Show Headers
B. ANKARA 1231
C. ANKARA 1275
D. ANKARA 1511
E. ANKARA 1342
F. ANKARA 944
G. ANKARA 1102
(U) Classified by CDA Robert Deutsch; E.O. 12958, reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary: Turkey is stuck in a domestic and foreign
policy drift stemming from leadership and structural problems
in ruling AKP. A long-overdue healthy debate over Turkey's
identity and AKP, including its handling of relations with
the U.S., has started. But AKP's policy muddle is leaving a
vacuum that resurgent nationalism is seeking to fill. This
period of drift could be extended, making EU reforms and
bilateral cooperation more difficult. The drift may well
continue until the next crisis creates new political
alternatives in a day of reckoning. End Summary.
AKP Government Adrift
---------------------
2. (C) As the AKP government confronts the arduous task of EU
harmonization, it is manifestly adrift on domestic political
and economic reform. Implementation of reform legislation
passed in 2003-2004 is seriously deficient (refs A and B).
The AKP government has a poor working relationship with the
military, the Presidency and the largely-secular state
bureaucracy. It is failing to control corruption in the AK
party. It has been slow to introduce the banking, tax
administration and social security legislation required by
the IMF as a pre-condition for a new stand-by program. It is
neglecting relations with the EU. Erdogan has delayed
appointing a chief negotiator for EU accession negotiations;
both Erdogan and FM Gul have made statements which have
disturbed EU officials and politicians. Erdogan has still
not decided on a much-anticipated cabinet reshuffle.
3. (C) AK party officials publicly deny the government's
obvious drift and we see no sign it has yet begun to
undermine Erdogan's voter base. AKP's ability to get back on
track is compromised by its Islamist/neo-Ottoman reflexes and
single-party-state spoils system. We doubt this government
will be able to refocus or move our bilateral relationship --
which remains strong in some areas -- back to a more
strategic level.
4. (C) PM Erdogan is isolated. He has lost touch with his
Cabinet and parliamentary group. We hear MPs and Ministers
alike, even Energy Minister Guler, who is close to Erdogan,
complain they no longer have comfortable access, or feel
obliged to kowtow for fear of incurring Erdogan's wrath.
Business associations, strong advocates of AKP economic
policies, tell us they feel they have lost the PM's ear.
Erdogan has cut himself off from his closest spiritual
advisors in the Iskender Pasa Naksibendi brotherhood in which
he grew up, as we have heard directly from the brotherhood's
number two leader.
5. (C) According to a broad range of our contacts, Erdogan
reads minimally, mainly the Islamist-leaning press.
According to others with broad and deep contacts throughout
the establishment, Erdogan refuses to draw on the analyses of
the MFA, and the military and National Intelligence
Organization have cut him off from their reports. He never
had a realistic world view, but one key touchstone is a fear
of being outmaneuvered on the Islamist side by "Hoca"
Erbakan's Saadet Party. Instead, he relies on his charisma,
instincts, and the filterings of advisors who pull conspiracy
theories off the Web or are lost in neo-Ottoman Islamist
fantasies, e.g., Islamist foreign policy advisor and Gul ally
Ahmet Davutoglu.
6. (C) Inside the AKP, the more ideological Deputy PM/FonMin
Gul continues behind-the-scenes machinations, especially
during Erdogan's foreign junkets. Gul seems to be trying to
undermine Erdogan and take on more party control. He may
hope to reclaim the Prime Ministership, which he was forced
to cede to Erdogan four months after AKP acceded to power.
With his relatively good English, Gul works to project an
image of being "moderate", or "modern". In fact, Gul's peers
say he has a far more ideologized anti-Western worldview than
Erdogan. Gul, reflecting his pragmatic streak, has made some
constructive statements on bilateral relations and on
Turkey's Iraq policy since the Iraqi elections. However, we
understand that Gul and a group of like-minded MPs and
journalists continue to see fomenting anti-American attitudes
as one way to get at Erdogan while also being moved by
emotions of Islamic/Sunni solidarity.
7. (C) AKP's disarray has generated significant internal
unease from those who support Erdogan, but also from some of
the other tendencies forming AK. Energy Minister Guler and
Finance Minister Unakitan have both relayed to us through a
trusted intermediary that Erdogan does not know how to
proceed, either on domestic policy or on rebuilding relations
with the U.S. Deputy PM Sener, a bellwether of Islamist
sentiment, has told two of our insider contacts that he is
about to resign in disgust at the party's rampant corruption.
Hasan Osman Celik, one of Erdogan's closest business and
brotherhood friends and advisors from Istanbul, says he sees
no future for this government and thinks it is time for a
more flexible and open leader. Leading member of the
Fethullah Gulen lodge Abdurrahman Celik, who is said to have
influence over 60 or more AKP MPs, has expressed to us the
Gulenists' sense that Erdogan cannot hack it.
Long Overdue Healthy Debate
---------------------------
8. (C) The ferment is not all bad. It is beginning to force
some to question the real roots of inertia and stasis in a
Turkey that needs to accelerate its transition. We are
encouraged by the determination of some to open a
long-overdue, healthy debate on AKP and its handling of
Turkey's relations with the U.S. Secretary Rice's February 6
visit and subsequent U.S. media coverage helped ignite the
debate. Another catalyst was Deputy CHOD Basbug's January 26
press briefing, in which he coolly analyzed Turkish concerns
about Iraq and repeatedly emphasized that one cannot reduce
broad and comprehensive U.S.-Turkish relations to a single
issue. It was not until late February, that Erdogan --
albeit without conviction in his voice -- expressed anything
similar to Basbug's assessment of the importance of bilateral
relations.
9. (C) The debate has now produced some sustained trenchant
criticism of AKP's domestic and foreign policies from several
insightful mainstream commentators. However, mainstream
commentators are seen as too "pro-American" to be persuasive
among AKP or its supporters. Perhaps more important have
been the decisions of some pro-AKP Islamist columnists to
write unusually blunt warnings that the AKP government must
pull itself together or risk a fall. The Parliamentary
opposition has continued its anti-American 60's leftist
rhetoric as it winds its merry way to irrelevance.
Resurgent Nationalism
---------------------
10. (C) There is a more disturbing consequence of AKP's
weakness: resurgent nationalism. Two of the hottest selling
books in Turkey are "Metal Storm", a conspiracy novel that
feeds the worst instincts of Turks with its tale of a U.S.
invasion of Turkey followed by Turkish nuclear counter-strike
with the help of the Russians; and "Mein Kampf" (ref C).
Under instructions from the Directorate of Religious Affairs,
imams across Turkey delivered a March 11 sermon against
Christian missionaries (ref D), claiming they aim to "steal
the beliefs of our young people and children." We are
receiving increased reports of anti-Christian activity in
different regions of Turkey (e.g., ref E). The Central Bank
Governor told us that nationalist/isolationist forces are
behind the problems with the IMF (ref F). An attempt to burn
the Turkish flag during a Newroz celebration in Mersin has
drawn strong nationalistic statements from across the
spectrum, including a statement from the General Staff that
"the Turkish nation and the Turkish armed forces are ready to
sacrifice their blood to protect their country and their
flag." The decision to memorialize, after a 47-year hiatus,
the killing by British forces of several Ottoman soldiers
during the Allies' W.W.I occupation of Istanbul also bespeaks
the national mood.
11. (U) The Turkish media have given prominent coverage to
what appears to be a growth in street crime and to a parallel
refusal of the police, angry at limitations on their
operational abilities under the new EU-inspired criminal
code, to patrol aggressively. In a March 18 column, Ertugrul
Ozkok, managing editor of Turkey's leading newspaper
"Hurriyet" and one of the most authoritative press voices of
the Establishment, noted that the Turkish public is deeply
disturbed by what it perceives as a breakdown of law and
order. Ozkok, in what would appear to be an overstatement,
closed with a warning to Erdogan that, when democratic forces
cannot ensure safety in the streets (sic), then the public
and political space is left to other forces. In a March 4
column, Umit Ozdag, now in the running for chairmanship of
the right-wing nationalist MHP, cited increased crime as one
reason for the current popularity of "Mein Kampf."
12. (C) Resurgent nationalist feelings probably also played
a role in the press and government reactions to comments from
EU Ambassador Kretschmer about the government's loss of
momentum and EU accession, to the EU Troika's worry about the
police violence against a March 6 Istanbul demonstration, and
the press feeding frenzy over Ambassador Edelman's innocent
remarks on Syria.
Comment
------
13. (C) Having reached one of its primary goals -- a date to
begin EU accession negotiations -- Erdogan's AKP government
is out of ideas and energy. For now, EU- and IMF-required
reforms will face tougher opposition from re-energized
nationalists, the government will be tempted to delay
difficult decisions in any realm, and resistance to change
will be the default mode. Bilateral cooperation will be more
difficult, more vulnerable to characterization as
unreasonable U.S. "demands" that infringe upon Turkish
"sovereignty."
14. (C) This period of drift could last a long time. AKP's
Parliamentary majority is eroding, but only slowly (ref G).
Despite the unhappiness inside AKP, there is currently no
political alternative and there are risks to anyone who
actually forces a split. Erdogan still has a "nuclear"
option in hand -- early elections. The danger is that tough
decisions and the settling out of the political system will
be put off until a real new crisis emerges which will either
energize the AKP or bring new political alternatives.
Waiting bears a real cost, since Turkey needs to be more
nimble in pursuing the political, economic, social and
foreign policy agendas many Turks, the EU and the U.S., have
been supporting, than this type of static drift will permit.
DEUTSCH
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001730
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2015
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, MARR, TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY ADRIFT
REF: A. ANKARA 1074
B. ANKARA 1231
C. ANKARA 1275
D. ANKARA 1511
E. ANKARA 1342
F. ANKARA 944
G. ANKARA 1102
(U) Classified by CDA Robert Deutsch; E.O. 12958, reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary: Turkey is stuck in a domestic and foreign
policy drift stemming from leadership and structural problems
in ruling AKP. A long-overdue healthy debate over Turkey's
identity and AKP, including its handling of relations with
the U.S., has started. But AKP's policy muddle is leaving a
vacuum that resurgent nationalism is seeking to fill. This
period of drift could be extended, making EU reforms and
bilateral cooperation more difficult. The drift may well
continue until the next crisis creates new political
alternatives in a day of reckoning. End Summary.
AKP Government Adrift
---------------------
2. (C) As the AKP government confronts the arduous task of EU
harmonization, it is manifestly adrift on domestic political
and economic reform. Implementation of reform legislation
passed in 2003-2004 is seriously deficient (refs A and B).
The AKP government has a poor working relationship with the
military, the Presidency and the largely-secular state
bureaucracy. It is failing to control corruption in the AK
party. It has been slow to introduce the banking, tax
administration and social security legislation required by
the IMF as a pre-condition for a new stand-by program. It is
neglecting relations with the EU. Erdogan has delayed
appointing a chief negotiator for EU accession negotiations;
both Erdogan and FM Gul have made statements which have
disturbed EU officials and politicians. Erdogan has still
not decided on a much-anticipated cabinet reshuffle.
3. (C) AK party officials publicly deny the government's
obvious drift and we see no sign it has yet begun to
undermine Erdogan's voter base. AKP's ability to get back on
track is compromised by its Islamist/neo-Ottoman reflexes and
single-party-state spoils system. We doubt this government
will be able to refocus or move our bilateral relationship --
which remains strong in some areas -- back to a more
strategic level.
4. (C) PM Erdogan is isolated. He has lost touch with his
Cabinet and parliamentary group. We hear MPs and Ministers
alike, even Energy Minister Guler, who is close to Erdogan,
complain they no longer have comfortable access, or feel
obliged to kowtow for fear of incurring Erdogan's wrath.
Business associations, strong advocates of AKP economic
policies, tell us they feel they have lost the PM's ear.
Erdogan has cut himself off from his closest spiritual
advisors in the Iskender Pasa Naksibendi brotherhood in which
he grew up, as we have heard directly from the brotherhood's
number two leader.
5. (C) According to a broad range of our contacts, Erdogan
reads minimally, mainly the Islamist-leaning press.
According to others with broad and deep contacts throughout
the establishment, Erdogan refuses to draw on the analyses of
the MFA, and the military and National Intelligence
Organization have cut him off from their reports. He never
had a realistic world view, but one key touchstone is a fear
of being outmaneuvered on the Islamist side by "Hoca"
Erbakan's Saadet Party. Instead, he relies on his charisma,
instincts, and the filterings of advisors who pull conspiracy
theories off the Web or are lost in neo-Ottoman Islamist
fantasies, e.g., Islamist foreign policy advisor and Gul ally
Ahmet Davutoglu.
6. (C) Inside the AKP, the more ideological Deputy PM/FonMin
Gul continues behind-the-scenes machinations, especially
during Erdogan's foreign junkets. Gul seems to be trying to
undermine Erdogan and take on more party control. He may
hope to reclaim the Prime Ministership, which he was forced
to cede to Erdogan four months after AKP acceded to power.
With his relatively good English, Gul works to project an
image of being "moderate", or "modern". In fact, Gul's peers
say he has a far more ideologized anti-Western worldview than
Erdogan. Gul, reflecting his pragmatic streak, has made some
constructive statements on bilateral relations and on
Turkey's Iraq policy since the Iraqi elections. However, we
understand that Gul and a group of like-minded MPs and
journalists continue to see fomenting anti-American attitudes
as one way to get at Erdogan while also being moved by
emotions of Islamic/Sunni solidarity.
7. (C) AKP's disarray has generated significant internal
unease from those who support Erdogan, but also from some of
the other tendencies forming AK. Energy Minister Guler and
Finance Minister Unakitan have both relayed to us through a
trusted intermediary that Erdogan does not know how to
proceed, either on domestic policy or on rebuilding relations
with the U.S. Deputy PM Sener, a bellwether of Islamist
sentiment, has told two of our insider contacts that he is
about to resign in disgust at the party's rampant corruption.
Hasan Osman Celik, one of Erdogan's closest business and
brotherhood friends and advisors from Istanbul, says he sees
no future for this government and thinks it is time for a
more flexible and open leader. Leading member of the
Fethullah Gulen lodge Abdurrahman Celik, who is said to have
influence over 60 or more AKP MPs, has expressed to us the
Gulenists' sense that Erdogan cannot hack it.
Long Overdue Healthy Debate
---------------------------
8. (C) The ferment is not all bad. It is beginning to force
some to question the real roots of inertia and stasis in a
Turkey that needs to accelerate its transition. We are
encouraged by the determination of some to open a
long-overdue, healthy debate on AKP and its handling of
Turkey's relations with the U.S. Secretary Rice's February 6
visit and subsequent U.S. media coverage helped ignite the
debate. Another catalyst was Deputy CHOD Basbug's January 26
press briefing, in which he coolly analyzed Turkish concerns
about Iraq and repeatedly emphasized that one cannot reduce
broad and comprehensive U.S.-Turkish relations to a single
issue. It was not until late February, that Erdogan --
albeit without conviction in his voice -- expressed anything
similar to Basbug's assessment of the importance of bilateral
relations.
9. (C) The debate has now produced some sustained trenchant
criticism of AKP's domestic and foreign policies from several
insightful mainstream commentators. However, mainstream
commentators are seen as too "pro-American" to be persuasive
among AKP or its supporters. Perhaps more important have
been the decisions of some pro-AKP Islamist columnists to
write unusually blunt warnings that the AKP government must
pull itself together or risk a fall. The Parliamentary
opposition has continued its anti-American 60's leftist
rhetoric as it winds its merry way to irrelevance.
Resurgent Nationalism
---------------------
10. (C) There is a more disturbing consequence of AKP's
weakness: resurgent nationalism. Two of the hottest selling
books in Turkey are "Metal Storm", a conspiracy novel that
feeds the worst instincts of Turks with its tale of a U.S.
invasion of Turkey followed by Turkish nuclear counter-strike
with the help of the Russians; and "Mein Kampf" (ref C).
Under instructions from the Directorate of Religious Affairs,
imams across Turkey delivered a March 11 sermon against
Christian missionaries (ref D), claiming they aim to "steal
the beliefs of our young people and children." We are
receiving increased reports of anti-Christian activity in
different regions of Turkey (e.g., ref E). The Central Bank
Governor told us that nationalist/isolationist forces are
behind the problems with the IMF (ref F). An attempt to burn
the Turkish flag during a Newroz celebration in Mersin has
drawn strong nationalistic statements from across the
spectrum, including a statement from the General Staff that
"the Turkish nation and the Turkish armed forces are ready to
sacrifice their blood to protect their country and their
flag." The decision to memorialize, after a 47-year hiatus,
the killing by British forces of several Ottoman soldiers
during the Allies' W.W.I occupation of Istanbul also bespeaks
the national mood.
11. (U) The Turkish media have given prominent coverage to
what appears to be a growth in street crime and to a parallel
refusal of the police, angry at limitations on their
operational abilities under the new EU-inspired criminal
code, to patrol aggressively. In a March 18 column, Ertugrul
Ozkok, managing editor of Turkey's leading newspaper
"Hurriyet" and one of the most authoritative press voices of
the Establishment, noted that the Turkish public is deeply
disturbed by what it perceives as a breakdown of law and
order. Ozkok, in what would appear to be an overstatement,
closed with a warning to Erdogan that, when democratic forces
cannot ensure safety in the streets (sic), then the public
and political space is left to other forces. In a March 4
column, Umit Ozdag, now in the running for chairmanship of
the right-wing nationalist MHP, cited increased crime as one
reason for the current popularity of "Mein Kampf."
12. (C) Resurgent nationalist feelings probably also played
a role in the press and government reactions to comments from
EU Ambassador Kretschmer about the government's loss of
momentum and EU accession, to the EU Troika's worry about the
police violence against a March 6 Istanbul demonstration, and
the press feeding frenzy over Ambassador Edelman's innocent
remarks on Syria.
Comment
------
13. (C) Having reached one of its primary goals -- a date to
begin EU accession negotiations -- Erdogan's AKP government
is out of ideas and energy. For now, EU- and IMF-required
reforms will face tougher opposition from re-energized
nationalists, the government will be tempted to delay
difficult decisions in any realm, and resistance to change
will be the default mode. Bilateral cooperation will be more
difficult, more vulnerable to characterization as
unreasonable U.S. "demands" that infringe upon Turkish
"sovereignty."
14. (C) This period of drift could last a long time. AKP's
Parliamentary majority is eroding, but only slowly (ref G).
Despite the unhappiness inside AKP, there is currently no
political alternative and there are risks to anyone who
actually forces a split. Erdogan still has a "nuclear"
option in hand -- early elections. The danger is that tough
decisions and the settling out of the political system will
be put off until a real new crisis emerges which will either
energize the AKP or bring new political alternatives.
Waiting bears a real cost, since Turkey needs to be more
nimble in pursuing the political, economic, social and
foreign policy agendas many Turks, the EU and the U.S., have
been supporting, than this type of static drift will permit.
DEUTSCH
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
You can use this tool to generate a print-friendly PDF of the document 05ANKARA1730_a.