B. ANKARA 4367
C. ANKARA 4499
D. ANKARA 2521
(U) Classified by DCM Robert S. Deutsch. Reason: 1.5 (b)(d).
1. (U) CNN Turk and NTV news channels report July 18 that the
Turkish General Staff (TGS) leadership has voiced objections
to the AK Government about its latest EU-related reform
package. According to the reports, TGS opposes the reforms
because: 1) they "restrict the jurisdiction of the National
Security Council;" 2) the package would bring the military's
budget under civilian (Court of Accounts) control; and 3) the
proposals foresee holding NSC meetings every other month,
vice the current monthly schedule.
----------
Commentary
----------
2. (C) In a telephone conversation with us after the news
broke, AK Vice Chairman Firat was sparse in his comments,
noting, however, that "we (the Government) are under pressure
on a number of issues." In a recent, more private
conversation reported ref A, Firat noted that TGS is
attempting to use the controversy surrounding the July 4
brief detention of Turkish Special Forces (TSF) by U.S.
troops in Iraq to fan nationalist flames and undercut the
reform drive. Firat indicated that TGS Chief Ozkok is facing
severe pressure from more hawkish elements in the military
leadership who are trying to make it difficult for Ozkok to
unseat them.
3. (S) In a meeting with Polmilcouns July 16, Air Force Maj.
Gen. Suphi Acar (J-5/Chief of Agreements), confirmed that the
hard-line/soft-line split within the military is more
pronounced since the July 4 detention of the TSF. Moreover,
hard-liners long concerned about Ozkok's "accommodationist"
stance vis-a-vis AK and P.M. Erdogan are even more agitated
since the July 4 incident. Acar noted that he counts himself
among those that feel that AK's true agenda is an eventual
Islamic state (a view echoed to Polmilcouns July 15 by Air
Force Lt. Gen. Turgut, Acar's boss and TGS Plans/Policy
Chief). Ozkok, Acar said, must take a tougher line on AK's
attempts to diminish the role of the military in the MGK and
to take control of military spending. Similarly, given the
widespread view of USG "support" for AK, many flag officers
want Ozkok to take a more aggressive line with the Americans,
too, and feel he capitulated on the Joint Statement. Acar
agreed that the premier hard-liners are Army officers: TGS
Deputy Chief Gen. Buyukanit and Army Gen. Yalman, NSC SecGen
Gen. Kilinc, Aegean Army Chief Gen. Tolon, and Lt. Gen.
Karabay (J-3/Ops Chief).
4. (C) Cuneyt Ulsever, an influential columnist at the daily
"Hurriyet," told us July 18 that the NSC issue represents a
crucial test of AK and of Turkey's ability to continue the
reform process. He noted that the military is particularly
concerned with maintaining the NSC's ability to impose
discipline on the civilians. The NSC SecGen oversees
directly and indirectly hundreds of staffers -- including the
ASAM think tank headed by Umit Ozdag, who Ulsever asserted is
on the TGS payroll (note: which we have heard from numerous
other commentators -- septel). "I know" for a fact, he
asserted, that Ozkok himself is not/not driving the
opposition to the reforms. Ulsever also noted that the
opposition CHP is reversing course and opposing further
reform. He related how CHP Deputy Kemal Dervis, one of the
party's more reform-minded members, is now trying to convince
journalists that AK "is seeking a Sharia state" even though
Dervis knows better. (Note: in a July 16 meeting with us,
Dervis expressed slight "reservations" about AK even as he
applauded AK's reform push. end note.)
----------------
What Will AK Do?
----------------
5. (S) Maj. Gen. Acar asserted that, facing pressure from
within the military, Ozkok will insist, via his working
relationship with Erdogan, on diluting these measures to the
point that the military hard-liners would be satisfied. Acar
expressed confidence that Ozkok would prevail, but admitted
that should AK decline to back down, the TGS Chief would face
"unbearable" pressure.
6. (C) Ulsever added that it would be "political suicide" for
AK to take a step back now, given that it has extended
Parliament's current session precisely to enact these reforms
and to demonstrate to an overwhelmingly pro-reform public its
seriousness of purpose. Dropping the reforms would also
potentially wreak havoc with the GOT's EU timetable, and
negatively effect the EU's report on Turkey due out this
fall. Turkey's EU candidacy, Ulsever averred, depends on
what AK does right now.
-------
Comment
-------
7. (C) In the interest of helping Ozkok manage relations with
his hard-liners, AK is showing signs of back-tracking on key
reform proposals. As recently as July 11, F.M. Gul assured
Ambassador that the Government is committed to transforming
the NSC into a "real" advisory vice governing body (ref B).
However, we note AK's willingness to temporize to limit the
extent of confrontation. Recently they: 1) weakened a
comprehensive "reintegration" proposal intended to bring
PKK/KADEK militants down from the mountains (ref C); 2)
shelved controversial higher education reform bills (septel);
and 3) have shaded toward a more nationalist line on the July
4 incident. AK's approach could represent a tactical
decision to wait for the outcome of the Aug 1-4 meeting of
the Supreme Military Council (YAS), in the hope that Ozkok
will have the wherewithal to ease out some of the military
hard-liners. However, as so often in Turkey, biding one's
time becomes an end in itself (ref D), and might have
profound implications for Turkey's immediate and EU-related
future.
PEARSON
| TURKISH GENERAL STAFF OBJECTS TO EU REFORM PACKAGE AIMED AT RESTRICTING MILITARY'S POLITICAL POWER | |
2003 July 21, 07:24 (Monday) |
03ANKARA4544_a |
SECRET |
SECRET |
|
-- Not Assigned -- |
5993 |
-- Not Assigned -- |
TEXT ONLINE |
-- Not Assigned -- |
TE - Telegram (cable) |
|
-- N/A or Blank -- -- N/A or Blank -- |
-- Not Assigned -- |
-- Not Assigned -- |
|
-- N/A or Blank -- |
|
Content
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 004544
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2013
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH GENERAL STAFF OBJECTS TO EU REFORM PACKAGE
AIMED AT RESTRICTING MILITARY'S POLITICAL POWER
REF: A. ANKARA 4319
B. ANKARA 4367
C. ANKARA 4499
D. ANKARA 2521
(U) Classified by DCM Robert S. Deutsch. Reason: 1.5 (b)(d).
1. (U) CNN Turk and NTV news channels report July 18 that the
Turkish General Staff (TGS) leadership has voiced objections
to the AK Government about its latest EU-related reform
package. According to the reports, TGS opposes the reforms
because: 1) they "restrict the jurisdiction of the National
Security Council;" 2) the package would bring the military's
budget under civilian (Court of Accounts) control; and 3) the
proposals foresee holding NSC meetings every other month,
vice the current monthly schedule.
----------
Commentary
----------
2. (C) In a telephone conversation with us after the news
broke, AK Vice Chairman Firat was sparse in his comments,
noting, however, that "we (the Government) are under pressure
on a number of issues." In a recent, more private
conversation reported ref A, Firat noted that TGS is
attempting to use the controversy surrounding the July 4
brief detention of Turkish Special Forces (TSF) by U.S.
troops in Iraq to fan nationalist flames and undercut the
reform drive. Firat indicated that TGS Chief Ozkok is facing
severe pressure from more hawkish elements in the military
leadership who are trying to make it difficult for Ozkok to
unseat them.
3. (S) In a meeting with Polmilcouns July 16, Air Force Maj.
Gen. Suphi Acar (J-5/Chief of Agreements), confirmed that the
hard-line/soft-line split within the military is more
pronounced since the July 4 detention of the TSF. Moreover,
hard-liners long concerned about Ozkok's "accommodationist"
stance vis-a-vis AK and P.M. Erdogan are even more agitated
since the July 4 incident. Acar noted that he counts himself
among those that feel that AK's true agenda is an eventual
Islamic state (a view echoed to Polmilcouns July 15 by Air
Force Lt. Gen. Turgut, Acar's boss and TGS Plans/Policy
Chief). Ozkok, Acar said, must take a tougher line on AK's
attempts to diminish the role of the military in the MGK and
to take control of military spending. Similarly, given the
widespread view of USG "support" for AK, many flag officers
want Ozkok to take a more aggressive line with the Americans,
too, and feel he capitulated on the Joint Statement. Acar
agreed that the premier hard-liners are Army officers: TGS
Deputy Chief Gen. Buyukanit and Army Gen. Yalman, NSC SecGen
Gen. Kilinc, Aegean Army Chief Gen. Tolon, and Lt. Gen.
Karabay (J-3/Ops Chief).
4. (C) Cuneyt Ulsever, an influential columnist at the daily
"Hurriyet," told us July 18 that the NSC issue represents a
crucial test of AK and of Turkey's ability to continue the
reform process. He noted that the military is particularly
concerned with maintaining the NSC's ability to impose
discipline on the civilians. The NSC SecGen oversees
directly and indirectly hundreds of staffers -- including the
ASAM think tank headed by Umit Ozdag, who Ulsever asserted is
on the TGS payroll (note: which we have heard from numerous
other commentators -- septel). "I know" for a fact, he
asserted, that Ozkok himself is not/not driving the
opposition to the reforms. Ulsever also noted that the
opposition CHP is reversing course and opposing further
reform. He related how CHP Deputy Kemal Dervis, one of the
party's more reform-minded members, is now trying to convince
journalists that AK "is seeking a Sharia state" even though
Dervis knows better. (Note: in a July 16 meeting with us,
Dervis expressed slight "reservations" about AK even as he
applauded AK's reform push. end note.)
----------------
What Will AK Do?
----------------
5. (S) Maj. Gen. Acar asserted that, facing pressure from
within the military, Ozkok will insist, via his working
relationship with Erdogan, on diluting these measures to the
point that the military hard-liners would be satisfied. Acar
expressed confidence that Ozkok would prevail, but admitted
that should AK decline to back down, the TGS Chief would face
"unbearable" pressure.
6. (C) Ulsever added that it would be "political suicide" for
AK to take a step back now, given that it has extended
Parliament's current session precisely to enact these reforms
and to demonstrate to an overwhelmingly pro-reform public its
seriousness of purpose. Dropping the reforms would also
potentially wreak havoc with the GOT's EU timetable, and
negatively effect the EU's report on Turkey due out this
fall. Turkey's EU candidacy, Ulsever averred, depends on
what AK does right now.
-------
Comment
-------
7. (C) In the interest of helping Ozkok manage relations with
his hard-liners, AK is showing signs of back-tracking on key
reform proposals. As recently as July 11, F.M. Gul assured
Ambassador that the Government is committed to transforming
the NSC into a "real" advisory vice governing body (ref B).
However, we note AK's willingness to temporize to limit the
extent of confrontation. Recently they: 1) weakened a
comprehensive "reintegration" proposal intended to bring
PKK/KADEK militants down from the mountains (ref C); 2)
shelved controversial higher education reform bills (septel);
and 3) have shaded toward a more nationalist line on the July
4 incident. AK's approach could represent a tactical
decision to wait for the outcome of the Aug 1-4 meeting of
the Supreme Military Council (YAS), in the hope that Ozkok
will have the wherewithal to ease out some of the military
hard-liners. However, as so often in Turkey, biding one's
time becomes an end in itself (ref D), and might have
profound implications for Turkey's immediate and EU-related
future.
PEARSON
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
210724Z Jul 03
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| References to this document in other cables | References in this document to other cables |
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| 03ANKARA4583 03ANKARA4804 | 03ANKARA4319 |
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