Would the U.S. Consider Assassinating Putin?

What would be gained by killing Putin? If the bar was juxtaposing the status quo with the consequences of Putin’s violent removal, would Russia’s threat to the United States and its allies be degraded? Would Russian troops withdraw from Ukraine and cease posing a threat to NATO allies in the Baltics and Eastern Europe? Or might Russian intentions become even more hostile and less predictable? Despite Putin’s obsession with intrigue, denial and deception, and smoke and mirrors, he’s fairly predictable. Indeed, the United States, with Britain leaning in the same direction, was the exception among its NATO allies, not to mention Ukraine itself, in forecasting with high confidence Putin’s plans to attack.

Would the United States do it? The record shows that the U.S. sanctioned violence in sponsoring the overthrow of democratically elected antagonist regimes in Iran in 1953 and Chile in 1973, while the Church committee investigations documented multiple CIA attempts to assassinate Cuba’s Fidel Castro.

More recently, the United States made no pretense in concealing its hand in killing Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force Commander Qassem Suleimani in January 2020, an action that historic precedent would suggest was an act of war. Since 9/11, U.S. counterterrorism strategy has in practice been predicated on assassination. The mantra “find, fix, finish” is the other euphemism for preemptively hunting down and killing terrorists abroad before they might strike the U.S. homeland.

While these episodes collectively demonstrate the U.S. government’s willingness to undertake consequential, lethal actions in the name of national security, when separated from transnational terrorist targets, only the strike against Suleimani occurred while he was abroad. Operations to depose Mohammad Mosaddegh in Iran, Salvador Allende in Chile, and Castro in Cuba depended rather on internal elements to facilitate the plots.

Apart from these episodes and a possible hand in others,  U.S. governments have arguably favored the status quo of a predictable adversary. Regime change has not worked out well for U.S. interests. The overthrow of Saddam Hussein in Iraq was no small factor in bringing about the Arab Spring, with effects that continue to reverberate across the Middle East as reflected by unresolved civil wars in Libya, Syria, and Yemen, as well as ongoing political instability in Egypt and Tunisia.

The U.S. occupation of Iraq also facilitated the rise of the Islamic State. And the Taliban ultimately outlasted the United States in Afghanistan by returning to power despite 20 years of American blood and treasure, and they now give sanctuary to insurgent groups threatening Pakistan, Iran, its Central Asian neighbors, and China.

The inclination to accept the known status quo is further strengthened when that country is armed with nuclear weapons. As regards Russia, even under the most ideal circumstances in which the U.S. government could remove Putin and conceal its hand in doing so, how confident is Washington that a stable and less hostile leadership would succeed him?

Police and Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) service members patrol Red Square in front of the Kremlin in Moscow on Oct. 24, 2022.Alexander Nemenov/AFP via Getty Images

The three organizations most capable of moving on Putin and the Kremlin are the Federal Security Service, or FSB; the Rosgvardia, or National Guard; and the Presidential Security Service within the Federal Protective Service, or FSO. The FSB is Russia’s internal security and intelligence arm through which Putin governs given its relatively massive and ubiquitous presence across all the country’s institutions. The FSB enforces Putin’s rule, monitors dissent, intimidates, punishes, and liaises with organized crime. The Rosgvardia is Putin’s brute force. It was established in 2016 from among the interior ministry’s militias variously responsible for internal order and border security to be Putin’s long red line against protests, uprisings, and armed organized coup attempts.

Russian President Vladimir Putin (center) with the head of the Federal Security Service, Alexander Bortnikov (right), in the Crimean port of Sevastopol.Yuri Kadobnov/AFP via Getty Images

Alexander Bortnikov leads the FSB, having succeeded Nikolai Patrushev, who followed Putin and has served since as one of his chief lieutenants. Until recently, Patrushev served as Russian Security Council chief and was most likely the Kremlin’s no. 2, and might still be, despite having been made a presidential advisor for shipping. Bortnikov, like Patrushev, shares Putin’s world view, paranoia for the West, political philosophy, and glorification of the old Soviet empire.

Bortnikov is considered by Kremlinologists to be Putin’s most relied-upon and trusted subordinate, and in turn, the individual best positioned to overthrow him, should he desire. While Bortnikov maintains a relatively low profile, limited glimpses suggest some degree of humility and contained ambition, although uncorroborated rumors suggest health issues. His deputy, Sergei Borisovich Korolev, some 10 years younger, is regarded as effective, similarly ruthless, but perhaps too ambitious and ostentatious in his relationships with Russian organized crime. It’s likely that Putin sees a bright future for Korolev but has enough reservation to justify more seasoning and evaluation before having him succeed Bortnikov.

The roughly 300,000-strong Rosgvardia is commanded by longtime former Putin bodyguard Viktor Zolotov. Likewise a part of Putin’s septuagenarian St. Petersburg crowd, with extensive past ties to organized crime, Zolotov emerged somewhat from the shadows following then-Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin’s June 2023 revolt. Zolotov claimed credit for protecting Moscow and mused publicly at how his organization would likely grow and secure more resources to facilitate its critical responsibilities.

Zolotov might not be as educated or sophisticated as Putin’s traditional siloviki associates, all former Cold War-era KGB veterans, but making his way up the ladder as he did from a St. Petersburg street thug, he’s not averse to using force to achieve his aims.

Russian National Guard Director Viktor Zolotov (center) during a meeting with officers of the Russian army and secret services in Moscow on June 27, 2023. Getty Images News

Little is publicly known concerning Zolotov’s politics apart from loyalty to his boss, but there’s no evidence he might offer a progressive alternative less hostile to the West. As Putin has done for all of those in his inner circle to secure their loyalty, Zolotov’s family members have been awarded land, gifts, and key posts. Patrushev’s son, for example, is now a deputy prime minister.

The FSO includes the Presidential Security Service, some 50,000 troops, and is responsible for Putin’s close physical protection. Little is known about its director, Dmitry Viktorovich Kochnev, now 60, whose mysterious official bio indicates that he was born in Moscow, served in the military from 1982 to 1984, and then went into “the security agencies of the USSR and the Russian Federation” from 1984 to 2002, after which time he was officially assigned to the FSO.

Dmitry Kochnev (left) with Putin during the Immortal Regiment march in Moscow on May 9, 2016. Mikhail Svetlov/Getty Images

If Kochnev wanted Putin dead, he’s had plenty of time to pursue that goal, but he is unlikely to have the means and network to go further on his own in seizing power. Kochnev would still need the FSB and the Rosgvardia to accomplish the mission so would likely be an accomplice, but he would not be at the forefront of such a plot.

There are likewise a handful of others close to Putin who might influence his succession, or be the face of it, such as Igor Sechin, former deputy prime minister and current Rosneft CEO; former KGB Col. Gen. Sergei Ivanov, also a former defense minister and first deputy prime minister; and former KGB Col. Gen. Viktor Ivanov, who also had a stint as the Federal Narcotics Service director. All are known to be ideologically in line with the Russian leader and seek a restored empire unwilling to subscribe to a world order and rules created by the West that they believe aim to keep Moscow weak and subservient.

If Putin were assassinated abroad, regardless of the evidence, the old guard would likely accuse the United States and use it as a lightning rod to consolidate power and rally the public. And sharing Putin’s paranoia over the West’s existential threat, the risk is credible that they would retaliate militarily, directly, and with uncertain restraint. Believing themselves insecure, they would likewise crack down at home in an indiscriminately ruthless manner that might unleash long-contained revolutionary vigor among the population, which would throw a large, nuclear-armed power into chaos.

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This image taken from video footage obtained by AFPTV shows security personnel carrying Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico (center) toward a vehicle after he was shot in Handlova, Slovakia, on May 15.RTVs/via Getty Images

According to leaked documents and the account of Gleb Karakulov, a former engineer and FSO captain, Putin is paranoid concerning his safety and health. Karakulov’s observations, Putin’s limited travel, and his proclivity to cloister himself from direct contact with but a small number of insiders for his safety makes him a hard target. Scrupulous care for his movements includes the intense vetting, quarantining, and close monitoring of those involved with his transportation and his personal routine as well as in securing the cars, trains, and planes he uses. Who can forget the flurry of photos and memes surrounding the 15-foot-long table Putin used when conducting personal meetings during the COVID-19 pandemic?

For any such operation to succeed, close target reconnaissance and good intelligence are required to determine patterns and vulnerabilities on which to construct a plan. But while foreign head-of-state visits follow certain protocols and have predictable events, there are no long-term patterns within which to easily identify vulnerabilities. Other considerations include a means to infiltrate and exfiltrate the various members executing the operation as well as their tools. North Korea is not an easy place to visit let alone operate in for a foreign intelligence service to clandestinely steal secrets or conduct an observable action such as an assassination.

Putin waves from the plane during a departure ceremony at the airport after a Russian-North Korean diplomatic visit in Pyongyang, North Korea, on June 19.Getty Images

There are certainly additional risks when Putin or any foreign leader ventures beyond the layered, redundant, and tested security protocols enjoyed in their home cocoons. Visiting dignitaries must rely on the host government for a variety of resources and needs too numerous and costly to pack, and when doing so would offend the locals. And that extends to perimeter and route security, emergency medical support, and infrastructure integrity.

The threat to a foreign leader’s communications security, habits, health information, and that of their entourage is higher while in transit abroad—and therefore an attractive intelligence target. The multiple moving pieces and complicated logistics associated with such visits produce information that must be shared with the host governments and span agendas, itineraries, dietary requirements, flight and cargo manifests, communication frequencies, telephone numbers, email addresses, travelers’ biographic details, and weapons, to name a few.

In the era of ubiquitous technical surveillance, as the Israelis learned firsthand when Mossad agents assassinated Hamas official Mahmoud al-Mabhouh in 2010, going undetected in any city is no small feat. Mabhouh’s killing was largely captured on CCTV. The Dubai investigation identified as many as 28 operatives who were involved, almost all of whom were revealed through technical means or the leads they generated.

Still, whoever assassinated Lebanese Hezbollah’s notorious international operations chief, Imad Mughniyah, in Damascus in February 2008 and al Qaeda deputy Abu Muhammad al-Masri in Tehran in 2020 managed to mount complex attacks in highly restrictive police states. Of course, neither moved about with a protective detail, let alone that which would surround a head of state.

Israel managed to assassinate Iran’s top nuclear scientist, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, in November 2020 in Iran despite a protective detail—although it was an operation that might have been taken from a science fiction movie involving automated robotic machines guns controlled from afar.

Then again, even with the best-laid plans for protecting Putin, one weak link could be the Russian leader’s self-imposed vulnerability, depending on the aging and problematic Soviet-designed Ilyushin Il-96 series jets he uses, as he did in recent travels to North Korea and Vietnam. Even if Russia builds and updates the replacement parts, there is long-term structural fatigue and limitations when trying to reconfigure so old an airframe design.

While there’s arguably an element of Putin’s pride in wishing to use Russian equipment, I suspect his inclination is driven more by paranoia for what adversaries might implant on his transport that prevents him from adopting newer Western aircraft, as his country’s commercial airlines have.

There are also significant bureaucratic hurdles to lethal operations. For the moment, at least, the U.S. practice of covert action is dictated by the rule of law. These are primarily executive orders rather than public laws, like EO 12333, which ironically forbids assassination, and the various presidential memos issued by Barack Obama in 2013, Donald Trump in 2017, and Joe Biden in 2022 guiding the use of “direct action,” the euphemism for drone strikes and other kinetic operations, against terrorist targets outside of conflict zones. But while the United States killed Suleimani as a terrorist who fit these guidelines, killing foreign leaders based on credible intelligence reflecting their ongoing efforts to do harm to the United States would reasonably still meet the legal bar for preemptive self-defense.

When it comes to killing Putin or any prominent adversary, the biggest challenge is not necessarily if it can be done, but whether it should be done. Openly killing Suleimani posed risks, of course, but ultimately, Iran is not an existential threat. Its retaliation could have been more costly, had Tehran chosen escalation, but still manageable.

Russia, on the other hand, as Putin frequently reminds the West in his saber-rattling speeches threatening nuclear war, is another matter. What happens if you fail? As The Wire’s Omar Little said, paraphrasing Ralph Waldo Emerson, “When you come at the king, you best not miss.”