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The Pentagon’s $52,000 trash can

With military spending at record highs, many contractors have hiked the cost of relatively simple items. (Video)

Reporting | Military Industrial Complex

Leading military contractors jacked up the price of several everyday products after receiving non-competitive contracts, costing taxpayers more than $1.3 million in apparently unnecessary markups, according to Pentagon contracting data acquired by Responsible Statecraft.

Until 2010, Boeing charged an average of $300 for a trash container used in the E-3 Sentry, a surveillance and radar plane based on the 707 civilian airliner. When the 707 fell out of use in the United States, the trash can was no longer a “commercial” item, meaning that Boeing was not obligated to keep its price at previous levels, according to a weapons industry source who spoke to RS.

In 2020, the Pentagon paid Boeing over $200,000 for four of the trash cans, translating to roughly $51,606 per unit. In a 2021 contract, the company charged $36,640 each for 11 trash containers, resulting in a total cost of more than $400,000. The apparent overcharge cost taxpayers an extra $600,000 between the two contracts.

In another case, Lockheed Martin hiked the price of an electrical conduit for the P-3 plane as much as 14 fold, costing the Pentagon an additional $133,000 between 2008 and 2015. 

Jamaica Bearings — a company that distributes parts manufactured by other firms — sold the Department of Defense 13 radio filters that had once cost $350 each for nearly $49,000 per unit in 2022. The apparent markup cost taxpayers more than $600,000 in extra fees.

The examples revealed here represent only a small portion of what experts say is a pattern of contractors overcharging DoD for a wide range of parts and weapons systems, a practice that reduces military readiness and drives up spending. A recent investigation by 60 Minutes highlighted rampant price gouging in the arms industry, including one case in which Boeing overcharged taxpayers by more than half a billion dollars for missiles used in the Patriot missile defense system.

The investigation also revealed that Raytheon Technologies had raised the price of Stinger missiles from $25,000 to more than $400,000 per unit. “Even accounting for inflation and some improvements, that's a seven-fold increase,” Shay Assad, a former Pentagon acquisitions official, told 60 Minutes.

In a letter sparked by the investigation, a bipartisan group of senators called on the Pentagon to investigate allegations of widespread price gouging by contractors.

“These companies have abused the trust [the] government has placed in them, exploiting their position as sole suppliers for certain items to increase prices far above inflation or any reasonable profit margin,” wrote Sens. Bernie Sanders (D-Vt.), Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.), Ron Wyden (D-Ore.), Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa), and Mike Braun (R-Ind.). 

“The DOD can no longer expect Congress or the American taxpayer to underwrite record military spending while simultaneously failing to account for the hundreds of billions it hands out every year to spectacularly profitable private corporations,” they added.

Boeing declined to comment on its alleged price gouging. Jamaica Bearings did not respond to questions about the price hikes or how much it paid to procure the radio filters before selling them to the Pentagon.

Lockheed Martin did not respond to a request for comment from RS, but it told 60 Minutes that it negotiates with the Pentagon “in good faith” and said its sales to the government are “in compliance with Federal Acquisition Regulations and all other applicable laws.”

The revelations come as major arms manufacturers boast record revenues. Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics, and Raytheon Technologies have each reported all-time highs in demand following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, allowing the companies to give shareholders nearly $20 billion last year through stock buybacks and dividends. And the CEOs of the top five weapons makers each make between $18 million and $23 million per year. 

About half of the Biden administration’s $842 billion Pentagon budget request goes to contractors. In 2022, roughly 30 percent of military spending went to the “big five” weapons makers, which include Raytheon, Boeing, Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics, and Northrop Grumman.

Experts say much of that contractor price gouging has worsened over the past few decades as the military sector has experienced dramatic consolidation. In the 1990s, there were more than 50 “prime” DoD contractors capable of competing for major contracts. Now, there are only five.

In practice, this means that many contracts receive only one bid, leaving little reason for companies to offer a fair price. Opportunities for gouging are particularly widespread when it comes to smaller contracts since contractors are not required to share their costs for any deals valued at less than $2 million, as the Intercept noted last year. 

As the Government Accountability Office recently reported, nearly 20,000 small businesses have bowed out of military contracting in the past decade, creating further opportunities for price hikes.

A screenshot (right) showing a Pentagon contract for four trash cans at a cost of $51,606 per unit.
Reporting | Military Industrial Complex
Will stock trade ban curtail DOD budget corruption?

Billion Photos via shutterstock.com

Will stock trade ban curtail DOD budget corruption?

QiOSK

A new bipartisan proposal to ban members of Congress and their immediate family members from trading individual stocks looks to close a glaring conflict of interest between politicians who control massive government budgets, much of which go to private contractors.

The potential for serious conflicts of interest are quickly apparent when reviewing the stock trades of members of Congress's Senate and House Armed Services Committees, the panels responsible for the National Defense Authorization Act, the bill that sets recommended funding levels for the Department of Defense.

The 2024 NDAA authorized $886 billion, approximately half of which will go to contractors.

Five of the six most traded individual stocks by members of the House Armed Services Committee in the past year — Baxter International, Alphabet, NetApp, General Motors and KKR — had contracts with the Department of Defense, meaning that members may stand to benefit from the NDAA via their investments in companies with Pentagon contracts.

Members of the committee’s Senate counterpart, the Senate Armed Services Committee, also traded heavily in stocks. Like the House committee, five of the six most traded stocks by members on the Senate Committee — Cleveland Cliffs, Texas Instruments, Applied Materials, Humacyte and Chevron — had contracts with the Department of Defense.

The new “ETHICS Act,” introduced by Sens. Jeff Merkley (D-Ore.), Gary Peters (D-Mich.), Jon Ossoff (D-Ga.), and Josh Hawley (R-Mo.) addresses this increasingly glaring ethics problem in members personal finances and would prohibit the sort of trades that members of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees are currently conducting.

“[I]f you want to serve in Congress don't come here to serve your portfolio, come here to serve the people,” Merkley told NPR

.

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Diplomacy Watch: Will Russia be invited to next peace summit?
Diplomacy Watch: Domestic politics continue to challenge Ukraine’s allies
Diplomacy Watch: Domestic politics continue to challenge Ukraine’s allies

Diplomacy Watch: Will Russia be invited to next peace summit?

QiOSK

While Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to work in public to strengthen his country’s military arsenal and urge Washington and the West to lift more restrictions on how its weapons are used , Kyiv is also signaling a potential openness to negotiations with Moscow in the future.

At this week’s NATO summit in Washington, U.S. President Joe Biden and his Ukrainian counterpart made their case that Ukraine can still win its war with Russia.

“Make no mistake, Russia is failing in this war,” Biden said during a speech on Tuesday evening. “When this senseless war began, Ukraine was a free country. Today, it is still a free country, and the war will end with Ukraine remaining a free and independent country. Russia will not prevail. Ukraine will prevail.”

Zelensky, meanwhile, pushed the U.S. to enhance its provision of weaponry so that Ukraine can achieve victory.

“Imagine how much we can achieve when all limitations are lifted. Similarly now we can protect our cities from Russian glide bombs if American leadership makes a step forward and allows us to destroy Russian military aircraft on their bases,” he said in remarks at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation and Institute. “How much longer can Putin last? The answer to this question is right here in Washington – your leadership, your actions, your choice – the choice to act now.”

Ukraine got some of what it asked for at the summit, with NATO allies agreeing to send five new air defense systems, its first American-made F-16 fighter jets, and a long-term pledge of more than $43 billion in aid over the next year.

At the same time, however, Bloomberg reported on Thursday that Ukraine is hoping to organize its next summit before November’s presidential election in the United States — and that Russia could be included in the meetings.

“The push to organize the meeting before the US elections points to a sense of urgency on the part of Ukraine as it faces the prospect of Donald Trump returning to the White House,” according to the Bloomberg report.

Ukraine has organized a series of “peace summits” since June 2023, including the largest one last month in Switzerland. To date, the meetings have been geared toward strengthening support for Zelensky’s “peace formula,” and Russian representatives have not been invited to any of them.

Kyiv has previously signaled a willingness to include Russia in future talks. Perhaps the absence of many nations — most importantly China — from the last summit, due to Moscow’s exclusion, pressured Kyiv to move more quickly.

There is still a long way to go before Russia is actually invited to a future summit, or before talks between the two sides begin in earnest. Unnamed U.S. officials told Bloomberg that they were “unconvinced” that such a meeting would take place, and Russia’s deputy foreign minister said on Thursday that Russia would not attend, calling Ukraine’s preconditions an “ultimatum.”

The news could nonetheless be a positive development. As U.S. diplomat and former ambassador to Russia Thomas Pickering wrote in Foreign Affairs last year, this kind of discussion before official talks is normal for such a difficult negotiation.

“Like battle plans, peace plans may not survive first contact with the enemy, but the groundwork laid in advance of negotiations will still inform decision-making and improve the odds of a favorable outcome,” he wrote. “Prior preparations do not require the parties to fully agree on issues of substance. They don’t even require the parties to agree among themselves; that is what this phase of peacemaking is for. Early resolution, or even just understanding, of differences among key players (...) is vital for diplomatic readiness.”

In other diplomatic news related to the war in Ukraine:

— The final communiqué of this week’s NATO summit included the alliance’s harshest condemnation of China’s role in the war, calling Beijing a “decisive enabler” of Moscow’s war effort. “The PRC cannot enable the largest war in Europe in recent history without this negatively impacting its interests and reputation,” read the declaration.

—The communiqué also announced that Ukraine was on an “irreversible” path to join the alliance. “We will continue to support it on its irreversible path to full Euro-Atlantic integration, including NATO membership,” says the statement. “We reaffirm that we will be in a position to extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the Alliance when Allies agree and conditions are met.”

It has been NATO’s position that Kyiv will eventually join the alliance since 2008, and the latest statement did not provide any firm commitments on when or how that will happen. As Foreign Policy’s Robbie Gramer put it on Twitter, “Shorter NATO summit document: We agree that Ukraine will be ready to join NATO once we all agree that Ukraine will be ready to join NATO.”

— During the summit, the U.S. and Germany also announced that Washington will deploy intermediate-range missiles in Europe starting in 2026, in preparation for the “enduring stationing of these capabilities in the future,” according to a joint statement issued by the two countries. Russia’s deputy foreign minister called the decision “destructive to regional safety and strategic stability” and vowed a “military response” from Moscow.

U.S. national security adviser Jake Sullivan described the Russian response as “saber rattling,” adding, “What we are deploying to Germany is a defensive capability like many other defensive capabilities we have deployed across the alliance, across the decades.”

— U.S. officials believe that Russia is not likely to take over much more Ukrainian territory, according toThe New York Times.

“Russia’s problems represent a significant change in the dynamic of the war, which had favored Moscow in recent months,” according to the Times. “Russian forces continue to inflict pain, but their incremental advances have been slowed by the Ukrainians’ hardened lines.”

Eric Ciaramella, a former intelligence official who now works at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, told the Times that it has become clear over the last 18 months that neither side “possesses the capabilities to significantly change the battle lines.”

— Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi met with Putin in Moscow this week. India has been floated as a possible mediator in the war, and Modi’s rhetoric during the meeting suggests that he may be open to playing that role. “Bombs and rockets do not secure peace,” Modi said according to Russian media, adding, “therefore we need to give accent to dialogue, and dialogue is necessary.”

U.S. State Department news:

During a Tuesday press briefing, State Department spokesman Matthew Miller was asked about the meeting between Modi and Putin, and said that Washington had “concerns” about the relationship between the two countries.

“We continue to urge India to support efforts to realize an enduring and just peace in Ukraine based on the principles of the UN Charter, based on upholding Ukraine’s territorial integrity and its sovereignty,” Miller added. “And that will continue to be what we will engage with (...) India about.”

















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Kissinger, one hagiography at a time

DAVOS/SWITZERLAND, JAN 1992 - Henry Kissinger, former US Secretary of State chairing a panel session on “The New Partners” with the presidents of Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan at the Annual Meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos in 1992.

World Economic Forum/Flickr

Kissinger, one hagiography at a time

Washington Politics

FÜRTH, GERMANY — There are tragic ironies in life. And then there is the life of Henry Kissinger.

In 1938, as a teenager, he was forced to flee his hometown in Fürth, southeastern Germany. It was his mother, Paula Kissinger, who foresaw that the Nazi Party's antisemitic measures would only grow more dangerous and organized the family's escape to the United States. At least 13 close relatives would die in the Holocaust.

Expelled from the world he had always known simply because he was Jewish, Henry Kissinger started a new life in the U.S. that would lead him to the highest echelons of power.

In his role as U.S. national security adviser (1969-1975) and secretary of state (1973-1977), Kissinger played a decisive role in the expansion of the Vietnam War to Cambodia and Laos and the overthrow of democratically elected leaders such as Salvador Allende in Chile. This, however, did not preclude Kissinger from receiving honorary citizenship on his return to Fürth in 1998. The man who had been the victim of a deadly hatred that would probably have ended his life had he stayed in Germany was now, six decades later, and despite his responsibility for war crimes, a role model in Fürth.

During his last visit to Fürth in May 2023 to celebrate his 100th birthday, Kissinger was feted by Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Germany’s president, and Markus Söder, the minister president of Bavaria, the federal state where Fürth is located. In a video message, Steinmeier addressed Kissinger to tell him that, "this very special mixture of scholarship and political reason, which you embody in person, is unparalleled."

In his visit to Fürth, Kissinger inaugurated the exhibition "Henry – World Influencer No. 1: The History of the Family Kissinger from Fürth." The exhibition is located in the Ludwig Erhard Zentrum, dedicated to the man who was chancellor of West Germany from 1963 to 1966 and, like Kissinger, a native of Fürth.

It would have been unreasonable to expect an exhibition inaugurated by Kissinger himself to shed much light on the darkest chapters of the statesman's life. Moreover, the biggest part of the exhibition is dedicated to the Kissinger family history, not to Henry Kissinger's political trajectory.

Still, the approach to Kissinger's years in power can only be defined as hagiographic. In one of the panels, for instance, we read that, in his role as Nixon’s national security advisor, Kissinger "aimed to end the Vietnam War and free America from foreign policy isolation. While the war seemed to be escalating with the bombardment of Cambodia, Kissinger was conducting top secret peace negotiations."

The expansion of the war to Cambodia is presented in a passive voice as if it had nothing to do with Kissinger. Facts, however, are stubborn. A Pentagon report released in 1973 confirmed that the close to 4,000 bombing raids against Cambodia in 1969 and 1970 were directly approved by the National Security Council headed by Kissinger. Between 1969 and 1973, the U.S. dropped thrice as many munitions over Cambodia — despite not being at war with the country — as it did in Japan during World War II. Leaving aside the bombardment of Laos and Vietnam, the air campaign over Cambodia resulted in the deaths of 50,000 civilians according to Kissinger’s own estimates, and over 150,000 according to independent studies.

As for Kissinger's role in ending official U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War by negotiating the 1973 Paris Peace Accords, he won a Nobel Peace Prize for it. It was another tragic irony in Kissinger's life, considering that he helped future president Richard Nixon in his sabotage of Lyndon B. Johnson's 1968 peace initiative to end the war in Vietnam. Nixon was worried that successful peace talks would lead to his defeat in the 1968 presidential race against Hubert Humphrey, the Democratic candidate and Johnson’s vice president. Therefore, and as documented by hand-written notes, Nixon ordered H. R. Haldeman, his closest aide (later to become Nixon’s White House chief of staff), to "monkey wrench" the peace talks. Kissinger proved instrumental in achieving this.

In his 2001 book "The Trial Against Henry Kissinger," Christopher Hitchens shed light on Kissinger's role. Kissinger, an unofficial consultant to the American delegation negotiating an end to the Vietnam War in Paris in 1968, became "a source of hints and tips and early warnings of official intentions" for the Nixon campaign, according to Hitchens.

Kissinger informed Nixon that Johnson was considering suspending the bombing of North Vietnam to facilitate the negotiations in Paris. Armed with these secret details, the Nixon campaign contacted the South Vietnamese government through intermediaries and promised it a better deal if Nixon won the election. Once Johnson actually suspended the bombing, South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu pulled out of the peace talks.

The exhibition dedicated to Kissinger in his hometown of Fürth, as well as the guided tour of the exhibition, stress the image of the statesman as the paradigmatic practitioner of Realpolitik. Thus, we read that Kissinger knew more than anyone else that “all states have interests, but they are rarely identical." Kissinger's role in the opening of diplomatic relations with Communist China has weighed heavily in the arguments of those who see Kissinger as mainly concerned with national interests.

Similarly, Kissinger’s scholarship, such as his 1994 book “Diplomacy,” displays a very clear interest in the balance of power. But there are reasons to believe that Kissinger, who has often been presented to us as the paradigmatic realist, was equally influenced by ideological considerations in many of his actions.

Take, for instance, the overthrow of Chilean President Salvador Allende in 1973. This is the only slightly critical reference to Kissinger's political trajectory that can be found in the exhibition in Fürth. In a picture, Kissinger is seen smiling while shaking hands with Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet, who took power after Allende killed himself during the army’s assault against the presidential palace.

Five days after the coup, in a conversation with Nixon, Kissinger said, "We didn't do it. I mean we helped them." This modesty was not justified. In October 1970, when Allende had already won the presidential elections but had still not been confirmed as president by the Chilean Congress, Kissinger met with the CIA’s deputy director of plans, who subsequently transmitted to the CIA station in Chile that "it is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup."

Chile has the largest copper reserves in the world. After they were nationalized in 1971, the Allende government decided not to pay compensation to the U.S. companies that owned them. This enraged the Nixon administration but was hardly a threat to U.S. national security. The U.S. policy to overthrow Allende had little to do with Realpolitik. Ideology helps explain it far better.

Jorge Heine, a Research Professor at Boston University, writes that "what made Kissinger take such deadly aim at Allende was his new political model, a "peaceful road to socialism." If the Chilean model was replicated elsewhere, the U.S. narrative of political freedom being possible only in a free-market system would have been in trouble.

After Kissinger's death, political analysts all over the world sought to understand why the statesman generated such great fascination in both admirers and detractors. Part of the explanation is that, through Kissinger's biography, one can understand many of the key events that shaped the last 100 years.

He was there when fascism rose in Europe, fought Nazi Germany in the Second World War, and held power during the height of the Cold War. He remained a sought-after author, consultant, and commentator in the following decades, exerting influence on current discussions, such as the rise of China.

If one had to reach an assessment of Kissinger’s political life based only on the exhibition devoted to him in Fürth, one could be forgiven to think that his trajectory was exemplary. This, to put it gently, would be a very mistaken assumption.

keep readingShow less
Kissinger, one hagiography at a time

DAVOS/SWITZERLAND, JAN 1992 - Henry Kissinger, former US Secretary of State chairing a panel session on “The New Partners” with the presidents of Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan at the Annual Meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos in 1992.

World Economic Forum/Flickr

Kissinger, one hagiography at a time

Washington Politics

FÜRTH, GERMANY — There are tragic ironies in life. And then there is the life of Henry Kissinger.

In 1938, as a teenager, he was forced to flee his hometown in Fürth, southeastern Germany. It was his mother, Paula Kissinger, who foresaw that the Nazi Party's antisemitic measures would only grow more dangerous and organized the family's escape to the United States. At least 13 close relatives would die in the Holocaust.

Expelled from the world he had always known simply because he was Jewish, Henry Kissinger started a new life in the U.S. that would lead him to the highest echelons of power.

In his role as U.S. national security adviser (1969-1975) and secretary of state (1973-1977), Kissinger played a decisive role in the expansion of the Vietnam War to Cambodia and Laos and the overthrow of democratically elected leaders such as Salvador Allende in Chile. This, however, did not preclude Kissinger from receiving honorary citizenship on his return to Fürth in 1998. The man who had been the victim of a deadly hatred that would probably have ended his life had he stayed in Germany was now, six decades later, and despite his responsibility for war crimes, a role model in Fürth.

During his last visit to Fürth in May 2023 to celebrate his 100th birthday, Kissinger was feted by Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Germany’s president, and Markus Söder, the minister president of Bavaria, the federal state where Fürth is located. In a video message, Steinmeier addressed Kissinger to tell him that, "this very special mixture of scholarship and political reason, which you embody in person, is unparalleled."

In his visit to Fürth, Kissinger inaugurated the exhibition "Henry – World Influencer No. 1: The History of the Family Kissinger from Fürth." The exhibition is located in the Ludwig Erhard Zentrum, dedicated to the man who was chancellor of West Germany from 1963 to 1966 and, like Kissinger, a native of Fürth.

It would have been unreasonable to expect an exhibition inaugurated by Kissinger himself to shed much light on the darkest chapters of the statesman's life. Moreover, the biggest part of the exhibition is dedicated to the Kissinger family history, not to Henry Kissinger's political trajectory.

Still, the approach to Kissinger's years in power can only be defined as hagiographic. In one of the panels, for instance, we read that, in his role as Nixon’s national security advisor, Kissinger "aimed to end the Vietnam War and free America from foreign policy isolation. While the war seemed to be escalating with the bombardment of Cambodia, Kissinger was conducting top secret peace negotiations."

The expansion of the war to Cambodia is presented in a passive voice as if it had nothing to do with Kissinger. Facts, however, are stubborn. A Pentagon report released in 1973 confirmed that the close to 4,000 bombing raids against Cambodia in 1969 and 1970 were directly approved by the National Security Council headed by Kissinger. Between 1969 and 1973, the U.S. dropped thrice as many munitions over Cambodia — despite not being at war with the country — as it did in Japan during World War II. Leaving aside the bombardment of Laos and Vietnam, the air campaign over Cambodia resulted in the deaths of 50,000 civilians according to Kissinger’s own estimates, and over 150,000 according to independent studies.

As for Kissinger's role in ending official U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War by negotiating the 1973 Paris Peace Accords, he won a Nobel Peace Prize for it. It was another tragic irony in Kissinger's life, considering that he helped future president Richard Nixon in his sabotage of Lyndon B. Johnson's 1968 peace initiative to end the war in Vietnam. Nixon was worried that successful peace talks would lead to his defeat in the 1968 presidential race against Hubert Humphrey, the Democratic candidate and Johnson’s vice president. Therefore, and as documented by hand-written notes, Nixon ordered H. R. Haldeman, his closest aide (later to become Nixon’s White House chief of staff), to "monkey wrench" the peace talks. Kissinger proved instrumental in achieving this.

In his 2001 book "The Trial Against Henry Kissinger," Christopher Hitchens shed light on Kissinger's role. Kissinger, an unofficial consultant to the American delegation negotiating an end to the Vietnam War in Paris in 1968, became "a source of hints and tips and early warnings of official intentions" for the Nixon campaign, according to Hitchens.

Kissinger informed Nixon that Johnson was considering suspending the bombing of North Vietnam to facilitate the negotiations in Paris. Armed with these secret details, the Nixon campaign contacted the South Vietnamese government through intermediaries and promised it a better deal if Nixon won the election. Once Johnson actually suspended the bombing, South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu pulled out of the peace talks.

The exhibition dedicated to Kissinger in his hometown of Fürth, as well as the guided tour of the exhibition, stress the image of the statesman as the paradigmatic practitioner of Realpolitik. Thus, we read that Kissinger knew more than anyone else that “all states have interests, but they are rarely identical." Kissinger's role in the opening of diplomatic relations with Communist China has weighed heavily in the arguments of those who see Kissinger as mainly concerned with national interests.

Similarly, Kissinger’s scholarship, such as his 1994 book “Diplomacy,” displays a very clear interest in the balance of power. But there are reasons to believe that Kissinger, who has often been presented to us as the paradigmatic realist, was equally influenced by ideological considerations in many of his actions.

Take, for instance, the overthrow of Chilean President Salvador Allende in 1973. This is the only slightly critical reference to Kissinger's political trajectory that can be found in the exhibition in Fürth. In a picture, Kissinger is seen smiling while shaking hands with Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet, who took power after Allende killed himself during the army’s assault against the presidential palace.

Five days after the coup, in a conversation with Nixon, Kissinger said, "We didn't do it. I mean we helped them." This modesty was not justified. In October 1970, when Allende had already won the presidential elections but had still not been confirmed as president by the Chilean Congress, Kissinger met with the CIA’s deputy director of plans, who subsequently transmitted to the CIA station in Chile that "it is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup."

Chile has the largest copper reserves in the world. After they were nationalized in 1971, the Allende government decided not to pay compensation to the U.S. companies that owned them. This enraged the Nixon administration but was hardly a threat to U.S. national security. The U.S. policy to overthrow Allende had little to do with Realpolitik. Ideology helps explain it far better.

Jorge Heine, a Research Professor at Boston University, writes that "what made Kissinger take such deadly aim at Allende was his new political model, a "peaceful road to socialism." If the Chilean model was replicated elsewhere, the U.S. narrative of political freedom being possible only in a free-market system would have been in trouble.

After Kissinger's death, political analysts all over the world sought to understand why the statesman generated such great fascination in both admirers and detractors. Part of the explanation is that, through Kissinger's biography, one can understand many of the key events that shaped the last 100 years.

He was there when fascism rose in Europe, fought Nazi Germany in the Second World War, and held power during the height of the Cold War. He remained a sought-after author, consultant, and commentator in the following decades, exerting influence on current discussions, such as the rise of China.

If one had to reach an assessment of Kissinger’s political life based only on the exhibition devoted to him in Fürth, one could be forgiven to think that his trajectory was exemplary. This, to put it gently, would be a very mistaken assumption.

keep reading Show less
US fielding new charges of hypocrisy over Kenya

An injured man reacts during a demonstration over police killings of people protesting against the imposition of tax hikes by the government, in Nairobi, Kenya, July 2, 2024. REUTERS/Donwilson Odhiambo.

US fielding new charges of hypocrisy over Kenya

Africa

Weeks of unprecedented upheavals in Kenya have focused a searchlight on United States’ foreign policy objectives in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Of special interest in the unfolding conversation are two interrelated issues: the first being President Biden’s designation of his Kenyan counterpart, William Ruto, as one of America’s closest allies, and the second being the deployment of Kenya’s police on a foreign mission to restore order in troubled Haiti — both occurring at the very moment that Kenya’s police have carried out serious human rights abuses against Kenyan citizens.

Mere weeks after Biden hosted Ruto in an elaborate state visit in May which ended with the U.S. designating Kenya as a “major non-NATO ally,” the East African country erupted into deadly protests that have seen state security forces kill nearly two dozen protesters while injuring 300 others in a brutal crackdown that has attracted widespread condemnation.

According to human rights groups in Kenya, the numbers killed could be anywhere between 39 and 200, reflecting both the chaos and gravity of the situation.

The youth-driven protests, coordinated via TikTok and other social media sites, was sparked by anger over Ruto’s introduction of a finance bill, part of International Monetary Fund-mandated reform package to raise extra tax income in order to plug the deficit in the country’s budget as it reels under a huge sovereign debt burden.

Within a space of six years (Between 2014 and 2020), Kenya’s debt interest payment as a share of revenue rose from 11% to more than 20%, leading to a massive depletion of reserves alongside a 19% depreciation of the Kenyan national currency, the shilling, against the U.S. dollar.

After days of protest that saw rampaging youth in Nairobi storm the parliament, the offending bill was withdrawn in a last-ditch attempt to douse tension, but the protests and deadly clashes have continued, prompting the United States to issue a statement last week “urg[ing] restraint to restore order and provide space for dialogue.”

But the statement has drawn flak from within the United States and abroad. Amnesty International USA, for example, complained that Washington had not gone far enough and demanded instead that President Biden “loudly condemn police violence against peaceful protesters and enforced disappearances; including [by] speaking with President Ruto directly.”

The human rights group further stressed that the fact that the brutal crackdown was taking place “immediately after President Ruto was given the highest U.S. diplomatic honor by President Biden demonstrates that the U.S. has continued to fail to prioritize human rights in its relationship with Kenya.”

This echoes widespread popular distrust in Africa of the U.S. and other Western nations. “The U.S. cares more about this government being in power over the wellness of the citizens of Kenya,” Muoki Abel, a Kenyan activist involved in the ongoing protests, told Responsible Statecraft. “The U.S. are part of the forces behind what ails Kenya today,” Abel added.

In a protest that has seen slogans such as “IMF, World Bank, Stop the Modern Day Slavery,” gain currency amidst calls for Ruto to resign, Washington makes an easy target for anti-West sentiment. For example, the U.S is the largest financial contributor to the IMF and World Bank — the two global financial institutions many in sub-Saharan Africa have come to associate with mounting debt and austerity.

Yet during his state visit, Ruto and Biden launched the Nairobi-Washington Vision to seek relief for debtor nations alongside a commitment by the U.S. to make available new funding of up to $21 billion to reinforce IMF assistance to poor countries struggling with debt repayment.

Kenya has long been a key trade and security partner of the U.S. in East Africa. Among other assistance provided by Kenya, it has played a significant role in combating al-Shabaab in Somalia. But many young Africans like Abel believe that this relationship only benefits the West and Africa’s privileged elite while leaving ordinary people grappling with poverty and unemployment.

“U.S. officials are entirely aware of the long history of repression and human rights abuse in Kenya, but this has not deterred them from prioritizing short-term U.S. needs and interests over the long-term welfare of the Kenyan people,” Samar Al-Bulushi, an assistant professor of Anthropology at the University of California, Irvine, and a non-resident fellow at the Quincy Institute, told Responsible Statecraft.

As the protests flared, a detachment of Kenyan police backed by the U.S. deployed to Haiti on a multinational security support mission to tackle powerful, heavily armed gangs that have taken control of much of the Caribbean nation since early this year.

Critics allege that Washington is reluctant to criticize Ruto more harshly in major part due to its gratitude for deploying his police — a move reportedly opposed not only by popular opinion in Kenya, but also deemed illegal by Kenya’s supreme court. Some of the police officers deployed to Haiti were reportedly selected from a unit of the Kenya police force, the Recce Commandos, which has been accused of involvement in previous crackdowns on domestic protests in Kenya, as well as in security operations in Somalia.

“The Kenyan government's willingness to lead a U.S.-backed and funded police intervention in Haiti will ensure that U.S. officials continue to look the other way when it comes to the domestic concerns in Kenya, including the unlawful crackdown on protests,” according to al-Bulushi, who recently authored the book, "War-Making as World making: Kenya, the United States, and the War on Terror.”

Once more, the upheaval in Kenya demonstrates the dilemma facing U.S. foreign policy in the context of a region beset by insecurity amid Great Power competition. This challenge, also known as “the Africa policy trilemma,” underscores the difficulty of simultaneously promoting democracy, combating violent extremism, and finding one’s way in a world in which great powers are competing for influence.

With Russia making successful inroads into the region while practicing a policy of non-interference in its client states’ domestic affairs, the U.S. may find itself out-maneuvered.

In this light, Washington’s warm reception for Ruto back in May despite his controversial past reflects “a degree of U.S. pragmatism,” Fergus Kell of London’s Chatham House told Responsible Statecraft.

Kell,who works in the think tanks’s Africa Program, explained that the U.S. faces “increasingly limited options for strong bilateral partnership on the African continent.”

But pragmatism is one thing; ignoring glaring acts of human right abuses committed by an ally is another. Especially at a period when there has been a broader erosion of U.S. and Western influence on the African continent amid a wave of “popular” military putsches, the White House ought to be mindful that such an approach can add to growing irritation towards Washington among the region’s civil society and vast youth population.

Earlier in April, Niger’s junta asked U.S. forces to depart the landlocked West African country following a coup last year on the heels of a similar pullout by France from its former colonies in the Sahel. Relations with previously strong American partners such as Uganda, Rwanda, and South Africa have also declined in recent years.

Thus, the Kenya conundrum is an opportunity for Washington to reevaluate its foreign policy objectives in Africa. The key to moving forward is to resolve the dilemma at the heart of the issue itself, which is: what gets the highest priority between a values-based foreign policy and an interests-based one?

Obviously, making a choice between the two is not going to be as easy as it sounds because of what is at stake but as Kell advised, “the U.S. should avoid a temptation to approach relations solely through a prism of great power competition.” Instead, Washington should take “a strong line on encouraging restraint by the Kenyan security forces in engaging with demonstrations and emphasizing the legitimacy of freedom of expression,” he added.

It should also continue to stress support for resolving broader global challenges that have contributed to Kenya’s fiscal malaise, particularly those around affordable financing while prioritizing “deep support for African economic transformation via industrialization, beneficiation and technology transfer[by] offering a more comprehensive alternative to piecemeal and opportunistic Russian engagement.”

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African juntas' defense pact makes mockery of US policy

Heads of state of Mali's Assimi Goita, Niger's General Abdourahamane Tiani and Burkina Faso's Captain Ibrahim Traore attend the opening of for the first ordinary summit of heads of state and governments of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) in Niamey, Niger July 6, 2024. REUTERS/ Mahamadou Hamidou

African juntas' defense pact makes mockery of US policy

Africa

On July 6, the three junta-led countries of the western Sahel — Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso — signed a treaty to establish a security alliance between them. This announcement came during the first summit of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), a trilateral body formed by the three governments in September 2023, encompassing a total population of 72 million people.

This is in accordance with the announcement the three governments made in March that they would jointly create a task force with the goal of better integrating security operations in response to possible threats.

The military rulers created AES to formalize their alliance in a new intergovernmental body that they intend to serve as an alternative to the Economic Organization of West African States (ECOWAS), the much larger regional group focused on advancing economic integration and facilitating diplomacy among its member states.

The July 6 treaty forms a deeply interconnected confederation between the three countries that looks to facilitate dialogue on matters related to security as well as deepen their economic ties.

In a clear indication of his perspective on the role foreign governments and multilateral bodies have played in Nigerien affairs, Niger’s military leader, Abdourahamane Tiani, said in an interview during the trilateral summit that “our people have irrevocably turned their backs on ECOWAS. … It is up to us today to make the AES Confederation an alternative to any artificial regional group by building ... a community free from the control of foreign powers."

The three governments have a history of calling out foreign countries, particularly France, and external bodies for interfering in their domestic affairs and imposing strict conditions on their governance in return for good relations and aid. Part of this anger has been directed towards ECOWAS, which has sanctioned member countries that fail to maintain democratic governance.

Following last year’s coup in Niger, ECOWAS threatened to intervene with military force if democratic rule was not restored. The Nigerien junta called ECOWAS’s bluff, and the regional body ultimately backed down.

The three military-ruled governments jointly announced their withdrawal from ECOWAS in January 2024, bringing to the forefront questions about ECOWAS’s future and its ability to resolve regional disputes. In an unsuccessful attempt to dissuade the governments from leaving, ECOWAS announced in February that it would lift sanctions on Niger that had been imposed after the coup.

But beyond dissatisfaction with ECOWAS, the three juntas have also expressed frustration with foreign powers. On Monday, July 8, the United States announced that it had completed its withdrawal of 1,000 American troops that were stationed at a military base near Niger’s capital, Niamey, and that it will continue to remove its personnel from a second military installation in the country. This comes in response to the ruling Nigerien junta ordering the United States to end its military presence in the country. From the junta’s perspective, the United States had failed to reduce insecurity and has been unable to improve the economic health of Nigeriens . Despite millions spent on the country — the United States spent $223 million in aid to Niger in 2023 alone — insurgent groups remain present in Niger while the economic health of the country remains dire.

Prior to last summer’s coup, Washington had worked with the civilian-led Nigerien government on security issues, including sharing security intelligence, conducting military training programs, and building and using multiple military bases in the country. Since seizing power, however, the junta has severed the once-strong alliance with the United States, expressing dissatisfaction with the way American officials have reportedly lectured them on the importance of democracy — something clearly not of interest to a ruling junta that acquired power through a coup. The United States has also argued that the geopolitical risks of forming new security partnerships with Russia pose a danger to human rights, another issue that likely fails to resonate with a military government whose top priority is maintaining power, rather than helping the United States compete against Russia or promote the U.S.-invented rules-based order.

Ultimately, the creation of this new alliance and the recent news of the creation of a confederacy is yet a further sign of how far these three countries have drifted from the West.

Gone are the days when the United States and France maintained close ties with these countries on the grounds that they were working to advance mutual security interests in a regional fight against terrorism. Now, they’re openly antagonistic to Western powers while gladly working with Russian forces whose security support helps them meet their self-interest.

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Where are Trump's possible VPs on foreign policy?

Aaron of LA Photography, lev radin, and Allssandro Pietri via shutterstock.com

Where are Trump's possible VPs on foreign policy?

Washington Politics

Donald Trump will soon be selecting a running mate for the general election, and his choices have reportedly narrowed to Ohio Sen. J.D. Vance, North Dakota Gov. Doug Burgum, and Florida Sen. Marco Rubio.

All three have been auditioning for the role, and one of them will presumably be selected before the Republican convention next week. Whoever gets the nod has a decent chance of being elected the next vice president and in that role he will have some influence in shaping a second Trump administration. So it is worth reviewing the foreign policy views of Trump’s possible picks to see what the selection can tell us about the direction Trump will take if he wins this November.

It may also tell us something about where the Republican Party may be headed in the future.

Of the three possible candidates, Burgum is the least well known and the one with the least formal foreign policy experience. As governor of North Dakota, he has had few occasions to comment on or debate foreign policy issues. During his 2024 presidential campaign, Burgum stuck to safe conventional hawkish talking points across the board. He seems to be more of a China hawk than anything else, and in his op-ed explaining the reason for his candidacy he said, “We must rebuild our military and re-establish our nation’s position of strength to win the cold war with China.”

While his foreign policy views seem to line up with Trump’s in most respects, Burgum appears to have caught Trump’s attention for other reasons. According to a report in The Wall Street Journal in May, “Trump likes that Burgum is rich, loyal and good looking,” and it doesn’t hurt that Burgum is well-connected with a lot of wealthy businessmen.

It is no accident that Burgum is The Wall Street Journal’s preferred option of the three finalists. Burgum may be the politically safest choice, but it is bound to disappoint anyone looking for signs that a second Trump administration might have a less hawkish foreign policy.

Sen. Vance may be the closest to Trump on foreign policy of the three. A skeptic and critic of military aid to Ukraine, Vance is also a vocal China hawk and hardline supporter of Israel. Like other so-called Asia First Republicans, Vance often frames his criticism of Ukraine aid in terms of needing to focus attention and resources on China. The senator represents the party’s populist wing, and he is no more a “neo-isolationist” than Trump is. It is worth noting that some of the worst interventionists in Washington loathe him, but that by itself isn’t a guarantee of anything.

Elected in 2022, Vance has the least experience in government of the three possible candidates, and that may limit his ability to influence policy. It doesn’t appear that he strongly opposed anything that Trump did during his first term, so it is possible that he would simply defer to Trump on everything. Vance’s defense of Trump’s foreign policy record ignores or whitewashes a lot of what Trump did as president.

A Vance selection would likely please many of Trump’s core supporters at the same time that it antagonizes the party’s conventional hawks.

Marco Rubio is familiar to anyone that has followed U.S. foreign policy debates over the last decade. Rubio has been one of the most predictable, reflexive hawks in the Senate since he was elected in 2010. A supporter of the Libyan intervention in 2011, Rubio consistently aligned himself with interventionists in the years that followed and opposed every attempt to withdraw U.S. troops from foreign wars. He was a favorite candidate among neoconservatives and hardliners in 2016 primarily because of his foreign policy views.

More than almost any other senator, Rubio is a hawkish ideologue with the record to match.

It is somewhat surprising that Marco Rubio is being considered given the senator’s criticisms of Trump during the 2016 presidential campaign and Trump’s attacks on him, but since then Rubio has gained influence with Trump. During Trump’s first term, Rubio’s efforts at cultivating that influence paid off when he was able to push the Trump administration to embrace a very aggressive regime change agenda in Venezuela. Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign against the Maduro government was largely the brainchild of Rubio and his political allies in Congress.

If Rubio were Trump’s vice president, it seems very likely that he would be pushing administration policy in a much more hawkish direction. A Rubio selection would anger and baffle many Trump supporters, and it would be a strong indication that Trump’s second term foreign policy might be even more reckless and destructive than it was the first time.

As the first Trump administration proved, personnel is policy. Trump will soon give us a clearer picture of what kind of foreign policy he will have if he wins.

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How far can a Putin-Modi hug go?

Russia's President Vladimir Putin awards India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi with the Order of St. Andrew the Apostle the First-Called at the Kremlin in Moscow, Russia July 9, 2024. REUTERS/Evgenia Novozhenina

How far can a Putin-Modi hug go?

Asia-Pacific

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi literally embraced Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow this week. Not just once, but a number of times, and in front of cameras.

It provided for a lot of colorful optics and press speculation, suggesting that the two were trying to send a message about their bilateral relations to the rest of the world. But what were they trying to say? Let’s examine.

At first, Russia seemed an unlikely destination for Modi’s first foreign visit since India’s national elections granted him a third term and continued success for his Bharatiya Janata party. But the Russian daily newspaper Kommersant soon promoted Modi’s visit as not only a boon to both countries, but as an important diplomatic victory for Moscow:

"While the U.S. and its allies discuss military issues countering Moscow’s [interest]," the paper declared, "one of the informal leaders of the Global South will be reaching agreement with the Russian president on general steps for bilateral cooperation and how to strengthen international security.”

According to reports, the two sides discussed strengthening and deepening military ties between the two countries and partnership in the atomic energy sector, among other issues. Modi also raised the necessity to end the fighting in Ukraine. “Bombs and rockets do not secure peace,” Modi said according to Kommersant, adding, “therefore we need to give accent to dialogue, and dialogue is necessary” — comments indicating that Modi may be trying to personally get involved in peace negotiations.

Russian and Indian geopolitical ties consist of several components, first of which is their respective Global South roles. India, like many members of this club, has maintained an unaligned position on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine but reportedly believes a resolution to the “conflict cannot be achieved through military means alone.”

Such “neutrality” has helped Russia attain positive soft power and reputational benefits that aid Russia’s expansion of trade and favorable political arrangements with many countries in the Global South as the war in Ukraine continues.

Bilaterally, this position has allowed Russia and India to continue expanding their energy trade and India to benefit from lower prices from Russian fuel. For example, pre-Ukraine war India imported almost no Russian oil. But since Western countries imposed oil sanctions on Russia at the end of 2022, India has become the second biggest importer of Russian oil, after China.

Currently, trade is almost all one-way as India produces little that Russia wants, and the rupee is not a convertible currency. According to the Indian foreign secretary, trade between India and Russia reached a record $65.7 billion in the 2023-2024 financial year, but Indian exports to Russia (pharmaceuticals, chemicals, electrical and mechanical equipment, iron and steel) totaled a mere $4.26 billion, versus imports from Russia which were $61.44 billion. During the meeting this week both sides agreed that their goal is to increase total trade to over $100 billion by 2030. However, the existing trade deficit continues to make India a bit uneasy, and it is expected Modi will try to get Russia to increase future imports.

A second component of the Russia-India relationship is China. Given its strong distrust of Beijing over ongoing border tensions, India was clearly unnerved by the deep support exhibited by Xi and Putin for one another during Putin’s visit to China in May. Moscow’s increased reliance on China militarily and politically is a concern to India, too, given the fact that India remains heavily reliant on Russian produced arms and hardware for its own defense.

Moreover, India does not share the exuberance Moscow does for BRICS expansion or for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Such moves pose a risk to India’s continued outreach to the West via participation in the G20. In fact, Modi did not attend last week’s SCO meetings in Astana, Kazakhstan.

Delhi does not support China’s Belt-Road Initiative, either, preferring the North-South Corridor which leaves out China. At the G20 summit, India also announced the new India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) corridor project together with Saudi Arabia that would link India’s markets, via the Middle East and Israel, to Europe — excluding both China and Russia.

From a geopolitical perspective, Modi likely recognizes the opportunities for India to build on the progress that Putin’s visits to North Korea and Vietnam have created between China and Russia. India would prefer these two countries under Russia’s influence than China.

A third component of Russian and Indian ties is the United States. Until recently, U.S.-India bilateral relations had been improving. However, the State Department recently included India on its list, along with Russia, as a “Country of Particular Concern” regarding religious freedom. India responded critically, calling it “propaganda against India.”

Meanwhile, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell said that India’s relations with Russia impede Indo-American technology cooperation, a statement that India could easily view as meddling in its sovereign affairs. Therefore, the timing of Modi’s visit could be a signal to Washington that India has global options outside of the American-led orbit. Putin would clearly not object to this message.

It will be interesting to see what deliverables emerge from the visit. The Russo-Indian relationship is clearly an incredibly important one for both countries in the present and the long-term future.

However, it is also a relationship that must balance sovereign interests with varying partners and enemies. Although it has been revealed that the two sides discussed their thoughts on a Ukraine solution, India, with its commitment to ending the war through enhanced diplomacy, could prove to be a trusted and valued partner, if not an acceptable broker in any future negotiations.

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Shutterstock_624917975-scaled-e1644615001666
Russian President Boris Yeltsin and U.S. President Bill Clinton shake hands at a news conference in the East Room of the White House, Washington DC., September 28Th, 1994. (mark reinstein / Shutterstock.com).
Russian President Boris Yeltsin and U.S. President Bill Clinton shake hands at a news conference in the East Room of the White House, Washington DC., September 28Th, 1994. (mark reinstein / Shutterstock.com).

Declassified docs: US knew Russia felt 'snookered' by NATO

QiOSK

This week at the NATO summit in Washington, alliance leaders are expected to sign a joint communique that declares that Ukraine is on an “irreversible” path to joining the alliance.

This decision is likely to be celebrated as a big step forward and a reflection of Western unity behind Ukraine, but a series of newly declassified documents show that the U.S. has known all along that NATO expansion over the last 30 years has posed a threat to Russia, and may have been a critical plank in Moscow's aggressive policies over that time, culminating in the invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

“The documents show that the Clinton administration’s policy in the 1990s emphasizing two tracks of both NATO enlargement and Russian engagement often collided, leaving lasting scars on [then Russian President Boris] Yeltsin, who constantly sought what he called partnership with the U.S,” according to the National Security Archive, which wrote about the newly declassified documents this week. “But as early as fall 1994, according to the documents, the Partnership for Peace alternative security structure for Europe, which included both Russia and Ukraine, was de-emphasized by U.S. policymakers, who only delayed NATO enlargement until both Clinton and Yeltsin could get through their re-elections in 1996.”

In 1995, then-national security adviser Anthony Lake warned President Bill Clinton that Russian leadership would not accept the expansion of the alliance to the East.

“Russian opposition to NATO enlargement is unlikely to yield in the near or medium term to some kind of grudging endorsement; Russia’s opposition is deep and profound,” Lake wrote. “For the period ahead, the Russian leadership will do its level best to derail our policy, given its conviction that any eastward expansion of NATO is at root antithetical to Russia’s long-term interests.”

Two years later, as Washington and Moscow were entering negotiations on the future of NATO-Russia cooperation, State Department official Dennis Ross wrote what the Archive calls an “astute and empathetic analysis” of the Russian position on NATO expansion.

“To begin with, the Russians for all the reasons you know see NATO expansion through a political, psychological, and historical lens,” Ross wrote in a memo to Strobe Talbott, then the Deputy Secretary of State.

“First they feel they were snookered at the time of German unification. As you noted with me, [former Secretary of State James] Baker's promises on not extending NATO military presence into what was East Germany were part of a perceived commitment not to expand the Alliance eastward,” the memo continues.”In addition, the 1991 promise to begin to transform NATO from a military alliance into a political alliance was part of the Soviet explanation for accepting a unified Germany in NATO.”

Because these perceived promises were never made concretely, Ross says, the Russians were “taking the lessons of 1991 and are trying to apply them now in the negotiations on NATO expansion.”

Despite these roadblocks, Clinton and his Russian counterpart Boris Yeltsin nonetheless reached an agreement on a series of issues at a summit in Helsinki one month later. During a private conversation with Clinton at that summit — which was part of the set of declassified documents — Yeltsin would say that he reached an agreement with NATO not because he wanted to “‘but because it is a forced step.”

In his exchange with the American president, Yeltsin made one thing apparent. “[NATO] enlargement should also not embrace the former Soviet republics,” he said. “I cannot sign any agreement without such language. Especially Ukraine. If you get them involved, it will create difficulties in our talks with Ukraine on a number of issues.” Clinton did not agree to a “gentlemen’s agreement” to that effect, and the two men eventually moved on.

The consequences of choosing to ignore Russian concerns decades ago continue to have an impact on relations between the West and Moscow today, experts say.

“These declassified documents underscore that U.S. officials clearly have long understood the depth of Moscow's objections to NATO's eastward expansion, going back to the Gorbachev era and Yeltsin's presidency. Yet Washington proceeded with this expansion anyway, judging that Russia would remain powerless to prevent it,” George Beebe, director of Grand Strategy at the Quincy Institute, told Responsible Statecraft. “Today, Russia is both embittered by this history and much more powerful than it was then, and it is resolved to block NATO's incorporation of Ukraine and Georgia by whatever means necessary.”

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Poll: Middle income Global South really likes China

Chinatown Street Market during Chinese New Year in Singapore. (Derek Teo/Shutterstock)

Poll: Middle income Global South really likes China

QiOSK

Middle-income countries of the Global South hold significantly more favorable views of China and its influence than those held by high-income countries of North America, Europe, and Northeast Asia, according to newly released findings of a poll of 34 countries released Tuesday by the Pew Research Center.

The survey, the latest in an annual series by the Pew Global Attitudes project, found that a median of 56% of respondents in 17 middle-income nations across Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia held an overall “positive” view of China.

That contrasted sharply with a median of 24% of respondents in 18 high-income countries (including the United States) who shared that assessment. The only exception in the high-income group was Singapore, where 67% of respondents said their view of China was “positive.”

The survey also found a sharp divide in views of China’s influence on global peace and security between respondents in India, Japan and South Korea on the one hand and respondents in six smaller countries of South and Southeast Asia. Solid majorities in the latter group agreed that Beijing contributed “a great deal” or “a fair amount” to peace and security, while large majorities in the former group rated Beijing’s contribution as “not too much” or “not at all.”

The poll, which interviewed more than 44,000 respondents across 34 countries, excluding the United States, between January and May, is the latest in an annual series dating back more than two decades. In addition to Singapore, India, Japan, and South Korea, the countries surveyed in the Asia-Pacific region included Australia, Bangladesh, Malaysia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Thailand.

In Europe, representative samples of respondents were polled in France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, Spain, and the UK. In the Americas, the poll covered Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Canada, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru, while in sub-Saharan Africa, it surveyed opinion in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa. Respondents in Israel, Tunisia, and Turkey were also interviewed.

The latest release found that the United States enjoys more favorable views than China, both in high-income countries where a median of 53% view the U.S. as “positive” and in middle-income countries where a median of 61% of respondents said they held a “positive” view.

In Malaysia, Singapore, Tunisia and Turkey, more people held a positive view of China than the U.S., while views were roughly evenly split among respondents in Bangladesh, Greece, Nigeria, Peru, South Africa, Sri Lanka, and Thailand.

One key finding of the latest survey makes clear that the perception of China’s global economic influence is now well established. In 10 of the 13 countries where respondents were asked both in 2019 and in 2024 about the impact of China on their own country’s economy, a significantly larger share said China has a “great deal of impact” than said so five years ago.

As to the nature of that impact, however, a median of 47% of respondents said in middle-income countries that it was “positive,” while 29% assessed it as “negative.” In the 18 high-income countries (including the U.S.), on the other hand, a median of 28% described China’s economic influence as positive, while 57% said they viewed it as “negative.” U.S. respondents were the most negative.

Of the countries whose respondents were also asked to assess China’s economic impact on their country in 2019, Pew found that views have generally become more negative, notably in Argentina, Brazil, Israel, Japan, South Korean, and Tunisia.

Asked about their views on the conduct of Chinese companies in their countries, respondents in middle-income countries were mostly positive. A median of 7 % of respondents in nine such countries said they held generally positive views about these companies’ effect on the local economy, while a 63% median said the companies worked to protect the environment; and a 57% median said they treated local workers fairly.

At least two out of every three respondents in Thailand, Kenya, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka gave Chinese companies positive marks (“very” or “somewhat well”) in all three areas, while respondents in Nigeria, the Philippines, and South Africa were more reserved. While around half of Ghanaian and Indian respondents said the companies’ operations were generally good for the economy, they were more critical about the companies’ environmental practices and how they treated local workers.

Among the 10 Asian-Pacific countries surveyed, majorities or pluralities of respondents expressed concern about territorial disputes between China and its neighbors.

Respondents in the Philippines, where tensions with China over the Spratley Islands have, if anything, increased since the poll was completed, 91% of respondents said they were either “very” (65%) or “somewhat” (25%) concerned about Manila’s conflict with Beijing.

Nearly nine of ten respondents in South Korea and Japan also expressed concern – 57% in each country said they were “very concerned.” Four out of 10 respondents in Australia and three of four respondents in Malaysia also expressed concern – 36% in each said they were “very concerned.” Seven of ten respondents in India, which also has a territorial dispute with China in the Himalayas, expressed concern – 44% said they were “very concerned.”

By contrast, 61% of Thai respondents said they were “not concerned,” while pluralities in Singapore and Bangladesh said they were “somewhat concerned.”

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Retro Israel panel defies 'America First' foreign policy

National Conservatism conference, Washington, D.C., July 9, 2024. (Kelley Vlahos)

Retro Israel panel defies 'America First' foreign policy

Washington Politics

The National Conservatism Conference, which professes to represent a new conservatism to “understand that the past and future of conservatism are inextricably tied to the idea of the nation, to the principle of national independence, and to the revival of the unique national traditions that alone have the power to bind a people together and bring about their flourishing,” has a foreign policy problem.

On the one hand the organizers and proponents rail against a globalism dominated by supranational neo-liberal institutions, and progressive litmus tests and ideas, but on the other they want borderless solidarity with other like minded nationalists across the globe. And for some reason this precludes them from talking too much about the biggest U.S. foreign policy issue in years, the Ukraine war, for which there is no panel scheduled over the course of the event, Monday through today.

It also means talking about Israel from a predominantly Israeli nationalist perspective. And talking about the Gaza war purely in the frame of Islamic extremism and the “mullocracy” of Iran. In other words, this is only an American interest insofar as, according to the speakers on Tuesday, U.S. presidents are accused of going too easy on Iran, which in part led to the Oct. 7 attacks on Israel. And now Washington has to help fix it.

Moreover, American political elites have allowed the “Islamosupremacists” to influence college campuses and Democratic administrations and turn Americans (in this case, Democrats) against not just Israel, but all Jews.

As Ben Weingarten charged in the one Israel panel — “Islam, Israel & the West” — the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas have had a grip on Washington since the George W. Bush administration, where the then-president had the temerity to declare that “Islam is peace.”

If that sounds familiar it is because the same people in the room today, 20 years older and graying at the ears, said the same exact thing after 9/11. But the difference here is that Israel is fighting its own war and making it an American war on terrorism and Islam is not going to work this time. What this national conservatism conference was missing was a true conversation about what is in America’s interest as it pursues policies with Israel, Iran, and the greater Middle East.

Instead we got old chestnuts from Weingarten, an “investigative reporter” for the Federalist, talking about “the troubling views held by large percentages of American Muslims (who) are or subscribe to the same worldview as Islamic supremacists who seek to impose… a theopolitical, Sharia-based ideology on America, wholly antithetical to our constitutional republic; while leftists and Islamic supremacists are in some ways polar opposites, traditional patriotic Americans are the chief stumbling block to each side achieving its objectives.”

To him, American protests against Israel’s military operations in Gaza, which have resulted in at 38,000 (or more) dead, the vast majority of the population displaced and hungry, most of the Strip’s civilian infrastructure (homes, electricity, hospitals, schools) damaged if not destroyed by American-made bombs, is merely the “the predictable consequence of an unholy alliance between progressives and Islamic supremacists that has for several years been fundamentally transforming not only the Democratic Party but America.”

Eugene Kontorovich, an Israeli legal scholar who now teaches at George Mason University's Anton Scalia Law School, spent his time on the panel railing against international institutions including the United Nations, which he said were dominated by anti-Jewish, pro-Islamist ideologues that were in essence working for Hamas. This conveniently renders, at least to his mind, International Criminal Court charges against Israel, including the deliberate starvation of the Palestinian population, absolutely meaningless (plus, as he has suggested, the U.S. military does it too, a favorite justification among Israeli military apologists since Oct. 7).

Instead he calls the Israel operation in Gaza "clearly the most restrained war in modern times, with the lowest proportion of civilian casualties of any war in modern times." Again, no conversation about whether the current U.S.-backed strategy will actually protect Israel in the long-term or destroy it from within, or whether it is in America’s interest to push it along.

No doubt, the discussion appealed to the paranoia among this retro crowd that Islamists have more power than they actually have in Washington (which is why Netanyahu is getting a red carpet on Capitol Hill this month, weapons and money slushing to Tel Aviv, and votes sailing through Congress cutting off aid to Palestinians and the very institutions Kontorovich abhors?).

But the National Conservatism conference, founded by the Edmund Burke Foundation under the tutelage of Israeli nationalist Yoram Hazony, should not be confused with the America First foreign policy now being debated in conservative circles today. After three days of programming, that much is clear.

There were a few counterbalances — a thoughtful discussion about the future of NATO, which included realist Sumantra Maitra, and remarks from Elbridge Colby, a self-described conservative realist. During a plenary speech, he said U.S. foreign policy must be rooted in the goals of preserving fundamental American interests of freedom, security, and prosperity, and cast in the lens of prioritization and power balancing. While North Korea, Russia, and Iran pose threats, he contended, they are regional threats to traditional U.S. allies and partners but not existential threats to those aforementioned American core interests. Therefore, he said, they are not foreign policy or security priorities for which the U.S. needs to militarize.

He does suggest, however, that China is a threat to the U.S. economy and the security of our allies in the region, and that requires priority. “Strategy and conservative realism would call for balance of manifest strength in Asia, but also openness to a modus vivendi in China. We must be laser focused on the rightful conservative goal here, to preserve peace, if at all possible, but decent peace, one that ensures Americans are safe, free, and prosperous, and most high necessity prevents China from dominating Asians.”

While not all realists and restrainers agree with Colby’s China perspective here, his brief against the primacist foreign policy of the last 70 years sits well with a growing faction of conservative foreign policy (American interest-focused) today, much to the contrast of the Israel panel dominated by the throw-back ideological rhetoric of the past.

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The perils of a US arms stockpile in Taiwan

Soldiers drive their military vehicles past Taiwan flags during an army exercise in Hsinchu, central Taiwan January 27, 2010. The U.S. and China are currently at odds over an arms sales to Taiwan, according to local media. REUTERS/Nicky Loh (TAIWAN - Tags: MILITARY POLITICS)

The perils of a US arms stockpile in Taiwan

Asia-Pacific

Last month, the Senate Armed Services Committee voted to advance the FY2025 NDAA to the Senate floor, which includes a significant provision that would establish a regional contingency stockpile of U.S. weapons in Taiwan.

This stockpile could mirror the shortcomings observed in the War Reserve Stockpile Allies-Israel (WRSA-I) program, and could have equally disastrous consequences for accountability. The Israel-based reserve’s lack of oversight, transparency, and accountability mechanisms serves as a cautionary tale for why such a model should not be replicated in Taiwan.

Insufficient checks, balances, and transparency

The Israel-based reserve does not have the necessary checks and balances to ensure end use monitoring of stockpiled weapons by Israeli forces. This absence of oversight mechanisms has allowed for withdrawals of military equipment without public documentation or congressional scrutiny. In Taiwan, a similar lack of oversight could result in the unregulated transfer and use of U.S. weapons, which carries with it potential to stoke regional tensions with additional military activity and use of force.

The Israel-based reserve's operations are also shrouded in secrecy, with no public inventory or clear policy guidance on allowable transfers of materials. This opacity has enabled unknown amounts of weapons transfers, in the shadow of ongoing conflict and civilian harm, without any public or legislative scrutiny. Establishing a similar stockpile in Taiwan at a time of heightened geopolitical strain in the Taiwan Strait, could diminish transparency further and erode trust in U.S. foreign policy decisions.

Legal, ethical, and escalatory concerns

One of the most concerning aspects of the Israel-based reserve program is its potential to embolden aggressive Israeli military actions by providing easy access to advanced weaponry. In the volatile context of Taiwan, where tensions with China are perpetually high, the presence of a U.S. weapons stockpile could encourage more confrontational postures. This in turn could trigger an arms race, destabilizing the region and posing significant risks to global security.

The legal frameworks governing the Israel-based reserve, such as the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act, have also proven inadequate in ensuring comprehensive reporting and accountability. Recent legislative efforts, such as the emergency supplemental H.R.815 and the 2023 Securing American Arms Act, have further eroded these constraints, reducing oversight and allowing for more discretionary transfers of defense articles. Replicating this flawed legal and operational structure in Taiwan could similarly lead to U.S. arms being used in violation of international law and human rights standards, or otherwise being diverted to unintended end users.

Enhanced oversight and transparency

To avoid replicating the dangers of WRSA-I, any consideration of a U.S. weapons stockpile in Taiwan must be accompanied by stringent oversight and transparency measures. Congress should mandate comprehensive reporting on all arms transfers and establish robust mechanisms to ensure these weapons are used in accordance with international law and ethical standards. Without such measures, the risks of unchecked militarization and regional instability far outweigh any perceived strategic benefits.

The shortcomings of the Israel-based reserve program provide a clear warning against establishing a similar weapons stockpile in Taiwan. The lack of oversight, transparency, and accountability, coupled with the potential for human rights abuses and regional destabilization, make such a stockpile a highly risky and potentially disastrous proposition. The U.S. must learn from the WRSA-I experience and enact responsible arms transfer policies that promote stability, not undermine it.

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NATO’s 75th birthday party: All balloons, no brass tacks

NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg reacts after the ceremonial first pitch throw to celebrate "NATO day" before the start of the game between the Washington Nationals and the St. Louis Cardinals at Nationals Park in Washington, U.S., July 8, 2024. REUTERS/Yves Herman

NATO’s 75th birthday party: All balloons, no brass tacks

Europe

The heads of state and government of all 32 NATO allies will meet at a summit in Washington, July 9-11, to celebrate the Alliance’s 75th birthday. It was scheduled more than a year ago, but, as the date has approached, it increasingly seems like a bad idea.

Of course, nobody could have foreseen current concerns in the American media and political class of President Joe Biden’s travails stemming from his poor debate performance with Donald Trump on June 27. Unfortunately, that story risks squeezing the summit’s achievements off page one.

In public, the 31 non-U.S. NATO leaders will demonstrate their confidence in Mr. Biden’s leadership, vision, and personal staying power for a second term. But in private, some allied leaders will quietly whisper misgivings into the prying ears of the hordes of media hovering at the fringes of the official meetings. This is to be expected, although, faced with a choice, there is overwhelming preference among allied leaders for Mr. Biden as president next year rather than Trump, who has at times been viewed as less than committed to a strong NATO.

Holding a NATO summit now is also unfortunate for a reason directly related to alliance business. Dominating the agenda is the continuing war in Ukraine. There is much to be considered, especially the quantity and quality of allies‘ support for Ukraine’s war effort against Russia’s aggression. Led by the United States, the allies must continue making careful calculations about the nature of military support for Ukraine, especially the capacity to strike targets in Russia — although at the summit, these discussions will likely occur “off line” rather than in plenary sessions.

Discussion of the Ukraine War will be constrained by several factors, one is that not all the Western allies are convinced that they should put their own security on the line for Ukraine, especially if this means an increased possibility of a direct Russian attack on an allied state — or threats such as cyber attack, which have already begun. At the extreme, Hungary’s prime minister, Viktor Orbán, spent the past few days meeting with Vladimir Putin, thus appearing to thumb his nose at NATO’s support for Kyiv. Some allies even worry about Putin’s threat to escalate to nuclear use, even though this is most unlikely, given that it would mean Russia’s risking mutual suicide.

Further, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has regularly declared that his country’s goal is “victory” which he has defined as regaining on the battlefield not just lands Russia occupied since its 2022 invasion, but also territories, including Crimea, that it seized in 2014. No serious person believes that this is possible. But it is impolitic to say so while Ukraine is fighting for its life. It will be hard for the allies at the Washington summit not to endorse Ukraine’s goal of victory, however ill-defined.

It will also be impolitic for the NATO summit to discuss possible negotiations with Russia on the war. That will have to be done at another venue at another time. Then, there will be debate about the “when and how” to enter into negotiations to try to end the war — for Ukraine, on terms that it can accept; but, like it or not, the “whether” of negotiations with Russia at some point is unavoidable.

Otherwise, the war will just continue, with massive killing and physical destruction, to no apparent end. But this issue will not be touched at the summit, lest there appear to be any breaking of ranks with Kyiv. An added complication is that, while negotiations to end the war could not take place without Ukraine’s involvement, any outcome would need to be agreed and underwritten by the only powers that ultimately count, the United States and Russia.

Discussion of the Ukraine War will be further complicated at the summit by a strategic mistake NATO made at its 2008 Bucharest summit, when it proclaimed that Ukraine (and Georgia) ”will become members of NATO.” That seemed harmless enough, but not to Russia. It would be as though the West were to accept that Ukraine would become a Kremlin satrapy. But instead of recognizing its mistake, NATO, under U.S. prodding, has continued ritually to repeat the formulation and will no doubt do so again at the Washington summit, as fealty to Ukrainian desires.

Yet in addition to flying in the face of geopolitical reality — that Ukraine, while a Western-oriented democracy, is a natural buffer state — the commitment to its eventual NATO membership plays into the hands of Mr. Putin, who has his own constituency to answer to, particularly in light of horrendous Russian as well as Ukrainian battlefield losses.

Further, the commitment is quite useless. Not only does it provide no immediate and practical benefit to Ukraine, but it would never be honored. It is virtually inconceivable that, at any point, all 32 NATO allies would join the consensus required for any country to enter the Alliance, with the commitment that “an armed attack against one or more [allies]… shall be considered an attack against them all.”

The summit’s Ukraine agenda also involves NATO’s overall military and related capabilities. Here, there is good news for the Alliance’s requirements. Most important are the last few year’s enormous advances in allied military efforts, organization, deployments, and preparedness for potential conflict. Efforts for the future are also on track and the summit will review them in detail.

Further, the Alliance is making progress on the target agreed at its 2014 summit that each ally should spend at least two percent of its gross domestic product on defense. That target was only roughly a measure of military capacity, however — indeed, the raw number is about inputs (money) rather than outputs (effectiveness), a more relevant measure. And the intended audience for that target was as much the U.S. Congress with its inveterate demand that the European allies assume more of common burdens — as Congress is again doing over the Ukraine War — as it was Russia, which had just taken Crimea and parts of eastern Ukraine.

Indeed, NATO has recently announced that 23 of the 32 allies have now met the two percent target (though what Congress will make of the nine laggards is not yet clear). In one bright spot for American bipartisanship, both Mr. Biden and Mr. Trump have taken credit for the increase in the number of allies that are now meeting the target.

A last “untouchable” issue for the summit is what to do about Russia in the future. Geopolitical facts are what they are: Russia will not be destroyed, it remains a looming presence whoever is in power in the Kremlin, and at some point the West will need to try configuring overall European security with Russia as active participant.

As of now, despite his rhetoric, Mr. Putin is unlikely to be interested in serious negotiations, either on Ukraine or on broader European security. Thus at the summit, allied leaders will steer clear of this matter, too, although it is of critical importance (despite many American commentators’ having already proclaimed “Cold War II” with Russia).

Ironically, the aspiration of including Russia in European security arrangements, as a geopolitical necessity, was formulated by President George H. W. Bush in May 1989 and followed by President Bill Clinton: to try creating a “Europe whole and free” and at peace. In the 1990s, there were efforts to work effectively with Russia, notably the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act. But by the early 2000s, cooperation went off the rails. This was due in part to Mr. Putin’s ambition to regain at least some of the lost Soviet territories.

But it also resulted from the view of a succession of U.S. policymakers that Russia would remain a second-rate power whose interests could be largely ignored — a miscalculation of historical proportions. With the ongoing war in Ukraine, this underlying and unavoidable strategic concern will be postponed to some indefinite future time.

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Why the chaotic French election is our problem too

People gathering during an election night event following the first results of the second round of France's legislative election at Republique Square in Paris, France, on July 7, 2024. (Photo by Jerome Gilles/NurPhoto)

Why the chaotic French election is our problem too

Europe

The French electorate and most of the political parties have ensured that — at least until the next presidential elections, due in April 2027 — France will not have a government of the radical rightist Rassemblement Nationale (National Rally) of Marine Le Pen.

They have in the process opened the question of whether France can have a government at all. The prospect of the further decline of governance and political stability in one of America’s most important allies should be a matter of deep concern to the U.S. establishment; as also the possible implications for the future of the European Union and NATO.

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All eyes on Biden, but can they see how close we are to war?

President Joe Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris at the White House, 6/10/24 (DT phots1/Shutterstock)

All eyes on Biden, but can they see how close we are to war?

Europe

Since the start of U.S. involvement in the Russo-Ukrainian War, the Biden administration established a series of clear red lines intended to limit the war's escalation and avoid direct confrontation with Russia.

However, at every juncture, President Biden has buckled in the face of outside pressure and crossed each of these lines. The last frontier he has yet to reach is putting U.S. service members on the ground in Ukraine, but unfortunately, we seem to be halfway there.

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This week, NATO III celebrates itself

Photo: Shutterstock/Ben Von Klemperer

This week, NATO III celebrates itself

Europe

NATO likes to present itself as “the most successful alliance in history,” not because it was successful in war, but because it prevented war, and also simply because it has lasted far longer than most alliances.

What this propaganda narrative, however, obscures is that NATO during the Cold War avoided actual war not just by deterring the Soviet Union, but by eschewing actions of its own that would have led to war.

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What's next for South Africa's foreign policy

South African President Cyril Ramaphosa speaks after being re-elected as president of South Africa during the first sitting of the National Assembly following elections, at the Cape Town International Convention Center (CTICC) in Cape Town, South Africa June 14, 2024. REUTERS/Nic Bothma

What's next for South Africa's foreign policy

Africa

South Africa’s new coalition government is likely to leave present foreign policy unchanged, despite awarding six cabinet seats to the center-right Democratic Alliance (DA), which is notably more pro-Western and pro-Israel.

However, new foreign policy initiatives may be more restrained as a result of a clause in the coalition’s declaration of intent that requires agreement between the major parties when new policies arise.

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Is it time for the US to recognize the Taliban?

Members of Afghanistan's delegation, led by the Taliban-run government's Acting Labour and Social Affairs Minister Abdul Hanan Omari, attend the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov

Is it time for the US to recognize the Taliban?

Middle East

Late last month, roughly two dozen countries sent envoys to Qatar for a conference about international engagement with Afghanistan and for the first time the Taliban participated too.

Taliban representatives attended the latest round of the “Doha process” because, unlike the May 2023 gathering, activists were not in attendance this time around. This conference gave the Taliban the chance to call on the U.S. and other western governments to lift economic sanctions on Afghanistan and build deeper ties with the Islamist regime in Kabul.

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The moderate wins in Iran. So what does it mean for the US?

Iran's President-elect Masoud Pezeshkian gestures during a gathering with his supporters at the shrine of Iran's late leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, in south of Tehran, Iran July 6, 2024. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via REUTERS

The moderate wins in Iran. So what does it mean for the US?

Middle East

Political moderation has won a victory in Iran.

Cardiac surgeon and former health minister Masoud Pezeshkian defeated stalwart conservative Saeed Jalili in a presidential runoff election, by a margin of 16.3 million votes to 13.5 million votes.

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Biden: Like the nation, I am indispensable too

ABC News interview with President Biden Friday July 5 (Screenshot/ABC)

Biden: Like the nation, I am indispensable too

Washington Politics

The president insisted that his campaign would continue and that he was the best candidate for the job in an interview with ABC News’ George Stephanopoulos on Friday.

Rejecting calls for him to step aside, Biden defended his determination to remain in the race by using one of his favorite foreign policy talking points, the conceit that America is the indispensable or essential nation. Building on the idea expressed by then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright a quarter century ago, the president said, “You know, not only am I campaigning, but I'm running the world. Not — and that's not hy — sounds like hyperbole, but we are the essential nation of the world. Madeleine Albright was right.”

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Diplomacy Watch: A peace summit without Russia
Diplomacy Watch: What’s the point of Swiss peace summit?

Diplomacy Watch: Ukraine, West prepare for an uncertain future

QiOSK

As November’s election approaches, the Ukrainian government and NATO member countries are planning for the possibility that European and American leadership may be less enthusiastic about supporting Kyiv’s war effort.

Meanwhile, Trump’s team-in-waiting is preparing for how it might deal with the thorny issues of rethinking the NATO alliance and managing the war in Ukraine.

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