The direct confrontation between Iran and Israel has sparked speculation about a potential shift in the Islamic Republic’s nuclear policies under the leadership of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

Following Iran's Apr. 14 military action against Israel in response to the Apr. 1 bombing of the Iranian consulate in Damascus, a senior commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) explicitly suggested the possibility of a revision to Tehran’s objection to atomic weapons. The suggestion may only be a part of the war of words between Iran and Israel. However, the fact that such discourse is rapidly becoming mainstream in Iran raises questions of what may lie ahead—including whether a shift may take place under Khamenei, who has long opposed atomic weapons on a religious basis.

Rapidly changing discourse

Amid media speculations of a major Israeli attack in response to Iran’s Apr. 14 drone and missile strike on sites inside Israel, Gen. Ahmad Haqtalab—the commander of the Protection and Security Corps of Nuclear Centers—on Apr. 18 stated, "If the Zionist regime wants to use the threat of attacking our country's nuclear centers as a tool to pressure Iran, it is possible to review the nuclear doctrine and policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran and deviate from the previous considerations."

The warning was rare, and even as tensions eased between Tehran and Tel Aviv, Iranian officials continued to underscore the significance of the matter. Four days after Haqtalab’s intervention, former IRGC commander and current MP Javad Karimi Qoddousi tweeted, "If permission is issued, there will be [only a] week before the first [nuclear] test." Qoddousi separately posited that the same amount of time was needed to test missiles with an increased range of 12,000 km (7,456 miles).

However, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Nasser Kanani promptly interjected, dismissing the notion of any alteration to the country’s nuclear doctrine. Meanwhile, government-run Iran daily slammed Qoddousi, characterizing his statements as "untrue" and possibly being exploited by “enemies” to pursue further sanctions and fear mongering against Iran. Several other outlets, including conservative-run media, notably echoed such criticisms.

Yet, despite the blowback, Qoddousi went ahead and posted a video on Apr. 25 in which he said that Iran needs only half a day to produce the 90%-enriched uranium necessary to build nuclear bombs.

Khamenei and the ‘nuclear fatwa’

In Shiite Islam, a fatwa is a religious edict issued by a high-ranking Islamic jurist on the basis of interpretation of Islamic law. To followers of the jurist in question, fatwas are binding and the primary point of reference for everything from major life decisions to day-to-day matters. Fatwas can also be a part of state policies.

Ayatollah Khamenei has on multiple occasions over the past two decades reiterated his objection to the development, stockpiling, and usage of nuclear weapons as haram or religiously impermissible. Among believers, violating what is deemed haram would have serious consequences both in this life and the hereafter. In 2010, the supreme leader reiterated his objection to weapons of mass destruction in a message to an international conference on nuclear disarmament, stating they “pose a serious threat to humanity” and that “everyone must make efforts to secure humanity against this great calamity.”

Critics of what became known as the nuclear fatwa have over the years raised a variety of objections, from the modality of Khamenei’s religious edict to the manner in which it has been presented. Some even question whether the ruling really exists. What is indisputable, however, is that the religious edict has previously averted conflict by aiding diplomacy.

For instance, in connection with the 2013-15 nuclear negotiations that led to the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between Iran and world powers—which saw Tehran agree to restrictions on its atomic program in exchange for sanctions relief—there were suggestions that the Islamic Republic should codify the fatwa.

A Flourish data visualization

Amid the nuclear negotiations with Iran, then-US secretary of state John Kerry in 2014 stated, “We take [Khamenei’s fatwa] very seriously….a fatwa issued by a cleric is an extremely powerful statement about intent. Our need is to codify it.” In another interview the same year, Kerry asserted that “the requirement here is to translate the fatwa into a legally binding, globally recognized, international understanding…that goes beyond an article of faith within a religious belief.”

Only days after the signing of the JCPOA in 2015, Khamenei said, “The Americans say they stopped Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. They know it is not true. We had a fatwa, declaring nuclear weapons to be religiously forbidden under Islamic law. It had nothing to do with the nuclear talks.”

Will Khamenei change his fatwa?

Khamenei is not the first Iranian Islamic jurist to issue a fateful religious edict on a highly politicized matter. Back in 1891, Mirza Mohammad Shirazi (1815-95), a leading Shiite religious authority at the time, issued a hokm or verdict against the usage of tobacco in what became known as the Tobacco Protest. The move came in protest against a concession granted by the Qajar monarch Naser Al-Din (1848-98) to the British Empire, granting control over the growth, sale, and export of tobacco to an Englishman. The hokm issued by Shirazi ultimately led to the repeal of the concession.

Neither a fatwa nor a hokm is set in stone and can be revised. The main distinction between the two types of rulings is that a hokm tends to have more conditions and requirements attached to it. Moreover, while a fatwa must be followed by the followers of the Islamic jurist who issued it, a hokm must be followed by all believers—including Shiites who are not followers of the jurist in question.

Explaining the intricacies of a hokm, a cleric and professor of Islamic law (fiqh) at the Qom Seminary told Amwaj.media, “There are primary hokm and secondary hokm. The former is like the necessity of the daily prayer that is mentioned in the Quran and the hadiths [traditions], or the prohibition on consuming alcohol. The secondary hokm is based on expediency and necessity that leads to the first ruling being changed. For example, if alcohol helps someone stay alive, then it is not haram [religiously impermissible] for him or her [to make use of it]." He added, "A fatwa can be changed too."

In other words, the professor asserted, both fatwas and hokms can be revised based on the needs of the Muslim world, emphasizing that certain circumstances may prompt jurists to reconsider their rulings to safeguard the interests of Islam.

Speaking on condition of anonymity given the sensitivity of the matter, the Qom-based cleric elaborated on how these dynamics could apply to Iran’s current strategic considerations, “While the initial fatwa [by Khamenei] deemed the use of weapons of mass destruction as forbidden, changing dynamics could alter this stance. For instance, while mass killing remains forbidden, in certain situations the production of such weapons might be deemed necessary solely as a deterrent against enemies who have attacked you." He also pointed out that such modifications could find support in certain Quranic verses advocating preparedness against adversaries.

In an interview with Amwaj.media, another Islamic legal expert (faqih) at the Qom Seminary—who also preferred that his name be withheld—addressed the context of the origin of Khamenei’s nuclear fatwa. In his view, the issuing of the religious edict was a response to expedient circumstances, arguing that western governments were attempting to portray Iran as a global threat even though it had no intentions to develop nuclear weapons.

At the same time, the Islamic legal expert made clear that considerations which shaped Khamenei’s fatwa may shift, "In the event of an Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear facilities, the fatwa could be subject to revision. The changed circumstances would necessitate obtaining nuclear weapons as a means of deterrence, similar to how Tehran's doctrine evolved during the [1980-88] war with Iraq; when Saddam Hussein targeted our cities, we then started targeting their cities [in response]."

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Concluding his remarks, the Islamic scholar emphasized, "Both fatwas and hokms require a rationale for their issuance. For example, if the initial prohibition of alcohol stemmed from its intoxicating effects, the emergence of non-intoxicating alternatives would nullify its prohibition. Similarly, the fatwa against nuclear weapons was initially aimed at preventing war…but if Israel attacks Iran's nuclear facilities, the fatwa's context and applicability will shift."

While Khamenei has so far remained steadfast on his nuclear fatwa, the heightened risk of an Israeli attack could compel him to change his stance for several reasons.

First, the original context and rationale behind the initial fatwa—which were aimed at fostering peace and averting conflict—may no longer be applicable. Second, in the view of the Shiite religious establishment in Iran, prioritizing the expediency of the interests of the Muslim world in the face of adversaries is paramount. These dynamics necessitate the establishment of deterrence, a principle that increasingly aligns with the notion that Iran may be compelled to weaponize its nuclear program. Only time, and external circumstances, will tell whether such a change will take shape under Khamenei.