NICM-Declassified-Foreign-Threats-to-US-Elections-After-Voting-Ends-in-2024

DECLASSIFIED BY DNI HAINES on 16 October 2024 EE — omfam NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL Eeymugs)s)A TTS Nm NS come EE Foreign Threats to US Elections After Voting Ends in 2024 (U) Key Takeaways a ey a TeiLe 2024) through InaugurationDay(20January2025). JThe ICassessesthatthisyearChina, Iran,andRussiaarebetterpreparedto exploit opportunitiestoexert influenceintheUSgeneralelectionafterthepollscloseonElectionDayduetolessonsdrawnfromthe 2020 ‘election cycle. We expect these actors to at least conduct information operations denigrating US democracy ‘through Inauguration Day.AETToare of activitywilllikely be shapedbytheir perception ofopportunity,tolerance forrisk, and,forthose seekingto influence theelectiontoward aparticularcandidate,howtheprojectedoutcomealignswiththeirpreference. +m Someforeignactorsmayconductactivitiesthatseektodisruptordelaythetime-sensitiveandtightly ‘sequencedseriesofprocessesandevents thatbeginafterpollsclose.Eachstep,fromthetabulationofvotes TTTcrimes FE —— esp il os ct monitors sh eo boy ri combo ae poetoe election infrastructure. However, we judge that operations that could affect voting or official counts are less likely bee ey re Man gests abo Ussing vere ovpogon 61 es oh China, Iran, and Russia have previously sought to amplify discord,includingafter the breachofthe US Capitol on 6 January 202 and probably are nowbetterprepared to exploit opportunities after the polls close than in previous cycles. ET a] Clasifid By: EE | Derived Fron:I— clos On EE —

I— NC THT NyTo VE TENE eT Post-Election Day Information Operations Highly Likely — Fig sive vil st ely conduct formation pea pend ee er ed deri fe haeof the dein proce Ths prea ll ick cent a res oly comet he hk cone confoion and ction shot he eto proces, he afc he reienit ecion 020, cingherachofheUS Copte Tfcac cos ll amo certopost a pity iof con arti patty 1h cor ls re over 0 hs ned ome judging from their pre-election day activity in the present andpriorcycles. These activities probably would be designed undermine th 0S democnc, an cond Bove mics fo Pos ccm prices © S——Ts ea, Rosi ene actors ave post alain scaled shot the posi cng ise migars sd detreiER RRA £07 100 S02 oat actors eed Ages nm ce ls mc asaot elt oi ao ctionmle, Sry,i04,oomvetsv evant vit deme ges vey © m— frig cor consAgener tcl amplify dss bon ecco i oc ‘suchasfalseimagesofelectionofficials taking part in activities to underminethe vote. Russiahasgenerated AI content related to the election across all four mediums we are following—text, images, audio, and video—though ‘the degree to which this content has been released and spread online varies. Iranian actors have used AI to help Semcon oct mesos nd ee ions mvs te fr mee pos reo mvs Sh ©mm osconandTeanmy ss am oportuniy ocontnepsig conten ring heiprefered ae For ae, ais ice ars av esd eemesa oi Vie Fest Hrs elt alleged compsher shot ee aio toofie kes, emo abe scr 10 ‘publish content denigrating former PresidentTrump,SEG Foreign ActorsQuicklyIncorporated Capitol Breach into Information Operations —Ci, 5Ricopiedonte evesof ae07 dere he0S ‘politicalsystem,thoughwehavenoindicationanyforeign actorwas involvedinplanningorexecutingthesiege. 7 ema Ramana er RmpeaethU5Copsvole somporno disparagetheUnitedStates, andRussianinfluenceactorssubsequentlypostedpropagandaonmultipleplatforms.EY©PRC21variousIraniangovernmentofficialsalsocitedtheattackinnarrativescharacterizingtheUSasadecliningpower,includingforEy m— 1 cs rig ctor re poston 0s ober operons and pone 1s donk aon he integrityof the election and collect data, judging from cyber actors’ prior activities. In particular, actors might seek to Grp or ater abl cin ate goverment and cvs caso premre confoson shot cin us ci Chey ba terre mh con, vei 4 0 rine th con and acai Plc aval oe epi dota st ony omarion o cl lon fils, whch hy co verge te cof nunc operons. Bo EE —

———— NIC [Im PEE NE SET Se aT? + — or instance, in 2022, po Russia, Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU)-conected cyber actors known as the Cyber Army of Russia Reborn conducted a distributed denial ofservice (DDoS) atack against a public facing, US state lection office website, rendering it periodically inaccessible throughout Election Day. + — CsofAugust 2023, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)EE J actors were awareofunspecified information on US voters i 27 unnamed sates avaiable for download onaleak website, which,if acquired, could be used to target voters with disinformation—as in 2020, when Iranian cyber actors used data on more than 100,000 votes or is operation impersonating the Proud Boys. As of February, IRGCJl cyber actors had accessed a network domain associated with a US stategovernment's division ofclectons and probably obtained data on voter registration and on whether of ot some ofthe registered individualsvoted,NEG |m— Foreign Actors’ Goals Likely To Persist in Post-Election Period® — venafterthepols closeon ElectionDay, China, Iran,andRussia are likely tocontinueeffortsto ‘undermine US democracy, stokesocietalunrest, and positontheirpreferred candidates © m—Russiaseeks 0denigrate Americandemocracyandundermineconfidencei theelection.JE117] © m—Weassess ran i ying 0encouragesocietal discord,stokeviolence,andunderminetrust athe US democratic process, regardless ofwho wins the election JEG_—_SEG_—S ee————— « m—We assess China seeks to denigrate American democracy, but withoutfueling the perception that it seks © influence or interfere inthe US presidential election. China may bemorewilling to meddle in certain Congressional races. Jm— Potential for Physical Threats and Cyberattacks Afer Election Day — Foreign actors also have the capacity 0 stoke protest, take violent actions, and conduct yberattacks against some election infrastructure, and probably will decide whether to use such tactics based on their perceptionofthe election outcome and domestic US reaction. In general, we expect foreign actos wil be more likely to consider these tacticsifthey perceive thy will resonate with the domestic population and they can maintain plausible deniability; we areclosely monitoring for indications ofa shift toward these actions — Uical Theeats and Violence. Iran and Russi are probably willing 0 at leat consider tactics that could foment or contribute to violent protests, and may threaten, or amplify thieats of, physical violencein the post Electon Day timeframe. ISSSSG__—E, otsby Iran{0 assassinate former President EA — — 131 ——

EE NC Im NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL ‘Trump and other former US officials, which are likely to persist after voting ends, regardlessofthe projected outcome. II Flier a ety HOI crag US oon is soi mdi clio fig 0nd mony eon ad Roof RiHt stor ov 1 chic copay 0 ccs sone US ceeton ccd + — IEEEEETr Tr rT TOT US cect nt specthw slr cinghe pt in wich an ello 0 proce so pee Forti ange cates pense or scion mm Adversaries Could Target Various Post-Election Day Process Vulnerabilities \m— Foreign adversaries are likelyto perceive varying opportunities to undermine each stageofthe post-voing process. This period also has a sequenceofdeadlines that,ifmissed, could disrupt the normal process and have 0 EE —

I— NIC HHH TEVEGTTY © m—r 05 0 city il ped eels sg rerls bmn bn sn Coe no te ang msde oso ces downlk dirs nll os de ro as 100 close to call, although media coverage about how close the election is shaping up tobe might lead them to mel hh le vs hor ed © m— 3005 my ie cpt es tee pte nl DOS a rif gene i ena dd miei nfl en dn ene Hesrnc le i es posh wl de ag oy fe pe rl is fn bs Dr wm © mm ne ye rtAr es i es rc ee is ‘report unofficial results, even though they willbe debunked by official results. Voice cloning or cutting into livestreams with Al-manipulated content would amplify concerns about the tabulation process. (U) Vote Casting Resilient Against Manipulation AttemptsrrLEEEmeELeeRtathataforeignactorhasimpactedvoterdataintegrity,theabilitytovote,thetabulationofvotes,orthetimelyLm mm Certification and the Electoral College Process. Foreign actors may perceive a windowofopportunity to push disinformationorfoment or amplify protests and physical threatsduring the period between certification andthe joint er en ml levels to certify election results and conduct the Electoral College process. The most critical dates in this time period Ii nyt kde Hl Cells cs ent cl mend es ms Domb mere fs neDent + mmm Foreignactors creating or amplifying narratives questioning the legitimacyof the election results or rr en le dene ee I