Actress Sasha Selvaraj, popularly known as Ranjini, has challenged a recent order by a single judge of the Kerala High Court to allow the publication of Justice Hema Committee Report on working conditions of women in the Malayalam film industry [Sasha Selvaraj @ Renjini v State of Kerala and ors].

In her appeal, Ranjini submitted that she is not opposed to the publication of the report as such. However, she has raised concerns that her right to privacy may be infringed if sensitive portions of the report have not been properly redacted.

A Division Bench of Acting Chief Justice A Muhamed Mustaque and Justice S Manu on Friday (August 16) admitted her appeal and listed the case for hearing on Monday (August 19).

The Justice K Hema Committee was established by the Kerala government in 2017 following a petition by the 'Women in Cinema Collective' to study the issues faced by women in the film industry.

Actress Ranjini was among those who gave a statement to the committee as part of this study. In her plea, she highlighted that she had given her statement on assurances that confidentiality would be maintained.

She submitted that she had a legitimate expectation that she would be notified and heard before any part of the report that concerns her statements would be released.

The committee submitted its report to the government in 2019.

The State Information Commission (SIC) later allowed a plea to publicly release portions of the report after redacting personal information.

This move was challenged by film producer Sajimon Parayil before the Kerala High Court. However, on August 13, Justice VG Arun (single judge of the High Court) dismissed the petition,

This order has now been challenged by Ranjini, who raised concern that her right to privacy may be violated with the report's release since the task of redacting sensitive portions of the report was left solely to the discretion of an Information Officer.

She has submitted that those affected by the report's release have been kept in the dark about which portions would be redacted prior to the report's publication.

"The State Information Commissioner ought not have directed the publication of the report without the affected parties including the appellant being heard," the appeal said.

She added that when the right to information under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution conflicts with the right to privacy under Article 21, the latter should take precedence due to the reasonable restrictions on the freedom of speech and expression.

The Government Pleader (who represented the Kerala government and the SIC) on Friday objected to maintainability of the appeal on the ground that Ranjini was not a party to the petition before the single judge.

However, the Court overruled these objections and decided to hear the matter on Monday.

Advocates Renjith B Marar, Lakshmi N Kaimal, P Rajkumar, Keshavraj Nair, Arun Poomulli, Anand Ramesh, Abhiram S, Abhijith Sreekumar and Gaadha Suresh appeared for Ranjini.

[Read Order]

The Bombay High Court’s Aurangabad bench recently held that minority educational institutions cannot admit students under the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (RTE Act)'s 25% quota for economically and socially disadvantaged children, even if they choose to do so voluntarily [Izak English Medium School and Anr v. State of Maharashtra].

The Court emphasised that allowing such admissions would contravene the constitutional protections that exempt minority institutions from the RTE Act's mandate.

The case involved Izak English Medium School in Ahmednagar and Anand Medical and Education Foundation, both of which operate minority-run English-medium schools.

These institutions challenged a government directive linked to a circular issued on March 15, 2013, which specifically excluded minority schools from the RTE Act’s 25% quota. The schools argued that they should be permitted to admit students under the RTE quota as a voluntary gesture, while also seeking reimbursement for students admitted under the quota in previous years.

However, the Court rejected these arguments, stating that minority institutions cannot opt into the RTE quota without violating their constitutional rights.

In their judgment, Justices Mangesh S Patil and Shailesh P Brahme noted,

"Once the constitutional bench of the Supreme Court has held the RTE Act itself being ultra vires Article 30(1) of the Constitution, this Court in exercise of the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot permit the minority institutes like the petitioners to subject themselves to the provisions of the RTE Act. Even if they [minority institutions] are ready and willing [to admit students under the RTE quota], allowing them to do so could be only by making the provisions of the RTE Act applicable to them, which in itself is prohibited by virtue of the declaration in Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust (supra)."

The Court's ruling was based on Section 1(5) of the RTE Act which explicitly exempts minority institutions from its applicability.

The Bench also referred to the Supreme Court's ruling in the Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust case, which declared that applying the RTE Act to minority institutions would be "ultra vires" Article 30(1) of the Constitution, which guarantees the rights of minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice.

The petitioners further challenged the validity of certain provisions of the RTE Act and the 2011 Rules framed under it, arguing that these violated their constitutional rights under Articles 14, 19(1), and 30. However, the Court dismissed these claims, asserting that the petitioners could not contest the validity of the RTE Act or the Rules.

While dismissing the petitions, the Court acknowledged that Izak English Medium School had previously admitted students under the RTE quota and had not been reimbursed for the academic years 2017-18 to 2019-20. The Court directed the government to "undertake scrutiny of the claim" and reimburse the school within six weeks.

Advocates GR Syed and AB Gatne appeared for the schools.

Additional Government Pleader AR Kale and advocate AD Aghav represented the State.

[Read Judgment]

The Kerala High Court recently observed that a woman cannot be booked for the offence of sexual harassment under Section 354A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), even if the offence is alleged to have been committed against another woman.

Justice A Badharudeen made the observation while partially quashing criminal proceedings initiated by a woman against her in-laws in a marital cruelty case.

The case included allegations that the complainant had been sexually harassed by her sister-in-law. However, the High Court noted that Section 354A of the IPC, which punishes sexual harassment, applies only to acts committed by men.

"In order to attract offence under Section 354A of IPC, the overt acts dealt under Section 354A(1), (2) and (3), should be the volition of 'a man.' So the legislature diligently used the term `a man' instead of `any person' In the statutory provision and the legislative intent is to exclude woman/women from the purview of Section 354A of IPC. If so, it has to be held that Section 354A of IPC would not apply when the overt acts dealt therein was done by a woman against another woman/ women," the Court held.

The Court was dealing with a plea to quash a marital cruelty initiated against the mother-in-law and sister-in-law (among other accused) of a woman.

The complainant-woman had alleged that she had been mistreated by her husband, his parents and his sister.

She alleged that she was subjected to cruelty by the accused in connection with demands for money and property and was even was detained in a room and starved.

She accused her mother-in-law of attempting to harm her by tampering with the gas stove and obstructing her studies, and her sister-in-law of coercing her into improper sexual activities through threats.

Criminal proceedings were initiated against the accused (husband and in-laws) under Sections 498A (husband or relative subjecting a woman to cruelty), 354A (sexual harassment), and 34 (acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention) of the IPC.

The woman's mother-in-law and sister-in-law (petitioners) later moved the High Court to quash the criminal charges against them.

The petitioners' counsel argued that there were no specific allegations against them to substantiate the marital cruelty charges and added that that women could not be held liable under Section 354A, IPC.

The Public Prosecutor countered that the complainant was subjected to domestic violence and molestation by the accused in connection with demands for money and property, which prima facie established the commission of the alleged offences.

The Court found that there were specific allegations against the petitioners that prima facie warranted a trial for the offence under Section 498A (cruelty to married woman) of the IPC. Therefore, it refused to quash the Section 498A case and allowed the trial to continue with respect to this offence.

However, the Court quashed the sexual harassment charges since Section 354A IPC cannot be invoked against women and, therefore, could not be invoked against the petitioners.

A similar ruling was recently passed by the Calcutta High Court, which had observed that, "a female cannot be an accused under Section 354A of the IPC as is evident from very terminology as used in the said enactment."

The petitioners were represented by advocates V Arun, V Jaya Ragi, R Harikrishnan (Kambisseril), Neeraj Narayan, and Avaneeth SR.

Public Prosecutor MP Prasanth appeared for the State.

[Read Order]

Supreme Court judge Justice BR Gavai on Saturday stressed upon the need to have sustainable development instead of mindless destruction of environment.

He said that human greed should not cross a limit that we cease to care for the future generations.

In this regard, he highlighted the recent tragedy in Kerala's Wayanad where over 230 died during in landslides at Mundakkai.

"Today's conference and particularly the location where it is being held - Kerala is known to be the God's own country, it is such a beautiful country - particularly in the backdrop of what is a result of a human greed which has been noticed in the recent past about 100 KMs away from here, holding of such a conference on the sustainable transport, tourism and technological Innovations is very important," he said.

Justice Gavai was speaking at Commonwealth Legal Education Association (CLEA)'s International Conference on 'Law and Technology: Sustainable Transport, Tourism and Technological Innovations' in Kerala's Kumarakom.

"We have seen that on account of conflict between the development and environmental concerns, in the last decade we have suffered many tragedies," the Supreme Court judge said.

While Justice Gavai emphasised that development is necessary for progress, he also said that all the three wings, legislature, executive and the judiciary, have to work together to balance development with environment.

"No doubt that development is necessary for progress but it cannot be at the cost of the environment. Man has always been said to be greedy but the greed should not go beyond limits where there is no concern for future generations. Therefore, the concept of sustainable development over the last couple of decades has taken importance," he added.

The top court judge also said that while Constitution requires the State to protect the environment, the citizens also have a fundamental duty to protect the nature.

Justice Gavai also spoke on how environmental jurisprudence has developed in India in the past few decades and referred to the Supreme Court's orders of 1990s regarding public transport in Delhi.

"Taking note of pollution causing buses in Delhi, in one of the first MC Mehta case, the Supreme Court issued directions to remove such buses and the pollution from buses in Delhi has reduced substantially," he said.

Speaking regarding his personal experience heading the Green Bench at top court, Justice Gavai said,

"On one hand we have demands of State governments to permit dams to produce electricity but on the other hand there are environmental concerns that it would threaten already fragile ecosystems."

Justice Gavai in his address also commented on Artificial Intelligence, eco-tourism and man-animal conflict.

"Artificial Intelligence certainly plays an important role but it cannot be a substitute for the human mind. Conflicts with man and the wild have also to be taken into consideration when looking at the tourism, eco-tourism. Eco-tourism is an important aspect because in order to protect the environment, the important stakeholder is the resident of the area. Unless he gets a livelihood of environment, tiger reserve, he would have no interest in protecting the environment... these are all complex issues."

The judge said that the adverse effects of climate change need to be examined seriously.

"It has been said development is necessary but as has been [also] said anything else you are interested in can't happen, if you can't breathe the air and drink the water. Don't sit this time, do something. You are by accident of it alive at an absolutely critical moment in the history of our planet. The challenges of climate change are being noticed world wide. The adverse effects are one of the aspect which need to be looked into seriously"

Justice Surya Kant, who was also present at the event, said there was a need to enact new laws to address issues related to sustainable tourism development and transport.

"We need new legislation to address emerging issues," the top court judge said.

The legal framework should not only ensure economic growth but also address environmental protection and social equity, he underscored.

Kerala High Court Acting Chief Justice A Muhamed Mustaque also spoke on the occasion and said Wayanad landslides were a grim reminder that development must be sustainable.

Sustainable development cannot be treated as a mere buzzword, he remarked.

"I must thank the organisers for choosing Kumarakom to hold this conference which is a very apt location. The landslides in Wayanad will remain a grim reminder for all of us as we discuss the topic today," Justice Mustaque said.

Attorney General for India R Venkataramani said that to express solidarity with lives lost in Wayanad, a donation will be made to the Chief Minister's Disaster Relief Fund.

"We are all gathered here as global citizens. We first thought of keeping AI as the topic but we, the organisers, thought we should keep something more important and real as the topic for this conference," he said.

Solicitor General of India Tushar Mehta also expressed solidarity with those who died in the natural disaster.

"The incident is a reminder to all of us of what happens when we tinker with the environment, climate and nature. The subject today is very apt," he said.

Mehta also spoke about public transport and judiciary's role in aiding the State in implementing innovative measures towards environmental protection.

"We need a better system of public transport... In some countries there are days which have vehicular curfews. But such measures will require collaboration with executive, legislature and judiciary. But will the legislature be able to introduce something experimental and innovative? Even if it is implemented, it will be challenged before the courts maybe on new grounds like right to privacy, autonomy, freedom of movement. These are the challenges with which judiciary will have to grapple. All of us have to collaborate to ensure we leave this earth a better place for coming generations," he opined.

YouTuber Dhruv Rathee has told a Delhi court that the Suresh Nakhua, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leader who is suing Rathee for defamation, has a history of abusing public figures and is playing fraud on the court to get a favourable order.

The BJP leader has sued Rathee for defamation over a video titled “My Reply to Godi Youtubers | Elvish Yadav | Dhruv Rathee."

In a reply filed before the court through Advocate Nakul Gandhi, Rathee referred to certain tweets where Nakhua allegedly used foul language against people like Sonia Gandhi, Barkha Dutt, Suhel Seth, and others.

The YouTuber added that Nakhua deliberately concealed the fact when he (Rathee) referred to Nakhua as a “hinsak gaalibaaz” (abusive troll), a reference was also made to one of Nakhua's tweets.

“…the Plaintiff [Nakhua] has deliberately concealed the visual representations of the alleged defamatory portion in the impugned video from the knowledge of this Hon’ble Court. It is further submitted that visual representations of the impugned video hold crucial importance in determining the veracity of the allegations levied by the Plaintiff. However, Plaintiff deliberately, with conscious mind, refrained from bringing the visual representation of the alleged defamatory portion of the impugned video from the knowledge of this Hon’ble Court with the sole intention to mislead and obtain favourable order. Moreover, in order to show false urgency and injury, the Plaintiff has sought ex-parte ad interim relief,” Rathee's reply stated.

Nakhua’s post, which Rathee referred to in the video, read, “@gsurya U ass***** bit** Did I abuse u? U confirmed tht u r product of a rape i.e. Balatkar ki paidaish.”

Rathee has made the submission in his response to a plea for an interim injunction against him in the defamation suit filed by Nakhua.

Nakhua has objected to Rathee referring to him (Nakhua) as a “violent and abusive” troll. Nakhua has argued that such comments tend to bring down his reputation.

He has sought an order to restrain Rathree from tweeting, creating, or publishing any content that is derogatory or harmful to him.

The court had issued summons to Rathee on July 19.

Rathee countered the allegations, stating that Nakhua is “a person who instigates random public figures on public domain by way of abusing them."

He further contended that if Nakhua’s prayer is granted, it will amount to a “super injunction/ blanket injunction/ gag order” which is impermissible in the eyes of the law.

The defamation case was listed for hearing on August 16 before the court. However, because the judge was on leave, it will now be heard on August 27. 

Dhruv Rathee is represented by advocate Nakul Gandhi of NG Law Chambers. 

Advocates Raghav Awasthi and Mukesh Sharma represented Suresh Nakhua.  

The Gujarat High Court recently criticised officials of the State Forest Department and the Railway authorities for their failure to work out a plan to ensure that lions are not killed due to accidental collisions with trains [Suo Motu v. Union of India & Ors.].

A Bench of Chief Justice Sunita Agarwal and Justice Pranav Trivedi noted that Railway authorities and the forest department have evidently not been able to control the situation and have failed in their duty to comply with earlier directions issued by the Court on the issue.

The Court had earlier ordered the authorities to take concrete steps to curb lion deaths due to train collisions. The State Forest Department has a duty to ensure that no animal in the Gir sanctuary is harmed by outside elements, the Court had warned at the time.

However, in an August 9 order, the Court found that at least two incidents of lion deaths took place last month alone, which involved the death of a lion, a lioness and two cubs.

"The two incidents occurred in a short period of one week or so, shows approach on the part of the Railway authorities as also the Officials of the Forest Department. The Chief Conservator of Forests, Wildlife Circle, Junagadh, in his affidavit has submitted (a) response ... but as to how he proposes to ensure compliance of the directions given by this Court that no such incident occurred on the Railway track, there is complete silence in the affidavit," the Court observed.

It thus called upon the Chief Conservator of Forests, Wildlife Circle, Junagadh, to show cause as to why the Court should not treat his response as an avoidance of earlier directions.

Among other aspects, the Court took note of a report filed by an amicus curiae which reported that there was no proper fencing to prevent lions from coming on the railway track.

A High Level Committee had also reported that if the speed of the trains were less, lion death incidents could be avoided.

However, no such preventive measures have been taken either by the Railways or by the Forest Department, the Court was told.

"Resultantly, two more incidents of death of the Lion had occurred in the interregnum," the Court observed.

Last month, one lion death incident was reported on July 18 when the carcasses of a lioness and two cubs were found.

Another incident was reported around July 24-25, in which two lions got seriously injured by colliding into the Mahuva-Surat Passenger Train. One of the two lions died due to critical injuries.

In its August 9 order, the Court lamented that there was complete 'silence' on part of the forest department regarding the action taken after this incident.

The Bench proceeded to issue a show-cause notice to the forest department and directed that these issues to be brought before the High Level Committee that was constituted after an Court order dated April 23.

In earlier hearings, the Court had also refused to accept the explanation of the Railways that most lions die in train accidents while chasing prey.

In a hearing held in March this year, the Court had emphasised that the Railway and forest officials will have to "act in coordination and be in sync" to save the lions that are the pride of the country.  

The case will be heard next on August 30.

Advocate DM Devnani appeared as the amicus curiae.

Additional Advocate General Manisha Lukumar Shah and Assistant government pleader Chintan Dave represented the State of Gujarat.

Advocated Kshitij M Amin, Ramnandan Singh and Parth H Bhat represented the Union of India.

Advocate Radhesh Y Vyas represented the District Development Officer.

[Read Order]

The Supreme Court recently dismissed a public interest litigation (PIL) petition challenging the validity of Section 149 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) and several provisions of the Constitution of India [Dr SN Kundra v. Union of India].

A Division Bench of Justice Hrishikesh Roy and Justice SVN Bhatti dismissed the plea while imposing a cost of ₹10,000 on the petitioner, who had appeared in person to argue the matter.

"We have perused the averments in the writ petition. Also considered the submission made by the petitioner-in-person. We see no merit in the writ petition and the same is accordingly dismissed, imposing a cost of ₹10,000 on the petitioner," the Court's August 9 order said.

The petitioner had challenged the oath taken by the armed forces as well as the following provisions of the Constitution:

• Article 52 (President of India);

• Article 53 (Executive power of the Union);

• Article 75(4) (President shall administer oath of office to Minister);

• Article 77 (Conduct of business of the Government of India);

• Article 102(2) (Disqualifications from Parliament for defection);

• Article 164(3) (Governor of State shall administer oath of office to Minister of State);

• Article 191(2) (Disqualification of Members of Legislative Assemblies for defection);

• Article 246 (Subject-matter of laws made by Parliament and by the Legislatures of States);

• Article 361 (Protection of President and Governors and Rajpramukhs);

• Article 368 (Power of Parliament to amend the Constitution and procedure).

The petitioner had also challenged Section 149 of the BNS which deals with punishment for collecting arms or ammunition with the intention of waging war against the government of India.

After dismissing the plea with costs, the Court directed the petitioner to deposit the cost amount with Supreme Court Legal Services Committee within a week.

[Read Order]

The Allahabad High Court recently dismissed the election petition filed by Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP) leader Maneka Gandhi challenging the election of Samajwadi Party Member of Parliament (MP) Ram Bhuwal Nishad from the Sultanpur Lok Sabha constituency [Maneka Sanjay Gandhi v. Rambhual Nishad And Others].

Justice Rajan Roy found that Gandhi's plea was barred by limitation as it had been filed in contravention of Section 81 of the Representation of People Act, 1951 (RPA), which provides that an election petition should be filed within 45 days from the date of the election of the returned candidate.

Further, Section 86 of the RPA Act requires the High Courts to dismiss election petitions that do not comply with the mandate under Section 81.

In the present case, the Court noted that there was a delay of seven days in filing the election petition.

"The election petition has apparently been filed beyond the period of 45 days prescribed in Section 81 of the Act 1951 ... it is apparent that the Limitation Act, 1963, especially Section 5 thereof, is not applicable to election petitions. In fact, the applicability appears to be specifically excluded in view of the provision of Section 86 (1) of the Act 1951 which makes it mandatory for the High Court/ Election Judge to dismiss the election petition if it is not in conformity with the provision of Section 81 of the Act 1951," the Court said while dismissing Gandhi's plea.

Since the election petition was not maintainable, the Court did not examine the merits of the matter either.

"Unless and until the election petition is maintainable and is not barred by limitation, the merits of the matter cannot be considered," the Court said.

Ram Bhuwal Nishad defeated Maneka Gandhi (who was earlier the MP representing Sultanpur) by over 43,000 votes in the Lok Sabha Elections 2024. Gandhi had received 4,01,156 votes to Nishad's 4,44,330 votes.

In her petition challenging Nishad's election, Gandhi accused him of failing to disclose outstanding criminal proceedings against him in his nomination form.

Gandhi argued that when Nishad filed Form-26 during the election process for the Sultanpur-38 Lok Sabha seat in the 2024 elections, he declared just 8 criminal offences, despite the fact that he had 12 unresolved cases.

Gandhi said that such non-disclosure would constitute a corrupt practice under Section 100 of RPA.

Senior Advocate Sidharth Luthra and advocates Prashant Singh Atal, Amit Jaiswal, Dr Pooja Singh and Vijay Vikram Singh appeared for Maneka Gandhi.

[Read Judgment]

The Kerala High Court recently held that the Kerala Micro Small and Medium Enterprises Facilitation Act, 2019 (MSME Facilitation Act) does not apply to units established prior to the Act and is limited to new enterprises [Thajudheen A & anr v State Police Chief & ors].

Justice VG Arun observed that the MSME Facilitation Act, 2019, is intended to assist and facilitate the establishment of new enterprises in the State.

The Court explained that provisions of the 2019 Act indicated that they were meant to assist in "starting" or "facilitating" an enterprise. The preamble to the Act also contained similar references.

"There is also merit in the contention ... that the provision of the MSME Facilitation Act would apply only to new units ... The position is further clear from Section 4 dealing with the powers and functions of the nodal agency. The first among the functions is to assist and facilitate the establishment of enterprises in the State. Section 5, providing for self certification, also mentions about persons intending to start an enterprise," the Court said.

The Court was hearing a petition by Thajudheen A and Sudheer S whose plea concerned a hot mix plant (a tar mixing unit), "N & T Hotmix," which was being operated by them in Nellad village.

They claimed that the plant was being operated with all the necessary licences and permissions.

However, the Nellanad Grama Panchayat, at the instance of members of a Samara Samithi (protest committee), issued stop memos to the petitioners.

The petitioners then obtained an acknowledgment certificate under the MSME Facilitation Act, 2019. They argued that this exempted them from needing a Panchayat licence.

Although the stop memos were stayed by the Tribunal for Local Self Institutions, the petitioners alleged that their vehicles were being obstructed by Samara Samithi members.

The petitioners approached the police but said that the authorities took no action against the illegal obstruction.

Therefore, the petitioners moved before the High Court seeking police protection to resume operations in their unit.

Senior Counsel Ranjith Thampan argued that the hot mix plant operated with all necessary permissions. He explained that due to the Panchayat's failure to decide on the petitioners' license application, the hot mix unit started functioning based on a deemed license under Section 236(3) of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994.

Section 236(3) states that if an application for a license or permission is not decided within 30 days (or a prescribed longer period), it will be deemed granted subject to the usual conditions.

He argued that the acknowledgment certificate under Section 5(3) of the MSME Facilitation Act has the effect of approval. During the period of three years for which the certificate is valid, no authority can undertake any inspection for the purpose of, or in connection with any such approval, he contended.

Advocate Kaleeswaram Raj, who represented some members of the Samara Samithi, countered that the High Court had already directed the petitioners to obtain a valid Pachayat licence in an interim order passed on an earlier petition (which was ultimately withdrawn).

Raj contended that the petitioners' decision to file a new writ petition without obtaining the licence constituted a fraud on the Court.

Additionally, it was submitted that the hot mix plant's operation was in a densely populated area which was causing health and environmental issues, and that the Panchayat had issued stop memos based on complaints from local residents.

The Court noted that since the petitioners' unit was established before the MSME Facilitation Act, it could not benefit from the 2019 Act's provisions, which were intended for new enterprises.

The Court found that the acknowledgment certificate under the MSME Facilitation Act of 2019 did not exempt the petitioners from obtaining necessary permits under the Panchayat Building Rules.

"The fact that a functioning unit, issued with an acknowledgment certificate, for which new enterprises alone are entitled, casts a shadow on the statutory right claimed by the petitioners. The shadow gets darker by the fact that the unit is functioning in unauthorised buildings, some of which were constructed without obtaining permit from the Panchayat ... can the elaborate procedure under the Panchayat Raj Act and the corresponding rules, which prescribe elaborate procedure, be overlooked in such a casual manner(?) Part IX of the Constitution by which the Panchayat are made institution of self governances, is also to be kept in mind, " the Court added.

The Court proceeded to take note of the grievances of the local residents about the environmental and health issues caused by the hot mix plant and concluded that the petitioners were not entitled to police protection.

However, it clarified that the police could intervene in case any law and order issues arise from the dispute between the petitioners and respondents (Samara Samithi members).

The writ petition was dismissed.

The petitioners were represented by Senior Advocate Ranjith Thampan assisted by advocate Ajith Krishnan.

Advocate Kaleeswaram Raj appeared for members of the Samara Samithi.

The Nellanad Grama panchayat was represented by advocate Hanil Kumar.

[Read Judgment]

The Allahabad High Court recently said that mere failure to take care of aged parents of a husband may not amount to cruelty since such allegations are subjective in nature.

The Division Bench of Justice Saumitra Dayal Singh and Justice Donadi Ramesh was dealing with a man’s appeal for divorce on the ground that his wife had failed to discharge “her moral duty” to take care of his aged parents while he used to live away while in service of the police.

The Court said that the level of care that was necessary or desirable was never established by the husband. It further noted that no inhuman or cruel behaviour was pleaded by him.

“Mere failure to take care of aged parents of a spouse that too when the spouse [husband] had chosen to live away from his matrimonial home, may never amount to cruelty. What exact situation may prevail in each household is not for the Court to examine in detail or to lay down any law or principle in that regard,” said the Court.

The husband had initially moved the family court in Moradabad for divorce on the ground of cruelty.

The family court rejected the plea leading to the present appeal before the High Court.

The High Court also ruled that no cruelty was made out and thus held that the trial court had not erred in dismissing the suit for divorce.

“The appeal lacks merit and is, accordingly, dismissed,” the Court ordered.

Advocates Deep Chandra Joshi and Satya Prakash Pandey represented the husband.

Advocates DK Srivastava and K Srivastava represented the wife.

[Read Judgment]