Ruling
CITIBANK N.A. VS JON M LEADERAug 06, 2024 | 11/28/2022 | 24SMCV00885
Case Number: 24SMCV00885 Hearing Date: August 6, 2024 Dept: N TENTATIVE RULING Plaintiff Citibank, N.A.s Motion for Order that Matters in Request for Admission of Truth of Facts Be Deemed Admitted is GRANTED. The matters identified in Plaintiff Citibank, N.A.s Requests for Admission, Set One, are deemed admitted as of the date of entry of this order. Plaintiff Citibank, N.A. to give notice. REASONING Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.280, subdivision (b), a party may move for an order that the genuineness of any documents and the truth of any matters specified in the requests be deemed admitted, as well as for a monetary sanction. The court shall grant the motion to deem requests for admission admitted unless it finds that the party to whom the requests for admission have been directed has served, before the hearing on the motion, a proposed response to the requests for admission that is in substantial compliance with Section 2033.220. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (c).) Plaintiff Citibank, N.A. (Plaintiff) served Defendant Jon M Leader with its Requests for Admission, Set One, on May 15, 2024. (Mot., Langedyk Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. 1.) To date, no responses have been received. (Mot., Langedyk Decl. ¶ 3.) Accordingly, Plaintiff Citibank, N.A.s Motion for Order that Matters in Request for Admission of Truth of Facts Be Deemed Admitted is GRANTED. The matters identified in Plaintiff Citibank, N.A.s Requests for Admission, Set One, are deemed admitted as of the date of entry of this order.
Ruling
ALYSSA BACKLUND VS CHRISTOPHER STONEAug 12, 2024 | BC449910
Case Number: BC449910 Hearing Date: August 12, 2024 Dept: 32 ALYSSA BACKLUND, Plaintiff, v. CHRISTOPHER STONE, et al., Defendants. Case No.: BC449910 Hearing Date: August 12, 2024 [ TENTATIVE] order RE: defendant christopher stones motion for reconsideration BACKGROUND On November 19, 2010, Plaintiff Alyssa Backlund filed this action against Defendants Christopher Stone and Elite Imaging Concepts, LLC, asserting causes of action for (1) defamation, (2) false light, (3) public disclosure of private facts, (4) abuse of process, (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (6) violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200. The complaint stems from alleged false statements and material about Plaintiff that Defendants posted online. On December 3, 2013, default judgment was entered for Plaintiff against Defendants. The judgment was renewed on November 28, 2023. On March 12, 2024, Defendant Stone filed a motion to vacate the renewal. The Court denied this motion on June 10, 2024. On June 21, 2024, Defendant Stone filed the instant motion for reconsideration of the Courts denial of the motion to vacate. Plaintiff filed her opposition on July 30, 2024. Defendant filed his reply on August 5, 2024. LEGAL STANDARD When an application for an order has been made to a judge, or to a court, and refused in whole or in part, or granted, or granted conditionally, or on terms, any party affected by the order may, within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order and based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, make application to the same judge or court that made the order, to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order. The party making the application shall state by affidavit what application was made before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008(a).) DISCUSSION I. Legal Background Ordinarily, a complaint for recovery of damages must state the amount demanded. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.10(a)(2).) However, where an action is brought to recover actual or punitive damages for personal injury or wrongful death, the amount demanded shall not be stated. ( Id. , § 425.10(b).) In a personal injury or wrongful death case, the defendant may instead demand a damages statement from the plaintiff, or if no demand is made, the plaintiff must provide the statement before a default may be taken. ( Id. , § 425.11(b), (c).) If a party has not appeared in the action, the statement shall be served in the same manner as a summons. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.11(d)(1).) If a party has appeared in the action, the statement shall be served upon the partys attorney, or upon the party if the party has appeared without an attorney, in the manner provided for service of a summons or in the manner provided by Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 1010) of Title 14 of Part 2. ( Id. , § 425.11(d)(2).) These requirements are designed to ensure that a defendant who declines to contest an action does not thereby subject himself to open-ended liability. ( Greenup v. Rodman (1986) 42 Cal.3d 822, 826.) [A] default judgment that exceeds the demand would effectively deny a fair hearing to the defaulting party. ( Ibid. ) Therefore, a default judgment greater than the amount specifically demanded is void as beyond the court's jurisdiction. ( Ibid. ) II. The Motion to Vacate Defendant moved to vacate the renewal of judgment on the grounds that Plaintiffs complaint failed to specify the amount of damages as required under Code of Civil Procedure sections 425.10(a)(2) and 580(a). Defendants motion argued that the action does not involve personal injury and therefore Plaintiffs statement of damages did not constitute proper notice of liability. As a result, Defendant argued that the default judgment violated his due process. Plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that the defamation, emotional distress, false light, and public disclosure claims were personal injury torts under O'Hara v. Storer Communications, Inc. (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1101, 1118; Globe Internat., Inc. v. Superior Court (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 393, 398-99; and O'Hilderbrandt v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 323, 329. Plaintiff therefore argued that the statement of damages constituted proper notice of liability. Plaintiff argued that she properly served the statement on June 26, 2013 by mailing it to the P.O. box address listed in the Substitution of Attorney form that was filed when Defendants counsel withdrew. In reply, Defendant argued that even if the causes of action were based on personal injury, the statement of damages was not served in the same manner as a summons as required under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.11(d)(1). Specifically, Defendant argued that the statement was not mailed with a notice and acknowledgment. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 415.30(a); Sakaguchi v. Sakaguchi (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 852, 860.) III. The Courts Order In denying Defendants motion to vacate, the Court agreed with Plaintiff that her causes of action were for personal injury under OHara , Globe Internat., Inc. , and OHilderbrandt . The Court further held that Plaintiff properly served the statement of damages under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.11(d)(2). Specifically, the Court found that because Defendant had appeared in the lawsuit, the statement was properly served by mail either on Defendants attorney of record or on Defendant himself. At the time of service, Defendant had no attorney, thus the Court found that service was proper at the P.O. box provided by Defendant. IV. The Instant Motion Defendant moves for reconsideration of the Courts order on the following grounds: (1) the Court did not allow Defendant to fully present his arguments at the hearing; (2) the alleged defamation and the related emotional distress damages are not based on personal injury; (3) Plaintiff failed to use the mandatory CIV-050 form for her statement of damages and her custom form was not sufficiently specific; (4) the statement was not mailed to Defendants address of record; and (5) the Court incorrectly applied section 425.11. a. Personal Injury Defamation is rather that which tends to injure reputation in the popular sense; to diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence in which the plaintiff is held, or to excite adverse, derogatory or unpleasant feelings or opinions against him. ( O'Hara, supra , 231 Cal.App.3d at p. 1118.) A defamation claim thus seeks to vindicate decidedly personal interests. As such, defamation is a personal injury within the meaning of section 3291. ( Ibid. ) Agreeing with Plaintiff and OHara , the Court held that Plaintiffs claim for defamation was one for personal injury. Defendant presents no new facts or law to justify reconsideration of this finding. Defendants continued disagreement with the Courts interpretation is not grounds for reconsideration [s]ince in almost all instances, the losing party will believe that the trial court's different interpretation of the law or facts was erroneous. ( Gilberd v. AC Transit (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1500.) b. Statement of Damages Form Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to use the mandatory CIV-050 form for her statement of damages and instead used ordinary pleading paper. Defendant relies on the requirement that [t]he rules pertaining to defaults and default judgments must be precisely followed to ensure that a defaulting defendant is aware of plaintiff's claims. ( Fasuyi v. Permatex, Inc. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 681, 691.) The court in Fasuyi found that the multitude of defects with the plaintiffs request for default did not constitute precisely following the rules of default and concluded that the default should have been set aside. ( Id. at pp. 693-94.) In particular, the request for default was not accompanied by any statement of damages, on the mandatory form or otherwise. ( Id. at p. 688.) There was no proof of service of a statement of damages. ( Id. at p. 692.) Defendant received only a single page of an incomplete document and did not have a complete copy of plaintiff's statement of damages. ( Ibid. ) By contrast, Plaintiff filed a complete statement of damages, with accompanying proof of service, on June 6, 2013 and June 28, 2013, respectively. Defendant does not contend that he was served with an incomplete form. As stated in Fasuyi , the purpose of the default procedures is to ensure that the defendant received sufficient notice of the pending action to make an informed choice as to whether to defend or ignore the plaintiff's claims. ( Fasuyi, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 691.) Plaintiffs statement of damages accomplished this by providing the exact same information as the CIV-050 form. The categories of damages claimed in Plaintiffs statement are the exact same ones as provided in the CIV-050 form. Plaintiff did not change the wording or description of the damages. They appear on Plaintiffs statement precisely as they appear on the CIV-050 form. Under these circumstances, the Court does not find that Plaintiff failed to follow the rules of default simply because she did not use the CIV-050 form. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs statement does not separate loss of consortium from general damages or loss of future earning capacity in special damages and is therefore not sufficiently specific. (Mtn. 6:19-22.) It is unclear what Defendant means by this. Plaintiffs statement did not claim loss of consortium or loss of future earning capacity. Additionally, even the CIV-050 form does not separate loss of consortium from general damages or loss of future earning capacity in special damages. Procedural due process requires that a defendant be given notice of the existence of a lawsuit and notice of the specific relief which is sought .... The logic underlying this principle is simple: a defendant who has been served with a lawsuit has the right, in view of the relief which the complainant is seeking from him, to decide not to appear and defend. However, a defendant is not in a position to make such a decision if he or she has not been given full notice. ( Yu v. Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 1024, 1031; Greenup v. Rodman (1986) 42 Cal.3d 822, 826 [CCP §§ 580 and 425.11 aim to ensure that a defendant who declines to contest an action does not thereby subject himself to open-ended liability].) Consistent with this principle, a default judgment greater than the amount specifically demanded is void as beyond the court's jurisdiction. ( Greenup , at p. 826; CCP § 580(a) [The relief granted to the plaintiff, if there is no answer, cannot exceed that demanded ... in the statement [of damages] required by Section 425.11.].) Section 425.11 has been construed to require a statement of both special and general damages sought [because] ... such information aids a defendant in evaluating the validity of plaintiff's damage claims with regard to their provability. ( Schwab v. Southern California Gas Co. (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1322, disapproved on another ground in Sass v. Cohen (2020) 10 Cal.5th 861; Schwab v. Rondel Homes, Inc. (1991) 53 Cal.3d 428, 432.) The statement of damages personally served on Defendant satisfied this requirement. Defendant is correct that the Judicial Council developed and approved form CIV-050 for mandatory use as a statement of damages under section 425.11. (See, CCP § 425.12(b) [The Judicial Council shall develop and approve an official form for use as a statement of damages pursuant to Sections 425.11 and 425.115.]; Cal. Gov. Code, § 68511 [The Judicial Council may prescribe by rule the form and content of forms used in the courts of this state. When any such form has been so prescribed by the Judicial Council, no court may use a different form which has as its aim the same function as that for which the Judicial Council's prescribed form is designed.].) But it does not follow that Plaintiffs failure to use form CIV-050 means the statement of damages served on Defendant cannot support entry of the default and default judgment, especially given the Supreme Court's direction in Greenup, supra , 42 Cal.3d at page 827 that the plaintiff must give notice to the defendant of the amount of special and general damages sought before obtaining a default judgment. As stated previously, form CIV-050 would not have provided Defendant with any additional detail as to the damages sought by Plaintiff. Defendant cites no authority suggesting that a statement of damages is defective simply because it is not written on the Judicial Council form, even if it provides precisely the same information as the Judicial Council form. Although the court in Fasuyi referred to the CIV-050 form as mandatory, the default judgment in that case was defective for a variety of reasons. ( Fasuyi, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at pp. 688, 692.) The court is not persuaded that the statement of damages personally served on Defendant in this case failed to apprise him of the nature and amount of damages being sought or otherwise impeded his ability to make a fair and informed decision. ( Greenup, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 829.) Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiffs statement of damages was proper. c. Defendants Address Defendant argues that the statement of damages was improperly mailed to a P.O. box that was listed on a Substitution of Attorney filed on April 24, 2013 when Defendants counsel withdrew. Defendant contends that without a notice of change of address, his address of record at the time was the office of his attorney. Defendants cited case law contradicts his position. The case actually held that service at a rented mailbox was proper because that was the only address on record at the time of service. (See Sweeting v. Murat (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 507, 513.) Here, Defendants address for service was his attorneys office only while Defendant had an attorney. But upon the attorneys withdrawal, the only address provided by Defendant was the P.O. box. Serving the statement to an attorney who no longer represented Defendant would have been futile and improper. Thus, Plaintiff served the statement of damages to the proper address. d. Mailing Under Section 425.11(d)(2) Defendants argument regarding service by mail on a pro per litigant was addressed and rejected at the hearing on the motion to vacate. While reasserting his disagreement with the Courts interpretation, Defendant offers no new facts or law to justify reconsideration. As stated above, disagreement with the Courts interpretation is not grounds for reconsideration [s]ince in almost all instances, the losing party will believe that the trial court's different interpretation of the law or facts was erroneous. ( Gilberd, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at p. 1500.) As discussed, Plaintiff properly mailed the statement of damages to Defendants P.O. box. CONCLUSION Defendants motion for reconsideration is DENIED.