004 [1977], 86).

activities allowed him to work on what he called the “most needed school books” (Κούκκου 1966, 212). However, the books were not printed straight away but only at the end of the decade, in the printing press of the Odessa Greek School of Merchants, the same school Vardalachos had taught at just before returning to Bucharest.

At least six of Vardalachos’s books were published during 1829–1830 in Odessa: a grammar of Classical Greek (*Ελληνική γλώσσα*) (Βαρδαλάχος 1829a), a grammar of spoken Greek (*ομιλουμένη Ελληνική γλώσσα*) (Βαρδαλάχος 1829b), a three-part textbook (Βαρδαλάχος 1830b; Βαρδαλάχος 1830a; Βαρδαλάχος 1830c), and a textbook of Aesop’s fables in the classical language with a translation into the modern language at the end of the book (Βαρδαλάχος 1830d)¹⁴. The books had probably been in use as manuscripts: in his preface to the grammar of spoken Greek, Vardalachos (1829b, 3–4) mourns the fact that “for some time, the pupils, especially the beginners, have had difficulties copying [the book].”

A preliminary survey does not establish a direct textual link between the Fish Primer and these books by Vardalachos. The Fish Primer does, however, include a selection of heavily abridged fables by Aesop, three of which are the same as in Vardalachos’s book.¹⁵ In addition, while the Fish Primer is clearly intended for younger pupils, some of its topics are very similar to those in Vardalachos’s text-book, for example, under the title “Physics”, both address a range of biological phenomena, such as animals and humans.

Yet what is perhaps more important here is Petăr Beron’s conviction of the importance of using vernacular-based language in writing. I believe that although being a patriot, Beron did not yet envisage a fully functional Bulgarian literary language. One indication of this might be that he published nothing in Bulgarian after the Fish Primer. On the other hand, in his afterword to the book, he gives a concrete reason for the uncompromising use of the vernacular: it is much easier to learn another language when one first masters the grammar of one’s mother tongue (*ibid.*, 288).

¹⁴ According to Κούκκου (1966, 179–180), after the untimely death of Vardalachos in September 1830 the grammar of spoken Greek was reprinted twice, in 1832 and 1834. Three more posthumous works appeared in Odessa, including a selection of dialogues by Lucian of Samosata translated into spoken Greek (*sic!* *ομιλουμένη Γραϊκική Γλώσσα*) in 1831 and a translation of Josephus’ *History of the Jews* in 1834.

¹⁵ It must be kept in mind, however, that Aesop’s fables are an integral part of Darvaris’s *Eklogarion*, too, and their form is much closer to that of the Fish Primer.

As we can see from the books by Konstantinos Vardalachos published in Odessa, he used extensively the spoken language as a medium of education. In his preface to the grammar of spoken Greek, he justifies his choice of subject very clearly:

There remains no resistance to or doubt about the usefulness of the grammar of the spoken language, as the everyday experience has shown how very easily the boys advance in the old Greek (παλαιά Ελληνική) language when they are first taught the grammar of their mother tongue. When a person is taught the grammar of any language, the grammars of other languages appear easier, especially when [the first grammar taught is] of that language that one also hears and speaks every day at home. This we can observe also among the civilized nations, they do not study another grammar without being first taught that of their own language.¹⁶ (Βαρδαλάχος 1829b, 3–4.)

The Bulgarian grammarian Ivan Bogorov (1986 [1848], 1–2) likewise uses surprisingly similar phrasing in the preface to his grammar based on “people’s pronunciation” from 1848: “Still, we struggled to accommodate it [the grammar] in a way that the structure would be similar to foreign grammars so that after learning it first, it would later be easy for a child to learn other, foreign languages.”

Vasil Aprilov, on the other hand, who, along with Beron, is considered to be one of the most important “vernacularists”,¹⁷ directly commends Vardalachos for his method in his book from 1847, *Misli za segašnoto bălgarsko učenie*, “Thoughts on contemporary Bulgarian education”:

Vardalachos’s grammar of the Modern Greek language became a new beacon for the children and teaching received a new method. The Greeks studied first the new and only after that the old language, and thus their adolescents walk with brave steps into perfection. Would it not be advisable for Bulgarians, too, to follow that example!! (Penev 1977 [1930], 303 quoting Aprilov.)

As we can see, for others at the time, the use of the vernacular in education was a new invention—with which some were ready to credit a Greek, namely Vardalachos. But an additional Bulgarian figure of the National Revival, Ivan Dobrovski (1812–1896), mentions another Greek in a similar context:

Contrary to Neofytos Doukas, who wanted to re-introduce Classical Greek, [Adamantios] Korais insisted that the people, in order to succeed in education,

¹⁶ I would like to warmly thank Antero Hyvönen for helping me with some of the difficulties in the Greek original. However, I take full responsibility for any deficiencies in the English translation.

¹⁷ See e.g. Gyllin (1991, 27).

should be taught in their simple mother tongue instead of Hellenic which was not comprehensible to the people. Because of that, I, too, began to think that, for the same reasons that Korais gave for the Greeks, namely—to succeed in education, in this case, our nation, too, must be taught in its mother tongue, not in Greek. (Quoted from Penev 1977 [1930], 72–73.)

Conclusions

The effect of the Greek influence during the Bulgarian National Revival is admittedly complex. I hope, however, that the example of the Fish Primer has demonstrated at least one fact: the birth of the modern Bulgarian nation was very much intertwined with cultural developments among the other Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans. This observation is in line with what Detrez writes about the Romaic proto-nation. I believe that what the conflicting views on the role of the Greek influence demonstrate is a shift in the Bulgarian attitudes that took place originally in the 1850s and 1860s during the intensification of the struggle for an independent Bulgarian church. In addition, as Lindstedt (this volume) demonstrates through the biography of Grigor Prličev, these decades do indeed seem to represent a final watershed period between the common Romaic and ethnically, linguistically based national consciousness.

To demonstrate this further, let us consider the following passage from an article in the newspaper *Gajda* by Petko Slavejkov from 1868:

Brother Bulgarians, our nation has endured and still endures great adversities! Great adversities, I say, because I do not know if there is a greater adversity than that when they take one's language away from somebody, when they do not allow that one prays or listens to the word of God in his tongue, when they recommend that one rejects one's nation, when they subsume one forcefully into another, foreign nationality, when they shove a strange language into one's mouth. (Rusinov 1980, 34 quoting Slavejkov.)

It is quite clear that writing of this nature would have been almost unimaginable only a few decades earlier. Hristaki Pavlovič, who was equally concerned about the growing Greek influence, puts it rather mildly in his foreword to a small Greek-Bulgarian dictionary from 1835: “Who succeeds with this useful language and learns it perfectly, I ask them strongly not to destroy their Bulgarian origins by calling themselves, as some insane people do, Greeks” (Penev 1977 [1930], 414).

Nevertheless, we need to return to the early examples of the Hellenizing ambitions that were described at the outset of this article. Although Doukas wrote in his letter from 1815 that anyone disagreeing would not be thinking

soundly, many, however, did disagree. The letter addressed to the Patriarch of Constantinople is, according to Kitromilides (1989, 158–159), one of the first examples of conflict between nationalism and Orthodoxy, the church being very much opposed to any type of secular nationalism, which, as Kitromilides notes, did eventually destroy “the ecumenical transcendental values that held Balkan society together within the fold of Orthodoxy during the years of captivity”.

While Doukas’s thinking clearly represents the kind of romantic nationalism that eventually shaped the political map of the Balkans, the case of Daniil is more complicated, mainly because he was not an ethnic Greek. As well, it was too early for Daniil’s exhortation to be part of any kind of systematic Hellenization attempt. I believe rather that Daniil was like the snob of MacDermott, the rich Bulgarians abroad of Milarov, or the insane of Pavlovič: those for whom their social status meant that they would speak and write Greek and regard those who did not as barbarians and peasants, in other words, typical Romaic persons of their social stratum in the sense of Detrez.

One final note must be made about the role of language in the shaping of the national state. I would not regard every early instance of self-identification along linguistic and ethnic lines as something that must be accounted for by those who believe in the prevalence of the Romaic identity in the Balkans. It would be naïve to think that such an obvious source of group identification would not emerge from time to time. As many ethnonyms show, language has always been a means of separating Us from Them. Friedman (2008, 386) points to jokes collected in the mid-nineteenth century from central Macedonia that clearly show how the awareness of the difference between language and religion must have already been widespread in the early 19th century, although in the same region, ethnic nationalism took roots only a century later.

It seems that for some historians it must have been painful to realize how much of the Bulgarian National Revival actually depended on external influences. All of the main proponents who were born before the 1820s received a solid Greek education, many of them partook in the Greek War of Independence, and further, they often wrote to each other in Greek¹⁸. One

¹⁸ This is not as strange as it may seem: in Finland, the most ardent and influential supporter of Finnish as the national language, Johan Wilhelm Snellman (1806–1881), never wrote a line in Finnish. He expressed his support for Finnish only in Swedish. (I would like to thank Henrik Forsberg for making me aware of this fact.)

could of course equally ask how Greek was the Greek enlightenment, when so many of its proponents were ethnically non-Greek. As the case of the Fish Primer shows, it was mostly a new pedagogical innovation that shaped the language of the book. The innovation was based on the ideals of the Enlightenment that were passed on in Greek, but in the hands of able Bulgarians, helped give birth to the Bulgarian national consciousness.

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