October 18, 2024 | Policy Brief
China’s Military Drills Around Taiwan Elicit Only Token U.S. Response
October 18, 2024 | Policy Brief
China’s Military Drills Around Taiwan Elicit Only Token U.S. Response
China launched large-scale military drills around Taiwan this week acting on the pretext that Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te made offensive remarks in a major speech. These latest drills reflect Beijing’s strategy of incrementally tightening its military and psychological grip on Taiwan without provoking a decisive response from Washington.
Beijing launched its drills after Lai delivered a speech celebrating Taiwan’s national day, although its content was unremarkable. Lai made the speech on October 10, known as Double Ten Day, which commemorates the 1911 uprising that overthrew China’s last imperial dynasty and led to the establishment of the Republic of China (Taiwan). Historically, Taiwanese leaders have used this day to convey their position on cross-strait relations. While reaffirming Taiwan’s sovereignty, Lai struck a softer tone compared to his inauguration speech, in which he openly criticized China. For example, Lai expressed willingness to “work with China on addressing climate change, combatting infectious diseases, and maintaining regional security to pursue peace and mutual prosperity.”
Moreover, Lai’s speech was consistent with past National Day addresses delivered by his predecessors. His assertion that “The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has no right to represent Taiwan” reaffirms Taiwan’s longstanding interpretation of the One-China framework, which maintains that Taiwan is a separate political entity. Similarly, Lai’s statement that “the Republic of China and the PRC are not subordinate to each other” echoes former President Tsai Ing-wen’s 2021 National Day speech, signaling continuity rather than a shift in cross-strait policy.
In response to Lai’s remarks, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) launched Joint Sword-2024B, encircling Taiwan with 153 aircraft, 17 warships, and 17 coast guard vessels. Of these, 111 aircraft crossed into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ), a buffer zone beyond Taiwan’s territorial airspace designed to monitor approaching aircraft. For the first time, the China Coast Guard (CCG) participated in the operation, conducting “law enforcement patrols” and “rapid-response” drills simulating what the PLA referred to as a “key port blockade” to sever Taiwan’s maritime lifelines for imports of trade, food, and energy.
Joint Sword-2024B marks the latest escalation in China’s longstanding gray zone strategy, designed to create conditions for annexing Taiwan by steadily eroding the status quo and weakening the resolve of Taiwan’s people. This strategy involves continuous low-level economic, cyber, and informational coercion, alongside near-daily PLA incursions into Taiwan’s exclusive economic zone and ADIZ. Beijing’s gray zone tactics aim to significantly strain Taipei’s ability to enforce its sovereignty, gradually shifting the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait in China’s favor.
For its part, China’s Taiwan Affairs Office — a state organ under the Chinese Communist Party’s Taiwan Work Office — described Joint Sword-2024B as a “resolute punishment” for Lai’s “separatist behavior” and a “powerful deterrent” to Taiwanese “separatist forces.”
Meanwhile, the U.S. response to Joint Sword-2024B consisted of little more than formulaic criticism. While the Defense Department described China’s actions as “irresponsible, disproportionate, and destabilizing,” it announced no concrete measures to counter Beijing’s provocations.
To respond effectively to China’s escalation, the United States should dispatch Adm. Samuel Paparo, commander of U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific theater, to Japan and the Philippines to reinforce regional deterrence and commence freedom of navigation discussions. The Defense Department should also accelerate the return of a carrier strike group to the Western Pacific. Additionally, the White House should explore new sanctions targeting Chinese entities involved in the expansion and militarization of the CCG.
Craig Singleton is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and senior director of FDD’s China Program, where Reece Breaux is an intern. For more analysis from Craig, Reece, and the China Program, please subscribe HERE. Follow Craig on X @CraigMSingleton. Follow FDD on X @FDD. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focused on national security and foreign policy.