THE SECURITY POLICY OF LITHUANIA AND THE

'INTEGRATION DILEMMA'

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Abstract

Foreign and security policy (FSP) of Lithuania, like that of other Baltic states, is closely related to the development of her political identity. The main objectives of Lithuania's FSP, those of strengthening state sovereignty and joining the European process of integration, are subject to the tensions of the 'integration dilemma' in Lithuania's political discourse. The dilemma sets state sovereignty against the processes of integration, for the preservation of sovereignty by way of an integration with international institutions requires the abandonment of certain aspects of sovereignty (Kelstrup, 1993; Petersen, 1996)

The problems involved in the integration dilemma have many different aspects and can be approached from a variety of theoretical positions. Traditionally, the 'integration dilemma' has been tackled in integration and adaptation theories. After a brief survey of these theories the present study proceeds with the analysis of the development of Lithuania's FSP from the perspective of social constructivism.

The analysis is based on the hypothesis that Lithuania's political reality has been conceptualized in terms of the interplay at least of two competitive discourses: the discourse of sovereignty and the integration discourse, with each of them implemented in different discursive practices. Considered from the perspective of constructivism, the integration dilemma acquires a very different content. Discussions about the relative power of loyalty to Europe versus that to nation/state loses its point, for Europe and state/nation are mutually constitutive.

On the basis of the hypothesis, the present study attempts to establish the correlation between security conceptualizations and Lithuania's FS policies since the declaration of independence in 1990. In particular, the prospects of Baltic states' co-operation, Lithuanian - Polish relations and the process of integration with the West have been considered, with an emphasis on the problems of NATO enlargement and European integration.

The analysis has led to the conclusion that Lithuania's FSP is dominated by the precepts of the sovereignty discourse. In justifying the integration process the meanings which have been shaped in the sovereignty discourse are being transferred to the emerging integration discourse. However, the conflict-based model of the relations between 'inside' and 'outside', when applied to the integration process, can easily lead to misunderstandings and inadequate assessment of the situation in practical politics.

Contents

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Introduction

The post- Cold War European development has been characterized by two seemingly opposing tendencies, namely, that of fragmentation which is related to the emergence of new states and that of integration related to these states' desire of joining the international community.[1] The interaction of the two tendencies is leading to a transformation of the nation-state. Lithuania's foreign and security politics (FSP), like those of other newly emerged states, have been influenced by both of the two tendencies. The relation between these two tendencies is often characterized as 'the integration dilemma', i.e. «the dilemma between being "entrapped" by the integration process or "abandoned" through possible exclusion.» (Kelstrup, 1998:38). The dilemma sets state sovereignty against the processes of integration by stressing that the preservation of sovereignty by way of an integration with international institutions requires the abandonment of certain aspects of sovereignty (Kelstrup, 1993; Petersen, 1996). As Stanley Hoffman notes, "What threatens us is, rather, an imbalance between the supreme legitimate authority that still resides in the sovereign state, and the incipient but fragmentary and feeble authority of collective institutions dealing with problems that transcend the states, or exceed their capacities, or require the reduction of their authority" (Hoffman, 1997: ix).

The integration dilemma has influenced the political climate in many of the newly emerged states by creating tensions between domestic and foreign policies. The problems involved in the integration dilemma have many different aspects and can be approached from a variety of theoretical positions. Traditionally, these issues have been tackled by integration theories. However, in this study we shall examine the development of Lithuania's FS policy from the perspective of social constructivism.[2]

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[1] Fragmentation and integration are the tendencies that can only be defined relatively. In every sovereign state with some ethnic or cultural diversity there is the possibility of fragmentation, if there exists a minority willing to become an independent political unit. Traditionally, a sovereign state seeks social integration in its internal policies and the preservation of sovereignty in its foreign policy. Since the end of the Cold War the growing influence in politics and economics of international institutions has led to a progressive obliteration of the difference between domestic and foreign policy. This has essentially changed the meaning of sovereignty as the organizing principle of international society.

[2] In contrast to the more traditional approaches of realism and liberalism, constructivism is a relatively new approach in international relations and thus still very much in the process of becoming. An acknowledged representative of constructivism Alexander Wendt has developed the idea that identities and interests of states are constructed by social interaction (1992). One can find many elements of constructivism in recent studies stressing the role of culture and ideas in the development of international relations (Katzenstein, 1996; Lapid & Kratochwil, 1996; Krause & Williams, 1997; Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1997, Ruggie, 1998).

Our analysis is based on the hypothesis that Lithuania's political reality has been conceptualized in terms of at least two competitive discourses: the discourse of sovereignty and the integration discourse, with each of them implemented in different discursive practices. We claim that Lithuania's FSP is based on the interplay of these two discourses. First, (in part I) we analyze the 'integration dilemma', as it is interpreted in integration theories and in constructivism, supplementing it with an outline of the constructivist interpretation of security. Next (in part II) an attempt is made, within the framework of our hypothesis, to reveal the correlation between security conceptualizations and Lithuania's FSP since the declaration of independence in 1990. The connection of Lithuania's contemporary FSP with Lithuania's historical past is also discussed.

Part I: The 'Integration Dilemma' and Conceptualizations of Security

1. Integration theories and the 'integration dilemma'

Contemporary integration theories are concerned with the nation state transformation in the process of European integration. Somewhat simplifyingly, it can be said that the development of integration theories is a reflection of the developments in the process of European integration. The theoretical stagnation of the 1970s was followed by theoretical revitalization and, later on, by novel theoretical developments. From among the earliest developments, a most fruitful one turned out to be Karl Deutsch's transactionalism, with its stress on the importance of common values and issues of identity for the development of a "security community".[3] At the very beginning of the development of integration theories there were conspicuous differences in the treatment of the integration process between the functionalist and the normative view. The functionalist view stressed the importance of the increase of institutional capacity of the newly developing political system (Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970), while the normative view was mostly about community building: "Political integration is the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new political centre, whose

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[3] The classical theories of integration propounded in the 1950s and 1960s were mostly concerned with the description and the analysis of processes [contributing] to the unification of different states. The concern gave

institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states. The end result of a process of political integration is a new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones" (Haas, 1961:196).

A new impulse for the development of integration theories was created after the European Single Act and Maastricht Treaty. Their contents are unquestionably influenced by the inter-paradigm debate between neorealism, a state-centric position, and liberalism, characterized by its pluralist non-state-centric position. The realist paradigm is associated with liberal inter-governmentalism (Moravcsik, 1993, 1997), while the liberal paradigm is mostly related to the idea of multi-level governance (Marks, Hooghe, Blank, 1996) The two approaches acknowledge the heterogeneity of integration by stressing the importance of both state and non-state actors. However, the liberal inter-govementalism is more sensitive to the individual state position in the process of integration. The integration process is treated as an interstate bargaining through a series of intergovemental "bargains", aiming at the strengthening of control over domestic affairs (Kelstrup, 1998: 37). As with other theories of the realist orientation, primary importance is accorded to the problems of state survival. Limitation of sovereignty in exchange for the benefits of integration can only be accepted if joining supranational institutions is in the interest of the state, that is, if it contributes to national security and national economic and social development.

This is the view of the integration process that creates the 'integration dilemma'. The basic motive for integration - the preservation and the strengthening of state sovereignty - is characterized by the contradiction between the goal (state sovereignty) and the means (joining the broader political community). Thus liberal inter-governmentalism being an aspect of the state-centred view on the integration process is closely tied to the sovereignty discourse.

Recently, there was growing an interest in the 'multi-level governance' approach which considers the 'governance' of European integration as a very complicated decision system with many different kinds of actors with the state being just one among them.
The multi-level governance theories are particularly concerned with the tendencies of state transformation (weakening of the state) which are explained by globalization and European integration. The state is here defined as a set of rules or a set of formal institutions, rather than

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birth to five different schools: federalism, functionalism, neo-functionalism, transactionalism and inter-govermentalism.

in terms of a sovereign actor (Marks, Hooghe and Blank, 1996). The difference between domestic and international politics is being gradually eroded. Politics come to be regulated by common rules rather than by the nation state political elite. It might seem that according to the multi-level governance approach there is no real integration dilemma, for in the decision-making process there is no antagonism between a nation state and the integration process. However, in this case we are confronted by the decision-making legitimacy problem, and this is a problem that can only be solved by a new normative theory of European integration (Kelstrup, 1998: 40).

When dealing with the theoretical attempts at conceptualizing the European integration process, one should not leave out of account the adaptation theories.[4]

The integration process is studied in these theories from the nation state position, mainly stressing the adaptation in value perspectives. From the rich literature devoted to the problem of nation state adaptation the present study is mainly relying on works devoted to the analysis of the post-Cold War European integration under conditions of the unipolar structure (Mouritzen, Waever, Wiberg, 1996). Nation-states in unipolar Europe are there divided into 'insiders' (EU members), 'would-be' insiders', and 'outsiders'. Nation states are conceptualized as 'regimes', while their behaviour is seen as exemplifying different modes of adaptation. "A regime is constituted by its public commitment to a set of values - the traditional state values (autonomy, influence, the safe-guarding of a certain territory and the welfare of the population in this territory) that are common to all regimes plus the so-called regime identity values that tend to vary from one regime to another"(Mouritzen, Waever, Wiberg, 1996:3). In analyzing the modes of adaptation characteristic of each group of states much attention is paid to the states' environment as well as to cultural and historical factors.

Despite their concern with the value perspective, adaptation theories remain within the framework of the realist paradigm. The integration dilemma acquires within these theories a different aspect than that in the classical integration theories - integration is not only a partial renunciation of sovereignty in exchange for the possible benefits of integration, but is also a change in (loss of) nation state identity.

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[4] Many different studies subsumed under the title of adaptation theories are unified by the attempt to conceptualize the relationship between a unit and its environment. See: Rosenau, 1970; Hansen, 1974; Petersen, 1996; Mouritzen, 1988.

2. Constructivism and the European integration

All the integration theories considered above study the integration process within a fixed setting. However, integration as the transformation of European states comprising the change both of identities and values, remains at the periphery of these theories' concerns. This might be due to the fact that their tools of analysis are not adequate for the purpose of revealing "the impact of "intersubjectivity" and "social context" on the continuing process of European integration" (Thomas Christiansen, Knud Erik Jorgensen and Antje Wiener, 1999:2). It was the search for more adequate tools of analysis that led in 1990s to the so-called constructivist turn in the theory of international relations. Despite the rapidly growing number of publications associating themselves with constructivism its message is still far from clear.[5] In most general terms John Gerard Ruggie has characterized the approach as follows:

"At bottom, constructivism concerns the issue of human consciousness: the role it plays in international relations, and the implications for the logic and methods of social taking it seriously. Constructivists hold the view that the building blocks of international reality are ideational as well as material; that ideational factors have normative as well as instrumental dimensions; that they express not only individual but also collective intentionality; and that the meaning and significance of ideational factors are not independent of time and place". "At the level of individual actors constructivism seeks, first of all "to problematize the identities and interests of states, to show that and how they are socially constructed" (Ruggie, 1998:33).

The analysis of identity-formation is mainly focused on the impact of rules and norms, on the role of language and of political discourse in reconstructing national identities under the influence of the integration process. The dynamics of European integration is considered "as intersubjective understandings or discourses of actors at many levels, possibly overlapping" (Larsen, 1998: 245). Such authors as Ruggie, W ver consider European integration as neo-mediavalism - the emergence of overlapping patterns of political authority and territoriality (Ruggie, 1993).

Considered from the perspective of constructivism the integration dilemma acquires a very different content. The discussion about the relative power of loyalty to Europe versus that to nation/state loses its point. (W ver, 1998: 105). Europe and state/nation are mutually

constitutive. The analysis is now focused on "the interaction between the national and the European level and the meanings and identities which shape, or are shaped by, the process. (Larsen: 1998:244). The emerging tension between the state level and the European level is analyzed as a result of conflict between two different discourses. Accordingly, any analysis of the FS policy demands an analysis of intersubjective meaning of such concepts as state, nation and security.

3. Constructivism and security

Security can be analyzed as an objective condition (as on the realist or the conventional understanding of security) or as an intersubjective phenomenon (as conceived by constructivism). The objectivist approach to security became predominant after the Second World War, when under the influence of Keynesian economics the functions of the state considerably expanded. The advance towards the welfare state, with the government taking over the responsibility for the well being of its citizens, naturally led to the expansion of the powers of the state. The preservation of national security, conceived as an objective identification and neutralization of threats to the state, became a central priority of the government. It is within the framework of the objectivist conception of security that a major role was accorded to the institution of experts (Dalby, 1990: 4-16).

However, the collapse of the Soviet Union that has never been anticipated in the scenarios of the experts, the end of the Cold War, the prolonged crisis in Yugoslavia and increasing influence of the ideas of liberalism posed a challenge to the conventional understanding of security. In security studies there has been a noticeable shift towards the conception of security as a phenomenon of intersubjectivity, as a social construct, "a shift in focus from abstract individualism and contractual sovereignty to stress on culture, civilization and identity; the role of ideas, norms and values in the constitution of that which is to be secured; and the historical context within which the process takes place" (Krause, Williams, 1997:49).

In contrast to realism's quest to legitimize and naturalize the status quo constructivism is focused on the sources of change. Thus it is particularly promising as a tool for the analysis of security and foreign policies of the newly emerged states. On the constructivist view, the

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[5] Contemporary constructivist research focuses on security communities (Adler and Barnett, 1998; Adler, 1998)

central issue in post-Cold War international studies is collective identity formation which is to be analyzed by focusing on how different groups constitute one another's identities and how social boundaries between human collectives are maintained. Of particular importance for the constructivist is the explanation of the role intersubjectivity plays in the construction of power relations. A constructivist analysis articulates how contemporary insecurities are being created and intensified by the settled oppositions of inside/outside, self/other, particularity/universality, identity/difference (Walker, 1993).

On the constructivist approach security is defined, at least in some respects, as a matter of intersubjectivity, as a social construct. "It has a specific meaning only within a specific social context. It emerges and changes as a result of discourses and discursive actions intended to reproduce historical structures and subjects within states and among them" (Lipshutz, 1995). The discourse is to be understood as "a relational totality which constitutes and organizes social relations around a particular structure of meanings" (Roxanne Lynn Doty, 1996: 239). The constructivist approach has introduced some important changes in the goals an analysis of security should pursue. The chief problem becomes mainly that of finding an answer to the question - "How do ideas about security develop, enter the realm of public policy debate and discourse and, eventually, become institutionalized in hardware, organizations, roles and practices" (Lipschutz, 1995). In other words, how and why there is an intersubjective actualization and de-actualization of environmental, economical, societal issues as threats (or securitization and de-securitization, in terms of Ole Waever)? In applying the constructivist approach to the analysis of politics one is mostly focusing on particular conceptualizations of security/insecurity (from which follow policy and practice). "There are not only struggle over security among nations, but also struggle over security among notions. Winning the right to define security provides not just access to resources but also the authority to articulate new definitions and discourses of security, as well" (Lipshutz, 1995).

4. Security conceptualizations: between realism and liberalism

Lithuania's political life presents ample material for the analysis of the conceptualization of security. Since 1990 the problems of national security have been treated as of major

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and on political identity (Neumann 1996, 1999; Weldes 1996, Wendt 1994).

importance. The first short document entitled 'An Outline of the Concept of National Security' was prepared by October 30, 1990, with only half a year after the declaration of Lithuania's independence and almost a year before the international recognition of Lithuania (Lithuania joined the UN on September 17, 1991). The document was drafted by the chief officers of the Department of National Defence. In 1992 a group of scholars, commissioned by the Department of National Defence, prepared the first draft of the national conception of security to be submitted for the adoption by Seimas, Lithuania's parliament. Later on, at least three more drafts, prepared by different political groupings, were made public. In December 1996 Seimas finally adopted the Basics of National Security of Lithuania. The texts provide rich material for the analysis of the conceptualization of security and the related dynamics of security policy. As already noted, they are part of Lithuania's political discourse, which is constituted by two overlapping discourses. Accordingly, the contents of the security conception as presented there will be here articulated by the contrast and the interplay of the sovereignty and the integration discourse.

Sovereignty discourse is related to the logical, the ontological and the ethical characteristics of the modern state. As Jens Bartelson has emphasized, a modern state is being realized through a dialectic of conflict that establishes an inside out of the outside, an identity out of a difference, "it treats identity and difference as qualities that implicate each other logically as well as temporally" (Bartelson, 1995: 211). At the core of sovereignty discourse lie the concepts of security, state and nation. Discursive practices construe the meanings which entrench the differentiation between the inside (self) and outside (threatening Other). Security is identified with the security of the inside (the nation state). "In seeking to authorize itself the state must confront an other" (Burton & Carlen, 1979: 48). The principal distinction drawn between the secure inside and the threatening outside is the precondition for the securitization of the outside and the inside (in so far as its integrity is threatened), i.e. "the issue is presented as an existential threat requiring emergency measures, and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure" (Buzan, W ver & de Wilde, 1997) Theoretically, the sovereignty discourse is related to the liberal inter-governmentalism approach and is based on the paradigm of realism.

The integration discourse has not been as thoroughly analyzed in constructivist security studies as the sovereignty discourse. In this paper we consider the integration discourse as

comprising those discursive practices and meanings that are related to the creation of intergovernmental structures and thus to a partial abandonment of sovereignty conceived as "the supreme legitimate authority within a given territory" (Hashmi, 1997: 5). The main concepts of integration discourse are interdependence, human rights and Europe. The integration discourse is related to multi-level governance approach in integration theories and is based on the paradigm of liberalism.

The texts under analysis belong to what is called the official discourse. The analysis has first of all to identify the author, the reader, the object and the Other: The function of official discourse is "to allay, suspend and close off popular doubt through an ideal and discursive appropriation of material problem" (Burton & Carlen, 1979:13). "Either the text can effect closure of a problem via a meconnaissance which denies the Other, or it can give new meaning to a problem via recognition of a problematic which denies not the Other but the Other's already known conditions of existence" (Burton & Carlen, 1979: 33). In official discourse a situation or a problem is "closed" by a displacement of one paradigm by another. Thus there is the constant process of social construction of reality. It is no accident that discourse analysis has been characterized as deconstruction in order to point out that the goal of analysis is disclosing something that was consciously or unconsciously "closed".

Let us proceed to the analysis of the texts. The concept of security will be explicated by answering the following questions: Who or what does speaking (author)? What are the referent objects for security (object)? Who is an addressee (reader)? How are identified the main dangers and threats for security (Other)?

4.1. *An Outline of the Concept of National Security*, 1990

On March 11, 1990 the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Soviet Republic issued the Declaration of Lithuania's Independence, a unilateral and defying act of separation from the Soviet Union. Even though neither the Soviet Union, nor any other state was ready to recognize Lithuania's sovereignty, the process of institutionalizing the independence began at once. In April the Department of National Defence was created. That was a period of dual government, for the governmental structures of independent Lithuania were being built with Soviet authorities still in place. The population was overwhelmingly in support of

independence and accepted the legitimacy of new state institutions, despite the fact that the Soviet declared them illegal and made attempts to stop their functioning both by decrees and by the use of force.

It was under these circumstances that the *Outline of the Concept of National Security* was born (October, 1990) The four pages document was prepared by the leadership of the Defence department. It was not made open for public discussion and was intended primarily for the narrow circle of the political elite of Lithuania. As the Defence department itself, functioning as it was in a state that did not have legal existence by international standards the document was in essence a symbolic expression of the quest for independence. Nevertheless, some of the principles stated there became the building blocks of Lithuania's foreign and security policy till the withdrawal of Russia's troops from Lithuania (August 31, 1993).

The very first sentence of the *Outline*, namely: "National security is the necessary condition for the preservation, development and continuity of the nation" makes it clear that the guiding idea is that of the nation state. However, in defining the referent object of security the nation is no longer mentioned and security is confined to that of the state and of the citizens, it conceived in extremely broad terms comprising the "spiritual, ecological, economic, civil and military" dimensions. The ambiguity of the text reflects the ambiguity of the situation at the time, characterized by the necessity of winning popular support (including that of non-Lithuanians) for independence which was needed to obtain the state's international recognition without, however, abandoning the nationalist aspirations. The text contains no explicit reference to particular threats or enemies, though obviously the Soviet Union, still in existence at that time (with its troops still on Lithuania's territory and having a common border with Lithuania), was the intended target. The Baltic and the Scandinavian states are explicitly referred to as friendly states. There is also an obvious contradiction between the stated goal of "joining the common security system of Europe" and the intention to "become a zone of greater confidence between the East and the West" (p.1) by keeping the state's neutrality.

We can thus conclude that the first document devoted to the articulation of Lithuania's security was as ambivalent as the future of a country still not internationally recognized. It was dominated by the meanings of sovereignty discourse with its attempts to define the 'inside' and the 'outside' and to identify the Other. The document was still compatible with a number of

different possible developments of Lithuania's political identity, even though an orientation to the West was already quite prominent.

4.2 *Conception of National Security of the Republic of Lithuania* (Draft), 1992

The dual rule that ensued after the declaration of independence could not last long. In January 1991 Moscow made an attempt at forcing Lithuania into submission. The attempt failed. This was primarily due to the international opinion being favorable towards Lithuania, to the collapse of the authority of government in the Soviet Union and to the massive support of Lithuania's population for the cause of independence that was manifested in many forms of civil disobedience and mass action. This explains why Lithuania's government was very favourably disposed towards civilian based defence and even before the January events made some efforts at implementing it in practice (Miniotaite, 1996). In September 1991, after joining the UN, Lithuania became an independent agent of international relations. The problem of national security rose to a new level. In 1992 a draft of the conception of national security was prepared by a group of scholars from the Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Law, commissioned by the Defence Ministry.[6]

During the period of the preparation of the draft the problems of national security were extensively discussed in the seminars of the Institute, a conference was organized with the papers read and the draft of the conception published in a book entitled *Lithuania's National Security: Theory and the Realities* (Bagdonavicius, 1994). The problems of security have been on the agenda of discussion in many different circles of society. The draft prepared by the scholars did not, however, satisfy the aspirations of Lithuania's political elite and was silently rejected. It was not expressive of the attitude of the political elite, but rather that of intellectuals striving to regain the support of the state they have nearly lost. Later, the main political parties presented their own visions of national security in which; by the way, one can easily discern many of the points made in the scholars' draft.

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[6] Those who are fond of juxtaposing modernity and post-modernity might easily discern in the predilection of Lithuania's political elite for 'national programs' a typical feature of modernity, i.e. the belief in the power of instrumental reason and conclusive solutions. The former Danish defence attaché to the Baltic states is reported to have said about Lithuania's military leadership that they "are convinced that there is a scientifically correct solution to every military problem" (Clemmesen, 1998: 240).

Despite the rejection of the draft conception of 1992, the text, 20 pages long, is an important stage in the process of security conceptualization and in developing Lithuania's political identity. National security is defined there as: "the maintenance of conditions favorable for the pursuit of the interests of the citizen, the nation and the state, to be achieved by minimizing the destabilization created by threats and dangers' (Bagdonavicius, 1994:128). Thus the referent objects for security are the citizen (whose "liberties and rights are to be protected"), the nation ("the preservation of the identity of the Lithuanian people") and the state ("the maintenance and strengthening of independence"). Lithuania's political identity is defined by drawing the explicit distinction between external and internal threats.

The following items are considered there to be the external threats to Lithuania's security: "tensions between Lithuania and Russia's Federation (in particular, because of the presence of Russian troops in Lithuania); emerging tensions between Lithuania and the CIS because of the latter's attempts at preserving the common military-strategic space; instability of the East European region due to economic, social and ethnic problems; the possibility of the country's economic and financial subjection to other states and multinational corporations; the possibility of the decline of the scientific and cultural potential because of external influences; ecological, social pathological and other threats from abroad." (Bagdonavieius, 1994: 132). There were also diverse other threats identified as internal extending, in fact, to all the domains of social life from politics to culture (including, e.g. negative demographic trends and insufficient support for the development of spiritual and moral culture (Bagdonavicius, 1994: 135)). Thus the concept of threat as defined in the document, allows for the politicization and securitization of the whole social life, societal and cultural in particular.

The draft is based on the idea of national identity as fixed and unchanging, so that particular emphasis is laid on its preservation and purification. The goal of the security policy is defined as that of "achieving maximal independence both from the East and from the West" (Bagdonavicius, 1994:133). The threat of "Westernization" is that of leading to the erosion of national identity, culture and values. Relations with the Baltic and the Scandinavian states are held of particular importance for the preservation of national security. The common security interests of these states are said to "have led to the revival of the idea of a collective security system for Baltoscandia and to its practical implementation" (133). Similarly, the idea of a common security region for all the Baltic Sea states is held promising and desirable.

It should be noted that great importance is accorded to civilian based defence ("people power") as a major means for upholding national security.[7] "Non-violent resistance is not only a means for defending independent statehood, but is also conducive to the survival of the nation" (127). With even modest military capacity, non-violent defence is said to "help preserve the nation's self-confidence and faith in the power of the state" (134).

It is rather obvious that the conception of national security as developed in the draft prepared by scholars is characterized by the meanings of sovereignty discourse. The clear-cut division of the inside/outside, a rigid identification of permanent threats, state-centrism, a belief that "politics is science inscribed in law" (Burton & Carlen, 1979: 38), all of this shows the conception's links with the ontological and the epistemological premises of the modern state and with the paradigm of realism. The project's stress on cultural and political isolationism was quite alien to the post- Cold War atmosphere of openness, so perhaps it is no wonder that the draft did not become an official document.

4.3. *The Basics of National Security of Lithuania*, 1996

The Basics of National Security of Lithuania (BNSL) that was adopted by Seimas in December 1996 was prepared by a task group created at the end of 1994. The group consisted of representatives from all the parties represented in Seimas, so that one can say the final document expressed the common attitude of Lithuania's political elite towards the issue of national security. In the 5 years elapsed between the first draft of the conception and the document's adoption by Seimas Lithuania's foreign and security policy acquired a distinctly pro-Western orientation. Membership in NATO and the EU became the chief goals of Lithuania's foreign and security policy.

Let us now consider to what an extent and in what form did new political realities find their expression in the BNSL. The document defines the following as the chief goals of the national security policy: "to develop and strengthen democracy, ensure safe existence of the Nation and the State, deter any potential aggressor and defend the sovereignty, the territorial

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[7] The attitude was, undoubtedly, the result both of the experience of non-violent liberation and of the meetings with the scholars from the Albert Einstein Institution; Gene Sharp's book "Civilian Based Defence" was translated into Lithuanian and published in early 1992.

integrity and the constitutional order of the state" (Basics, 1996:1). The referent objects for national security are "human and citizen's rights, fundamental freedoms and personal security; the cherished values of the nation, its rights and conditions for a free development; state independence; constitutional order; the integrity of the state's territory; environmental and cultural heritage"(Basics, 1996: 2).

The definition of the "risks and threats" for national security is based on a clear-cut dissection of political reality into the inside and the outside and the risks and threats are, accordingly, defined as internal and external. Without listing all the threats envisaged, let us note only the major types and their examples. External threats are classified into political («political pressure and dictate, attempts to establish zones of special interest and ensure special rights, preventing Lithuania from obtaining international security; threats by foreign states to use force under the pretext of defending their interests; attempts to impose upon Lithuania dangerous and discriminatory international agreements»); military («military capability in close proximity to Lithuanian borders; military transit through Lithuania»); specific («illegal immigration and transit migration, influx of refugees; attempts by other states to impose on Lithuania the principles of dual citizenship»); economic («economic pressure, blockade or other hostile economic actions; investment of capital with political goals») (Basics, 1996:10-11). Though the document makes no reference to particular countries as posing a threat for Lithuania's security, anyone familiar with the realities of the region would easily discern that the threats classified as political, military and, partly, economic are conceived as originating from Russia.

Similarly, the definition of "Potential Internal Risks and Domestic Crises" includes the political («political instability or crisis of State power posing threat to the constitutional democratic order»); economic («rise in unemployment, decline in production volume and decrease of gross national product beyond a critical level»); social («excessive differentiation in wealth approaching a critical level and threatening to provoke a social conflict»); national («factors weakening the Nation's immunity and sense of identity; negligence toward national values, spread of antihumanistic, pro-violence pseudo culture»), criminal («high crime rate, corruption») and some other risks for Lithuania's security («environmental pollution, especially with carcinogens and mutagens»).

Such a detailed listing of threats is expressive of a tendency towards the politicization of all spheres of life and lays the ground for broad securitization. This is confirmed in the third part of the document entitled "The means of ensuring national security". It begins with the statement that "national security shall be ensured by the state, by the citizens". Then follows a detailed list of the domains of social life, from economics to culture, which are considered liable to insecurity and thus subject to political control. Among the means for ensuring national security is "unconditional defence and total civil resistance in the event of aggression" (Basics, 1996:2) as well as integration with the EU, the WEU and joining of NATO. The latter presumably means that the main motive for the integration with the West is the protection of Lithuania's sovereignty. A most prominent feature of the document is the partition of the security space into those of peace and those of potential conflict zones. One can thus conclude that the concept of security employed remains within the field of meanings of the sovereignty discourse with its characteristic "dialectic of conflict".

The texts reviewed belong to different stages in the build-up of the Lithuanian State. This finds reflection in their contents. The first project of the conception of national security (1990) envisions the policy of neutrality and lays hopes at exploiting Lithuania's geopolitical situation as the bridge between the East and the West as a means for ensuring national security. The second project of the conception (1992), with Lithuania already formally recognized as an independent state, is mostly concerned with identifying the threats - both external and internal - to the Lithuanian state, the nation and the citizens. It explicitly refers to Russia as Lithuania's threatening Other, while the orientation to the West finds its expression in stressing the importance of close relations with the Scandinavian countries. The policy of neutrality is held to be promising, and great importance is accorded to civilian-based defence. The third document, The Basics of National Security of Lithuania, adopted by Seimas in 1996, is also much concerned with the identification of threats. Though not referred to by name Russia remains the chief threat to Lithuania's security. The document is explicit and unambiguous about Lithuania's integration with the structures of the West (EU, NATO, WEU) as the means for ensuring Lithuania's security. In defence civilian based defence is accorded an important role, alongside with the military one.

The documents, though differing in contents and in some presuppositions are nevertheless based on the same paradigm of realism. Security is conceived as the preservation of a fixed

and unchanging entity (the nation, the state), as the identification of the threats it faces and as their neutralization by political and military means. The ideas are squarely within the sovereignty discourse. This is only natural, since the goal of the documents is the justification of the nation state security and of the nation state foreign policy.

The goal of integration with the West as formulated in the third document still is based on the meanings of sovereignty discourse. In justifying the integration process the meanings, which have been shaped in the sovereignty, discourse is being transferred to the emerging integration discourse. However, the conflict-based model of the relations between `inside' and `outside', when applied to the integration process, can easily lead to misunderstanding and inadequate assessment of the situation in practical politics.

Part II: Lithuania's foreign security policy: main features

Let us now consider Lithuania's FS policy within the context of the overlap between the sovereignty discourse and the integration discourse trying to show how different security conceptions become institutionalized in organizations, roles and practices. The analysis of recent Lithuanian FS policy starts from March 11, 1990 when the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania,1 with Lithuania still part of the USSR, declared the restoration of the independent state of Lithuania. From the very first days Lithuania faced the problems of the preservation and international recognition of her sovereignty. The state's security building has been closely bound to state building. In the emerging vision of Lithuania's political identity the country's history has played an important role. It was the "binding idea" (Buzan, 1991, 64) of the new state and the main source of justification for its FS policy. Thus it is reasonable to start the analysis of Lithuania's present FS policy with a short digression to the inter-war Lithuania's history, as it is perceived in the contemporary context.

5. Historical background for foreign security policy

When viewed from the perspective of the West the three Baltic States look much like a unified bloc. However, in their attempt to reconcile the different goals of nation state building and of integrating with the rest of Europe Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia themselves are often inclined to stress their individual differences and peculiarities. There is no doubt that the attitude in question has historical grounding. However, so far it has not justified itself in terms of pragmatic considerations. This has been amply demonstrated by the FS policies that Lithuania pursued in the period between the two world wars.

The three Baltic States declared their independence in 1918, in the aftermath of the war and the revolutions that led to the collapse of the Russian and the German empires. Their main goal at that time was to define, and to secure international recognition of their territorial borders. At the time Lithuania had borders with Latvia, Poland and Germany. Despite the common goal of the three countries, it was already at the Paris Peace conference of 1919 that the Lithuanian Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Augustinas Voldemaras, claimed Lithuania's exceptionable and preferable geopolitical situation, as compared to those of Latvia and Estonia which, allegedly, was due to Lithuania's lack of direct borders with Russia and lack of sea ports, such as those of Riga and Tallinn, which were important for Russia. Moreover, Lithuania was claimed to have the privilege of being able to appeal to international law because of its former history of statehood.[8] The attitude in question had a strong influence on Lithuania's policy of security and on its foreign policy in the inter-war period.

In a book published in 1938, commemorating 20 years' anniversary of Lithuania's independence, Lithuania was characterized as the country "struggling for Vilnius" (Zaunius, 1990: 30). The problems relating to Vilnius were raised at the Paris peace conference. The goal of Lithuanian political leaders was the restoration of independent Lithuania in its ethnic

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[8] The state of Lithuania (The Great Dukedom of Lithuania) has its roots in the 13th century. In the 15th century the country was among the most powerful European states. At the end of the 16th century the Great Dukedom of Lithuania, judging by the size of its territory and population, was the fourth in Europe, while Poland was the eleventh. In 1565 the Lublin union between the Great Dukedom of Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland was created, constituting the Commonwealth of Lithuania and Poland. The union established a common monarch and common parliament as the two permanent links binding together Poland and Lithuania. In other respects both states enjoyed autonomy. This was most significant in regard to the continued existence of the Lithuanian legal system and its government offices, including the treasury and military establishment (Dembowski, 1982). In 1793-95 the Commonwealth was broken up and absorbed by Russia, Prussia and Austria. The entire Lithuanian ethnic area fell under Russian rule. It remained so until the end of the First World War.

boundaries with Vilnius as capital and with the area of the Smaller Lithuania (Konigsberg region) included within its boundaries.[9] The goal clashed with Poland's interests in its endeavour to re-establish Poland within the boundaries of 1793. Thus it claimed the same territories as did Lithuania, the Vilnius and the Klaipeda (Memel) region. The Polish delegation proposed to take the Memel region away from Germany and to adjoin it to Lithuania, on the condition that Lithuania would join Poland in a federation. In an attempt to strengthen its position in the negotiations with Lithuania Poland seized Vilnius on October 9, 1920. In 1923 the League of Nations resolved to cede Vilnius to Poland, while recognizing Lithuania's claims to the Klaipeda (Memel) region. Despite the resolution of the League of Nations Lithuania refused to establish any relations with Poland till Vilnius remained in its hands.[10]

In its efforts to regain Vilnius Lithuanian foreign policy turned towards establishing closer relations with Russia and Germany and isolating itself from the other neighboring states. All attempts of Estonia, Latvia and Poland at creating a unified geopolitical space between Germany and Russia failed. Lithuania's policy was fitting Russia and Germany, which were both intent in preventing Poland from gaining dominance over the region. Russia, being the first country to recognize Lithuania's independence in July 1920 with Vilnius as capital, supported Lithuania on all issues relating to its conflict with Poland. In 1923 it issued a note protesting the decision of the Ambassadors' conference to cede the Vilnius region to Poland. In 1926 Russia and Lithuania signed a treaty of non-aggression. In 1927 Russia's warning note to Poland prevented it from starting an armed conflict with Lithuania.

By the end of the 30s the main direction of Lithuania's security policy, as defined by Voldemaras - fighting Poland with the help of Germany and Soviet Union - fell to the ground and forced the government to seek new points of support. The new guiding lines for the security and foreign relations policy have been associated with the name of Stasys Lozoraitis,

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[9] The Smaller Lithuania, the southwestern part of ethnic Lithuania was conquered by the Livonian order in the 13th century. The many attempts of Lithuania at regaining the strip of coastline including the port of Klaipeda were not successful. Until the Versailles treaty of 1919 the territory in question was part of the German Empire. It should be noted that despite the centuries' long attempts at assimilation, after World War Ian overwhelming majority of the original population was still Lithuanian; the Klaipeda region had the Lithuanian population of 48,9%.

[10] Internationally, the Polish occupation of Vilnius was qualified as such only in 1931, when the international court in the Hague draw the decision that in seizing Vilnius Poland violated international law. Diplomatic relations with Poland was established in 1938.

minister for foreign affairs. His attention was drawn towards the Baltic states, the League of Nations and Poland. In 1934 Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia signed the Treaty of Peace and Co-operation for a period of ten years. In the treaty the three countries put themselves under obligation to consult each other on matters of common interest in foreign affairs and to render each other political and diplomatic assistance in international relations. The issue of Vilnius was not directly referred to in the obligations.

Lozoraitis made an attempt at radically changing Lithuania's relations with Poland. His suggestion was that in order to get an agreement with Poland the struggle for Vilnius had to be suspended and confined to the demands for the cultural autonomy of ethnic Lithuanians in the region. The cabinet of ministers rejected Lozoraitis' proposals. Passions excited by the issue of Vilnius were so widespread through all the strata of the Lithuanian population that any governmental move towards compromise was bound to fail.

The new direction of Lithuania's security policy was a response to the changing balance of powers in Europe. It was becoming evident that Germany, rapidly gaining in strength, and the Soviet Union, obtaining international recognition (it was accepted to the League of Nations in 1934) were beginning to pose the main threats to the sovereignty of the Baltic states. However, the readjustment of the security policy was belated and insufficiently resolute. The threats posed by the Soviet Union and Germany were underestimated while Poland as the guarantor of security was overestimated. An alliance between the Baltic States and Poland in the 20s, even if it would not have greatly changed the balance of powers in the region, could have played an important role in the subsequent development in Europe but it was too late in 30-ties.

At the end of the 30s, when the danger to peace in Europe was beyond anyone's doubt, Lithuania opted for a policy of neutrality (the neutrality act was passed in January 1939). After the German seizure of the Klaipeda area a non-aggression treaty was signed with Germany in March 1939. An attempt was also made to build up the country's position in the crumbling League of Nations, by proposing Lithuania's nomination to the Council of the League.

After the Soviet Union and Germany signed the non-aggression pact of August 23, 1939, with its secret supplementary protocols apportioning their respective zones of influence, the backbone of Lithuania's security policy, based as it was on the clash of interests of the Soviet Union and Germany, was broken. The Lithuanian State was doomed. However, in distinction

to Estonia and Latvia, Lithuania had the illusion of option choosing 'the Russian or the German yoke'. According to the secret protocols Lithuania was assigned to Germany. On September 1, after the onslaught on Poland, Germany made the suggestion that Lithuania recaptured Vilnius by herself. The Lithuanian government declined the proposal, justifying the refusal by the neutrality act.

It is difficult to say what the consequences would have been had Lithuania joined the war on Germany's side. Definitely, the stand of Lithuania had some influence on the results of the German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty of September 28, according to which Lithuania was turned over to the Soviet Union.

Later events developed on a scenario common to all Baltic States: 'mutual assistance' treaties signed (with Lithuania on October 10, including the stationing of 25,000 Soviet troops), then occupation (June 1940) and, finally, incorporation into the Soviet Union (August 1940). For fifty years the Baltic States disappeared from the world map. And even though no one doubts that Lithuania alone or together with the other Baltic states was hardly able to withstand the military intervention of the Soviet Union, historians and politicians today are still unable to reconcile themselves with the fact that the Baltic States were occupied without any political and military resistance. In Lithuania's case this, undoubtedly, had much to do with president Smetona's dictatorship (since 1926) that severed political decision-making from democratic procedure and thus led to a fatal split.

The interpretations of the inter-war Lithuanian history are an important for the understanding Lithuania's contemporary FS policies. Some of the assessments and conceptions deriving from that period have been incorporated into contemporary political discourse, thus, decisions are made and institutions created on their basis. A short outline of Lithuania's history in the inter-war period can help identify those aspects of the country's inter-war FS policies that have made considerable impact on the development of its contemporary political discourse. The aspects are related to the issue of Baltic States'cooperation, relations between Lithuania and Poland, pro-Western orientations, and the relations with Russia.

6. Lithuania and other Baltic States: allied or separate?

Let us consider, within the context of the sovereignty and the integration discourses, the development of Lithuania's relations with the other Baltic States since the restoration of their independence. Despite a number of historical and cultural differences between Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, at the level of international relations they are usually not differentiated and are treated as a whole, the Baltic States. As we saw, at least the history of the 20th century provides some reasons for this treatment. The common experience of the Soviet occupation and the joint efforts during the liberation movement have laid the foundations for the Baltic states' co-operation after they regained their independence. Seen from the outside, their contemporary FSP seem to be essentially similar: they share the same pro-Western orientation, they seek membership in NATO for the hard security it would guarantee, they are actively involved in attempts of joining the EU for soft security and, finally, they are cautious and distrustful in their relations with Russia.

However, in implementing their basically similar foreign policies the Baltic States have at the same time regressed on the issue of their own mutual integration. This is somewhat paradoxical, for formally there are numerous institutions for their co-operation, including the Baltic Assembly, the Baltic Council of Ministers, the Free Trade Agreement, as well as some common initiatives in matters of defense. Nevertheless, the dominant public opinion in Lithuania is that the relations among the Baltic States are unsatisfactory. Retrospectively, one can say that before the withdrawal of Russian troops from all Baltic States in 1994 the Baltic states acted as a geopolitical unit in respect of their foreign and security policies. Since that time, however, despite their common initiatives, they have evolved mutual competition in the pursuits of integration with the West and in strengthening of respective state's sovereignty.

This is clearly demonstrated by the peculiarities of Lithuanian - Latvian relations. In particular, problems have arisen in the sea border delimitation. Negotiations on the issue have carried on for five years and it was only in May 1999 that an agreement on the sea border delimitation was reached. The heart of the matter is that in the disputed area of the Baltic Sea shelf there is a promising oil deposit claimed by both Latvia and Lithuania. Latvia has started negotiations with foreign companies on the exploration and possible exploitation of the deposit. In Lithuania this was conceived as doing injury to her economic and political interests. Within the conceptual framework of sovereignty discourse the chances of reaching a mutually advantageous agreement are rather doubtful. The positive turn in the negotiations

was only reached when it was agreed to separate the legal and the economic aspects of the issue. This, in turn, was influenced by the EU demand making membership in EU conditional on the signing of a treaty on the border delimitation

The other problem is the construction of the Butinge oil terminal near Klaipeda. The terminal could lessen Lithuania's dependence on Russia's energy supplies and would strengthen Lithuania's role as a seafaring nation. The experts hold the project economically worthwhile. However, the building of the terminal was disapproved by Latvia's politicians and the greens claiming that the project was ecologically dangerous and economically useless. On the other hand, Lithuanian politicians hold the ecological arguments a mere disguise for Latvia's economic interest in keeping the Ventspils terminal (the biggest terminal in Baltic states, with the capacity of 32 million tons) free from the new competitor (the planned capacity of the Butinge terminal is 12 mil. tons). In some experts' opinion, by coordinating their efforts the two countries could achieve a mutual economic gain. However, in this case, too, the nation state' approach overshadows the economic one. Among other examples of policies, associated with the sovereignty discourse and causing tensions between the Baltic States, one can mention the so-called "pork wars". The most recent case was that of tariffs on pork imports imposed in May 1999 by the Latvian Parliament, to protect the interests of the country's domestic producers.

By far the largest progress in the development of trilateral relations of the Baltic States has been achieved in military co-operation. The observers of the developments in the Baltic states are certainly familiar with the four major co-operative projects of the Baltic states - Baltic Battalion (BALTBAT), Baltic Naval Squadron (BALTRON), Baltic Airspace Surveillance Network (BALTNET) and Baltic Defence College (BDC). However, even in this field there are some threats to their co-operation. The projects, even if supported by Western participants, put strong pressure on national defence budgets. On the whole, the trilateral co-operation for 1998 included about 40 co-operation items. The bulk of the costs of their implementation will fall in the period of 1998-1999. The Baltic States may face serious difficulties in financing the projects. This is particularly true of Latvia, for Latvia's defence spending in 1998 amounted to 0,6% of the GDP, while in Estonia this figure reached 1,2%, and in Lithuania 1,5% of the GDP. In absolute terms these figures constitute 39.3, 58.7 and 119.75 million USD respectively. In 1999 Latvia increased the defence budget to 0,93%,

while Lithuania will spend 1,51%. Lithuania's defence budget will reach 2% of GDP in 2001, according to the law adopted by the Seimas. These differences might soon become an obstacle for the implementation of the common projects and lead to some misunderstandings among the Baltic States. This might also bring back the idea, put forward by Lithuania in 1996, of joining NATO separately.

In all Baltic States the central motivation of the political elites for closer integration with the West remains within the sovereignty discourse, with its characteristically clear-cut division between foreign and domestic policy and the prioritization of 'national interests'. The whole idea of the Baltic unity and integration is hardly compatible with their orientation to the building of a nation-state. No wonder, that first Estonia and then Latvia turned towards the North, while Lithuania, since 1995, was turning to the South, in the direction of Poland and Central Europe. The re-orientation was succinctly put by Lithuania's Foreign Affairs Minister Saudargas in 1996, namely, that the unity of the Baltic states is a myth that only exists in the heads of Western politicians (Atgimimas, 1996). Doubts concerning the Baltic unity were repeatedly voiced by Estonia's President Lennart Meri and Latvia's Foreign Minister Valdis Birkavs. At the Baltic Assembly in May 1999 Birkavs told that the illusions of Baltic unity are indeed disappearing (Baltic Times, 1999).

7. Lithuania and Poland: between the past and the future

The development of Lithuanian-Polish relations since 1990 is a good illustration of the mixture of the sovereignty and the integration discourses in Lithuania's political and public life. As already noted, the two countries have old historical links. One can speak of their common history starting with the Lublin Union (1569) which brought the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth into existence. The common history includes both their joint uprisings against the Russian Empire in the 19th century and also the Polish occupation of Vilnius in 1920. The territorial conflict between Lithuania and Poland has been the leitmotif of the foreign and security policy of inter-war Lithuania. The conflict led to Lithuania's isolation from the other Baltic States and to a rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Indirectly, it encouraged the Polonization of the Vilnius region that was occupied by Poland. It is hardly surprising that in

the dynamics of Polish-Lithuanian relations in the 90-ties historical arguments played a prominent role. One can distinguish three stages in the dynamics of this short period.

The first stage was the period from the declaration of Lithuania's independence on March 11, 1990 till the August putsch (1991) in Moscow. It was characterized by Poland's unqualified support for the Lithuanian case (with the exception of official recognition). At the time, though critical of the way minorities were treated in Lithuania, Poland did not support the autonomy demands of the Polish ethnic minority (Burant, 1993: 399-401; Miniotaite, 1993: 216-218).

After the August putsch, when Lithuania achieved international recognition, the relations between the two countries deteriorated. At the end of 1991 Lithuania's Defence minister Audrius Butkevicius pronounced Poland the greatest threat for Lithuania, while Poland's president Lech Walesa in his letter to Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of Lithuania's Supreme Council, described the two countries' relations as "near-crisis" (Lopata, Zalys, 1995:19-20). The events could only turn this way because of Lithuania's becoming an independent agent of international relations faced with the challenge of its political identity. By taking inter-war Lithuania as the model, the image of Poland as Lithuania's malicious enemy was also naturally embraced. The image was also operative in shaping early Lithuanian policies towards the Polish ethnic minority.

A gradual improvement in Lithuanian-Polish relations began in 1992. The Declaration of Friendship and Good-Neighbourly Co-operation was signed in 1992. The signing of the main document, Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation, was delayed till 1994. The delay was mostly due to the opposition's demand in Lithuania that the treaty included a clause condemning the occupation of Vilnius in 1920; this, however, was not acceptable to Poland.The year 1994 was the turning point in Polish-Lithuanian relations. The change was related to the rise of the movement in Central European states towards closer association with NATO. Poland was becoming 'a bridge linking Lithuania with the EU and NATO'. During the visit to Lithuania in 1996 by Poland's president Kwasniewski it was agreed to prioritize military co-operation. The two countries endorsed common projects on airspace control, joint military exercises, peace-keeping (the establishment of a joint Lithuanian-Polish peace-keeping unit, LITPOLBAT). The right-wing coalition that came to power in Lithuania in autumn 1996 is intent on a simultaneous progress of Lithuania and Poland towards an

association with NATO and the EU. It even seems that an attempt is made on the part of some politicians at changing Lithuania's identity from that of a Baltic state to that of a Central European state. The eight years' dynamics of Lithuanian- Polish relations clearly show that the nationalist security policy is being supplanted by a more pragmatic one. Now we can talk about close Lithuanian-Polish co-operation both at the parliamentary and the executive levels.

However, examining some particular Lithuanian-Polish relations in Lithuania or in Poland we can find some causes for misunderstandings and tensions. The latest example is an episode related to the law on the official language dating from 1995. The law states that languages other than Lithuanian can only be used by non-state institutions. In January 1998 the Vilnius district municipality proclaimed polish the second official language of the region. (With the exclusion of Vilnius City, 63 percent of the Vilnius district population is Polish). The decision was annulled by the governor of the district. In a conciliatory gesture, Lithuania's Seimas adopted an amendment of the law which allows for dominant regional minority members to make appeals and to communicate in their own language. Still, the only official language remains Lithuanian. Despite some mutual concessions, the problems of the Polish minority in Lithuania and of the Lithuanian minority in Poland are still live issues. To tackle them a bilateral commission was created in May 1999.

As this brief survey shows contemporary Lithuanian-Polish relations are characterized by two tendencies: 1) friendly bilateral relations in matters related to the countries' integration with the West (the integration discourse) and 2) the ever-present misunderstandings related to the problems of national minorities (the sovereignty discourse). Both the Poles in Lithuania and the Lithuanians in Poland the counties' policy towards national minorities consider as assimilatory, as posing a threat to their identity. A solution of the problem is possible by the gradual substitution of the normative sumptions of the sovereignty discourse by those of the integration discourse.

8. Lithuania: from the 'anti-East to the 'pro-West' identity?

The end of the cold war seemed to promise that Lithuania's geopolitical position in the confrontation between the East and the West would no longer be of relevance. However, subsequent developments have shown that the optimism was somewhat premature. Lithuania

is part of the emerging European security complex and its security inevitably rests on the specific interdependencies within the system. With the European security system losing its bipolarity the cultural and political watershed between the East and the West has nevertheless remained and it still has the potential of getting transformed into a political and even military confrontation. As a small nation Lithuania does not exert a significant influence on the security dynamics in the region; yet because of its geopolitical situation she has the possibility of choosing either the Eastern or the Western alignment. It should be noticed that the concepts of the East and the West are highly value-laden the West being associated with prosperity, security and democracy, the East, with poverty, totalitarianism, insecurity. From the point of view of Lithuania's national security, the West is not identified with any particular country, but rather with their different alliances, in particular, with the EU and the NATO as the most important ones. After regaining its independence Lithuania was unwavering in its choice of an integration with the West. The choice was even sanctioned by a constitutional act "On the Non-Alignment of the Republic of Lithuania with Post-Soviet Eastern Alliances (1992).

After the withdrawal of Russia's troop from Lithuania in 1993, the pro-Western orientation has been expressed by such radical political decisions as the application for membership in NATO (1994)[11] and the signing of the European Agreement (1995). Lithuania's prospective membership in the EU was treated favourably both in the West and in the East. The situation was quite different with her intention of joining NATO. It became increasingly obvious that Lithuania's political elite had underestimated the role of East - West (Russia's and NATO's) relations for Lithuania's chances of success in choosing and implementing her political goals. The active and unswerving Baltic quest for membership in NATO was perceived in Russia as a challenge to her national interests. It was countered by Russia's Federal Council's statement denouncing the expansion of NATO (March, 1996), by Russia's Parliament's vote in favour of restoring the Soviet Union (March, 1996) and by the increased attempts at strengthening the ties between CIS member states. All these measures have caused tensions in the region and made the problem of the Baltic countries more acute. This, in turn, created the 'Baltic dilemma' for the West, namely, 'how to reconcile legitimate security interests of Russia and the CEE states and a unique opportunity to influence internal processes in those states by promoting stability in the transitional period' (Rotfeld, 1996: 26)·

The way the dilemma is going to be solved is bound to make an impact on the whole European security climate, with consequences directly relevant for Scandinavia, continental Europe, the EU and Russia. The 'Baltic dilemma' remained an unresolved issue even after the Madrid Meeting (1997) and the signing of the USA - Baltic Charter (1998).

From Lithuania's point of view, the way the dilemma has been dealt with till now was giving the preference to Russia's interests ('Russia first') and postponing indefinitely Baltic States' acceptance to NATO. The approach was met both in the Baltic States and sometimes in the West with allusions to the realities of the Second World War. The «Munich complex», «New Yalta», «Danzig corridor» (relating to Lithuania's geopolitical situation after Poland's joining NATO), these were the epithets often employed (Landsbergis, 1996). The assumption underlying these allusions is that just like on the eve of the Second World War the Baltic States have again become an object of a deal between the big powers.

The reaction suggests that the orientation of political identity that underlies Lithuania's FSP is 'anti-East' rather than 'pro-West'. While Western decision-makers "foresee NATO become more of a co-operative security organisation in its relations with Russia", Lithuania's politicians used to treat it as a "collective defence organisation *against* Russia" (Archer, Jœger, 1998: 459). In supporting democratisation processes in Russia the West has been intent on creating a common security space encompassing both Russia and the Baltic states. As for the majority of Russia's political elite, they hold that «the Baltic states are part of Russian sphere of influence in a sense that bilateral problems should be predominantly resolved without direct or indirect interference of the third powers» (Moshes, Vushkarnik, 1997: 81). This position on the part of Russia became even more pronounced at the end of 1997. After the Madrid meeting and before the signing of the USA-Baltic Charter Russia offered security guarantees for the Baltic States. The guarantees laid particular emphasis on the Baltics' non-alliance with military blocs and the importance of their policy of neutrality. It was suggested that the guarantees might be legally enacted as a bilateral agreement between the Baltic States and Russia. The Baltics unanimously rejected these offerings. In part, this might be explained by the memories of Russia's guarantees given in 1939.

A good illustration of Lithuania's 'anti-East' orientation has been provided by a political scandal in May 1999 caused by the intention of the national power supply company 'Lietuvos

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[11] [18] Contacts of Lithuania's Defense ministry with NATO began as early as 1991, with the first NATO seminar

energija' to sign a joint agreement with Russia, Belarus, Estonia and Latvia on power supply integration. The agreement, which was signed by all, with the exception of Lithuania, dealt with ways of better managing the inherited unitary power supply system. Lithuania's politicians condemned the intention of signing the agreement as implicating Lithuania in the eastern zone and as blocking the road westwards. An essentially technical agreement was given a political interpretation: the case was even considered at an urgent session of Lithuanian Defence Council.

The examples suggest that the incentives for seeking membership in NATO are still those belonging to the framework of sovereignty discourse. However, the new NATO doctrine that puts democracy above state sovereignty is being shaped within the framework of integration discourse, with its characteristic emphasis on the priority of human rights. It is probably because of the mismatch between NATO self-identification and its identification in Lithuania that the number of those supporting Lithuania's membership in NATO has been on the decrease recently. According to the public opinion survey center 'Vilmorus', in May 1999, for the first time, those who were 'against NATO' outnumbered those who were 'for NATO' (32% and 31%, accordingly; the results of the survey has not yet been published). To compare, early in 1997 those 'for NATO' comprised 48%, while those 'against NATO' were 14% of the respondents. By contrast, the attitude of the political elite towards membership in NATO has not changed, it has remained invariably positive.

Public opinion surveys have also shown a decrease in the support for Lithuania's membership in EU. Early in 1997 membership in EU was supported by 49% of the respondents, 11% were against; in April 1999 the numbers were, accordingly, 39% and 28%. The tendency has first surfaced at the end of 1998 (*Integracijos zinios*, 1999:12).[12] The main reasons referred to by those in support were «improvement in economic situation» (24,2%), «a lot of advantages for free market» (7,1%), «security guarantees» (7%); while the reason of those against were: «not ready (23%), «loss of sovereignty» (22,4%), «damage to the local market» (19,5%). (Gaidys, 1998: 71).

The decrease of support for Lithuania's membership in EU derives from the perceived discrepancy of the consequences of integration for economic and social structure, from the

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held in Vilnius in December 1991.
[12] According to data made public in June 1999 by a working group of the Secretariat of the European Parliament, in April 1999 only 27% of the surveyed Lithuanian population were in support of joining EU (*Respublika*, 1999).

growing influence of Euroskeptics on public opinion, and from the growing politicization of the process. This can be illustrated by the debates on the rationale for the closure of the Ignalina atomic power plant and by the conflicting views on the process of privatization.

According to the demands of the European Commission, one of the conditions for Lithuania's membership in the EU is the closure of the Ignalina atomic power plant. This is the biggest in Europe Chernobyl-type atomic power plant potentially threatening the whole Baltic Sea region. The plant is the major source of cheap electric power in Lithuania that is also exported to Russia and Belarus. It produces 80% of electric power. There are also realistic projects for the export of electricity via Poland to Western Europe. In order to raise the safety level of the plant some 220 million USD have been invested since 1991 from both national and international sources of funding. Nevertheless, the European Commission insists that because of the reactor type the safety level of the plant's long-term exploitation cannot attain to Western standards of safety. To complicate things further, according to an international expert study (Barselina study, 1992 - 1996), with safety upgrade already done, the probabilistic risks of an accident in the Ignalina plant are more or less comparable with those of Western plants. Lithuania's politicians, objecting to the demand for the precipitant closure of the plant point out the huge direct and indirect costs this would involve. These are estimated to be about 2,3 and 3,5 mlrd USD, accordingly (*Integracijos zinios*, 1999: 4). They also stress the importance of the plant for Lithuania's economy. Lithuania's President, formerly himself a prominent ecologist in the United States, considers the development of nuclear energy a most promising priority for Lithuania. Some Lithuanian politicians even consider the demands of the European Commission for the closure of the plant as a covert attempt at ousting the potential competitor from the electricity market of the unified Europe. All these claims and counterclaims suggest that the basically technical issue of the plant's safety has been politicized on both sides.

The other example is related to the demand of the European Commission to speed up the privatization of such large companies as the 'Telekomas' (privatized in 1998), the oil refinery 'Mazeikiu nafta', the Klaipeda Sea port. The decision was challenged by the opposition, mostly social democrats and the democratic labour party. In 1988 a referendum was even suggested on the issue of the privatization of the so-called strategic objects. As the proposal did not gain sufficient popular support, the referendum failed. Together with the trade unions

the opposition organized protest marches and meetings. In 1999 protest actions have been directed mainly against the privatization of the oil refinery 'Mazeikiu nafta' and the Klaipeda Sea port. Even though the actions are joined by only a small fraction of the population, the events have shown that without due consideration of local circumstances privatization can spurn social tension and political instability. Thus in 1998 the opposition to privatization led to structural changes in the government and had influenced the decision to abolish the Ministry of European Affairs.

These examples can lead one to some paradoxical conclusions. On the one hand, all major political parties in Lithuania support the country's joining the EU.[13] The arguments are that this would open more opportunities for economic growth and provide security. However, the very process of getting closer to the West is a potential source of internal tensions. This seemingly paradoxical conclusion is explained by the hypothesis that the conceptualization of Lithuania's political life is still firmly within the 'integration dilemma', with priority accorded to the sovereignty discourse. This, in turn, is related to the fact that Lithuania's security policy has been closely tied to the processes of state-building and to the search for political identity. The pre-eminent goal of Lithuania's security policy and her politics in general has been the build-up of the nation state, the preservation of its territorial integrity and fixed identity. Integration with the West has been mostly of instrumental nature, a mode of survival on the 'meeting ground of two worlds'. The proclaimed 'pro-Western' orientation of foreign and security policy finds its expression mostly in 'anti-Eastern' political decisions and in the politicization of economic and social life.

Concluding Remarks

Lithuania's FSP, like that of the other Baltic States, is closely related to the peculiarities of the development of her political identity. The main objectives of her FSP, those of strengthening state sovereignty and joining the European integration process, have been conceived along the lines of the 'integration dilemma', which is based on the realist assumptions concerning international relations. The 'integration dilemma', as it is interpreted in contemporary

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[13] Euroskeptics are now represented by the National Democratic Party, established in January 1999, which opposes membership in EU and advocates moderate nationalist ideology. The party is an outgrowth of the national democratic grouping 'For Independent Lithuania', active since 1997.

integration theories, is characterized by the conflict between the processes of nation-state building and the integration process, leading to tensions between domestic and foreign policy.

However, when considered from the perspective of constructivism the integration dilemma acquires a very different content. Discussions about the relative power of loyalty to Europe versus that to nation/state lose its point. Europe and state/nation are mutually constitutive. In contrast to the realist analysis of FSP with its stress on the preservation and strengthening of a fixed political identity, constructivism is concerned with an analysis of political identity development, with the process of constructing the meanings of such concepts as state, nation, Europe, security.

The present analysis of the dynamics of construction of these meanings within Lithuania's political discourse (based on the examination of documents and debates on national security conceptions) has led to the conclusion that concepts such as those of state, nation, security, Europe (the West) are still firmly within the framework of the sovereignty discourse.

This is confirmed by the analysis of Lithuania's FSP. A survey of the development of the relations between the Baltic states, of those between Lithuania and Poland as well as of the problems related to the integration with the West (Europe) shows that Lithuania's FSP is dominated by the precepts of the sovereignty discourse. In justifying the integration process the meanings, which have been shaped in the sovereignty, discourse have been transferred to the emerging integration discourse. However, the conflict-based model of the relations between the 'inside' and the 'outside', when applied to the integration process, can easily lead to misunderstandings and inadequate assessment of the situation in practical politics.

Finally, the study shows that an analysis of Lithuania's FSP, based on the hypothesis of the interaction of sovereignty discourse and that of integration discourse, facilitates the explanation and prediction of developments in Lithuania's FSP.

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