Realism, Common Sense, and Science

@article{Caro2015RealismCS,
  title={Realism, Common Sense, and Science},
  author={Mario De Caro},
  journal={The Monist},
  year={2015},
  volume={98},
  pages={197-214},
  url={https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:145176956}
}
  • M. D. Caro
  • Published 1 April 2015
  • Philosophy
  • The Monist
After a long period of unpopularity, philosophical realism is enjoying a revival. According to some of its contemporary versions, the world consists in just what the ordinary view of the world assumes, while the unobservable entities postulated by scientific theories are nothing more than fictions. Some other versions, in contrast, accept only the ontology of the best scientific theories and assume a reductionist or eliminationist stance towards the entities postulated by common sense. In this… 

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