Think
A compelling introduction to philosophy
by Simon BlackburneVersion 3.0 / Notes at EOF
Back Cover:
"Blackburn has produced the one book eery smart person should read to understand! andeen enoy! the key #uestions o$ philosophy! ran%in% $rom those about $ree &ill and morality to &hat &e can really kno& about the &orld around us." '' (alter )saacson!
Time Magazine
"*his is a &onder$ully stimulatin%! incisie and '' the &ord is not too stron% '' thrillin% introduction to the pleasures and problems o$ philosophy." '' +ohn Banille!
Irish Times
O,FO-N)VE-S)* 1-ESS2reat larendon Street! O4$ord O,5 61O4$ord niersity 1ress is a department o$ the niersity o$ O4$ord.)t $urthers the niersity7s obectie o$ e4cellence in research! scholarship!and education by publishin% &orld&ide inO4$ord Ne& ork 8thens 8uckland Ban%kok Bo%oti Buenos 8ires alcutta apeto&n hennai ares Salaam elhi Florence 9on% :on% )stanbul:arachi :uala ;umpur <adrid <elbourne <e4ico ity <umbai Nairobi 1aris Sao 1aulo Sin%apore *aipei *okyo *oronto (arsa&&ith associated companies in Berlin )badanO4$ord is a re%istered trade mark o$ O4$ord niersity 1ress in the : and in certain other countries= Simon Blackburn >???*he moral ri%hts o$ the author hae been assertedatabase ri%ht O4$ord niersity 1ress @makerAFirst published >???8ll ri%hts resered. No part o$ this publication may be reproduced! stored in a retrieal system! or transmitted! in any $orm or by any means!&ithout the prior permission in &ritin% o$ O4$ord niersity 1ress!or as e4pressly permitted by la&! or under terms a%reed &ith the appropriaterepro%raphics ri%hts or%aniation. En#uiries concernin% reproductionoutside the scope o$ the aboe should be sent to the -i%hts epartment!O4$ord niersity 1ress! at the address aboeou must not circulate this book in any other bindin% or coer and you must impose this same condition on any ac#uirer British ;ibrary atalo%uin% in 1ublication ataata aailable ;ibrary o$ on%ress atalo%in% in 1ublication ataata aailable )SBN 0'>?'5>005C'6 @hbk.A )SBN 0'>?'?6?0D'> @pbk.A3 ? >0 D 6 C
ad
*ypeset by )nisible )nk
Preface
*
9)S
BOO:
2-E(
F-O<
years o$ &restlin% &ith the problems o$ tryin% to interest people in ideas. ) hae done this as a teacher! but also as someone &ho has tried to e4plain the alue o$ the humanities in %eneral! and philosophy in particular! to a &ider audience. )ndeed my $irst debt is to the climate o$ the times! &hose scepticism about the alue o$ hi%her education made it eident to me ust ho& ur%ent this task is. 8 second! more serious debt is to all the students o$ many years! &hose nods and $ro&ns eentually shaped the book. ) also o&e a debt to teachin% assistants here at the niersity o$ North arolina! &ho had $irst'hand e4perience o$ en%a%in% students in earlier ersions o$ the &ork. ) &ould neer hae taken the plun%e! ho&eer! had it not been $or the %enerous encoura%ement o$ atherine larke and 8n%us 1hillips! at O4$ord niersity 1ress. 8n%us has closely monitored the pro%ress o$ the &ork! and ) o&e much to his support andadice.Earlier ersions o$ the material hae been read by 9u& 1rice and -alph (alker! &ho each proided inaluable su%%estions. uri Balasho and an -yder %ae me help &ith speci$ic topics. For the sake o$ breity ) hae not included a %lossary o$ philosophical terms! &hich &ould in any case hae echoed de$initions $ound in my
Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy.
*he superb editin% o$ <aura 9i%h and 8n%ela Blackburn %ae me an uncom$ortable sense o$ my shortcomin%s as a &riter! &hile happily dis%uisin% them $rom the &ider public. 8n%ela! o$ course! had also to su$$er the usual burdens o$ hain% a &ritin% husband! and &ithout her support nothin% &ould hae been possible.Simon Blackburn
Contents
)ntroduction>. :no&led%e5. <ind 3. Free (ill C. *he Sel$ . 2od 6. -easonin% . *he (orld D. (hat to o
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Introduction
*his book is $or people &ho &ant to think about the bi% themesG kno&led%e! reason! truth! mind! $reedom! destiny! identity! 2od! %oodness! ustice. *hese are not the hidden presere o$ specialists. *hey are thin%s that men and &omen &onder about naturally! $or they structure the &ays &e think about the &orld and our place in it. *hey are also themes about &hich thinkers hae had thin%s to say. )n this book ) try to introduce &ays o$ thinkin% about the bi% themes. ) also introduce some o$ the thin%s thinkers hae had tosay about them. )$ readers hae absorbed this book! then they should be on better terms &ith the bi% themes. 8nd they should be able to read many other&ise ba$$lin% maor thinkers &ith pleasure and reasonable understandin%.*he &ord "philosophy" carries un$ortunate connotationsG impractical! un&orldly! &eird. )suspect that all philosophers and philosophy students share that moment o$ silent embarrassment &hen someone innocently asks us &hat &e do. ) &ould pre$er to introduce mysel$ as doin% conceptual en%ineerin%. For ust as the en%ineer studies the structure o$ material thin%s! so the philosopher studies the structure o$ thou%ht. nderstandin% the structure inoles seein% ho& parts $unction and ho& they interconnect. )t means kno&in% &hat &ould happen $or better or &orse i$ chan%es &ere made. *his is &hat &e aim at &hen &e inesti%ate the structures that shape our ie& o$ the &orld. Our concepts or ideas $orm the mental housin% in &hich &e lie. (e may end up proud o$ the structures &e hae built. Or &e may beliee that they need dismantlin% and startin% a$resh. But $irst! &e hae to kno& &hat they are. *he book is sel$'standin% and does not presuppose that the reader has any other resources. But it could be au%mented. For e4ample! it could be read alon%side some o$ the primary source materials$rom &hich ) $re#uently #uote. *hese are readily aailable classics! such as escartes7s
Meditations,
or Berkeley7s
Three Dialogues,
or 9ume7s
Enuiry !oncerning "uman #nderstanding,
or his
Dialogues !oncerning $atural %eligion.
But it can e#ually &ell beread on its o&n &ithout the te4ts to hand. 8nd a$ter $inishin% it! the reader should pick upthe classics! and other thin%s like lo%ic te4ts or &ritin%s on ethics! &ith a mind prepared.
WHAT ARE WE TO THINK ABOUT
9ere are some #uestions any o$ us mi%ht ask about ourselesG (hat am )H (hat is consciousnessH ould ) surie my bodily deathH an ) be sure that other people7s e4periences and sensations are like mineH )$ ) can7t share the e4perience o$ others! can ) communicate &ith themH o &e al&ays act out o$ sel$'interestH <i%ht ) be a kind o$ puppet! pro%rammed to do the thin%s that ) beliee ) do out o$ my o&n $ree &illH9ere are some #uestions about the &orldG (hy is there somethin% and not nothin%H (hatis the di$$erence bet&een past and $utureH (hy does causation run al&ays $rom past to $uture! or does it make sense to think that the $uture mi%ht in$luence the pastH (hy does nature keep on in a re%ular &ayH oes the &orld presuppose a reatorH 8nd i$ so! can &e
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understand &hy he @or she or theyA created itHFinally! here are some #uestions about ourseles
and
the &orldG 9o& can &e be sure that the &orld is really like &e take it to beH (hat is kno&led%e! and ho& much do &e haeH (hat makes a $ield o$ in#uiry a scienceH @)s psychoanalysis a scienceH )s economicsHA 9o& do &e kno& about abstract obects! like numbersH 9o& do &e kno& about alues and dutiesH 9o& are &e to tell &hether our opinions are obectie! or ust subectieH*he #ueer thin% about these #uestions is that not only are they ba$$lin% at $irst si%ht! but they also de$y simple processes o$ solution. )$ someone asks me &hen it is hi%h tide! ) kno& ho& to set about %ettin% an ans&er. *here are authoritatie tide tables ) can consult.) may kno& rou%hly ho& they are produced. 8nd i$ all else $ails! ) could %o and measure the rise and $all o$ the sea mysel$. 8 #uestion like this is a matter o$ e4perienceG an
empirical
#uestion. )t can be settled by means o$ a%reed procedures! inolin% lookin% and seein%! makin% measurements! or applyin% rules that hae been tested a%ainst e4perience and $ound to &ork. *he #uestions o$ the last para%raphs are not like this. *heyseem to re#uire more re$lection. (e don7t immediately kno& &here to look. 1erhaps &e $eel &e don7t #uite kno& &hat &e mean &hen &e ask them! or &hat &ould count as %ettin% a solution. (hat &ould sho& me! $or instance! &hether ) am not a$ter all a puppet! pro%rammed to do the thin%s ) beliee ) do $reelyH Should &e ask scientists &ho specialie in the brainH But ho& &ould they kno& &hat to look $orH 9o& &ould they kno& &hen they had $ound itH )ma%ine the headlineG "Neuroscientists discoer human bein%s not puppets." 9o&H So &hat %ies rise to such ba$$lin% #uestionsH )n a &ord! sel$'re$lection. 9uman bein%s are relentlessly capable o$ re$lectin% on themseles. (e mi%ht do somethin% out o$ habit! but then &e can be%in to re$lect on the habit. (e can habitually think thin%s! and then re$lect on &hat &e are thinkin%. (e can ask ourseles @or sometimes &e %et asked by other peopleA &hether &e kno& &hat &e are talkin% about. *o ans&er that &e need to re$lect on our o&n positions! our o&n understandin% o$ &hat &e are sayin%! our o&n sources o$ authority. (e mi%ht start to &onder &hether &e kno& &hat &e mean. (e mi%ht &onder &hether &hat &e say is "obectiely" true! or merely the outcome o$ our o&n perspectie! or our o&n "take" on asituation. *hinkin% about this &e con$ront cate%ories like kno&led%e! obectiity! truth! and &e may &ant to think about them. 8t that point &e are
reflecting
on concepts and procedures and belie$s that &e normally ust
use.
(e are lookin% at the sca$$oldin% o$ our thou%ht! and doin% conceptual en%ineerin%.*his point o$ re$lection mi%ht arise in the course o$ #uite normal discussion. 8 historian! $or e4ample! is more or less bound at some point to ask &hat is meant by "obectiity" or "eidence"! or een "truth"! in history. 8 cosmolo%ist has to pause $rom solin% e#uations &ith the letter
t
in them! and ask &hat is meant! $or instance! by the $lo& o$ time or the direction o$ time or the be%innin% o$ time. But at that point! &hether they reco%nie it or not! they become philosophers. 8nd they are be%innin% to do somethin% that can be done &ell or badly. *he point is to do it &ell.9o& is philosophy learnedH 8 better #uestion isG ho& can thinkin% skills be ac#uiredH *he thinkin% in #uestion inoles attendin% to basic structures o$ thou%ht. *his can be done &ell or badly! intelli%ently or ineptly. But doin% it &ell is not primarily a matter o$ ac#uirin% a body o$ kno&led%e. )t is more like playin% the piano &ell. )t is a "kno&in% ho&" as much as a "kno&in% that". *he most $amous philosophical character o$ the
ad
classical &orld! the Socrates o$ 1lato7s dialo%ues! did not pride himsel$ on ho& much he kne&. On the contrary! he prided himsel$ on bein% the only one &ho kne& ho& little he kne& @re$lection! a%ainA. (hat he &as %ood at '' supposedly! $or estimates o$ his success di$$er '' &as e4posin% the &eaknesses o$ other peoples7 claims to kno&. *o process thou%hts &ell is a matter o$ bein% able to aoid con$usion! detect ambi%uities! keep thin%s in mind one at a time! make reliable ar%uments! become a&are o$ alternaties! andso on.*o sum upG our ideas and concepts can be compared &ith the lenses throu%h &hich &e see the &orld. )n philosophy the lens is itsel$ the topic o$ study. Success &ill be a matter not o$ ho& much you kno& at the end! but o$ &hat you can do &hen the %oin% %ets tou%hG &hen the seas o$ ar%ument rise! and con$usion breaks out. Success &ill mean takin% seriously the implications o$ ideas.
WHAT I! THE POINT
)t is all ery &ell sayin% that! but &hy botherH (hat7s the pointH -e$lection doesn7t %et the &orld7s business done. )t doesn7t bake bread or $ly aeroplanes. (hy not ust toss the re$lectie #uestions aside! and %et on &ith other thin%sH ) shall sketch three kinds o$ ans&erG hi%h %round! middle %round! and lo& %round.*he hi%h %round #uestions the #uestion '' a typical philosophical strate%y! because it inoles %oin% up one leel o$ re$lection. (hat do &e mean &hen &e ask &hat the point isH -e$lection bakes no bread! but then neither does architecture! music! art! history! or literature. )t is ust that &e &ant to understand ourseles. (e &ant this $or its o&n sake! ust as a pure scientist or pure mathematician may &ant to understand the be%innin% o$ the unierse! or the theory o$ sets! $or its o&n sake! or ust as a musician mi%ht &ant to sole some problem in harmony or counterpoint ust $or its o&n sake. *here is no eye on any practical applications. 8 lot o$ li$e is indeed a matter o$ raisin% more ho%s! to buy more land! so &e can raise more ho%s! so that &e can buy more land. . . *he time &e takeout! &hether it is to do mathematics or music! or to read 1lato or +ane 8usten! is time to be cherished. )t is the time in &hich &e cosset our mental health. 8nd our mental health is ust %ood in itsel$! like our physical health. Furthermore there is a$ter all a payo$$ in terms o$ pleasure. (hen our physical health is %ood! &e take pleasure in physical e4ercise! and &hen our mental health is %ood! &e take pleasure in mental e4ercise.*his is a ery pure'minded reply. *he problem &ith it is not that it is &ron%. )t is ust thatit is only likely to appeal to people &ho are hal$'coninced already '' people &ho didn7t ask the ori%inal #uestion in a ery a%%ressie tone o$ oice.So here is a middle'%round reply. -e$lection matters because it is
continuous
&ith practice. 9o& you think about &hat you are doin% a$$ects ho& you do it! or &hether you do it at all. )t may direct your research! or your attitude to people &ho do thin%s di$$erently! or indeed your &hole li$e. *o take a simple e4ample! i$ your re$lections lead you to beliee in a li$e a$ter death! you may be prepared to $ace persecutions that you &ould not $ace i$ you became coninced '' as many philosophers are '' that the notion makes no sense. Fatalism! or the belie$ that the $uture is $i4ed &hateer &e do! is a purely philosophical belie$! but it is one that can paralyse action. 1uttin% it more politically! it can also e4press an ac#uiescence &ith the lo& status accorded to some se%ments o$
ad
society! and this may be a pay'o$$ $or people o$ hi%her status &ho encoura%e it.;et us consider some e4amples more prealent in the (est. <any people re$lectin% on human nature think that &e are at bottom entirely sel$ish. (e only look out $or our o&n adanta%e! neer really carin% about anyone else. 8pparent concern dis%uises hope o$ $uture bene$it. *he leadin% paradi%m in the social sciences is
homo economicus &&
economic man. Economic man looks a$ter himsel$! in competitie stru%%le &ith others. No&! i$ people come to think that &e are all! al&ays! like this! their relations &ith each other become di$$erent. *hey become less trustin%! less cooperatie! more suspicious. *his chan%es the &ay they interact! and they &ill incur arious costs. *hey &ill $ind it harder! and in some circumstances impossible! to %et cooperatie entures %oin%G they may %et stuck in &hat the philosopher *homas 9obbes @>DD'>6?A memorably called "the &ar o$ all a%ainst all". )n the marketplace! because they are al&ays lookin% out to be cheated! they &ill incur heay transaction costs. )$ my attitude is that "a erbal contract isnot &orth the paper it is &ritten on"! ) &ill hae to pay la&yers to desi%n contracts &ith penalties! and i$ ) &ill not trust the la&yers to do anythin% e4cept ust enou%h to pocket their $ees! ) &ill hae to %et the contracts checked by other la&yers! and so on. But all this may be based on a philosophical mistake '' lookin% at human motiation throu%h the&ron% set o$ cate%ories! and hence misunderstandin% its nature. <aybe people can care $or each other! or at least care $or doin% their bit or keepin% their promises. <aybe i$ a more optimistic sel$'ima%e is on the table! people can come to lie up to it. *heir lies then become better. So this bit o$ thinkin%! %ettin% clear about the ri%ht cate%ories &ith &hich to understand human motiation! is an important
practical
task. )t is not con$ined to the study! but bursts out o$ it.9ere is a ery di$$erent e4ample. *he 1olish astronomer Nicholas opernicus @>C3'>C3A re$lected on ho& &e
'no(
about motion. 9e realied that ho& &e perceie motion is
perspecti)al*
that is! &hether &e see thin%s as moin% is the result o$ ho& &e our'seles are placed and in particular &hether &e ourseles are moin%. @(e hae mostly been subect to the illusion in trains or airports! &here the ne4t'door train or aeroplane seems to moe o$$! and then &e realie &ith a olt that it is &e &ho are moin%. But there&ere $e&er eeryday e4amples in the time o$ opernicus.A So the apparent motions o$ the stars and planets mi%ht arise because they are not moin% as they appear to do! but &e obserers moe.8nd this is ho& it turned out to be. 9ere re$lection on the nature o$ kno&led%e '' &hat philosophers call an
epistemological
in#uiry! $rom the 2reek
episteme,
meanin% kno&led%e '' %enerated the $irst spectacular leap o$ modern science. Einstein7s re$lectionson ho& &e kno& &hether t&o eents are simultaneous had the same structure. 9e realied that the results o$ our measurements &ould depend upon the &ay &e are traellin% compared to the eents &e are clockin%. *his led to the Special *heory o$ -elatiity @and Einstein himsel$ ackno&led%ed the importance o$ precedin% philosophersin sensitiin% him to the epistemolo%ical comple4ities o$ such a measurementA.For a $inal e4ample! &e can consider a philosophical problem many people %et into &henthey think about mind and body. <any people enisa%e a strict separation bet&een mind!as one thin%! and body! as a di$$erent thin%. (hen this seems to be ust %ood common sense! it can be%in to in$ect practice in #uite insidious &ays. For instance! it be%ins to be di$$icult to see ho& these t&o di$$erent thin%s interact. octors mi%ht then $ind it almost
ine)ita+le
that treatments o$ physical conditions that address mental or psycholo%ical
ad
causes &ill $ail. *hey mi%ht $ind it ne4t to impossible to see ho& messin% &ith someone7smind could possibly cause chan%es in the comple4 physical system that is their body. 8$ter all! %ood science tells us that it takes physical and chemical causes to hae physicaland chemical e$$ects. So &e mi%ht %et an a priori! armchair certainty that one kind o$ treatment @say! dru%s and electric shocksA has to be "ri%ht" and others @such as treatin% patients humanely! counsellin%! analysisA are "&ron%"G unscienti$ic! unsound! bound to $ail. But this certainly is premised not on science but on a
false philosophy. A
better philosophical conception o$ the relation bet&een mind and body chan%es it. 8 better conception should enable us to see ho& there is nothin%
surprising
in the $act o$ mind' body interaction. )t is the most commonplace $act! $or instance! that thinkin% o$ some thin%s @mentalA can cause people to blush @physicalA. *hinkin% o$ a $uture dan%er can cause all kinds o$ bodily chan%esG hearts pound! $ists clench! %uts constrict. By e4trapola'tion there should be nothin% di$$icult to comprehend about a mental state such as cheer$uloptimism a$$ectin% a physical state like the disappearance o$ spots or een the remission o$ a cancer. )t becomes a purely
empirical fact
&hether such thin%s happen. *he armchair certainty that they could not happen is itsel$ reealed as dependent on bad understandin% o$ the structures o$ thou%ht! or in other &ords bad philosophy! and is in that sense unscienti$ic. 8nd this realiation can chan%e medical attitudes and practice $or the better.So the middle'%round ans&er reminds us that re$lection is continuous &ith practice! and our practice can %o &orse or better accordin% to the alue o$ our re$lections. 8 system o$ thou%ht is somethin% &e lie in! ust as much as a house! and i$ our intellectual house is cramped and con$ined! &e need to kno& &hat better structures are possible.*he lo&'%round ans&er merely polishes this point up a bit! not in connection &ith nice clean subects like economics or physics! but do&n in the basement &here human li$e is alittle less polite. One o$ the series o$ satires etched by the Spanish painter 2oya is entitled "*he Sleep o$ -eason 1roduces <onsters". 2oya belieed that many o$ the $ollies o$ mankind resulted $rom the "sleep o$ reason". *here are al&ays people tellin% us&hat &e &ant! ho& they &ill proide it! and &hat &e should beliee. onictions are in$ectious! and people can make others coninced o$ almost anythin%. (e are typically ready to beliee that
our
&ays!
our
belie$s! our reli%ion!
our
politics are better than theirs! or that
our
2od'%ien ri%hts trump theirs or that
our
interests re#uire de$ensie or pre'emptie strikes a%ainst them. )n the end! it is ideas $or &hich people kill each other. )t is because o$ ideas about &hat the others are like! or &ho &e are! or &hat our interests or ri%hts re#uire! that &e %o to &ar! or oppress others &ith a %ood conscience! or een sometimes ac#uiesce in our o&n oppression by others. (hen these belie$s inole the sleep o$ reason! critical a&akenin% is the antidote. -e$lection enables us to step back! to see our perspectie on a situation as perhaps distorted or blind! at the ery least to see i$ there is ar%ument $or pre$errin% our &ays! or &hether it is ust subectie. oin% this properly is doin% one more piece o$ conceptual en%ineerin%.Since there is no tellin% in adance &here it may lead! re$lection can be seen as dan%erous. *here are al&ays thou%hts that stand opposed to it. <any people are discom$ited! or een outra%ed! by philosophical #uestions. Some are $ear$ul that their ideas may not stand up as &ell as they &ould like i$ they start to think about them. Othersmay &ant to stand upon the "politics o$ identity"! or in other &ords the kind o$ identi$ication &ith a particular tradition! or %roup! or national or ethnic identity that inites them to turn their back on outsiders &ho #uestion the &ays o$ the %roup. *hey
ad
&ill shru% o$$ criticismG their alues are "incommensurable" &ith the alues o$ outsiders. *hey are to be understood only by brothers and sisters &ithin the circle. 1eople like to retreat to &ithin a thick! com$ortable! traditional set o$ $olk&ays! and not to &orry too much about their structure! or their ori%ins! or een the criticisms that they may desere. -e$lection opens the aenue to criticism! and the $olk&ays may not like criticism. )n this &ay! ideolo%ies become closed circles! primed to $eel outra%ed by the #uestionin% mind.For the last t&o thousand years the philosophical tradition has been the enemy o$ this kind o$ cosy complacency. )t has insisted that the une4amined li$e is not &orth liin%. )t has insisted on the po&er o$ rational re$lection to &inno& out bad elements in our practices! and to replace them &ith better ones. )t has identi$ied critical sel$'re$lection &ith $reedom! the idea bein% that only &hen &e can see ourseles properly can &e obtaincontrol oer the direction in &hich &e &ould &ish to moe. )t is only &hen &e can see our situation steadily and see it &hole that &e can start to think &hat to do about it. <ar4said that preious philosophers had sou%ht to understand the &orld! &hereas the point &as to chan%e it '' one o$ the silliest $amous remarks o$ all time @and absolutely belied by his o&n intellectual practiceA. 9e &ould hae done better to add that &ithout understandin% the &orld! you &ill kno& little about ho& to chan%e it! at least $or the better. -osencrant and 2uildenstern admit that they cannot play on a pipe but they seek to manipulate 9amlet. (hen &e act &ithout understandin%! the &orld is &ell prepared to echo 9amlet7s responseG " 7Sblood! do you think ) am easier to be played on than a pipeH"*here are academic currents in our o&n a%e that run a%ainst these ideas. *here are people&ho #uestion the ery notion o$ truth! or reason! or the possibility o$ disinterested re$lection. <ostly! they do bad philosophy! o$ten &ithout een kno&in% that this is &hat they are doin%G conceptual en%ineers &ho cannot dra& a plan! let alone desi%n a structure. (e return to see this at arious points in the book! but mean&hile ) can promise that this book stands unashamedly &ith the tradition and a%ainst any modern! or postmodern! scepticism about the alue o$ re$lection.2oya7s $ull motto $or his etchin% is! ")ma%ination abandoned by reason produces impossible monstersG united &ith her! she is the mother o$ the arts and the source o$ her &onders." *hat is ho& &e should take it to be.
Cha"ter OneKno#$ed%e
1
E-981S
*9E
<OS*
unsettlin% thou%ht many o$ us hae! o$ten #uite early on in childhood! is that the &hole &orld mi%ht be a dreamI that the ordinary scenes and obectso$ eeryday li$e mi%ht be $antasies. *he reality &e lie in maybe a irtual reality! spun out o$ our o&n minds! or perhaps inected into our minds by some sinister Other. O$ course! such thou%hts come! and then %o. <ost o$ us shake them o$$. But &hy are &e ri%ht to do soH 9o& can &e kno& that the &orld as &e take it to be! is the &orld as it isH 9o& do &e be%in to think about the relation bet&een appearance and realityG thin%s as &e take them to be! as opposed to thin%s as they areH
ad
&O!IN' THE WOR&(
(e mi%ht sayG it all be%an on >0 Noember >6>?.On that date! in the southern 2erman to&n o$ lm! the French mathematician and philosopher -enJ escartes @>?6'>60A shut himsel$ a&ay in a room heated by a stoe! and had a ision $ollo&ed by dreams! &hich he took to sho& him his li$e7s &orkG the un$oldin% o$ the one true &ay to $ind kno&led%e. *he true path re#uired s&eepin% a&ay all that he had preiously taken $or %ranted! and startin% $rom the $oundations up&ards.O$ course! it didn7t! really! be%in in >6>?! $or escartes &as not the $irst. *he problems escartes raised $or himsel$ are as old as human thou%ht. *hese are problems o$ the sel$! and its mortality! its kno&led%e! and the nature o$ the &orld it inhabitsI problems o$ reality and illusion. *hey are all raised in the oldest philosophical te4ts &e hae! the )ndian Vedas! stemmin% $rom about >00 B.. *he %eneration immediately be$ore escartes had included the %reat French essayist <ontai%ne! &hose motto &as the title o$ one o$ his %reat essaysG "Kue sais'eH" '' &hat do ) kno&H Nor did escartes come to his enterprise &ith a totally innocent mindG he himsel$ had an intense education in the preailin% philosophies o$ the time! at the hands o$ +esuit teachers. But by escartes7s time thin%s &ere chan%in%. *he 1olish astronomer opernicus had discoered the heliocentric @sun'centredA model o$ the solar system. 2alileo and others &ere layin% the $oundations o$ a "mechanical" science o$ nature. )n this picture the only substances in space &ould be material! made up o$ "atoms"! and caused to moe only by mechanical $orces &hich science &ould eentually discoer. Both opernicus and 2alileo $ell $oul o$ the %uardians o$ atholic orthodo4y! the )n#uisition! $or this scienti$ic picture seemed to many people to threaten the place o$ human bein%s in the cosmos. )$ science tells us all that there is! &hat becomes o$ the human soul! human $reedom! and our relationship &ith 2odHescartes &as smart. 9e inented standard al%ebraic notationI and artesian coordinates!&hich enable us to %ie al%ebraic e#uations $or %eometrical $i%ures! are named a$ter him.9e himsel$ &as one o$ the leaders o$ the scienti$ic reolution! makin% $undamental adances not only in mathematics but also in physics! particularly optics. But escartes &as also a pious atholic. So $or him it &as a task o$ %reat importance to sho& ho& the un$oldin% scienti$ic &orld '' ast! cold! inhuman! and mechanical '' neertheless had room in it $or 2od and $reedom! and $or the human spirit.9ence his li$e7s &ork! culminatin% in the
Meditations,
published in >6C>! "in &hich are demonstrated the e4istence o$ 2od and the distinction bet&een the human soul and the body"! accordin% to the subtitle. But the subte4t is that escartes also intends to rescue the modern &orld ie& $rom the char%e o$ atheism and materialism. *he scienti$ic &orld is to be less threatenin% than &as $eared. )t is to be made sa$e $or human bein%s. 8nd the &ay to make it sa$e is to re$lect on the $oundations o$ kno&led%e. So &e start &ith escartes because he &as the $irst %reat philosopher to &restle &ith the implications o$ the modern scienti$ic &orld ie&. Startin% &ith the medieals or 2reeks is o$ten startin% so $ar a&ay $rom &here &e are no& that the ima%inatie e$$ort to think in their shoes is probably too %reat. escartes is! comparatiely! one o$ us! or so &e may hope.*here is a dan%er in paraphrasin% a philosopher! particularly one as terse as escartes. )
ad
am %oin% to present some o$ the central themes o$ the
Meditations.
*his is in the spirit o$ a sportscast sho&in% only the "edited hi%hli%hts" o$ a %ame. loser ac#uaintance &ith thete4t &ould uncoer other hi%hli%htsI closer ac#uaintance &ith its historical conte4t &oulduncoer yet others. But the hi%hli%hts &ill be enou%h to illuminate most o$ the central issues o$ subse#uent philosophy.
THE E)I& (E*ON
*here are si4
Meditations.
)n the $irst! escartes introduces the "method o$ doubt". 9e resoles that i$ he is to establish anythin% in the sciences that is "stable and likely to last" he must demolish all his ordinary opinions! and start ri%ht $rom the $oundations.For he has $ound that een his senses deceie him! and it is "prudent neer to trust completely those &ho hae deceied us een once". 9e puts to himsel$ the obection thatonly madmen @"&ho say that they are dressed in purple &hen they are naked! or that their heads are made o$ earthen&are! or that they are pumpkins or made o$ %lass" '' madmen &ere eidently pretty colour$ul in the seenteenth centuryA deny the ery obious eidence o$ their senses.)n ans&er to that! he reminds us o$ dreams! in &hich &e can represent thin%s to ourseles ust as conincin%ly as our senses no& do! but &hich bear no relation to reality.Still! he obects to himsel$! dreams are like paintin%s. 8 painter can rearran%e scenes! but ultimately depicts thin%s deried $rom "real" thin%s! i$ only real colours. By similar reasonin%! says escartes! een i$ $amiliar thin%s @our eyes! head! hands! and so onA are ima%inary! they must depend on some simpler and more uniersal thin%s that are real.But &hat thin%sH escartes thinks that "there is not one o$ my $ormer belie$s about &hicha doubt may not properly be raised". 8nd at this sta%e!
I will suppose therefore that not God, who is supremely good and the source of truth, but rather some malicious demon of the utmost power and cunning has employed all his energies in order to deceive me. I shall think that the sky, the air, the earth, colours, shapes, sounds and all external things are merely the delusions of dreams which he has devised to ensnare my judgment.
*his is the Eil emon. Once this $ri%htenin% possibility is raised! his only de$ence is resolutely to %uard himsel$ a%ainst beliein% any $alsehoods. 9e reco%nies that this is hard to do! and "a kind o$ lainess" brin%s him back to normal li$e! but intellectually! his only course is to labour in the "ine4tricable darkness" o$ the problems he has raised. *hisends the $irst
Meditation.
CO'ITO+ ER'O !U*
*he second
Meditation
be%ins &ith escartes oer&helmed by these doubts. For the sakeo$ the in#uiry he is supposin% that ") hae no senses and no body". ButG
Does it now follow that I too do not exist? o! if I convinced myself of something then I certainly existed. "ut there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning who is deliberately and constantly deceiving me. In that case I too undoubtedly exist, if he is deceiving me# and let him deceive me
ad
as much as he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something. $o after considering everything very thoroughly, I must finally conclude that this proposition,
I am, I exist,
is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind.
*his is the $amous "o%ito! er%o sum"G ") think! there$ore ) am."9ain% saed his "sel$" out o$ the %eneral seas o$ scepticism! escartes no& asks &hat this sel$ is. (hereas $ormerly! he thou%ht he kne& &hat his body &as! and thou%ht o$ himsel$ by &ay o$ his body! no& he is $orced to reco%nie that his kno&led%e o$ his sel$ is not based on kno&led%e o$ his embodied e4istence. )n particular! he is %oin% to meet problems &hen he tries to ima%ine it. )ma%ination is a matter o$ contemplatin% the shape or ima%e o$ a corporeal thin% @a body! or thin% e4tended in spaceA. But at this sta%e! &e kno& nothin% o$ corporeal thin%s. So "ima%inin%" the sel$ by ima%inin% a thin or tubby! tall or short! &ei%hty bodily bein%! such as ) see in a mirror! is inade#uate.So &hat is the basis o$ this kno&led%e o$ the sel$H
%hinking? &t last I have discovered it '' thought# this alone is inseparable from me. I am, I exist ''that is certain. "ut for how long? (or as long as I am thinking. (or it could be, that were I totally to cease from thinking, I should totally cease to exist. . . I am, then, in the strict sense only a thing that thinks.
*he in#uiry no& takes a sli%htly di$$erent course. escartes reco%nies that a conception o$ onesel$ as an embodied thin%! liin% in an e4tended spatial &orld o$ physical obects! &ill come back almost irresistibly. 8nd he realies that the ")" he is le$t &ith is pretty thinG "this pulin% ) that cannot be pictured in the ima%ination". So "let us consider the thin%s &hich people commonly think they understand most distinctly o$ allI that is the bodies &e touch and see". 9e considers a ball o$ &a4. )t has taste and scent! and a colour!shape! and sie "that are plain to see". )$ you rap it! it makes a sound. But no& he puts the&a4 by the $ire! and lookG
)*I*+he residual taste is eliminated, the smell goes away, the colour changes, the shape is lost, the sie increases# it becomes li-uid and hot# you can hardly touch it, and if you strike it, it no longer makes a sound. "ut does the same wax remain? It must be admitted that it does# no one denies it, no one thinks otherwise. $o what was it in the wax that I understood with such distinctness? vidently none of the features which I arrived at by means of the senses# for whatever came under taste, smell, sight, touch or hearing has now altered '' yet the wax remains.
escartes %losses the result o$ this e4ample as sho&in% that there is a perception o$ the &a4 that is "pure mental scrutiny"! &hich can become "clear and distinct" dependin% on ho& care$ul he is to concentrate on &hat the &a4 consists in. So! by the end o$ the second
Meditation,
he concludesG
I now know that even bodies are not strictly perceived by the senses or the faculty of imaginationbut by the intellect alone, and that this perception derives not from their being touched or seen but from their being understood# and in view of this I know plainly that I can achieve an easier and more evident perception of my own mind than of any thing else.
*OTI)ATION!+ ,UE!TION!
ad
9o& are &e to read a piece o$ philosophy like thisH (e start by seein% escartes tryin% to motiate his method o$ e4treme doubt @also kno&n as artesian doubt! or as he himsel$ calls it! "hyperbolic"! that is! e4cessie or e4a%%erated doubtA. But is the motia'tion satis$actoryH (hat e4actly is he thinkin%H 1erhaps thisG
The senses sometimes deceive us.
$o
for all we know, they always deceive us.
But that is a bad ar%ument '' a $allacy. ompareG
Newspapers sometimes make mistakes.
$o
for all we know, they always make mistakes.
*he startin% point or premise is true! but the conclusion seems ery unlikely indeed. 8nd there are een e4amples o$ the ar%ument $orm &here the premise is true! but the conclusion
cannot
be trueG
Some banknotes are forgeries.
$o
for all we know, they all are forgeries.
9ere! the conclusion is impossible! since the ery notion o$ a $or%ery presupposes alid notes or coins. For%eries are parasitic upon the real. For%ers need %enuine notes and coins to copy.8n ar%ument is
)alid
&hen there is
no (ay &&
meanin% no
possi+le
&ay '' that the premises! or startin% points! could be true &ithout the conclusion bein% true @&e e4plore this $urther in hapter 6A. )t is sound i$ it is alid and it has true premises! in &hich case its conclusion is true as &ell. *he ar%ument ust identi$ied is clearly inalid! since it is no better than other e4amples that lead us $rom truth to $alsity. But this in turn su%%ests that it is uncharitable to interpret escartes as %iin% us such a sad o$$erin%. (e mi%ht in'terpret him as hain% in mind somethin% else! that he re%rettably does not make e4plicit. *his is called lookin% $or a
suppressed premise &&
somethin% needed to buttress an ar%ument! and that its author mi%ht hae presupposed! but does not state. 8lternatiely &e mi%ht
reinterpret
escartes to be aimin% at a &eaker conclusion. Or perhaps &e can do both. *he ar%ument mi%ht beG
The senses sometimes deceive us. We cannot distinguish occasions when they do from ones when they do not.
$o
for all we know, any particular sense experience may be deceiving us.
*his seems to be a better candidate $or alidity. )$ &e try it &ith banknotes and $or%eries! &e &ill $ind that the conclusion seems to $ollo&. But the conclusion is a conclusion about
any particular
e4perience. )t is no lon%er the conclusion that
all
our e4perience @en bloc! as it &ereA may be deceiin% us. )t is the di$$erence bet&een "$or all &e kno& any particular note may be a $or%ery" and "$or all &e kno& all notes are $or%eries". *he $irst may be true &hen the second is not true.Still! perhaps at this sta%e o$ the
Meditations
the &eaker conclusion is all escartes &ants. But &e mi%ht also turn attention to the second premise o$ this re$ined ar%ument. )sthis premise trueH )s it true that &e cannot distin%uish occasions o$ error '' thin%s like il'lusions! delusions! misinterpretations o$ &hat &e are seein% '' $rom othersH *o think about this &e &ould &ant to introduce a distinction. )t may be true that &e cannot detect
ad
occasions o$ illusion and error
at a glance.
*hat is &hat makes them illusions. But is it true that &e cannot do so
gi)en time
On the contrary! it seems to be true that &e can do soG &e can learn! $or instance! to mistrust ima%es o$ shimmerin% &ater in the desert as typically misleadin% illusions or mira%es '' tricks o$ the li%ht. But &orse! the $act that &e can detect occasions o$ deception is surely
presupposed
by escartes7s o&n ar%ument. (hy soH Because escartes is presentin% the $irst premise as a place to start $rom '' a kno&n truth. But &e only
'no(
that the senses sometimes deceie us because $urther inesti%ations '' usin% the ery same senses ''
sho(
that they hae done so. (e $ind out! $or instance! that a #uick %limpse o$ shimmerin% &ater misled us into thinkin% there &as &ater there. But &e discoer the mistake by %oin% closer! lookin% harder! and i$ neces'sary touchin% and $eelin%! or listenin%. Similarly! &e only kno&! $or instance! that a #uick! o$$'the'cu$$ opinion about the sie o$ the Sun &ould be &ron% because $urther laborious obserations sho& us that the Sun is in $act many times the sie o$ the Earth. So the second premise only seems true in the sense o$ "&e cannot distin%uish
at a glance
&hether our senses are deceiin% us". (hereas to open the &ay to escartes7s maor doubts! it &ould seem that he needs "&e cannot distin%uish
e)en o)er time and (ith care
&hether our senses are deceiin% us". 8nd this last does not seem to be true. (e mi%ht try sayin% that the senses are "sel$'correctie"G $urther sense e4perience itsel$ tells us &hen a particular sense e4perience has induced us to make a mistake.1erhaps anticipatin% this kind o$ criticism! escartes introduces the topic o$ dreams. ")nside" a dream &e hae e4periences &hich bear some resemblance to those o$ ordinaryliin%! yet nothin% real corresponds to the dream. )s escartes7s idea here that the &hole o$ e4perience may be a dreamH )$ so! once a%ain &e mi%ht use a distinction like the one &e ust madeG perhaps &e cannot distin%uish immediately or "at a %lance" &hether &e are dreamin%! but usin% our memory! &e seem to hae no trouble distin%uishin% past dreams $rom past encounters &ith reality.Still! there is somethin% troublin% about the idea that all e4perience mi%ht be a dream. For ho& could &e set about determinin% &hether that is trueH Sometimes people "pinch themseles" to ensure that they are not dreamin%. But is this really a %ood testH <i%ht &enot ust dream that the pinch hurtsH (e mi%ht try $rom &ithin a dream to discoer &hether it is a dream. et een i$ &e think up some cunnin% e4periment to determine &hether it is! mi%ht &e not ust dream that &e conduct it! or dream that it tells us the ans&er that &e are a&akeH(e mi%ht try sayin% that eents in eeryday li$e e4hibit a scale and a sheer coherence that dreams do not e4hibit. reams are erky and spasmodic. *hey hae little or no rhyme or reason. E4perience! on the other hand! is lar%e and spacious and maestic. )t %oes on in re%ular &ays '' or at least &e think it does. 9o&eer! it is then open $or escartes to &orry &hether the scale and coherence is itsel$ deceptie. *hat takes him to the Eil emon! one o$ the most $amous thou%ht'e4periments in the history o$ philosophy. )t is a thou%ht'e4periment desi%ned to alert us to the idea that! so $ar as truth %oes! all our e4perience mi%ht be ust like a dreamG totally disconnected $rom the &orld.)t is important to seie on t&o thin%s at the outset. First! escartes is per$ectly &ell a&arethat as actie! liin%! human a%ents &e do not bother ourseles about such an outlandish possibility. )n $act! &e cannotG as many philosophers hae pointed out! it is psycholo%ically impossible to keep doubt about the e4ternal &orld alie outside the study. But that does not matter. *he doubt is &orth botherin% about because o$ the task he
ad
is en%a%ed upon. *his is the task o$ $indin% $oundations o$ kno&led%e! o$ ensurin% that his belie$s are built on a sound $ootin%. escartes7s in#uiry is made $or purely intellectualreasons. Second! escartes is not askin% you to
+elie)e
in the possibility o$ the Eil emon. 9e is only askin% you to consider it '' en route to %ettin% clear ho& to dismiss it.*hat is! he thinks @not unreasonably! surelyHA that unless this possibility can be dismissed! there remains a challen%e o$
scepticism*
the possibility that &e hae no kno&led%e! but that all our belie$s are entirely delusie.(e can appreciate the thou%ht'e4periment by remindin% ourseles ho& ery "realistic" a irtual reality can become. 9ere is an updated ariant o$ the thou%ht'e4periment. )ma%ine an adance in science that enables a mad scientist to e4tract your brain! and thento maintain it in a at o$ chemicals that sustain its normal $unctionin%. )ma%ine that the scientist can delier inputs to the normal in$ormation channels @the optic nere! the neres that transmit sensations o$ hearin% and touch and tasteA. Bein% %ood'natured! the scientist %ies in$ormation
as if
the brain &ere lod%ed in a normal body and liin% a reasonable li$eG eatin%! playin% %ol$! or &atchin% *V. *here &ould be $eedback! so that $or instance i$ you delier an "output" e#uialent to raisin% your hand! you %et "$eedback" as i$ your hand had risen. *he scientist has put you into a irtual reality! so your irtual hand rises. 8nd! it seems! you &ould hae no &ay o$ kno&in% that this had happened! since to you it &ould seem ust as i$ a normal li$e &as continuin%.escartes7s o&n ersion o$ the thou%ht'e4periment does not cite brains and ats. )n $act! i$ you think about it! you &ill see that he does not need to do so. Our belie$s about the brain and its role in %eneratin% conscious e4perience are belie$s about the &ay the &orld &orks. So perhaps they too are the result o$ the Eil emon7s inputtin%sL 1erhaps the emon did not need to %et his hands @HA dirty messin% around in ats. 9e ust inputs e4periences in &hateer &ay is made appropriate by the
real
reality. Brains and neres themseles belon% to the irtual reality.*his thou%ht'e4periment does not cite actual illusions o$ sense! or actual dreams. )t simply sets e4perience as a &hole a%ainst a ery di$$erent and potentially disturbin% reality. Notice as &ell that it is not obiously use$ul to ar%ue a%ainst the Eil emon hypothesis by citin% the coherence and scale o$ eeryday e4perience. For &e do not kno& o$ any reason &hy the emon could not input e4perience as coherent as he &ishes!and o$ &hateer scale or e4tent he &ishes.So ho& could &e possibly rule out the Eil emon hypothesisH Once it is raised! &e seem to be po&erless a%ainst it.et! in this sea o$ doubt! ust &hen thin%s are at their darkest! escartes $inds one certain rock upon &hich he can perch. "o%ito! er%o sum"G ) think! there$ore ) am. @8 better translation is ") am thinkin%! there$ore ) am". escartes7s premise is not ") think" in the sense o$ ") ski"! &hich can be true een i$ you are not at the moment skiin%. )t is supposed to be parallel to ") am skiin%".AEen i$ it is a irtual reality that ) e4perience! still! it is ) &ho e4perience itL 8nd! apparently ) kno& that it is ) &ho hae these e4periences or thou%hts @$or escartes! "thinkin%" includes "e4periencin%"A.(hy does this certainty remainH ;ook at it $rom the emon7s point o$ ie&. 9is proect &as to deceie
me
about eerythin%. But it is not lo%ically possible $or him to deceie
me
into thinkin% that ) e4ist &hen ) do not. *he emon cannot simultaneously make boththese thin%s trueG
ad
I think that I exist.I am wrong about whether I do.
Because i$ the $irst is true! then ) e4ist to do the thinkin%. *here$ore! ) must be ri%ht about&hether ) e4ist. So lon% as ) think that @or een think that ) think itA! then ) e4ist.) can think that ) am skiin% &hen ) am not! $or ) may be dreamin%! or deluded by the emon. 9o&eer! ) cannot think that ) am thinkin% &hen ) am not. For in this case @and only this caseA the mere $act that ) think that ) am thinkin%
guarantees
that ) am thinkin%.)t is itsel$ an e4ample o$ thinkin%.
THE E&U!I)E -I-
Outside the conte4t o$ the doubt! the ")" that thinks is a
person
that can be described in arious &ays. )n my case! ) am a middle'a%ed pro$essor o$ philosophy! &ith a certain personality! a history! a net&ork o$ social relations! a $amily! and so on. But in the conte4to$ the doubt! all this is s&ept a&ayG part o$ the irtual reality. So &hat is the ")" that is le$tH )t seems ery shado&y '' a pure subect o$ thou%ht. )t mi%ht not een hae a bodyL *his takes us to the ne4t t&ist.ou mi%ht try peerin% into your o&n mind! as it &ere! to catch the essential "you". But! rememberin% that the "you" @or the ")"! $rom your point o$ ie&A is here separated $rom normal marks o$ identity @your position in space! your body! your social relations! your historyA! it seems there is
nothing to catch.
ou can become a&are o$ your o&n e4periences! but neer! it seems! a&are o$ the ")" that is the subect o$ those e4periences. Or you can try to ima%ine the sel$! to $rame a picture o$ it! as it &ere. But as escartes remarks! ima%ination seems %ood at $ramin% pictures o$ thin%s that hae shape and sie! and are $ound in space @"e4tended thin%s"A. *he sel$ that remains as the rock in the seas o$ doubt may not
+e
an e4tended thin%. For &e can be certain o$ it &hen &e are still uncertain about e4tended thin%s! since &e are takin% seriously the possibility o$ the Eil emon.One reconstruction o$ this point o$ the ar%ument presents escartes thinkin% like thisG
I cannot doubt that I exist. I can doubt whether things extended in space !bodies!" exist.
%herefore,
I am not a body.
)n a nutshell! souls are certain! bodies are doubt$ul! so the soul is distinct $rom the body. )$ this is escartes7s ar%ument! then it is super$icially plausible! but can be seen to be inalid. For consider the parallelG
I cannot doubt that I am here in the room. I can doubt whether a person who will get bad news tomorrow is in the room.
%herefore,
I am not a person who will get bad news tomorrow.
8 nice proo$ &ith a &elcome resultL *he $allacy is o$ten called the "masked man $allacy"G) kno& &ho my $ather isI ) do not kno& &ho the masked man isI
so,
my $ather is not the masked man.) mysel$ doubt i$ escartes committed this $allacy! at least in this
Meditation.
8t this point he is more concerned &ith the &ay in &hich &e kno&
anything
about souls and
ad
bodies. 9e is not concerned to proe that they are distinct! but more concerned to sho& that kno&led%e o$ the sel$ is not dependent upon kno&led%e o$ bodies. Because the one can be certain! een &hen the other is not. Neertheless! &hat are &e le$t really kno&in% about the sel$H)n the $ollo&in% century the 2erman philosopher 2eor% hristoph ;ichtenber% @>C5'??A remarkedG "(e should say! 7it thinks7 ust as &e say! 7it thunders7. Een to say 7co%ito7 is too much! i$ &e translate it &ith 7) think7." @;ichtenber% liked pithy aphorisms! and &asan important in$luence on a yet later $i%ure! Friedrich Nietsche M>DCC'>?00.A*he idea is that the apparent re$erence to an ")" as a "thin%" or subect o$ thou%ht is itsel$ an illusion. *here is no "it" that thundersG &e could say instead ust that thunder is %oin% on. Similarly ;ichtenber% is su%%estin%! at least in the conte4t o$ the doubt! that escartes is not entitled to an ")" that is thinkin%. 8ll he can properly claim is that "there is a thou%ht %oin% on".*his seems a ery biarre claim. For surely there cannot be a thou%ht &ithout someone thinkin% itH ou cannot hae thou%hts $loatin% round a room &aitin%! as it &ere! $or someone to catch them! any more than you can hae dents $loatin% around &aitin% to latch onto a sur$ace to be dented. (e return to this in hapter C. But then &hy isn7t ;ichtenber% ri%htH )$ escartes cannot con$ront a sel$ that is doin% the thinkin%! cannot e4perience it! cannot ima%ine it! then &hy is he entitled to any kind o$ certainty that it e4istsH )ndeed! &hat can it mean to say that it e4istsHescartes adroitly puts this problem to one side! by raisin% a parallel di$$iculty about "thin%s &hich people commonly think they understand most distinctly o$ all" '' ordinary bodies! or thin%s met &ith in space. *his is &hat &as aimed at by the ball o$ &a4 e4'ample. 9ere is a possible reconstruction o$ the ar%umentG
#t a particular time, my senses inform me of a shape, colour, hardness, taste that belong to the wax. $ut at another time my senses inform me of a different shape etc. belonging to the wax. %y senses show me
nothing but
these diverse &ualities which we can call !sensory &ualities!, since our senses take them in". I nevertheless make a 'udgement of identity( it is the same piece of wax on the earlier and the later occasion. So, it is the nature of the ball of wax that it can possessdifferent sensory &ualities at different times. So, to understand what the wax
is
I must use my understanding, not my senses.
)$ this is a %ood reconstruction! &e should notice that escartes is not denyin% that it is by means o$ the senses that ) kno& that the &a4 is there in the $irst place @assumin% &e hae %ot rid o$ the Eil emon! and are back to trustin% our sensesA. )n $act! he %oes on to say as much. -ather! he is su%%estin% that the senses are like
messengers
that delier in$ormation that needs
interpreting.
8nd this interpretation! &hich is here a #uestion o$ identi$yin% the one obect amon%st the many successie appearances! is the &ork o$ the understandin%. )t is a matter o$ employin% principles o$ classi$ication! or cate%ories! &hose credentials &e can also inesti%ate.So! all &e can understand by the &a4 is that it is some elusie "thin%" that can take on di$$erent bodily properties! such as shape! sie! colour! taste. 8nd &e understand by the sel$! the ")"! ust some e#ually elusie "thin%" that at di$$erent times thinks di$$erent thou%hts. So maybe the sel$ should not be re%arded as especially mysterious! compared &ith eeryday thin%s like the ball o$ &a4. 1erhaps seles are no harder to understand than bodies! and &e only think other&ise because o$ some kind o$ preudice. (e return tothe &a4 in hapter .
ad
C&EAR AN( (I!TINCT I(EA!
*he $irst t&o
Meditations
desere their place as classics o$ philosophy. *hey combine depth! ima%ination! and ri%our! to an e4tent that has ery seldom been paralleled. So one is le$t &ith bated breath! &aitin% $or the story to un$old. 9ere is escartes le$t perchin% on his one minute rock! surrounded by a sea o$ doubt. But it seems he has denied himsel$ any &ay o$ %ettin% o$$ it. ;i$e may still be a dream. *o use the metaphor o$ $oundationsG he is do&n to bedrock! but has no buildin% materials. For the ery standards he set himsel$! o$ "demon'proo$" kno&led%e! seem to $orbid him een $rom usin% "sel$'eident" or natural means o$ reasonin%! in order to ar%ue that he kno&s more than the o%ito. *here is nothin% di$$icult about the emon deceiin% us into listenin% to delusie pieces o$ reasonin%. Our reasonin%s are apt to be een more $allible than our senses.uriously! he does not see it #uite like that. (hat he does is to re$lect on the o%ito! and ask &hat makes it so especially certain. 9e coninces himsel$ that it is because he has an especially transparent "clear and distinct" perception o$ its truth. )t is %enerally a%reed that escartes! the mathematician! had a mathematical model o$ clarity in mind. Suppose! $or instance! you think about a circle. )ma%ine a diameter! and dra& chords $rom the opposite ends to a point on the circum$erence. *hey meet at a ri%ht an%le. ra& others! and they al&ays seem to do so. 8t this point! you mi%ht hae a not ery clear sense that perhaps there is a reason $or this. But no&! suppose you %o throu%h a proo$ @dra&in% the line $rom the centre o$ the circle to the ape4 o$ the trian%le! and solin% the t&o trian%les you createA. 8$ter that you can ust
see
that the theorem
has
to hold. *his may come as a "$lash"G a blindin% certainty! or insi%ht into this particular piece o$ %eometrical truth. *his is ust a random %eometrical e4ample o$ a procedure that can make you "see" somethin% that you mi%ht only dimly hae %rasped. But i$ only &e couldsee the rest o$ reality! mind! body! 2od! $reedom! human li$e! &ith the same rush o$ clarity and understandin%L (ell! one philosophical ideal is that &e can. *his is the ideal o$
rationalism*
the po&er o$ pure unaided reason. For the rationalist can see $rom her armchair that thin%s must be one &ay and cannot be other &ays! like the an%le in the semicircle. :no&led%e achieed by this kind o$ rational insi%ht is kno&n as "a priori"G it can be seen to be true immediately! &ithout any e4perience o$ the &ay o$ the &orld.
THE TRA(E*ARK AR'U*ENT
*rustin% clarity and distinctness! escartes indul%es a piece o$ reasonin%. ;ookin% into his o&n "sel$"! &hich is all that he has at this point! escartes discoers that he has an idea o$ per$ection. 9e then ar%ues that such an idea implies a cause. 9o&eer! the thin% that caused it must hae as much "reality"! and that includes per$ection! as the idea itsel$. *his implies that only a per$ect cause! that is! 2od! &ill do. 9ence 2od e4ists! and has le$t the idea o$ per$ection as an innate si%n o$ his &orkmanship in our minds! like a cra$tsman leain% a trademark stamped in his &ork.Once escartes has discoered 2od! the seas o$ doubt subside in a rush. For since 2od is per$ect! he is no deceierG deceiin% is clearly $allin% short o$ %oodness! let alone
ad
per$ection. 9ence! i$ &e do our stu$$ properly! &e can be sure that &e &ill not be the ictims o$ illusion. *he &orld &ill be as &e understand it to be. oin% our stu$$ properly mainly means trustin% only clear and distinct ideas. (hat are &e to make o$ the "trademark" ar%umentH 9ere is a reconstructionG
I have the idea of a perfect being. This idea must have a cause. # cause must be at least as perfect as its effect. So something at least as perfect as my idea caused it. Therefore such a thing exists. $ut that thing must be perfect, that is, )od.
Suppose &e %rant escartes the idea mentioned in the $irst premise. @*here are theolo%ical traditions that &ould not een do that. *hey &ould say that 2od7s per$ection de$ies understandin%! so that &e hae no idea o$ it! or him.A Still! &hy is he entitled to the premise that his idea must hae a causeH <i%ht not there be eents that hae simply no causeH Eents that! as &e mi%ht say! "ust happen"H 8$ter all! sittin% on his rock! escartes cannot appeal to any normal! scienti$ic! e4perience. )n his bare metaphysical solitude! ho& can he deny that eents mi%ht ust happenH 8nd i$ he thinks the contrary! shouldn7t he then &orry &hether the emon mi%ht be &orkin% on him! makin% him think this althou%h it is not trueH9o&eer! it %ets &orse &hen &e arrie at the ne4t step. onsider my idea o$ someone &ho is per$ectly punctual. oes this need a per$ectly punctual causeH Surely a better thin% to think &ould be this. ) can simply de$ine &hat it is $or someone to be per$ectly punctual. )t means that they are neer late @or perhaps! neer early and neer lateA. *o understand &hat it &ould be $or someone to be like that! ) do not hae to hae come across such a person. ) can describe them in adance. ) understand &hat condition they hae to satis$y &ithout any such ac#uaintance! and indeed een i$ nobody is eer like that.1robably escartes &ould reect the analo%y. 1erhaps he thinks o$ it more like this. o ) hae an idea o$ a per$ect mathematicianH (ell! ) can start by thinkin% o$ a mathematicianas one &ho neer makes mistakes. But that is hardly ade#uate. 8 per$ect mathematician &ould be ima%inatie and inentie as &ell. No&! &ith my ery limited kno&led%e o$ mathematics! ) only hae a ery con$used understandin% o$ &hat that &ould be like. )n %eneral! ) cannot clearly comprehend or understand inentions be$ore they come alon% '' other&ise! ) &ould be makin% the inentions mysel$L So perhaps it &ould take a per$ect mathematician to %ie me a %ood idea @a "clear and distinct" ideaA o$ &hat a per$ect mathematician &ould be like.(ell! perhapsI but no& it becomes doubt$ul &hether ) do hae a clear and distinct idea o$ a per$ect mathematician! and analo%ously! o$ a per$ect bein%. 2enerally! &hat happens i$ ) $rame this idea is that ) think more as ) did &hen thinkin% o$ someone per$ectly punctual. ) think o$ an a%ent &ho neer makes mistakes! neer behaes unkindly! neer $inds thin%s he cannot do! and so on. ) mi%ht add in ima%ination somethin% like a kind o$ %lo&! but it is clear that this &ill not help. )t surely seems presumptuous! or een blasphemous! to allo& mysel$ a complete! clear! comprehension o$ 2od7s attributes.)n $act! else&here in his &ritin%s escartes %ies a rather loely analo%y! but one &hich threatens to undermine the trademark ar%umentG
)/+e can touch a mountain with our hands but we cannot put our arms around it as we could put them around a tree or something else not too large for them. %o grasp something is to embrace it
ad
in one0s thought# to know something it is sufficient to touch it with one0s thought.
1erhaps &e can only touch 2od7s supposed #ualities by &ay o$ de$inition! but cannot comprehend them. )n that case &e cannot ar%ue back to an ideal or archetype that enabled us to comprehend them.So! the trademark ar%ument is one that strikes most o$ us as $ar $rom demon'proo$ '' so $ar! in $act! that it seems pretty easy to resist een i$ &e are not at all in the %rip o$ e4treme doubt. 8t this point some suppressed premises su%%ested by the history o$ ideas may be used to e4cuse escartes. 9e &as undoubtedly more optimistic about the trademark ar%ument than &e can be because he inherited a number o$ ideas $rom preious philosophical traditions. One ery important one is that %enuine causation is a matter o$ the cause
passing on
somethin% to an e$$ect. ausation is like passin% the batonin a relay race. So! $or e4ample! it takes heat to make somethin% hot! or moement to induce motion. *his is a principle that sur$aces a%ain and a%ain in the history o$ philoso' phy! and &e shall encounter it more than once. 9ere it disposed escartes to think that the "per$ection" in his idea needed to be secreted into it! as it &ere! by a per$ect cause.But this principle about causation is scarcely demon'proo$. )n $act! it is not een true. (ehae become $amiliar &ith causes that bear no resemblance to their e$$ects. *he moement o$ a piece o$ iron in a ma%netic $ield bears no resemblance to an electric cur'rent! but that is &hat it causes. )n $act! it seems as thou%h escartes @once more in$luenced by ideas $rom preious philosophical traditionsA may hae slipped into thinkin% that an idea o$ , actually shares ,. So an idea o$ in$inity! $or instance! &ould bean in$inite idea. @(ould an idea o$ somethin% solid be a solid ideaHA Similarly an idea o$ per$ection &ould be a per$ect idea! and &ould re#uire a per$ect cause. But a%ain! it mi%ht be the emon that makes you think any such thin%! and a%ain there is no %ood reason to $ollo& him.
THE CARTE!IAN CIRC&E
escartes coninced himsel$ that the ar%ument &as %oodG eery step in it &as "clear and distinct". So no& he has 2od! and 2od is no deceier. Still! remember that to do this he had to trust his clear and distinct ideas as sources o$ truth. Neertheless! isn7t there an a&$ul hole in his procedureH (hat happened to the emonH <i%ht not een our clear anddistinct ideas lead us astrayH *o close o$$ this possibility! it seems! escartes turns round and uses 2od '' the 2od &hose e4istence he has ust proed '' as the %uarantor that &hat &e perceie clearly and distinctly must be true.)t &as one o$ his contemporaries! 8ntoine 8rnauld @>6>5'?CA! &ho cried "$oul" most loudly at this point! accusin% escartes o$ ar%uin% in a circle! the in$amous "artesian circle". escartes seems committed to t&o di$$erent priorities. onsider the ie& that i$ &e clearly and distinctly perceie some proposition
p,
then it is true that
p.
;et us abbreiate this to @
p &
*
p
A! readin% that i$
p
is clear and distinct @""A! then it is true @"*"A. 8nd suppose &e symbolie "2od e4ists and does not deceie us" by "
-
". *hen the circle is that at some points it seems that escartes holdsG ) can kno& that @
p
' *
p
only i$ )
first
kno&
-
. But at other points he holdsG ) can kno& that
-
only i$ )
first
kno& @
p
' *
p
A. )t is like the $amiliar impasse in the mornin%! &hen you need to hae some co$$ee to %et out o$ bed! and you need to %et out o$ bed to $i4 the co$$ee.
ad
One or the other has to come $irst. *here is a &hole literature tryin% to understand &hether escartes actually $alls into this trap. Some commentators cite passa%es in &hich it seems that he does not really hold the $irst. *he maor su%%estion is that
-
is necessary only to alidate
memory of
proo$s. So &hile you actually clearly and distinctly perceie somethin%! you do not need to trust anythin% at all! een
-
! to be entitled to assert its truth. But later! &hen you hae $or%otten the proo$! only
-
under&rites your title to say that you once proed it! so it must be true.Other commentators su%%est that escartes does not need the second. 9e sees that 2od e4ists! clearly and distinctly! but does not need a %eneral rule! o$ the kind @
p
' *
p
A! tounder&rite this perception. 9e can be certain o$ this instance o$ the rule! &ithout bein% sure about the rule itsel$. *his is itsel$ an interestin% $orm o$ su%%estion! and introduces aery important truth! &hich is that ery o$ten &e are more certain o$ particular erdicts than &e are o$ the principles that &e mi%ht cite &hen &e try to de$end them. For e4ample! ) mi%ht kno& that a particular sentence is %rammatical! &ithout bein% sure o$ any %eneral rule o$ %rammar that allo&s it. 1hilosophers hae o$ten been rather hard on this possibility. *he admired character Socrates! in 1lato7s
Dialogues,
is in$uriatin%ly $ond o$ %ettin% his stoo%es to say somethin%! sho&in% that they cannot de$end it by articulate %eneral principles! and concludin% that they didn7t really hae any ri%ht to claim &hat they did. 9o&eer! the case o$ %rammatical kno&led%e su%%ests that this is a bad in$erence. onsider as &ell ho& in perception! ) may reco%nie somethin% as a 1omeranian! or a member o$ the -ollin% Stones! or my &i$e! &ithout kno&in% any %eneral principles that "usti$y" the erdict. <y perceptual system may operate accordin%to some %eneral principles or "al%orithms" $or translatin% isual input into erdicts! but ) hae no idea &hat they are. So ) couldn7t ans&er a Socrates &ho asked $or %eneral principles underlyin% my reco%nition. ) could only $lounder and splutter. But ) reco%nie the 1omeranian! or -ollin% Stone! or my &i$e! $or all that. Socrates7 procedure is only aptto %ie philosophers a bad name.Still! &e are bound to ask
(hy
escartes thinks he can be certain o$ this instance o$ the rule. (hy is his "seein%" that 2od e4ists clearly and distinctly also a clear and distinct case o$ seein% the truthH Some o$ us may hae the dark suspicion that it is because mention o$ 2od clouds the mind rather than clari$yin% it.For our purposes! &e can leae this issue. (hat remains clear is that there is a distinct &hi$$ o$ double standards here. *he kind o$ sceptical problem embodied in the Eil emon is someho& #uietly $or%otten! &hile escartes tries to en%ineer his &ay o$$ the lonely rock o$ the o%ito. 8nd this mi%ht su%%est that he has put himsel$ on a desert island $rom &hich there is no escape.
.OUN(ATION! AN( WEB!
*he %reat Scottish thinker aid 9ume @>>>'6A criticied escartes like thisG
%here is a species of scepticism, antecedent to all study and philosophy, which is much inculcated by Descartes and others, as a sovereign preservative against error and precipitate judgment. It recommends an universal doubt, not only of all our former opinions and principles, but also of our very faculties# of whose veracity, say they, we must assure ourselves, by a chain of reasoning, deduced from some original principle, which cannot possibly be fallacious or
ad
deceitful. "ut neither is there any such original principle, which has a prerogative above others, that are self'evident and convincing. 1r if there were, could we advance a step beyond it, but by the use of those very faculties, of which we are supposed to be already diffident. %he 2artesian doubt, therefore, were it ever possible to be attained by any human creature 3as it plainly is not4 would
be entirely incurable# and no reasoning could ever bring us to a state of assurance and conviction upon any subject.
)$ escartes7s proect is to use reason to $end o$$ uniersal doubt about the truth$ulness o$ reason! then it has to $ail.9ume7s challen%e seems conincin%. )t looks as thou%h escartes &as doomed to $ailure.So &hat should be the outcomeH 2eneral scepticism! meanin% pessimism about &hether there is any harmony at all bet&een the &ay &e beliee thin%s to be and the &ay they areH Or somethin% elseH Other possibilities need introduction. One &ay o$ thinkin% '' 9ume7s o&n '' accepts the ie& that our system o$ belie$ needs some kind o$ $oundation. 9o&eer! it denies that that $oundation could hae the kind o$ rational status that escartes &anted. *he eracity @truth$ulnessA o$ our senses and reasonin%s is itsel$
part
o$ the $oundation. )t cannot itsel$ be demonstrated by standin% onsome
other
"ori%inal principle". For all o$ us! outside the philosophical study! it comes naturally to trust our common e4perience. (e %ro& up doin% so! and as &e %ro& up &e become %ood at reco%niin% dan%er areas @illusions! mira%esA a%ainst the back%round o$ natural belie$s &e all $orm. *he sel$'correctie nature o$ our systems o$ belie$! mentionedaboe! is all &e need. (e could call this approach non'rational or
natural
$oundationalism. @Not o$ course implyin% that there is anythin%
irrational
about it. )t is ust that the thin%s in the $oundation do not hae the demon'proo$ &ay o$ "standin% to reason" that escartes had hoped $or.A 9ume himsel$ %ae a number o$ ar%uments $or side'linin% any appeal to rationality! and &e isit some o$ them in due course.*he emphasis on natural &ays o$ $ormin% belie$ chimes in &ith another strand in 9ume and other British philosophers o$ the seenteenth and ei%hteenth centuries! &hich is their distrust o$ the po&er o$ unaided reason. For these philosophers! the best contact bet&een mind and the &orld is not the point at &hich a mathematical proo$ crystallies! but the point at &hich you see and touch a $amiliar obect. *heir paradi%m &as kno&led%e by sense e4perience rather than by reason. Because o$ this! they are labelled
empiricists,
&hereas escartes is a card'carryin%
rationalist.
*he labels! ho&eer! conceal a lot o$ important detail. For e4ample! at some points &hen he %ets under pressure! escartes himsel$ appears to say that the really %ood thin% about clear and distinct ideas is that you can7t doubt them &hen you hae them. *his is not really a certi$ication by reason! so much as the ery same kind o$ natural potency that 9ume himsel$ attaches to basic empirical belie$s. 8nd soon &e isit an area &here the champion o$ British empiricism! +ohn ;ocke @>635'>0CA! is as rationalist as the best o$ them. 2reat philosophers hae a disturbin% habit o$ resistin% labellin%.On this ie&! escartes7s problem &as that he relied too much on the po&ers o$ reason. )nstead! &e can appeal to nature! here meanin% our natural propensities to $orm belie$s and to correct them. 8nd &hat o$ the Eil emonH On this story! the true moral o$ escartes7s stru%%les is that i$ &e raise the #uestion &hether our e4perience and reasonin% @en blocA accords &ith the &ay the &orld is @en blocA! it &ill take an act o$ $aithto settle it. "2od" simply labels &hateer it is that ensures this harmony bet&een belie$ and the &orld. But! as 9ume says in the passa%e ust #uoted! &e do not $ind a need to
ad
raise this #uestion in normal li$e. *he hyperbolic doubt! and the ans&er to it! is in this sense unreal.*his may sound sensible! or it may ust sound complacent. But to blunt the char%e o$ complacency! &e can at least notice this. -e%ardin% the doubt as unreal does not hae to mean that &e simply turn our backs on the problem o$ harmony bet&een appearance and realityG ho& &e think and ho& thin%s are. (e can approach it $rom
(ithin
our normal $rame&ork o$ belie$s. )n $act! &hen 9ume himsel$ approached it in this &ay! he became oer&helmed by di$$iculties in our ordinary &ays o$ thinkin% about thin%sG di$$iculties stron% enou%h to reintroduce scepticism about our ability to kno& anythin% about the &orld. *his is the topic o$ hapter .9o&eer! one piece o$ optimism is aailable to us! t&o centuries later. (e mi%ht thus suppose that eolution! &hich is presumably responsible $or the $act that &e hae our senses and our reasonin% capacities! &ould not hae selected $or them @in the shape in &hich &e hae themA had they not
(or'ed.
)$ our eyesi%ht! $or e4ample! did not in$orm us o$ predators! $ood! or mates ust &hen predators! $ood! and mates are about! it &ould be o$ no use to us. So it is built to %et these thin%s ri%ht. *he harmony bet&een our mindsand the &orld is due to the $act that the &orld is responsible $or our minds. *heir $unctionis to represent it so that &e can meet our needsI i$ they &ere built to represent it in any &ay other than the true &ay! &e could not surie. *his is not an ar%ument desi%ned to do a&ay &ith the Eil emon. )t is an ar%ument that appeals to thin%s &e take ourseles to kno& about the &orld. n$ortunately! &e hae to isit in time the area o$ 9ume7s doubts! &here thin%s &e take ourseles to kno& about the &orld also sere to make that kno&led%e seem doubt$ul.8 rather di$$erent response shru%s o$$ the need $or any kind o$ "$oundations"! &hether certi$ied by reason! as escartes hoped! or merely natural! as in 9ume. *his approach %oes back to emphasiin% instead the
coherent structure
o$
O-
eeryday system o$ belie$sG the &ay they han% to%ether! &hereas the sporadic e4periences or belie$s &e %et indreams are $ra%mentary and incoherent. )t then points out an interestin% $eature o$ coherent structures! namely that they do not need $oundations. 8 ship or a &eb may be made up o$ a tissue o$ interconnectin% parts! and it deries its stren%th $rom ust those interconnections. )t does not need a "base" or a "startin% point" or "$oundation". 8 structure o$ this kind can hae each bit supported by other bits &ithout there bein% any bit that supports all the others &ithout support itsel$. Similarly! i$ any one belie$ is challen%ed! others can support it! unless! o$ course! it turns out that nothin% else supports it! in &hich case it should be dropped. *he 8ustrian philosopher Otto Neurath @>DD5'>?CA used this loely metaphor $or our body o$ kno&led%eG
/e are like sailors who on the open sea must reconstruct their ship but are never able to start afresh from the bottom.
8ny part can be replaced! proided there is enou%h o$ the rest on &hich to stand. But the &hole structure cannot be challen%ed en bloc! and i$ &e try to do so! &e $ind ourseles on escartes7s lonely rock.*his approach is usually called "coherentism". )ts motto is that &hile eery ar%ument needs premises! there is nothin% that is the premise o$ eery ar%ument. *here is no $oundation on &hich eerythin% rests. oherentism is nice in one &ay! but dissatis$yin% in another. )t is nice in &hat it does a&ay &ith! namely the elusie $oundations. )t is!
ad
ho&eer! not clear that it o$$ers us enou%h to replace them. *his is because &e seemed able to understand the possibility represented by the Eil emon '' that our system o$ belie$ should be e4tensie and coherent and interlockin%! but all completely &ron%. 8s ) said in the introduction to this chapter! een as children &e $all naturally into &onderin% &hether all e4perience mi%ht be a dream. (e mi%ht sympathie &ith escartes7s thou%ht that i$ the options are coherentism or scepticism! the more honest option &ould be scepticism.)t is %ood! then! to remember $our options in epistemolo%y @the theory o$ kno&led%eA. *here is rational $oundationalism! as attempted by escartes. *here is natural $oundationalism! as attempted in 9ume. *here is coherentism. 8nd broodin% oer all o$ them! there is scepticism! or the ie& that there is no kno&led%e. Each o$ these has had distin%uished de$enders. (hicheer the reader pre$ers! he or she &ill $ind %ood philosophical company. One mi%ht think that escartes %ot almost eerythin% ri%ht! or that he %ot almost eerythin% &ron%. *he ba$$lin% thin% is to de$end &hicheer ans&er commends itsel$.
&OCA& !CEPTICI!*!
Scepticism can be raised in particular areas! as &ell as in the %lobal $ashion o$ escartes. Someone mi%ht be coninced that &e hae! say! scienti$ic kno&led%e! but be ery doubt$ul about kno&led%e in ethics or politics or literary criticism. (e $ind particular areas shortly &here it does not take hyperbolic doubt! only a bit o$ caution! $or us to become insecure. 9o&eer! there are other nice e4amples o$ hi%hly %eneral areas &here scepticism is ba$$lin%. *he philosopher Bertrand -ussell @>D5'>?0A considered the e4ample o$ time. 9o& do ) kno& that the &orld did not come into e4istence a ery $e& moments a%o! but complete &ith delusie traces o$ a much %reater a%eH *hose traces &ould include! o$ course! the modi$ications o$ the brain that %ie us &hat &e take to be memories. *hey &ould also include all the other thin%s that &e interpret as si%ns o$ %reat a%e. )n $act! Victorian thinkers stru%%lin% to reconcile the biblical account o$ the history o$ the &orld &ith the $ossil record had already su%%ested much the same thin% about %eolo%y. On this account! around C!000 years a%o 2od laid do&n all the misleadin% eidence that the earth is about C!000 million years old @and! &e can no& add! misleadin%si%ns that the unierse is about >3!000 million years oldA. *his &as neer a popular moe! probably because i$ you are sceptical about time! you #uickly become sceptical about eerythin%! or maybe because it presents 2od as somethin% like a lar%e'scale practical oker. -ussell7s possibility sounds almost as $ar'$etched as escartes7s Eil emon.9o&eer! there is one hi%hly intri%uin% thin% about -ussell7s scenario. *his is that it can actually be ar%ued to be scienti$ically more
pro+a+le
than the alternatie &e all beliee inL *his is because science tells us that "lo&'entropy" or! in other &ords! hi%hly ordered systems are more improbable. )n addition! as physical systems like the cosmos eole! entropy or disorder increases. *he smoke neer returns into the ci%aretteI the toothpaste neer %oes back into the tube. *he e4traordinary thin% is that there &as eer
enough
order in thin%s $or the smoke to be in the ci%arette or the toothpaste to be in the tube in the $irst place. So! one mi%ht ar%ue! it is "easier" $or a moderately disordered &orld! such
ad
as the &orld is no&! to come into e4istence! than it is $or any lo&er'entropy! more orderlyancestor. )ntuitiely! it is as i$ there are more &ays this can happen! ust as there are more&ays you can %et $our'letter or $ie'letter &ords in an initial hand o$ seen letters in Scrabble! than there are in &hich you can %et a seen'letter &ord. )t is much more probable that you %et a $our'letter &ord than a seen'letter &ord. Similarly! the ar%ument %oes! it is as i$ 2od or Nature had less to do! to make the &orld as it is today out o$ nothin%! than to make the lo&er'entropy &orld as it is supposed to hae been some thirteen billion years a%o out o$ nothin%. *here$ore! it is more probable that it happened like that. )n a strai%ht competition $or probability bet&een -ussell7s outlandish hypothesis and common sense! -ussell &ins. ) leae this $or the reader to ponder.
THE *ORA&
9o& then should &e re%ard kno&led%eH :no&led%e implies
authority*
the people &ho kno& are the people to &hom &e should listen. )t implies reliabilityG the people &ho kno& are those &ho are reliable at re%isterin% the truth! like %ood instruments. *o
claim
kno&led%e implies claimin% a sense o$ our o&n reliability. 8nd to
accord
authority to someone or some method inoles seein% it as reliable. *he unsettlin% scenarios o$ a escartes or a -ussell unseat our sense o$ our o&n reliability. Once &e hae raised the outlandish possibilities! our sense o$ a reliable connection bet&een the &ay thin%s are and the &ays &e take them to be %oes dim. (e could re%ain it! i$ &e could ar%ue that the scenarios are either impossible! or at least hae no real chance o$ bein% the &ay thin%s are. *he di$$iculty is that it is hard to sho& them to be impossible! and in these abstract realms &e hae no ery %ood sense o$ probabilities or chances. So it is di$$icult to ar%ue that they hae no chance o$ bein% true &ithout relyin% on the ery opinions that they #uery. 9ence! scepticism permanently beckons! or threatens! us. (e
may
be trackin% the &orld reliably! but &e may not. *o reert to the en%ineerin% analo%y ) used in the )ntroduction! the structure o$ our thou%ht seems to span lar%e %apsG here! the %ap bet&eenho& thin%s appear and ho& they mi%ht be. (e hand ourseles the ri%ht to cross those %aps. But i$ &e do this trailin% no ery %ood sense o$ our o&n reliability or harmony &iththe truth! then that ri%ht seems ill'$ounded. 8nd this is &hat the sceptic insists upon. 8ny con$idence in a harmony bet&een the &ay &e take thin%s to be! and the &ay they are! &ill seem to be a pure act o$ $aith.escartes le$t us &ith a problem o$ kno&led%e. 9e also le$t us &ith seere problems in understandin% the place o$ our minds in nature. 8nd $inally the entire scienti$ic reolution o$ &hich he &as such a distin%uished parent le$t us &ith pro$ound problems o$ understandin% the &orld in &hich &e are placed. (e hae seen somethin% o$ the problemo$ kno&led%e. *he ne4t chapter turns to problems o$ mind.
Cha"ter T#o*ind
ad
S
11OSE
(E
1*
ON
ONE
S)E
the %eneral problem o$ harmony bet&een the &ay &e take the &orld to be and the &ay the &orld is. (e shall keep our $in%ers crossed! supposin% that &e do really kno& &hat &e naturally take ourseles to kno&. But ho& &ell do our ie&s han% to%etherH escartes le$t us &ith our o&n seles and our o&n minds as special! intimate! obects o$ immediate kno&led%e. Or rather! each o$ us is le$t &ith his or her o&n mind as a special! intimate! obect o$ immediate kno&led%e. For een i$ ) can climb out o$ the seas o$ doubt onto the o%ito! ) cannot climb out onto the nature o$
your
mind. So ho& then do ) kno& anythin% about your mental li$eH 9o& do ) kno&! $or instance! that you see the colour blue the &ay that ) doH <i%ht it be that some o$ us $eel pain more! but make less $uss about it! or that others $eel pain less! but make more $ussH 9o& do &e be%in to think about mind and body! brains and behaiourH
THE 'HO!T IN THE *ACHINE
(e hae seen ho& escartes7s strate%y led him to re%ard kno&led%e o$ our o&n minds asmore secure and certain than kno&led%e o$ the rest o$ the &orld. But escartes &as also a scientist. 9e made $oundational discoeries in optics. 9e practised dissections! and kne& a $air amount about the transmission o$ impulses throu%h the neres to the brain. 9e kne& this took place by means o$ a physical transmission! a "pull" or "iolent motion" o$ the neres! or as &e &ould no& think! an electrochemical impulse transmittedthrou%h the nerous system. *he ordinary senses o$ si%ht! touch! taste! smell! and hearin%actiate the nerous system! &hich transmits messa%es to the brain. *he brain is not! o$ course! an undi$$erentiated lump. Bits o$ the brain transmit si%nals to other parts o$ the brain and back to the bodyG &hole patterns o$ actiation %et set up. 8ll this is part o$ neurophysiolo%y. *hese eents can in principle be seen in publicG &ith the ri%ht instruments! the patterns o$ actiation can be sho&n to a classroom.
And then (hat
(ell! then there is the ma%ic moment. *he "mind" @the thinkin% thin%! or "res co%itans"A %ets a$$ected as &ell! and the &hole &orld o$ e4perience opens up. *he subect sees colours! hears sounds! $eels te4tures and temperatures! and has sensations o$ taste and smell. *his &orld o$ e4perience is composed o$ mental eents or eents &ithin subectieconsciousness. *hese eents in the subect7s consciousness cannot be seen in public. *hey are priate. *he &hole classroom may see some neurones $irin%! but only the one person $eels the pain. escartes actually located the place &here the ma%ical eent takes place. For #uite sensible neurophysiolo%ical reasons he thou%ht that the pineal %land! a structure lyin% centrally &ithin the brain! must be the place &here messa%es &ere conducted $rom the realm o$ physics to the realm o$ the mental.For escartes it is not only that mental eents are distinct $rom physical eents. *hey also belon% to a distinct kind o$ substance '' immaterial substance '' a kind o$ %host'stu$$ or ectoplasm. Strictly speakin% i$ ) say! ") thou%ht o$ the Kueen and ) saluted!" there is a kind o$ ambi%uityG the ")" that is the subect o$ the thou%ht is not the ")"! the body! that salutes. *hou%hts and e4periences are modi$ications in one kind o$ stu$$I moement and position belon%s to the other. *his part o$ escartes7s doctrine marks him as a "substance
ad
dualist". )t is not ust that there are t&o kinds o$ properties @mental properties and physical propertiesA and that persons can hae both. )t is that there are t&o kinds o$ bearers o$ properties as &ell. O$ course this is theolo%ically conenientG it opens the &ay to the immortality o$ the soul! since there is no reason $or soul'stu$$ to hae the same li$e span as anythin% like a physical body. But substance dualism is not compulsory. One could hold that mental and physical properties are ery di$$erent but that the one or%anied body has them both '' a$ter all! mass and elocity are t&o ery di$$erent kinds o$ property! but proectiles hae them both. 1eople &ho hold that there are t&o kinds o$ property @mental and physicalA but that they can belon% to the one kind o$ stu$$ @&hateer lar%e animals are made o$A are called property dualists.escartes leads us to the ie& neatly summed up by 2ilbert -yle @>?00'6A as holdin% that the human bein% is a "%host in a machine". Eents in the machine! the physical body!are like other eents in the physical &orld. *hey consist in the interactions o$ $amiliar kinds o$ stu$$G molecules and atoms! electrical $ields and $orces. Eents in the %hostly part! the mind! are alto%ether di$$erent. 1erhaps they are eents in some kind o$ %host'stu$$ '' ectoplasm! or the non'physical stu$$ that spirits and an%els are made o$. Spirits and an%els do &ithout the physical embodiment alto%ether! in the popular mind. But in the normal human bein% there is a close correlation bet&een eents o$ the one kind and those o$ the otherG stickin% a pin in someone makes physical chan%es! but it also causes a mental eent o$ $eelin% pain. 8nd ice ersaG the mental eent o$ rememberin% a blunder may cause physical eents such as %roanin% and blushin%. So eents in the one realm may a$$ect those in the other. But in principle the t&o realms are entirely distinct.
/O*BIE! AN( *UTANT!
O$ course! this ie& is not peculiar to escartes. )t is the ie& presupposed by many o$ the &orld7s %reat reli%ionsG it is part o$ any doctrine holdin% that &e can surie bodily death! or that our soul can %o one &ay &hile our body %oes another. et it is a ie& that $aces enormous! and ar%uably insurmountable! problems.*he $irst $amily o$ problems is epistemolo%ical. ) ust said that in the normal human bein% there is a close correlation bet&een eents o$ the one kind and those o$ the other. But ho& are &e entitled to beliee thatH 9ere is one &ay thin%s mi%ht beG
The Zombie Possibility.
*ombies look like you and me, and behave like you and me. Their physical natures are indistinguishable. If you opened a *ombie brain, you would find that it functions exactly the same way as your brain or mine. If you prick a *ombie, he or she will go !ouch!, 'ust like you or me.
"ut
*ombies are not conscious. There is no ghost within.$ecause *ombies look and behave 'ust like you and me, there is no way of telling which of us are *ombies and which are conscious in the way that you and I are. +r at any rate, in the way that I am. or now I have raised the *ombie possibility, I see that I can-t really be sure about you or anyone else. erhaps consciousness is an extremely rare correlate of a complex system of brain and body. erhaps I am the only example of it( perhaps the rest of you are all *ombies.
9ere is another &ay thin%s mi%ht beG
The Mutant Possibility.
%utants look like you and me, and behave like you and me. Their physical natures are indistinguishable. If you opened a %utant brain, you would find that it
ad
functions exactly the same way as your brain or mine. If you prick a %utant, he or she will go !ouch!, 'ust like you or me./nlike *ombies, %utants are conscious. There is a ghost within. $ut the events in the %utant ghost are not like those we expect. # %utant who is pricked, for instance, may experience a mental event like hearing middle 0 on a clarinet. She still goes !ouch!, for, since her brain functions like ours and she behaves like us, being pricked with a pin starts processes that cause changes that eventually end up with her saying !ouch!, 'ust like the rest of us. erhaps when she does instead hear middle 0 on a clarinet, she feels awful pain, but it only makes her smile beatifically. # %utant who sees $ritish post1boxes may see them as yellow2 one who sees daffodils may see them as blue. 3vents in the %utant-s consciousness bear no relation to the events in your mind or mine. +r at any rate, no relation to the events in my mind. or now I have raised the %utant possibility, I see that I can-t really be sure about you or anyone else. erhaps the rest of you are all %utants, compared with me.
*he point about these possibilities is that they seem to be &ide open! on the artesian dualist account o$ mind and body. *hey are unnerin% possibilities! and ones &e do not normally consider @althou%h ) suspect that they cross our minds
more
o$ten than the outlandish possibilities o$ the $irst chapterA.One &ay to react to them is to bite the bullet. ou mi%ht sayG all ri%ht! let us suppose these are &ide'open possibilities. 1erhaps ) can neer really kno& &hat the mind o$ another person is like! &hat mental eents occur &ithin it! or een &hether there is any mental li$e %oin% on at all. But can7t ) still
suppose
that other people7s mental lies are much like mineH an7t ) reasonably use mysel$ as a model $or all the restH )t &ould be notso much a case o$
'no(ledge
as o$ a hypothesis or
con/ecture,
but it perhaps it is a
reasona+le
conecture to make. *his is called the ar%ument $rom analo%y to the e4istenceo$ other minds.*he problem &ith this ar%ument is that it seems incredibly &eak. 8s the %reat 8ustrian philosopher ;ud&i% (itt%enstein @>DD?'>?>A dismissiely askedG "8nd ho& can ) %eneralie the
one
case so irresponsiblyH" *he mere $act that in
one
case '' my o&n '' perhaps as luck has it! there is a mental li$e o$ a particular! de$inite kind! associated &ith a brain and a body! seems to be ery $limsy %round $or supposin% that there is ust the same association in all the other cases. )$ ) hae a bo4 and it has a beetle in it! that %ies me only ery poor %rounds $or supposin% that eeryone else &ith a bo4 has a beetle in it as &ell.1erhaps &orse! it %ies me ery poor %rounds $or denyin% that there are beetles any&hereelse than in bo4es. <aybe then thin%s that are ery
different
$rom you and me physically are conscious in ust the &ay that ) amG rocks or $lo&ers! $or e4ample.ou mi%ht be inclined ust to "shru% o$$" the Pombie and <utant possibilities. ou mi%htre$lect that they are pieces o$ philosophical $antasy! unreal or at any rate uneri$iable. Butthat is not an intelli%ent reaction. *he possibilities are indeed uneri$iable. Neurophysiolo%ists! $or instance! cannot $ind conscious e4perience in the &ay they can $ind neurones and synapses and patterns o$ brain actiity '' as &e put it! they cannot display it on the screen to their students in the lecture theatre. But then! on artesian dualism! the possibilities &e all naturally beliee in! namely that other people are
not
Pombies! and
not
<utants! are
themsel)es
uneri$iableL *hey amount to blind articles o$ $aith. Someone holdin% the Pombie possibility is no &orse o$$ than the rest o$ us in that respect.)n $act! i$ our conception o$ mind allo&s the Pombie and <utant possibilities! &e mi%ht een suppose them #uite probable! or at least as probable as anythin% else. For i$ it is not
ad
a priori $alse that other people are Pombies! &hy should it be a priori less probable than that they are conscious like meH(hy do philosophers talk so much about biarre possibilities that other people happily i%nore @one o$ the thin%s that %ies the subect a $orbiddin% look and a bad nameAH *he reason is that the possibilities are used to test a conception o$ ho& thin%s are. 9ere they are bein% used to test the conception o$ mind and matter that %ies rise to them. *he ar%ument is that
if
mind and matter are thou%ht o$ in the artesian &ay!
then
there &ould be &ide'open possibilities o$ a biarre kind! about &hich &e could kno& nothin%. So! since this is intolerable! &e should rethink the conception o$ ho& thin%s are @this is calledthe metaphysicsA. 8 better conception o$ mind and its place in nature should $oreclose these possibilities. *he aim is not to &allo& in scepticism! but to dra& back $rom any philosophy that opens up the sceptical possibilities. (e &ould sayG accordin% to artesian dualism the Pombie possibility and the <utant possibility are both &ide open. But that ust sho&s there is somethin% &ron% about artesian dualism. *he mental and the physical ust aren7t as distinct as it is claimin%. Because it really is
not
possible that @sayA someone &ho has ust stubbed their toe and is ho&lin% &ith pain is doin% so
+ecause
they are in a mental state like that &hich ) %et into by hearin% middle on a clarinet.
That
mental state ust cannot be e4pressed by ho&lin% or %roanin%. *he tie bet&een the intrinsic nature o$ the mental state '' &hat it $eels like '' and its e4pression iscloser than that. (e
'no(
that someone &ho has ust stubbed their toe is
not
ho&lin% because they hae an e4perience ust like the one ) hae &hen ) hear middle on a clarinet. (e kno& that they are e4periencin% somethin% ery like &hat ) e4perience &hen) stub my toe.*he ar%ument $rom analo%y to other minds &as the particular tar%et o$ (itt%enstein. (itt%enstein7s main obection to the "ar%ument $rom analo%y" is not simply that it is so &eak. 9e tries to sho& that i$ you learned about mental eents entirely $rom your o&n case! it &ould not be possible $or you een to think in terms o$ other peoples7 consciousness at all. )t &ould be as i$! &ere ) to drop a brick on your toe! there is simply no pain about '' ) $eel none '' and that is the end o$ it. But since &e
do
think in terms o$ other minds and their e4periences! &e hae to conceptualie them some other &ay.On this account! the &ay $or&ard is to reect the picture o$ mind and body %ien to us by artesian dualism. 8nd &e should be encoura%ed to reect artesian dualism by
metaphysical
as &ell as
epistemological
pressures. an &e really %et a possible picture o$ ho& the &orld is $rom artesian dualism! neer mind about &hether &e kno& it is like thatH onsider the Pombie a%ain. 9is physical $unctionin% is identical &ith ours. 9e responds to the &orld in the same &ay. 9is proects succeed or $ail in the same &ayG his health depends on the same ariables as ours. 9e may lau%h at the ri%ht places! and &eepat appropriate tra%edies. 9e may be %ood $un to be &ith. So &hat is the lack o$ consciousness
doing
Or! puttin% it the other &ay round! &hat is consciousness supposedly
doing
$or usH 8re &e to conclude that in us! non'Pombies! mental eents e4ist but do not
do
anythin%H )s consciousness like the &histle on the en%ineG no part o$ the machinery that makes thin%s happenH @*his is the doctrine kno&n as epiphenomenalism.A But i$ minds do not do anythin%! &hy did they eoleH (hy did nature %o in $or themH 8nd i$ mental states really don7t do anythin%! ho& do they enter memory! $or e4ampleH*his is the problem o$ brain'mind interaction! as it presents itsel$ to artesian dualism.
ad
&OCKE AN( &EIBNI/ AN( 'O(0!'OO( P&EA!URE
*he issue here is beauti$ully summed up in a debate bet&een +ohn ;ocke and his contemporary! the %reat mathematician and philosopher 2ott$ried (ilhelm ;eibni @>6C6'>>6A. ;ocke &as another seenteenth'century thinker &ho &orried about the im' plications o$ the modern scienti$ic ie& o$ the &orld. )n particular! he &orried about the point o$ causation! at &hich the motions o$ particles in the brain %ie rise to ideas! such as those o$ colour! in the mind. )n the $ollo&in% passa%e he is talkin% o$ the &ay in &hich bombardments o$ small atomic particles %ie rise to thin%s like smells! tastes! sounds! and coloursG
5et us suppose at present, that the different motions and figures, bulk, and number of such particles, affecting the several organs of our senses, produce in us those different sensations, which we have from the colours and smells of bodies,
v.g.
that a violet, by the impulse of such insensible particles of matter of peculiar figures, and bulks, and in different degrees and mod'ifications of their motions, causes the ideas of the blue colour, and sweet scent of that flower to be produced in our minds. It being no more impossible, to conceive, that God should annex suchideas to such motions, with which they have no similitude# than that he should annex the idea of pain to the motion
of a piece of steel dividing our flesh, with which that idea hath no resemblance.
;ocke shared the ie& &e hae already met in Ne&ton and escartes! that some causal processes &ere relatiely intelli%ible! notably those in &hich one #uality! like motion! is passed on $rom one particle to another by impact. But the moment o$ body'to'mind causation! in &hich motions in the brain produce somethin% entirely di$$erent! the sensations o$ smell or colour! or pain! &as entirely obscure. )t is ust an amain% $act that the mental eents occur &hen they do. )t is due to &hat ;ocke else&here calls the "ar' bitrary &ill and %ood pleasure" o$ 2od! "the &ise architect" &ho "anne4es" particular modi$ications o$ consciousness to particular physical eents. )n escartes7s terms! ;ocke thinks &e hae no "clear and distinct" idea o$ ust &hat kinds o$ system 2od mi%ht choose as suitable places $or him to superadd consciousness. )t &ould ust be a brute $act that the unierse is or%anied so that some kinds o$ system do! and others do not! possessconsciousness. 8nd it is ust a brute $act that their conciousnesses chan%e and ac#uire de$inite properties at the time that their physical seles chan%e and ac#uire particular properties. *he contrast is bet&een a rational and intelli%ible connection! such as &e $ind in the priori discipline o$ mathematics! and the $act that certain "motions" ust do producethe sensations in us that they do. *his is the brute $act! the conse#uence o$ 2od7s %ood pleasure8ctually ;ocke is not so $ar here $rom the doctrine kno&n as
occasionalism,
&hich &as embraced by another contemporary! Nicolas <alebranche @>63D'>>A. 8ccordin% to this! physical eents do not strictly cause or brin% about mental eents at all. -ather! they proide the occasions upon &hich 2od himsel$ inserts mental eents o$ appropriate kindsinto our bio%raphies. Strictly speakin%! our bodies do not a$$ect our minds! but only pro'ide occasions on &hich 2od does. ;ocke himsel$ does not say this! but &e mi%ht re$lect that there is precious little di$$erence bet&een! on the one hand! 2od interenin% at his
ad
%ood pleasure to make it that the diidin% o$ the $lesh by the steel brin%s about a sensation o$ pain! and! on the other hand! 2od directly inectin% a sensation o$ pain into the soul &heneer there is a diidin% o$ $lesh by the steel. ;ocke7s doctrine deeply upset ;eibni. )n the $ollo&in% passa%e $rom his
$e( Essays,
&hich are a blo&'by'blo& commentary on ;ocke! 1hilalethes is ;ocke7s spokesman! and *heophilus is ;eibni7s. Note the direct #uotation $rom the passa%e $rom ;ocke aboeG
67I5&5%7$. ow, when certain particles strike our organs in various ways they cause in us certain sensations of colours or of tastes, or of other secondary -ualities which have the power to produce those sensations. *It being no more impossible, to conceive, that God should annex such ideas )as that of heat+ to such motions, with which they have no similitude# than that he should annex the idea of pain to the motion of a piece of steel dividing our flesh, with which that idea hath no resemblance.* %7167I58$. It must not be thought that ideas such as those of colour and pain are arbitrary and that between them and their causes there is no relation or natural connection! it is not God0s way to act in such an unruly and unreasoned fashion. I would say, rather, that there is a resemblance of a kind '' not a
perfect one which holds all the way through, but a resemblance in which one thing expresses another through some orderly relationship between them. %hus an ellipse, and even a parabola or hyperbola, has some resemblance to the circle of which it is a projection on a plane, since then there is a certain precise and natural relationship between what is projected and the projection which is made from it, with each point on the one corresponding through a certain relation with a point on the other. %his is something which the 2artesians have overlooked# and on this occasion, sir, you have deferred to them more than is your wont and more than you had grounds for doing. . . It is true that pain does not resemble the movement of a pin# but it might thoroughly resemble the motions which the pin causes in our body, and might represent them in the soul# and I have not the least doubt that it does.
(here ;ocke sees only "2od7s %ood pleasure"! ;eibni seems to be insistin% there must be a rational connection. *he eents in the soul must bear some #uasi'mathematical relationship to the "motions" in the brain and body that brin% them about.(e can put the issue like this. )ma%ine 2od creatin% the unierse. 9o& much does he hae to doH One attractie doctrine &ould be thisG he has to create the physical stu$$ and the la&s o$ physics! and then eerythin% else $ollo&s. On this ie&! by $i4in% the
physical
state o$ the unierse at all times! a creatin% 2od $i4es eerythin% at all times. )$ he had &anted to make a &orld in &hich somethin% &as di$$erent '' say! one in &hich pinpricks &ere not pain$ul '' then he &ould hae to hae tinkered &ith the
physical
$acts so that this did not come about. 9e &ould hae had to $i4 up di$$erent neres and path&ays in the body and brain. *here is no
independent
ariation &hereby the physical could stay the same! but the mental be di$$erent. *his is ;eibni7s position! at least as it appears in this passa%e. @8 di$$erent interpretation o$ ;eibni has him thinkin% that there is independent ariation but 2od has! o$ course! chosen the
+est
&ay o$ associatin% mental and physical eents.A;ocke! on the other hand! thinks that 2od has t&o di$$erent thin%s to do. First! $i4 all the physics and la&s o$ physics. But second! decide ho& to "anne4" mental eents to physical eents! $i4in% up psycho'physical relations. )t is as i$ the &orld has t&o di$$erent bio%raphies! one o$ its physical happenin%s and one o$ its mental happenin%s! and 2od had to decide ho& to relate them. On this account! there could be independent ariation. 2od could hae kept the physics ust the same! but decided not to anne4 pain to pin' pricks.onsider no& a person @yoursel$A and a physical duplicate o$ that person @a t&inA. )$
ad
;ocke is ri%ht! then it is in principle possible that the t&in is a Pombie or a <utant. 8lthou%h his or her physical sel$ is ust like yours! it &ould be an arbitrary e4ercise o$ 2od7s bounty to make their mental li$e similar as &ell. *his is especially obious on the "occasionalist" ersion o$ the ie&G perhaps $or his o&n inscrutable reasons 2od treats my stubbin% my toe as an occasion on &hich to insert pain into my mental bio%raphy! butnot so $or you. On the other hand! i$ ;eibni is ri%ht! there is no such possibility. )$ you and your t&in both stub your toes &ith the same $orce! and react physically in the same &ays! then the "e4pression" o$ the physical eents in your minds must also be the same! ust as the $i%ures proected by t&o identical shapes on a plane at an an%le must be the same.)t is interestin% that ;eibni uses a mathematical analo%y. )t is not ust that he &as an een better mathematician than escartes! and amon%st other thin%s inented the calculus. )t is rather that $or ;eibni the &hole order o$ nature must eentually be transparent to reason. (hen thin%s $all out one &ay or another it is not ust that they happen to do so. *here must be! i$ &e could only see $ar enou%h! a reason &hy they do. *hin%s hae to make sense. (hen ;eibni says 2od does nothin% in an arbitrary or unprincipled &ay he is not really e4pressin% a piece o$ theolo%ical optimism! so much as insistin% that &e ou%ht to be able to see &hy thin%s are one &ay or another. *his is his "principle o$ su$$icient reason". )n escartes7s terms! &e ou%ht to be able to achiee a clear and distinct idea o$ &hy thin%s $all out as they do. (e should be able to %ain insi%htinto &hy the &ay thin%s
are
is the &ay they must be. )t is this con$idence in &hat ou%ht to be possible to reason that makes ;eibni! like escartes! a "rationalist".)n the philosophy o$ mind the ;eibniian must deny the possibility o$ Pombies and <utants. )$ the physical bio%raphy is $i4ed! then the mental bio%raphy is $i4ed thereby. *here is no independent ariation! actual or possible. *he
philosophical pro+lem
is that o$ understandin% &hy this is so. )t is a #uestion o$ ho& to understand the
(ay
in &hich the entire physical story makes true the mental story.;ocke thou%ht he could leae it open &hether it is an immaterial "thin%" @a %hostA &ithin us that does the thinkin%! or &hether it is the physical system itsel$! since 2od can superadd thou%ht to anythin% he likes. But he is abundantly clear that it takes a mind to make a mind. )t takes a special dispensationG thou%ht cannot arise naturally @or! as ;eibni has it! in a rationally e4plicable &ayA $rom matter.
(or unthinking particles of matter, however put together, can have nothing thereby added to them, but a new relation of position, which it is impossible should give thought and knowledge to them.
)t is this kind o$ a priori certainty about &hat can and cannot cause other thin%s that marks ;ocke! like eeryone else o$ his time! as $undamentally a rationalist! albeit one &ho is more nerous about our po&ers o$ reason than escartes and ;eibni.*hinkers about mind and matter hae not %ot much beyond ;ocke and ;eibni. *oday as &ell there are thinkers @sometimes called "ne& mysterians"A &ho think &e shall neer understand the relationship bet&een mind and matter. )t remains as ;ocke le$t it! a rationally ine4plicable matter '' 2od7s %ood pleasure. *here are een philosophers &ho think that some kind o$ artesian dualism is true! and that the mind really is epiphenomenal '' neer causes any physical eents at all. *hey say this because they reco%nie that the physical is a
closed system.
)$ there is a process that be%ins &ith a pin
ad
bein% stuck in you and ends &ith a &ince! then there is an entire physical chain $rom pin to &ince that e4plains the &ince. So! they think! it has to be
false
that you &ince because you are in pain. *his bit o$ common sense has to be %ien up. ou &ince because o$ the physical path&ays! not because o$ a mental add'on. *hese thinkers are in $act stuck &ith the same problem o$ interaction that $aces ;ocke. (e discuss it more in the ne4t chapter.But there are other thinkers &ho think that a rational relationship can be made out. ) shallintroduce t&o broad approaches. *he $irst tries to %ie an "analysis" o$ the mental! in terms that enable us to see it as a ;eibniian e4pression o$ the physical. *he second tries $or a scienti$ic kind o$ reduction or identity o$ the mental to the physical.
ANA&1!I!
8nalysis! as philosophers aim at it! attempts to say &hat makes true some mysterious kinds o$ statement! usin% terms $rom some less mysterious class. 8nalysis is easily illustrated by a homely e4ample. Suppose someone becomes perple4ed by that icon o$ modern (estern li$e! the aera%e man! &ith his 5.C children and >.D automobiles. 9o& can this oke $i%ure be o$ any real interestH *he ans&er is %ien by sho&in% &hat makes true statements couched in terms o$ himG here that! across $amilies! the total number o$ children diided by number o$ pro%enitors is 5.C! and automobiles diided by number o$ o&ners is >.D. *his in$ormation is succinctly presented in terms o$ the aera%e man. 9e is&hat -ussell called a "lo%ical construction" out o$ a%%re%ates o$ $acts. @*his does not mean that all statements about the aera%e are sensible or use$ulG as has been said! the aera%e person has one testicle and one breast.A 1hilosophers also talk o$ a
reduction
o$ statements o$ one kind to those o$ another. 8nalyses proide the reductions.8nalysis tells us &hat is meant by statements made in one $orm o$ &ords! in terms o$ statements made in other &ords. )ts credentials as an intellectual tool hae themseles been the topic o$ a %reat deal o$ philosophical controersy! and its status has aried oer the last hundred years. Some! such as -ussell and 2. E. <oore @>D3'>?DA! thou%ht o$ itas the essential %oal o$ philosophy. ;ater! its prospects &ere #ueried by the leadin% 8merican thinker o$ the mid't&entieth century! (. V. Kuine @>?0D' A! and by others! and their pessimism &as %ien some credibility by the depressin% $act that ery $e& philosophical analyses seemed success$ul. urrently analysis is enoyin% somethin% o$ a cautious reial. But $or our purposes these methodolo%ical #uestions can be set aside. *he point is that i$ &e can analyse mental ascriptions in physical terms! then the ;eibniian dream o$ a rational or a priori &ay o$ seein%
ho(
the physical %ies rise to themental is indicated.;et us take pain as an e4ample o$ a mental state. Suppose no& &e try to analyse &hat it is $or someone to be in pain. (e identi$y pain primarily in terms o$ &hat pain makes us
do
@&hich is also &hat it is
for,
in eolutionary termsA. 1ain makes us do a ariety o$ thin%s. )t demands attention! it causes us to immobilie parts o$ the body! distracts us $rom other thin%s! and o$ course it is unpleasant. Suppose &e can sum these conse#uences in terms o$ tendencies or dispositions to behaiour. *hen the su%%estion is that to be in pain ust is to be disposed in these &ays. *his is the analysis o$ &hat it means! or &hat makes it true! that a person is in pain. *his result &ould be an a priori e4ercise o$ reason! brou%ht about by thinkin% throu%h &hat is really intended by
ad
statements about this kind o$ mental eent. *hen the mystery o$ consciousness disappears. ou and your t&in! since you share dispositions @you eri$iably tend to behae the same &ayA! share your sensations! because this is &hat sensations are.*his doctrine is called lo%ical behaiourism. ) beliee there is somethin% ri%ht about it! but there are certainly di$$iculties. (e mi%ht obect that &e are $amiliar &ith the idea that people can share the same sensation althou%h they react some&hat di$$erently. One can stub one7s
toe one day! and make a $ear$ul $uss about it! but do the same thin%! and $eel the same pain! another day and braely smile and carry on. Behaiour is not a transparent%uide to sensations! thou%hts! or $eelin%s. @*hat is the point o$ the oke about t&o behaiourists in bedG "*hat &as %reat $or you! ho& &as it $or meH"A So! at the ery least! complications must be added. 1erhaps &e could sala%e the analysis in terms o$ dispositions to behaiour by pointin% out that een i$ you braely smile and carry on! youare still in some sense
disposed
to more e4pressie demonstrations o$ pain that you are suppressin% $or one reason or another. )t is almost impossible to suppress tendencies to pain behaiour entirely! and other parties are ery %ood at noticin% the di$$erence bet&een! $or instance! a child &ho has not hurt itsel$! and one &ho has but &ho is bein% brae. )t seems essential to pain that it disposes in this &ay. But een this much is sometimes challen%ed by cases o$ people &ith certain kinds o$ brain dama%e! &ho apparently sincerely say that some pain is still present! but that they don7t mind it any more. (e should notice! ho&eer! that it is #uite hard to make sense o$ that. )$ you %ie yoursel$ a nice sturdy e4ample o$ pain '' touch a hotplate! or s&in% your toe into the &all'' it is ery hard to ima%ine
that
ery mental state &ithout ima%inin% it as incredibly unpleasant. 8nd it is hard to ima%ine it &ithout its tendency to cause typical mani$estations in behaiour.ontemporary thinkers tend not to pin too much $aith on behaiourism o$ this kind. *hey pre$er a sli%htly more elaborate doctrine kno&n as $unctionalism. *his too pays prime attention to the $unction o$ the mental state. But it identi$ies that $unction in a sli%htly more rela4ed &ay. )t allo&s $or a net&ork o$ physical relationshipsG not only dispositionsto behaiour! but typical causes! and een e$$ects on other mental states '' proidin% those in turn become suitably e4pressed in physical dispositions. But the idea is essentially similar.1ain is a mental eent or state that lends itsel$ $airly readily to the proect o$ analysis! $or at least it has a $airly distinctie! natural! e4pression in behaiour. Other states &ith the same kind o$ natural e4pression mi%ht include emotions @sadness! $ear! an%er! and oy all hae typical mani$estations in behaiourA. But other mental states only relate to behaiour ery indirectlyG consider the taste o$ co$$ee! $or e4ample. *o taste co$$ee %ies us a distinctie e4perience. *here is somethin% that it is
li'e
$or us to taste co$$ee @not $or PombiesA. But it doesn7t typically make us do anythin% much. ontemporary thinkers like to put this by sayin% that there are
ualia
or ra& $eels or sensations associated &ith tastin% co$$ee. 8nd $riends o$ #ualia are o$ten $airly %lum about the prospects o$ reducin%#ualia to dispositions in behaiour. 8s $ar as that %oes! they are back &ith ;ocke. 8s it happens! these #ualia are superadded to arious physical eents '' in my case! i$ not in yours '' but it could hae been other&ise. But then scepticism &hether you are Pombies or <utants a%ain threatens.
ad
A !CIENTI.IC *O(E&
One distinction the contemporary debate is $ond o$ makin% is important to notice. So $ar! &e hae presented ;eibni as opposin% the element o$ brute happenstance in ;ocke! in the name o$ a rational #uasi'mathematical relation bet&een mind and body. )t is possible to su%%est that there is a middle routeG one that opposes the happenstance! but does not %o so $ar as a mathematical or rationally transparent relationship. *his is usually put by sayin% that perhaps there is a
metaphysical
identity bet&een mental and physical $acts or eents! but that it is not necessarily one that can be kno&n a priori.8 common analo%y is this. lassical physics identi$ies the temperature o$ a %as &ith the mean kinetic ener%ies o$ the molecules that compose it. So in makin% hot %ases 2od has only
one
thin% to $i4G $i4 the %as and the mean kinetic ener%y o$ its molecules! and this thereby $i4es the temperature. *here is no independent ariation. *here can7t be Pombie or <utant %ases! in &hich the kinetic ener%y o$ the molecules either issues in no temperature at all! or issues in di$$erent temperatures $rom those associated &ith the sameener%y in other %ases.On the other hand it is not
simply
reason or thou%ht or mathematics that enabled scientists to e#uate temperature &ith mean kinetic ener%y. *he breakthrou%h &as not a priori! armchair analysis o$ &hat is meant by temperature! but took e4periment and obseration! and %eneral
theoretical
considerations. *he result &as not purely a priori! but at least mostly a posteriori. *he relation is not one that could be &orked out in adance ust by mathematics or by "clear and distinct ideas"! like the $act that a circle on a tilted plane casts an ellipse.)n %eneral! in science! &hen one theoretical term or property! like temperature! becomes identi$ied &ith another @here mean kinetic ener%y o$ constituent moleculesA! the link is %ien by brid%e principles that are part o$ the theories o$ the sciences in #uestion. So! $or e4ample! the current identi$ication o$ %enes &ith bits o$ N8 happens because in classical biolo%y %enes are de$ined in terms o$ their $unction in makin% characteristics heritable! and no& in molecular biolo%y it turns out that bits o$ N8 are the thin%s that hae that $unction. Notice that analysis is not
entirely
absent. (e hae to kno& &hat %enes are meant to do be$ore the e#uation can be made. But the bi% discoery is the contin%ent! scienti$ic discoery o$ &hat it is that does &hat they are de$ined as doin%.)$ &e modelled our approach to the mind'brain problem on scienti$ic reductions o$ the kind ust described! &e &ould $ind some physical state characteristic o$ people sharin% some mental state. So! $or instance! &e mi%ht $ind that all and only people in pain share some brain state @o$ten indicated a%uely by sayin% that their "'$ibres are $irin%"A. 8nd then it &ould be proposed that this then
is
the state o$ bein% in pain! ust as some bits o$ N8 are %enes. Once a%ain! there &ould be a complete reduction o$ the mental to the physical.*his &ould be &hat is called a psycho'physical identity theory.Opponents sometimes say that you can only beliee this theory at the cost o$ $ei%nin% permanent anaesthesia. *he complaint is that eerythin% distinctiely mental has been le$t out. *he correct rebuttal to this is to ask the challen%er ust &hat he thinks has been le$t out! and &atch him s#uirm on the di$$iculties o$ dualism. But there are other di$$iculties in $ront o$ this kind o$ psycho'physical identity theory. One is that in the case o$ mental eents! one7s o&n consciousness rules! in the $ollo&in% sense. From the
ad
subect7s perspectie! anythin% that $eels like pain is pain. )t doesn7t matter i$ it is '$ibres! or somethin% #uite di$$erent. )$ someone had a mini'transplant! in &hich or%anic '$ibres &ere replaced by somethin% silicon! $or e4ample! then i$ the silicon brin%s aboutthe same results! it is still pain. Our kno&led%e o$ our pain is not hosta%e to the #uestion o$ &hether &e hae '$ibres inside us! or any other particular kind o$ biolo%ical en%ineerin%. *here is a $irst'person authority. E#ually! althou%h &e mi%ht kno& &hether mar%inal candidates $or $eelin% pain! such as perhaps shrimp! do or do not hae '$ibres! &e mi%ht be uncom$ortable in declarin% them to su$$er pain or not purely on that account. So the identity does not seem #uite so strai%ht$or&ard as in other scienti$ic cases @this could be challen%edA.(e &ould be pleased enou%h i$ &e could come to see the relation bet&een mental eents and eents in the brain or body as clearly as &e can see the relation bet&een temperature and mean kinetic ener%y in %ases. 1erhaps it &ould not matter much to us &hether the result &as achieed more by "pure thou%ht"! or more by e4periment. So &e can appreciate ;eibni7s obection to ;ocke &ithout entirely sharin% his rationalism. Still! &hen &e try to think hard about the relationship bet&een brain and body on the one handand mind on the other! it usually seems to be our thinkin% rather than mere scienti$ic i%norance that is lettin% us do&n. -ecently many scientists hae turned their attention to consciousness! and a ariety o$ brain states hae been identi$ied as implicated in normal conscious $unctionin%. For e4ample! electroma%netic &aes in the brain o$ a particular lo& $re#uency hae been thou%ht to be ital. But it is not clear that this kind o$ truth is adapted to solin% the problem '' to enablin% us to side &ith ;eibni a%ainst ;ocke. From the ;ockean point o$ ie&! all the scientist may hae discoered is that
(hen
the brain is in some speci$ic state! &e %et symptoms o$ consciousness. But
that
mi%ht ust tell us &hat consciousness is anne4ed to! by happenstance. )t does not make the combination intelli%ible. 8nd it also presupposes a ri%ht to shoe the Pombie and <utant possibilities out o$ si%ht! $or other&ise the scientist could neer establish the correlation! e4cept at best in his or her o&n case. But accordin% to ne& mysterians! neither science nor philosophy &ill eer %et us to a point &here thin%s are better. (e &ill neer be able to side &holeheartedly &ith ;eibni a%ainst ;ocke.
IN)ERTE( !PECTRA: PRI)ATE &AN'UA'E!
*he case o$ colour o$ten seems especially to open &ide the possibility at least o$ <utants'' people physically identical &ho neertheless perceie colours #uite di$$erently. *here mi%ht een be <utants &hose colour spectra are completely inerted &ith respect to eachother! so that the e4perience one %ets $rom li%ht at the red end o$ the spectrum is the erye4perience that the other %et $rom li%ht at the blue end. 8nd there &ould be nothin% to tell them that this is so.artesian dualism opens the possibility o$ Pombies and <utants. But perhaps it also opens an een more $ri%htenin% possibility. )$ &e think in the dualist &ay! &e are apt to $eel secure that at least &e kno& &hat our
o(n
e4perience is like. *he minds o$ others may be a bit conectural! but our o&n minds are &ell kno&n to us. But is een this trueH onsider no& not the minds o$ others! but
your o(n past experience.
8re you sure that
ad
the &orld looks to you today the same colour as it looked yesterdayH 8re you in $act sure that it looked any colour yesterday '' in other &ords! that you actually receied the conscious e4perience that you remember yoursel$ as hain% hadHBy askin% these #uestions you are applyin% the Pombie and <utant possibilities to your o&n past. No& o$ course! at $irst si%ht the possibilities are een more outlandish and absurd than applied to other minds. 8nd &e are inclined to retort that o$ course &e kno& per$ectly &ell that colours looked much the same yesterday as they do today. (e &ould surely notice it i$ &e &oke up and the sky no& looked like %rass did yesterday! and ice ersa.) a%ree o$ course that &e
(ould
notice the chan%e. But is this security %uaranteed! %ien artesian dualismH )t depends on &hat &e think about memory and mental eents. (hy should &e be sure that mental eents '' thou%ht o$ as entirely distinct! remember! $rom anythin% physical '' leae reliable traces in memoryH ) can
chec'
that my memory o$ the physical &orld is reliable enou%h. ) remember puttin% the car in the %ara%e! and lo and behold! &hen ) %o do&n! there it is. ) remember the &ay to the kitchen! and lo and behold! %et there &ithout any e$$ort or any mistake. But &hat &ould check that my memory o$ the mental &orld is accurateH )n ;ocke7s terms! &hy should it not be "2od7s %ood pleasure" to anne4 certain mental modi$ications to me today! to%ether &ith the delu'sie memory that similar ones &ere anne4ed to me yesterdayH (itt%enstein saidG
&lways get rid of the idea of the private object in this way! assume that it constantly changes, but that you do not notice the change because your memory constantly deceives you.
*his is the heart o$ the 7anti'priate'lan%ua%e7 ar%ument in his
Philosophical In)estigations
@published posthumously in >?3A! one o$ the most celebrated ar%uments o$ t&entieth'century philosophy. (itt%enstein tried to sho& that there could be no si%ni$icant
thought
about the nature o$ one7s past @or $utureA mental li$e i$ that mental li$e is diorced $rom the physical &orld in the &ay that artesian dualism proposes. )t becomes! as it &ere! too slippery or %hostly een to be an obect o$ our o&n memories or intentions.*he <utant and Pombie possibilities! applied to our o&n pasts! are certainly unnerin%. But really they ou%ht only to unnere us about the dualist picture. Once more! can &e recoil $rom ;ocke to some ersion o$ ;eibniH ;eibni! remember! &ants there to be a "rational" relationship bet&een the physical and the mental! so that the mental eent o$ seein% a colour is some kind o$ rational
expression
o$ &hat is %oin% on physically! not an accidental anne4ation to it. 9o& could this &ork in the case o$ coloursH *he ;eibniian idea is that i$ ) and my t&in @&hich no& mi%ht be mysel$ as ) &as yesterdayA are $unctionin% physically in the same &ay! then there is no possibility that our mental lies are di$$erent. 9o& can &e $lesh out this su%%estionH 9ere is a sketch o$ an ans&er.<any o$ the physical chan%es underlyin% colour perception are $airly &ell understood. olour perception is the result o$ the stimulation o$ the cones that pack the central part o$ the retina. *he current best theory su%%ests that there are three di$$erent kinds o$ cone! ;! <! and S @lon%! medium! and shortA. ; cones "spike" or send messa%es do&n the optic nere more readily &hen li%ht o$ lon%er &aelen%th hits them! < cones %et e4cited more &hen li%ht o$ medium &aelen%th does! and S cones &hen li%ht o$ shorter &aelen%th does. *he colour &e perceie then depends in the $irst place on a comparison bet&een the leels o$ e4citation o$ these three kinds o$ cone. So! $or instance! i$ S is much more
ad
e4cited than ; this codes $or blue! the colour at the short &aelen%th end o$ the spectrum.)$ ; is much more e4cited than S! this codes $or yello&. )$ ; is more e4cited than < &e %et red! and i$ < is more e4cited than ;! &e %et %reen. )t is as i$ the channels are "opponents" and the result depends on &hich o$ the opponents oercomes the other. No& consider the $act that colours hae a lot o$ interestin% properties. 9ere are someG you cannot hae a sur$ace that is yello&y blue. ou can7t hae one that is reddish %reen. ou can on the other hand hae sur$aces that are bluish %reen! or yello&ish red @oran%eA. ou can7t hae a bri%ht bro&n. ou cannot hae a bri%ht %rey @it is di$$icult to ima%ine a %rey $lame or a bro&n $lameA. ello& is a li%hter colour than iolet. ou can hae a transparent red or blue or %reen %em! but you cannot hae a transparent &hite %em '' the nearest &ould be a milky &hite! like an opal. ou can hae &hite li%ht! but not black li%ht.8ll these mi%ht seem to be brute $acts about the artesian realm o$ the mind! &here colours are supposed to hold their residence. But &e can be%in to see them as e4pressionso$ arious physical $acts. (e can7t see a sur$ace as yello&y blue! because yello& and blueare produced by mathematical oppositesG &e %et yello& &hen ; Q S! and blue &hen S Q ;. Similarly $or red and %reen. (e cannot hae bri%ht bro&n! because bro&n is darkened yello&. 8 sur$ace is seen as bro&n &hen it &ould be coded $or yello&! e4cept that there is only a lo& oerall ener%y leel compared &ith that o$ other sources o$ li%ht in the conte4t. Similarly $or %rey! &hich is darkened &hite. ello& is li%hter than iolet becauseyello& li%ht @; Q SA is also nearer the $re#uency at &hich our isual systems are ma4i'mally responsie. By comparison both red at one end and blue at the other end o$ the isual spectrum are takin% us to&ards the dark! &here &e cannot respond at all. ou cannot hae transparent &hite because somethin% is only seen as &hite &hen it scatters li%ht.8ll this o$ course only scratches the sur$ace o$ colour science. But it %ies us a %limmerin% at least o$ the &ay in &hich thin%s "make sense". (ith enou%h $acts o$ this kind in $ront o$ us &e mi%ht be less enchanted by the inerted spectrum possibility. ;et us take $irst the simpler case o$ monochromatic @black'and'&hiteA ision. Suppose it is su%%ested that someone mi%ht be a physical duplicate o$ me! but see as dark &hat ) see asli%ht! and ice ersa. )s that possibleH Our snap ud%ement mi%ht be that it is. 1erhaps &eima%ine the &orld appearin% to him as it appears in a photo%raphic ne%atie. But this does not really &ork. )$ ) make a piece o$ %rey %lass li%hter! ) see better throu%h itI i$ ) make it darker! ) see less &ell throu%h it. Since he is a physical duplicate! this has to be true o$ my t&in. But $or him! &hen &e clear the %lass it "seems" as thou%h &e added soot! since it becomes subectiely darker. 8nd &hen &e add soot it "seems" as thou%h it is becomin% clearer. But then &e hae to ima%ine that $or him! as a plate o$ %lass becomes darker he sees throu%h it better and better! and as it becomes li%hter he sees throu%h it &orse and &orse. 8nd that ust doesn7t seem to make sense. )t doesn7t mark a coherent possibility. No& consider someone &ho is physically identical &ith me! but supposedly sees yello& as ) see blue! and ice ersa. )t is no& not #uite so easy to ima%ine him. 9e has to respond in the same &ay as ) do! so he cannot %o round sayin% that yello& is a dark colour! $or e4ample. *hat di$$erence in response and behaiour &ould be a physical di$$erence. So &e hae to ask
ho(
he sees blue as bri%ht! and yello& as dark. )$ he really sees yello& as dark! as ) see blue! ho& does he see bro&nH 9o& does he see oran%eH
ad
Bro&n is darkened yello&! but $or him yello& is already dark. So it is di$$icult to ima%ineho& his physical discriminations could match mine! %ien this complete disparity in mental e4perience.)n short! the possibility becomes a %ood deal less clear! and &e may $eel our &ay to denyin% that it is a possibility at all. (e &ould be en%ineerin% a conception o$ the mind that closes the %ap bet&een the physical and the mental! that is! bet&een the $ully $unc'tionin% and responsie isual system in the brain and the apparently superadded "subectie" #ualia o$ colour e4perience. Such a piece o$ en%ineerin% &ould be a indication o$ ;eibni7s position. Subectie colour e4perience becomes not ust a #ueer addon! but the ineitable! rationally e4plicable!
expression
o$ the kinds o$ physical $unctionin% o$ the creatures that &e are. )$ the same can be done $or all the elements o$ our consciousness! the problem is soled.
THOU'HT
(e no& turn to a sli%htly di$$erent aspect o$ consciousness. *his chapter has concentrated upon sensations and #ualia. But our consciousness is also lar%ely made up o$ thou%hts. *hou%hts are stran%e thin%s. *hey hae "representational" po&ersG a thou%httypically represents the &orld as bein% one &ay or another. 8 sensation! by contrast! seems to ust sit there. )t doesn7t! on the $ace o$ it! point to&ards anythin% beyond itsel$! such as a $act or putatie $act. @Some thinkers deny this. *hey think! $or instance! that a sensation o$ pain is a perception o$ bodily inury! and that this perception represents the body as inured! ust as the thou%ht that tomorro& is Friday represents tomorro& as bein%Friday. ) leae the reader to ponder ho& plausible this is.A *he representatie nature o$ thou%hts! sometimes called their intentionality or directedness! is itsel$ hi%hly pulin%. )$ &e ima%ine thou%hts as kinds o$ "thin%" present in consciousness! the #uestion becomes ho& a "thin%" can in and o$ itsel$ point to&ards another thin% @a $act or state o$ a$$airsA. ertainly a si%npost! $or instance! can point to&ards a illa%e. But that seems to be a matter o$ the &ay it is taken. 8 si%npost doesn7t in and o$ itsel$ represent the &ay to the illa%e. (e hae to learn ho& to take it. (e could ima%ine a culture in &hich the same physical obect! &hich is to us a si%npost! had a #uite di$$erent $unctionG a display board! or a totem! or a piece o$ abstract art. (e see this &ith animalsG &hen you point at somethin%! do%s typically pay attention only to the pointin% $in%er! to their o&ners7 irritation. (hereas it seems incoherent to ima%ine a creature &ith the same
thoughts
as us! but &ho hasn7t learned to take those thou%hts in the &ay that &e do. )t is the "take" that
ma'es
the thou%ht.1robably the ri%ht reaction to this is to deny that thou%hts are thin%s at all. *he mistake o$ supposin% that to eery noun there corresponds a "thin%" is sometimes called the mistake o$
reification.
*hinkers $re#uently char%e one another &ith mistaken rei$ications.)t is people &ho think! and their doin% so is not the matter o$ some kind o$ blob bein% present either in the brain or the mind. *his is true een i$ the blob is thou%ht o$ as a small sentence &ritten in the brain. *hinkin% is a matter o$ takin% the &orld to be one &ay or another! and so takin% it is a matter o$ our dispositions rather than a matter o$ &hat thin%s are han%in% out inside us.1erhaps it ou%ht to be no more pulin% that &e can think about absent states o$ a$$airs ''
ad
distant states! and past and $uture states '' than that &e can pay attention to the &orld at all. et it is a $eat that sets us apart $rom other animals. 8nimals can presumably perceiethe &orld! but &e are nerous about supposin% that they can represent to themseles distant and past and $uture states o$ a$$airs. et &e can certainly do so.*he most popular current approach to this is to concentrate upon the &ay in &hich &e can attribute thou%hts to the &ell'$unctionin% person. )t should be somethin% about a person7s behaiour that enables us to interpret him or her as thinkin% about yesterday! or concentratin% upon the &eather predicted $or the &eekend. *hou%hts are e4pressed in both lin%uistic and non'lin%uistic behaiour! and perhaps &e can hope $or some kind o$ reductionG ", thinks that
p0
i$ and only i$ ,7s plans or desires or behaiour are
someho( in line
&ith the &orld bein% such that
p.
*he trick &ould be to $ill out the "someho& in line". )t is $air to say that nobody has success$ully done that. But there are su%%estions about ho& to %o. (e say that an intelli%ent system! such as a %uided missile! thinks that there is a plane a mile a&ay and t&o hundred $eet up i$ its systems point it in a direction that is
appropriate
to there bein% a plane in that place '' %ien its aim @or $unctionA o$ brin%in% do&n planes. Similarly &e mi%ht say o$ a person that she thinks the &eather &ill be $ine at the &eekend i$ her behaiour is appropriate! %ien her aims @or $unctionsA! to that bein% the &eather at the &eekend. *he di$$iculty &ould be to $ill out this thou%ht &ithout relyin% in other &ays on other mental states o$ the subect! and this is &hat nobody kno&s ho& to do.) leae thinkin% aside $or the moment. )nstead! in the ne4t t&o chapters ) consider t&o more elements in our ie& o$ the &orld that also nourish artesian dualism. *he $irst is aran%e o$ thou%hts about our o&n $reedom. *he second is a ran%e o$ thou%hts about our o&n identity.
Cha"ter Three.ree Wi$$
&gain, if movement always is connected,ew 9otions coming in from old in order fixed,If atoms never swerve and make beginning 1f motions that can break the bonds of fate &nd foil the infinite chain of cause and effect /hat is the origin of this free will 6ossessed by living creatures throughout the earth?
4ucretius,
De :erum atura
O
-
!
)N
8
S;)29*;
;ESS
eleated toneG
There (as a young man (ho said, 0Damn, It is +orne upon me that I am
A creature that mo)es
ad
In predestinate groo)es && $ot e)en a +us, +ut a tram.1
*he last chapter had us thinkin% about &hat the brain producesG elements o$ consciousness such as thou%hts! or sensations! or #ualia. But &hen &e think about ourseles! &e are conscious o$ other thin%s as &ell. (e don7t only re%ister the &orld! as &e take it to be. (e act in it. (e concentrate on alternaties. (e deliberate and do thin%s.(e take control. 9o& should &e think about thatH
THE BON(! O. .ATE
(e usually re%ard ourseles as $ree a%ents. (e lie our lies &ithin an open space o$ possibilities. (e deliberate &hich ones to pursue! and hain% deliberated! &e choose. ) &ent to the mountains this year $or a holiday! but ) could hae %one the seaside. )t &as my choice. ) could not hae %one to the <oon! because it &as not $easible.(e seem to be conscious o$ our $reedom. onsciousness o$ $reedom seems closely allied to any kind o$ consciousness at all. (hen &e thou%ht o$ Pombies in the last chapter! &e probably ima%ined erky! robotic! Frankenstein creations! slaes to particular pro%rams! actin% in$le4ibly and unintelli%ently. But &e are not like that! are &eHSometimes &e are proud o$ our $reedomG &e are not mere creatures o$ instinct and desire.(e can pull ourseles to%ether and $i%ht to control our obsessions or addictions. (e desere praise &hen &e succeed. )$ &e $ail! &e may desere and sometimes receie punishment. Freedom brin%s responsibility! and people &ho abuse it desere blame and punishment. But nobody deseres punishment $or $ailin% to do somethin% i$ they
could not do it
. )t &ould be most unust to punish me $or not hain% %one to the <oon! or to punish a man in prison $or not keepin% an appointment outside the prison! $or e4ample. 9ere the obstacles are beyond the a%ent7s control. *hat means! he or she is not to blame.So our moral reactions as &ell as our ordinary thinkin% seem to presuppose that sometimes! een i$ &e acted badly! &e could hae done other&ise.But mi%ht this consciousness o$ $reedom be an illusionH ould &e eer really hae acted other&ise than &e didH;ucretius and the youn% man at the be%innin% o$ the chapter can be %ien an ar%umentG
The past controls the present and future.5ou can-t control the past. #lso, you can-t control the way the past controls the present and future.So, you can-t control the present and future.
)n $act! you can7t control anythin% at all! past! present! or $uture.*he $irst premise o$ this ar%ument is a thumbnail ersion o$ the doctrine kno&n as determinism! &hich can be put by sayin% that eery eent is the upshot o$ antecedent causes. *he state o$ the &orld at any moment is the result o$ its state immediately be$ore! and eoles $rom that precedin% state in accordance &ith unchan%in% la&s o$ nature. *hesecond premise looks certain. *he third reminds us that &e cannot control the la&s o$ nature '' the &ays in &hich eents %ie rise to one another. 8nd the conclusion certainly looks to $ollo&.
ad
1eople &ho accept this ar%ument are called
hard
determinists! or
incompati+ilists,
since they think that $reedom and determinism are incompatible.1erhaps to restore human $reedom &e should deny determinismH (e mi%ht be optimistic about doin% this! because the best current science o$ nature! #uantum physics! is standardly interpreted as postulatin% uncaused eents. )n the #uantum &orld! there are microphysical eents that "ust happen". On these interpretations one system can be in
exactly
the same state as another '' there are no "hidden ariables" '' and yet in one system a #uantum eent occurs! and in the other it does not. Such eents hae no causeG they ust happen! or do not happen. Kuantum physics %ies them a probability! but cannot determine! $rom the state o$ play at one moment! &hether such an eent &ill happen or not in the immediate $uture.But this is not #uite &hat &e &antedG it is introducin% an element o$
randomness
into thin%s! but not an element o$ control or responsibility. *o see this! think o$ the $ull neurophysiolo%ical state o$ your brain and body. Eents $ollo& their causes. )$ sometimeslittle $its and starts occur at a micro leel you can hardly be held responsible $or any di$$erences that do arise $rom the $its and starts. ou can7t control electron umps. )$ they are %enuinely indeterministic!
nothing
can control them. )t is ust as much bad luck i$ one umps the &ron% &ay! as i$ your %ood intentions &ere $rustrated by outside accidents beyond your control. 1uttin% the accident into your brain does not restore your responsibility.)$ anythin%! physical indeterminism makes responsibility and the ustice o$ blame een more elusie. *his is sometimes called the dilemma o$ determinism. )$ determinism holds! &e lose $reedom and responsibility. )$ determinism does not hold! but some eents"ust happen"! and then! e#ually! &e lose $reedom and responsibility. hance is as relentless as necessity.
.I' TREE! AN( WATER.A&&!
)n the 2ospel accordin% to <ark! >>G>5'>C! 50'>! there is a stran%e storyG
&nd on the morrow, when they were coming from "ethany, he was hungry. &nd seeing a fig tree far off, having leaves, he came, if haply he might find any thing thereon# and when he came to it he found nothing but leaves# for the time of figs was not yet. &nd ;esus answered and said unto it, o man eat fruit of thee hereafter for ever. &nd his disciples heard it. . . &nd in the morning, as they passed by, they saw the fig tree dried up from the roots. &nd 6eter calling to remembrance, saith unto him, 9aster, behold, the fig tree that thou cursedst is withered away.
;et us i%nore the disturbin% social! economic! and ecolo%ical problems &ith this story! and concentrate on the apparent inustice to the $i% tree. )t is true that +esus did not curse the $i% tree $or not bearin%! say! apples! or plums. )t &as $i%s he &as a$ter. 8nd $i% trees do sometimes bear $i%s. But it still seems un$air on the $i% tree. )t is as i$ +esus is ar%uin% "ou sometimes bear $i%s! so you could be bearin% $i%s no&". *o &hich is seems a completely ade#uate de$ence $or the $i% tree to point out that it bears $i%s in the summer! but it is no& &inter! or at any rate "the time o$ $i%s &as not yet". )t takes a certain set o$ circumstances $or a $i% tree to bear $i%sG een the best tree does not do so out o$ season!
ad
any more than it bears plums.*he $i% tree mi%ht not be a&are o$ this. 1erhaps i$ it &as a thou%ht$ul $i% tree it &ould hae $elt bad because it &as itsel$ una&are o$ the precise causes necessary $or it to bear $i%sG perhaps it only remembers that it sometimes does so! and then $eels bad about not doin% so on this occasion. But that is ust i%norance. )$ the $i% tree $eels bad about not bearin% $i%s in &inter! then that is irrationalG the time &as not ri%ht! that is all.ou mi%ht think like our ima%ined $i% treeG ) ust kno& that ) am $ree. ) stand here! able to raise my arm or not! ust as ) please. Suppose ) do it '' thus '' then ) hae $elt mysel$ controllin% the &ay eents un$olded. <y
consciousness
reeals my $reedom to me.But here is the 2erman philosopher Schopenhauer @>DD'>D60AG
5et us imagine a man who, while standing on the street, would say to himself! *It is six o0clock in the evening, the working day is over. ow I can go for a walk, or I can go to the club# I can also climb up the tower to see the sun set# I can go to the theater# I can visit this friend or that one# indeed, I also can run out of the gate, into the wide world, and never return. &ll of this is strictly up to me, in this I have complete freedom. "ut still I shall do none of these things now, but with just as free a will I shall go home to my wife.* %his is exactly as if water spoke to itself! *I can make high waves 3yes< in the sea during a storm4, I can rush down hill 3yes< in the river bed4, I can plunge down foaming and gushing 3yes< in the waterfall4, I can rise freely as a stream of water into the air 3yes< in the fountain4, I can, finally, boil away and disappear 3yes< at certain temperature4# but I am doing none of these things now,
and am voluntarily remaining -uiet and clear water in the reflecting pond.*
)n this parable! the &ater is not conscious o$ the causal setups necessary $or it to boil! make &aes! and so on. )t only remembers that it
sometimes
does these thin%s. 9ence! it thinks! it can do them. So it attributes its calm to its o&n oluntary decision. But in this itis mistakenG i$ it "tries" to boil &hen the temperature is &ron%! or "tries" to make &aes &hen there is no &ind! it &ill soon discoer that these thin%s do not depend on its o&n decision. *o make the same point! (itt%enstein ima%ines the lea$ $allin% in the autumn &inds! and sayin% to itsel$! "No& )7ll %o this &ay! no& )7ll %o that."Schopenhauer denies that our o&n sel$'understandin%! our sel$'consciousness! displays our real $reedom. (e can interpret him as criticiin% this ar%umentG
I am not conscious of the causal background needed for me to do 5.I know I sometimes do 5.
$o
, I am conscious that there is no causal background needed for me to do 5.
9is point is that this ar%ument is inalid. Bein%
unconscious of something
cannot be parlayed into bein%
conscious of its a+sence.
(hen ) speak ) am not conscious o$ the incredible causal structures that make it possible $or me to speakG the musculature! the coordination o$ muscle and breath control! the moement o$ the ton%ue and palate! the con$i%urin% o$ my a&. But all these thin%s are necessary! as ) &ould #uickly discoer i$ ust one o$ them &ent &ron%.8t this point one mi%ht start thinkin% somethin% like thisG
erhaps if we confine our thoughts to the physical world, we seem to have no option but determinism or random indeterminacies, and we lose sight of real freedom. $ut suppose there is another level. $ehind or above the evolutions of brain and body, there is the 6eal %e, receiving information, and occasionally directing operations. There will be times when left to themselves the brain and body would move one way. $ut with direction from the 6eal %e, they will go the
ad
other way. I can take over, and interfere with the way things would otherwise have gone. This is where my freedom lies.
*his conceptualies the relationship bet&een me on the one hand and my brain and body on the other in terms o$ a t&o'&ay interaction. *he brain and body brin% the -eal <e messa%es! and this -eal <e then issues them instructions. *he -eal <e sits in the controlroom! and the &hole person behaes $reely &hen it is in command. )$ it is not in command! the brain and body %et on &ith their @"mindless"A physical eolutions.*his is mind'body dualism a%ain. *he -eal ou dictates eents. <essa%es come in! perhaps throu%h the pineal %land. 8 breath o$ soul then $ans neurones and synapses into action! and initiate ne& causal chains. *here is a %host in the machine! and the machine behaes $reely &hen the %host is in char%e. No&! &e hae already seen somethin% o$ the mystery o$ mind'brain interaction on this picture. But here &e can raise a di$$erent obection. ualism tries to understand human $reedom by introducin% an e4tra in%redient! the controllin% soul. But ho& do &e understand the $reedom o$ the soulH;ook a%ain at the dilemma o$ determinism. 9o& does a %host or soul inside the machine escape the same problemH 8re there la&s %oernin% ho& %host'stu$$ behaes! so that i$ a %host is in one state at a particular time! there is a la& determinin% &hat its ne4t state &ill beH )$ not! then is %host'stu$$ subect to random $its and startsH 9o& does that help
me
to.be $ree and responsibleH -emember as &ell that there is no 2od'%ien correlation bet&een an eent bein% "mental" and the eent bein% under my $ree controlG ) cannot &ish a&ay pains! desires! obsessions! un&elcome thou%hts! and con$usions! ust like that.*he dualist approach to $ree &ill makes a $undamental philosophical mistake. )t sees a problem and tries to sole it by thro&in% another kind o$ "thin%" into the arena. But it $or%ets to ask ho& the ne& "thin%" escapes the problems that beset ordinary thin%s. (e meet this kind o$ mistake a%ain in hapter ! on the philosophy o$ reli%ion. )n $act! i$ youthink about it! you &ill $ind that you surreptitiously think o$ the $reedom o$ any non' physical soul! any %host in the machine!
on the model of human freedom.
*hat is! $ar $rom helpin% to understand human $reedom! the idea depends upon it. For the %host is really a kind o$ ethereal little human bein%! a "homunculus" that takes in in$ormation! deliberates! &ants arious thin%s! is s&ayed or in$luenced or %uided by di$$erent pieces o$ in$ormation! and that in the li%ht o$ all that does somethin%. )$ &e cannot understand ho&human bein%s are $ree! &e cannot understand ho& such a homunculus can be $ree either.8nd o$ course there is the &hole problem o$ mind'brain interaction! &hich is so intractable %ien artesian dualism. *he physical system is a
closed
system. )t takes a physical cause to produce a physical e$$ect.*o try to reconcile $reedom &ith a deterministic unierse composed o$ small! hard! indiisible atoms in motion! the 2reek philosopher Epicurus @3C>'50 BA had already su%%ested that the spirit o$ a person could step in and make the atoms "s&ere" in di'rection. )n $act! ;ucretius! &ho is interpretin% Epicurus in the passa%e at the be%innin% o$ the chapter! %oes on to talk o$ a minute s&erin% o$ the atoms! and the &ay in &hich "that M&hich the minute s&erin% o$ the atoms causes is neither place nor time de'terminate". n$ortunately! the la&s o$ motion are not ery hospitable to this "s&ere". *he la&s that &e actually $ind tell us that linear momentum! a oint $unction o$ motion
and
direction! is physically consered. )t &ould shatter the la&s o$ motion ust as badly i$ the -eal <e could make the <oon chan%e direction by ust thinkin%! as i$ the -eal <e could make it speed up or slo& do&n.
ad
8s an aside! it is &orth noticin%! ho&eer! that the 2reek and -oman atomists! includin% Epicurus and ;ucretius! &ere better o$$ in one respect than escartes. For they thou%ht! as he did not! that the spirit itsel$ must be understood in
mechanical terms.
*he mind or spirit! they held! &as composed o$ particularly $ine! small! and e4ceedin%ly mobile mechanical particles! so there is no reason in principle &hy these should not in$luence the directions and elocities o$ the lar%er particles o$ the body. ;ucretius e4plains the &ay in &hich this subtle stu$$ is "o$ seeds e4tremely small! throu%h eins! $lesh! sine&s! &oen". *he soul has to be made o$ thin stu$$! $or "dreams o$ smoke and mist can moe it". Such dreams are presumably made o$ much smaller particles than een smoke and mist themseles. But ;ucretius un$ortunately $ails to reisit the #uestion o$ ho& the motions o$ een tiny particles can break the bonds o$ $ate and $oil the in$inite chain o$ cause and e$$ect. 8ncient atomists liked to compare the action o$ the soul on the body &ith the action o$ the &ind on a ship! but o$ course the &ind is part o$ the in$inite chain o$ cause and e$$ect. )t is not somethin% standin% outside it! and neither! on this model! is the soul.
PU&&IN' 1OUR!E&. TO'ETHER
)s there any better &ay o$ breakin% the ar%ument $or incompatibilismH*he ar%ument $or hard determinism does not talk o$ the
'inds
o$ causal in$luences in playas an a%ent per$orms a %ien action. No& sometimes the causal routes are totally independent o$ &hat &e think. *he causal route that leads $rom my bein% irreersibly under &ater to my dro&nin% is one o$ them. *he same outcome is ineitable $or Einstein and $or a donkey. But sometimes the causal routes only %o ia hi%h'leel neural processes. *his is no more than to say that &e o$ten moe as &e do because our brains are $unctionin% properly.So let us try a primitie model. *hink o$ the brain in "so$t&are" terms! as hain% arious "modules". One @a "scanner"A takes in in$ormation about a situation. 8nother @a "tree producer"A deliers options $or behaiour in the li%ht o$ &hat the scanner says. 8 third @an "ealuator"A ranks the options in the li%ht o$ concerns that it has pro%rammed into it. )t may &ork by attachin% emotional indicators such as $ear or oy to the di$$erent paths. Finally a $ourth @a "producer"A $i4es on the option ranked best by the precedin% processes! and outputs neural si%nals that moe muscles and limbs. 9ere is a schematic dia%ramG
= scanner = tree producer = evaluator = producer =
-emember that all this is supposed to be ust a "so$t&are" description o$ parts o$ the brain. No& suppose a decision is the upshot o$ these modules $unctionin%. Suppose it is one o$ your decisions! and these parts $unction to produce it in the &ay that they normally do. )$ &e call these modules! "decision" modules! and i$ these modules are en%a%ed in producin% the output! then &e can say that
you
chose the output. )t &as not $orced on you! in the &ay that dro&nin% is $orced on the trapped s&immer.Suppose the decision &as to do somethin% really bad. ou come into my room! and chuck my peaceable old do% out o$ the &indo&. ) am outra%ed! and minded to blame you. Suppose you try to de$end yoursel$ by inokin% the incompatibilist ar%ument.
ad
4ook, this action was the result of the way my scanner7producer system had been !set!. erhaps events in my childhood, &uite outside my control, !set it! so that making the environment dog1freehas for me the highest priority. %y tree producer told me it was an option, after my scanner had told me that there was a dog present and a window nearby. %y evaluator immediately selected that option, and my producer smoothly initiated the action of chucking the dog out of the window. Why blame me8
Surely ) am not likely to be ery impressed. ) mi%ht reply somethin% like thisG
I am not all that interested in how you came to be !set! like you are. What bothers me is that this is your set. I don-t care how it came to be your set, or what deterministic forces brought you to have these systems set that way. #ll I am concerned about is that now, at the end of the day, you are a nasty piece of work, and I am going to thump you. %aybe it was indeed bad luck your getting to be like you are. #nd now it is doubly bad luck, because you are going to get thumped for it.
8t least ) hae the consolation that! $ollo&in% your o&n ar%ument! you cannot blame me $or thumpin% youL )t7s ust the &ay ) am setG ) react badly to people &ho do this to my peaceable old do%.*humpin% you may hae a point '' in $act! seeral points. )t mi%ht readust your ealuator. Ne4t time round! this module may rank thro&in% the do% out o$ the &indo& belo& puttin% up &ith its presence. )n a more comple4 picture! &e could ima%ine this happenin% by means o$ a number o$ other mechanismsG perhaps it attaches a risk'o$' bein%'thumped $la% to the do%'thro&in% option. Or perhaps my an%er shocks you into a more %eneral re'ealuation o$ strate%ies o$ behaiour. 8nd een i$ thumpin% you does notsucceed in chan%in% you! it sends a si%nal to other &ould'be do%'chuckers. )t also reliees my $eelin%s.*his is di$$erent $rom blamin% someone $or dro&nin%! &hile not blamin% him or her $or bein% trapped in the &ater. *he causal route there lies throu%h basic animal physiolo%y that cannot be altered by education or the attitudes o$ others. 1raise and blame cannot "reset" it. *he causal route does not lie throu%h modules that are
elastic,
or $le4ible! capable o$ bein% reset by an%er or blame. But do%'thro&ers can be deterred and chan%ed and &arned a&ay.Schoolteachers sometimes say thin%s like thisG ") don7t mind a stupid pupil! but ) do dislike a lay one." )n the %rip o$ the hard determinist ar%ument! you mi%ht think that thisis ust preudiceG some people are born stupid and pitied $or itI &hy should those born lay not be similarly pitied $or thatH )t is ust tou%h luck! either &ay. But the schoolteacher7s attitude &ill hae a point i$ lainess responds to incenties in a &ay that stupidity does not. )$ respect $or the teacher7s opinion can make you &ork harder! &hereas it cannot make you smarter! then there is one usti$ication $or the asymmetry. *he teacher is in the business o$ resettin% your ealuatin% module. )t is an empirical $act! a $act to be learned $rom human e4perience! ho& $ar modules do %et reset by interactions&ith others! includin% the unpleasant ones in &hich the others display their an%er or contempt $or us.(e hae here the be%innin% '' but only the be%innin% '' o$ the pro%ramme o$
compati+ilism,
or the attempt to sho& that! properly understood! there is no inconsistency bet&een ackno&led%in% determinism and our practices o$ holdin% people responsible $or
ad
their actions. ompatibilism is sometimes called "so$t" determinism! in opposition to "hard" determinism. *his is not a ery %ood label $or t&o reasons. First! it is not really a di$$erent kind o$ determinism. )t accepts determinism in ust the same sense as anybody else. *here is no %hostly po&er steppin% in to inter$ere &ith the natural causal order o$ eents. Second! in moral or political terms! the "so$t" determinist may actually be pretty hard! in the sense o$ harsh. )$ you come to her &ith the heartrendin% e4cuse that your biolo%y or your enironment made you the &ay you are! she turns dea$! and ents her an%er on you ust the same. Not $or her the $acile e#uation bet&een crime and illnessG people can pull their socks up! and i$ it seems appropriate! she &ill use punishment or any other appropriate reaction to make you do so too.O$ course! a compatibilist can accept some kinds o$ e4cuse. )$ you &ere constrained in some situation so that no matter ho& &ell'$unctionin% your "modules"! no %ood upshot &as possible! then you are not to blame $or eents. *his is the case o$ the dro&nin% s&immerG no matter ho& %ood their character! there is nothin% they can do about it. E#ually! i$ an action is #uite "out o$ character"! $or instance! because you hae had to take some medications &hose result is to disorientate you or depress you! then perhaps you can be $or%ien! &hen you are yoursel$ a%ain.(e mi%ht think at this pointG &ell! the reaction to the illainous do%'thro&er &as natural enou%h. 1erhaps it is een usti$iable in terms o$ its
conseuences.
1erhaps blame and associated reactions hae a $unction! and &e ust need thin%s &ith that $unction. But all the same! isn7t there a hint o$ inusticeH Because &e hae done nothin% to sho& that the do%'chucker
could ha)e done other(ise.
For on any occasion! the modules &ill be set one &ay or another! so the outcome is determined. ompatibilists! so $ar! seem to blame someone $or eents! &hen the person could not hae done other&ise. *o this they may reply by distin%uishin% di$$erent senses o$ "could hae done other&ise". )$ the causal route to the a%ent7s action lay throu%h the decision modules! then she "could hae done other&ise" in some sense! and maybe re%arded as bein% $ree. *o %et at the ri%ht sense o$ "could hae done other&ise"! &e mi%ht o$$er &hat ) shall call
the first compati+ilist definition*
# sub'ect acted freely if she could have done otherwise in the right sense. The sub'ect could have done otherwise in this sense provided she
would
have done otherwise
if
she had chosen differently.
8nd! says the compatibilist! that is all that is needed to usti$y our reactions o$ holdin% people responsible! and perhaps reactin% to them &ith blame and an%er.*he %hostly response to determinism posited a kind o$ interention $rom
outside
the realm o$ natureG a "contra'causal" $reedom! in &hich the %host is distinct $rom the causal order o$ nature! yet mysteriously able to alter that order. (e could call that conception!
inter)entionist
control. )t is sometimes kno&n in the literature as a
li+ertarian
conceptiono$ $reedom! althou%h this is con$usin%! since it has nothin% to do &ith political or economic libertarianism! &hich is the ideolo%y o$ $ree markets and minimal %oernment.) shall stick &ith callin% it interentionist control. ompatibilism on the other hand substitutes a ie& o$ you as entirely situated
inside
the causal order o$ nature. our $reedom lies in the &ay action $lo&s out o$ your co%nitie processes. So ho& does the compatibilist respond to the ori%inal ar%ument about controlH 9e mi%ht su%%est that the ar%ument is no better than thisG
ad
The past controls the present and future. 9# thermostat cannot control the past. # thermostat cannot control the way in which the past controls the present and future.
$o
, a thermostat cannot control the future.
*here has to be somethin% &ron% &ith this! because a thermostat
can
control the $uture! in respect o$ temperature. *hat is &hat thermostats do. 8 thermostat controls the temperature by bein%
part of the (ay
in &hich the past controls the present and $uture. 8nd accordin% to compatibilism! that is ho& &e control thin%s. (e are inoled in the causal order. (e are part o$ the &ay in &hich the past controls the $uture. 8nd therein liesour responsibility. (e can call this conception o$ control!
inside
control! control $rom inside nature. (hen &e e4ercise inside control! the compatibilist holds! &e are responsible $or arious eents. 8nd i$ &e e4ercise that control badly! &e may ustly be held responsible $or the upshot! and held to blame i$ blame is an appropriate reaction.But is this compatibilist $reedom &hat &e really &antedH (e do not attribute any $reedom to the thermostat. 8nd compatibilism can seem more like a dismissal o$ the problem o$ $reedom! rather than a solution o$ it. *his is ho& it seemed to the %reat )mmanuel :ant @>5C'>D0CA! &ho dismissed it as %iin% us only the "$reedom o$ clock&ork" and called it nothin% better than a "&retched subter$u%e".
PUPPET! AN( *ARTIAN!
9ere is another &ay o$ sharin% :ant7s &orries. *he modules and comple4ities o$ in$ormation processin% complicated the causal picture. But do they alter it $undamentallyH )ma%ine counsel $or the $i% tree! pointin% out that it &as &inter rather than summer. *his is a complete de$ence o$ the tree. (ell! i$ ) acted badly! then does not that sho& that it &as &inter tooH *he modules had been badly set! presumably by eents belon%in% to causal chains that stretch back be$ore my birth. )t may be that i$ you are an%ry &ith me that &ill alter my decision'makin% system
for the future,
but it does not sho& that ) could hae acted di$$erently
in the past.
8s &e come to learn about causal re%ularities lyin% behind actions and other mental states! &e are apt to s&itch into less moralistic modes. (e mi%ht blame someone $or bein% depressed all the time! until &e learn a chemical story e4plainin% it. (e mi%ht be an%ry &ith someone $or bein% unable to stir himsel$! until &e learn that he has mononucleosis. But accordin% to the determinist! there are
al(ays
thin%s like this to learn. Kuite apart $rom increasin% neurophysiolo%ical eidence! &e may think o$ cases &here &e learn o$ "brain&ashin%" or "conditionin%". 1arents may be inclined to blame their teena%e dau%hter $or spendin% time! ener%y! and income on alueless cosmetics! buta better reaction &ould be to understand the social and commercial pressures that paralyse her better ud%ement and brin% this state o$ a$$airs about.*hin%s %et &orse $or compatibilism i$ &e indul%e in a little science $iction. )ma%ine the inasion o$ the mini'<artians. *hese are incredibly small! or%anied! and mischieous bein%sG small enou%h to inade our brains and &alk around in them. )$ they do so! they can set our modules pretty &ell at &ill. (e become puppets in their hands. @)$ this kind o$ e4ample sounds too $ar'$etched! re$lect that there actually e4ists a parasite that lies by
ad
coloniin% the brains o$ ants. nder its in$luence! the ant climbs blades o$ %rass. *his makes it more likely to be in%ested by passin% sheep! &hich the parasite then in$ects Mthe particular indiidual in the ant7s brain itsel$ perishes! but others hitch'hike. For all one kno&s! the ant $eels $ree as air as it climbs its blade o$ %rass.A O$ course! the mini'<artians mi%ht set us to do &hat &e &ould hae done anyho&. But they mi%ht thro& the chemical s&itches so that &e do #uite terrible thin%s. *hen let us suppose that! $ortunately! science inents a scan to detect &hether the <artians hae inaded us. (on7t &e be sympathetic to anyone &ho su$$ered this mis$ortuneH (ouldn7t &e immediately reco%nie that he &as not responsible $or his &ron%doin%sHBut! says the incompatibilist! &hy does it make a di$$erence i$ it &as mini'<artians! or causal a%encies o$ a more natural kindH*his kind o$ reply takes issue &ith the compatibilist ersion o$ "could not hae done other&ise". )t is all ery &ell! it points out! to say that someone &ould hae done other&ise i$ he or she had chosen di$$erently. But suppose they &ere set so that they
could not
hae chosen di$$erently. Suppose at the time o$ actin%! their choosin% modules &ere locked into place by mini'<artians! or chemicals! or &hateer. (hat thenH *he compatibilist &e hae so $ar shru%s the #uestion o$$ '' he is not interested in ho& the subects %ot to be as they are! only &hether the outcome is %ood or bad. *he obector $inds it important! and at least some o$ our reactions! &hen &e $ind more about causal routes! sho& that &e a%ree &ith the obector.
OB!E!!ION! AN( TWINKIE!
) think the best line $or compatibilism! $aced &ith this counterattack! is to #uery the &ord"set"! &hen there is talk o$ the modules bein% set to produce some outcome. *his in e$$ect repeats a similar moe to the one he made to distin%uish decision'makin% $rom dro&nin%. *here! he introduced a de%ree o$ $le4ibility into the causal process! by hi%hli%htin% modules that are capable o$ bein% tuned or set di$$erently. (hen the obector claims that in that case the subect is a mere ictim i$ the modules are "set" &ron%! the reply ou%ht to be to introduce another leel o$ $le4ibility. *rue! &e can say! in the case o$ the brain&ashed teena%er! or the mini'<artians! the modules may really be set. (e are ima%inin% the modules badly
fixed
by chemical or other processes. But these cases are special! precisely because once they are in them subects become in$le4ibleG immune to ar%ument! or to additions or chan%es in the decision'makin% scenario. But normally a%ents are not so set in their &ays. *heir $reedom consists in the $act that they are responsie to ne& in$ormation! and ne& di$$erences in the situation. *hey are not drien or bound to chuck do%s out o$ &indo&s or to stand all day at the cosmetics counter.(e mi%ht pursue the idea &ith somethin% like this! that ) shall call the
re)ised compati+ilist definition*
The sub'ect acted freely if she could have done otherwise in the right sense. This means that shewould have done otherwise if she had chosen differently
and,
under the impact of other thoughts or considerations, she
would
have chosen differently.
O$ course! on an occasion! it may hae been bad
luc'
that the ri%ht thou%hts did not arise.(ell! says the compatibilist once more! that is indeed bad luck. But perhaps my an%er
ad
and the $act that ) am %oin% to thump you &ill preent it recurrin%.Some philosophers @Baruch Spinoa M>635' is the most $amous e4ampleA like to associate $reedom &ith increased kno&led%e and understandin%. (e are $ree! they say! in so $ar as &e understand thin%s. *his is in many &ays an attractie ideaG it ties $reedom o$ the &ill to thin%s like political $reedomsG $reedom o$ in$ormation and $reedom o$ speech. (e are only $ree in so $ar as &e hae opportunities open to us! and lack o$ in$ormation denies us opportunities. (e could add this thou%ht to the reised compatibilist de$inition! by speci$yin% that the "other thou%hts or considerations"! $irst! are accurate representations o$ the a%ent7s situation and options! and second! are
a)aila+le
to the a%ent. *hat is! it is not much use sayin% that under the impact o$ other thou%hts or con'siderations she &ould hae chosen di$$erently! i$ those other thou%hts and considerations &ere simply not in the landscape. *hus! suppose ) set about to poison you and cunnin%ly put arsenic in your co$$ee. ou drink it. )t is not much use sayin% that you &ere $ree not to do so. For althou%h it is true that you &ould hae aoided the co$$ee i$ you had chosendi$$erently! and true that the thou%ht or consideration that perhaps the co$$ee &as laced &ith arsenic &ould hae made you choose di$$erently! neertheless! since there &as no reason $or that thou%ht to enter your mind! you &ere a ictim rather than a $ree a%ent. (emi%ht incorporate that into a reised reised compatibilist de$initionG
The sub'ect acted freely if she could have done otherwise in the right sense. This means that shewould have done otherwise if she had chosen differently
and,
under the impact of other
true and available
thoughts or considerations, she
would
have chosen differently. True and available thoughts and considerations are those that represent her situation accurately, and are ones that she could reasonably be expected to have taken into account.
(hat o$ the person to &hom the thou%hts or considerations ust didn7t occurH )s she a ictim rather than a responsible a%entH *his introduces a ne& t&ist to thin%s.So $ar &e hae talked as i$ "$ree choice"! either o$ some mysterious interentionist kind or o$ some substitute "inside" or compatibilist kind! is necessary $or responsibility. But isthis ri%htH ) said aboe that it mi%ht be ust bad luck that some crucial consideration doesnot occur to someone at a moment o$ decision. But sometimes &e do not treat it as "mere" bad luck. (e say that the thou%ht
should
hae arisen. *he a%ent is liable to censure i$ it didn7t. Someone settin% $ire to buildin%s $or $un cannot seriously plead that "it neer occurred to him" that someone mi%ht %et hurt '' not unless he is a child or mentally de$icient. Een i$ it is true that it neer occurred to him! so there &as no $ree choice to put people at risk! he is still responsible. -ecklessness and ne%li%ence are $aults! and &e can be held responsible $or them! ust as much as &e are $or more con'trolled decisions. Some philosophers hae $ound it hard to accept that. 8ristotle rather desperately held that ne%li%ent people hae actually chosen to make themseles ne%li%ent! perhaps in early childhood! and that this is the only reason they can be held responsible.*here is actually a &hole ran%e o$ interestin% thou%hts that open up here. Some kinds o$ bad luck are really incidentalG thin%s that do not a$$ect our relationship to the a%ent. But others in some &ay cast a re$lection on the a%ent. )ma%ine a %ol$er. Suppose on day one he hits a $ine ball! but! amain%ly! a passin% sea%ull %ets in its &ay and spoils the shot. *hen on day t&o he hits an e#ually $ine ball! but a little breee blo&s it o$$ course and a%ain spoils the shot. (e mi%ht say each o$ these is bad luck. *he $irst is pure bad luck.
ad
But the second is not #uite so simple. )t is bad luck! yes! but the kind o$ bad luck that a really %ood %ol$er is e4pected to $oresee and play around. )t should be &ithin the player7s purie&. (hereas the sea%ull represents a pure act o$ 2od. Enou%h bad luck o$ the second kind! and &e start to think less &ell o$ the %ol$er! and it is the same &ith a%ency. 9ence the reply made by a pianist &hose admirer %ushed about ho& lucky he &as to hae so much talentG "es! and the more ) practice the luckier ) %et."*he conceptual en%ineerin% &e are doin% at this point is supposed to tease out or make e4plicit real elements in our thinkin%. (e &ant to hi%hli%ht and try to encapsulate thin%s like thisG &e do make a distinction bet&een chan%in% the past @cannot doA and actin% di$$erently than &e do @sometimes can doAI &e do hae discriminatin% practices o$ blameI &e do make a distinction bet&een bein% ill and bein% badI &e do allo& some e4cuses and disallo& others. *he philosophical analysis is supposed to %ie us intel'lectual control o$ all this. )t is supposed to e4hibit it all! not ust as an irrational umble o$ disconnected habits! but as the application o$ a reasonable and de$ensible set o$ concepts and principles. )t is because it is hard to do this that the philosophy is hard. *he compatibilist account is a piece o$ en%ineerin%! either plottin% our e4tant concepts! or desi%nin% improed ones. )t has to ans&er to the &ays &e o$ten think! or think &hen &e are best in control o$ the problems that $ace us. <ysel$! ) beliee that the reised reised compatibilist de$inition does that pretty &ell. But others take :ant7s obection more seriously. *hey think that our "interpersonal reactions"! &hich include the &ays &e hold each other and ourseles responsible $or thin%s! do depend upon some lin%erin% a$$ection$or interentionist $reedom. So i$ that is metaphysically bankrupt! our attitudes ou%ht to chan%e. *he philosophical problem &ould be that interentionist control is untenable! and inside control inade#uate.Sometimes an analysis &ill settle hard cases. But sometimes it leaes %rey areas! and thismay not be a bad thin%. -eturn to the teena%e %irl spendin% an incredible amount o$ time and money on cosmetics. an she do other&iseH )$ &e run the reised reised de$inition! &e may $ind that the issue hin%es no& on &hat other thou%hts and considerations are "aailable" to her. )n one sense! &e mi%ht &ant to say! it is possible that she should start realiin% that her popularity or attractieness is not %reatly improed by cosmetics @it &ould increase more i$ she %ot a decent mind! perhaps by readin% a book like thisA. *his may be a true and potentially aailable thou%ht. But in another sense! perhaps it is not. 1erhaps people subected to the in$luences she is subected to ust cannot %et themseles to beliee this. *he culture is a&$ully %ood at blindin% teena%ers to this truth. So it &ouldnot be reasonable to e4pect her to beliee it. <ysel$! ) &ould incline to this dia%nosis! seein% her as a ictim rather than an a%ent. But the point is that een i$ the reised reised analysis does not settle this issue! it certainly pinpoints it. 8nd this is itsel$ a step to&ards %ettin% the issue o$ responsibility and $reedom under control. But it must in $airness be added that there is still a road to trael. 8n incompatibilist! $or instance! mi%htinsist that thou%hts are only aailable i$ they are themseles the obects o$ $ree @interentionistA selection! and this &ould put us back to s#uare one.ontemporary culture is not ery %ood on responsibility. onsider the notorious 7*&inkiede$ence". One day in >?D! an e4'employee o$ the city o$ San Francisco! an (hite! entered the ity 9all &ith a %un! eadin% metal detectors by %oin% throu%h a basement &indo&. 9e &ent upstairs! and shot and killed <ayor 2eor%e <oscone and a superisor! 9arey <ilk. )n court a de$ence psychiatrist! <artin Blinder! testi$ied that (hite had
ad
been depressed! &hich led to his eatin% too much! and in particular the hi%h'su%ar unk $ood kno&n as *&inkies. 8ccordin% to Blinder! this $urther deepened his depression! since (hite &as an e4'athlete and kne& that *&inkies &ere not %ood $or him. Blinder claimed that the emotional state (hite &ould hae %ot into &ould hae meant it &as impossible to hae acted &ith premeditation or real intent! both o$ &hich &ere necessary conditions $or $irst'de%ree murder. *he ury &ere impressed by the ar%ument! and ac#uitted (hite o$ murder! $indin% him %uilty instead o$ the lesser crime o$ "oluntary manslau%hter".ali$ornia later reised its la& to close the space $or this kind o$ de$ence! and on the $ace o$ it the state &as ri%ht to do so. (hite
o+)iously
acted &ith intention and premeditation! since that is &hy he procured a %un and &ent in throu%h the basement. 8nd &e can see that the reised reised analysis is not at all hospitable to the *&inkie de$ence. 8 de$endant &ould hae to &ork a&$ully hard to sho& that enou%h su%ar literally takes our behaiour out o$ the ran%e o$ our decision'makin% modules and our thou%hts. )t does not seem to be true that &ith enou%h *&inkies inside us &e become literally incapable o$ certain thou%hts! so that &e could not reasonably be e4pected to realie that murderin% people is a bad idea! $or e4ample. Een a lot o$ su%ar does not tend to do that. @But then! contemporary uries are not ery %ood on causation either. )n <ichi%an recently a man &on a la&suit $or substantial dama%es because! he claimed! a rear'end collision in his car had made him a homose4ual.ABe$ore leain% compatibilism! it is &orth noticin% a di$$iculty in $ront o$ all the de$initions. ompatibilism tries to %enerate the ri%ht notion o$ control out o$ the re$lection that under di$$erent circumstances the a%ent
(ould
hae done other&ise. *here are nasty cases that su%%est that these notions do not $it to%ether #uite so ti%htly. *hese are called "causal oerdetermination" cases. )n such a case somethin% does control some outcome! althou%h the outcome &ould hae been the same any&ay because o$ a "$ail'sa$e" mechanism. *hus! a thermostat mi%ht control the temperature een i$! because o$ a $ail'sa$e mechanism! the temperature
(ould
hae been the same een
if
the thermostat had mal$unctioned. )$ the thermostat had mal$unctioned! somethin% else &ould hae clicked in to keep the temperature at its proper leel. Similarly an a%ent mi%ht do somethin% bad! be in control! be actin% &ith intent and responsibility! een i$
(ere
he to choose to do other&ise unkno&n mechanisms &ould click in to ensure that he does the bad thin% anyho&. )ma%ine the mini'<artians sittin% there not actually inter$erin% &ith thin%s! but ready to do so &heneer the outcome looks set to be one that they don7t &ant. *hese cases are surprisin%ly tricky to handle. But the compatibilist can re$lect that they make it no harder to de$ine the ri%ht sense o$ control $or human bein%s than they do $or thermostats. Since the problem must hae a solution in the case o$ mechanical control! it must hae one $or people as &ell.
OB2ECTI.1IN' PEOP&E
)s there anythin% else to &orry aboutH One mi%ht think like thisG
The compatibilist vision describes the operation of organic beings with brains in terms of decision1making modules. $ut all this is 'ust describing things in terms of what happens. It is not describing things in terms of agency, or of
my
doing things. It is therefore leaving out something
ad
essential to my humanity, and essential to my human regard for others, which is that we are not 'ust passive patients and victims, but active agents.
*his is ho& &e re%ard ourseles! and re%ard other normal people! and normally it is ho& &e &ant to be re%arded.*he $ear is that somethin% essential to human liin% is bein% lost. )t is essential to us that &e think o$ ourseles as a%ents! not ust as patients. 8nd it is essential to us that other people so re%ard us. )n a $amous paper the philosopher 1eter Stra&son @>?>?' A contrasts an "obectie" or impersonal attitude to other people &ith a "personal" or human attitude.On the obecti$yin% track! other people are ust there like blocks to our pro%ress! needin% to be "mana%ed or handled or cured or trained". *hey are not the obects o$ personal attitudes. 1eople are looked at as i$ they &ere mad! rather than intelli%ent a%ents &ho can be understood.*here is an interestin% "%estalt s&itch" in Stra&son7s picture. 8t $irst! it mi%ht seem that the moral attitudes associated &ith blame are hard and harsh! and &e mi%ht think that it is an improement i$ &e can %et past them to more liberal and understandin% attitudes to such thin%s as crime or "deiant behaiour". *reatin% people as patients rather than as criminals looks to be a step in a humane! decent direction. Stra&son asks us to con$ront &hat is
lost
in this chan%e. 9e su%%ests that a lot o$ &hat makes human relationships distinctiely human is lost. Suppose! $or instance! that ) hae behaed in a &ay that ) &ant to e4plain. But ) $ind other people listenin% to my story &ith a look in their eyes that su%%ests that this talk is ust another symptom. )t is ust another si%n that ) need to bemana%ed or handled or cured or trained. *hen ) hae been dehumanied. ) &ant my decision to be understood! not patronied. ) &ant other people to "hear my oice"! &hich means appreciatin% my point o$ ie&! seein% ho& thin%s appear to me! rather than &on'derin% &hat causes a human or%anism to behae like this. *his kind o$ obecti$ication concerns us a%ain in hapter D! &hen amon% other thin%s &e con$ront the therapy industry &ith it.*he ri%ht response to the hi%hli%hted complaint! takin% account o$ Stra&son7s point! is this. *he compatibilist is not intendin% to deny a%ency! but to %ie a particular
account of it.
*he account is in terms o$ modular brain $unctions! in &hich data are taken in! and alternaties %enerated and ranked! until eentually an output comes "on line" and initiates action. *rue! these eents are all thin%s that "ust happen" @passiely! as it &ereA but! accordin% to the compatibilist! they
are
the thin%s that happen! and
all
that happens! &hen you! the person! do somethin%. escribin% you as doin% somethin%! and $or a reason! is a description at the
personal
leel o$ the upshot o$ these multiple micro'leel happenin%s.Some thinkers like to say that there are t&o perspecties on all o$ this. *here is the deliberatie! $irst'person stance you adopt &hen you yoursel$ are makin% a choice. 8nd there is an "obectie" or third'person stance! one that a scientist mi%ht take! seein% you as a comple4! determined! neurophysiolo%ical system. *he problem lies in reconcilin% the t&o stances.)$ the problem is put this &ay! then the ri%ht solution is surely this. *here &ould only be adi$$iculty about reconciliation i$ &hat is disclosed in the deliberatie stance is incompatible &ith &hat is disclosed in the third'person stance. But the deliberatie stance discloses nothin% about causation. *hinkin% other&ise is makin% the mistake that Schopenhauer7s &ater madeG mistakin% absence o$ a&areness o$ the $unctionin% o$ brain
ad
and body $or a&areness o$ the absence o$ such $unctionin%. *he $irst is uniersal! but the second is impossible! $or &ithout the $unctionin% there could be no a&areness.So! since nothin% is seen $rom &ithin the deliberatie stance that con$licts &ith the scienti$ic &orld'ie&! perhaps there is no need to $ind the problem o$ reconciliation at alldi$$icult. (hat &e may be le$t &ith is ust a moral problemG one o$ makin% sure that &e approach one another not &ith the obecti$yin% stance! but &ith $ull human understandin%! enriched! rather than undermined! by kno&led%e o$ the conditions that brin% about the decisions o$ other people.
.ATE+ ORAC&E!+ AN( (EATH
) kne& an old man &ho had been an o$$icer in the First (orld (ar. 9e told me that one o$ his problems had been to %et men to &ear their helmets &hen they &ere at risk $rom enemy $ire. *heir ar%ument &as in terms o$ a bullet "hain% your number on it". )$ a bullet had your number on it! then there &as no point in takin% precautions! $or it &as %oin% to kill you. On the other hand! i$ no bullet had your number on it! then you &ere sa$e $or another day! and did not need to &ear the cumbersome and uncom$ortable helmet.*he ar%ument is sometimes called the "lay sophism". )$ ) am %oin% to %et cancer! ) am %oin% to %et it! says the smoker. ou cannot aoid your $ate. 8nd i$ determinism is true! isn7t the $uture $i4ed already! by the inde$inite chain o$ states o$ the &orld already passedH *hese %ie birth to the $utureG it un$olds ineitably $rom the &omb o$ the past. 8nd i$ the $uture is $i4ed shouldn7t &e ust resi%n ourseles to our $atesH oesn7t action become pointlessH )s it not better to &ithdra&! and perhaps sit in an oran%e sha&l sayin% "Om" all dayH*here are many stories remindin% us that &e cannot aoid our $ates. 9ere is a ersion o$ the $amous )slamic parable o$ eath in SamarkandG
%he disciple of a $ufi of "aghdad was sitting in an inn one day when he heard two figures talking. 7e realied that one of them was the &ngel of Death.*I have several calls to make in this city,* said the &ngel to his companion.%he terrified disciple concealed himself until the two had left. %o escape Death, he hired the fastest horse he could, and rode day and night to the far distant desert city of $amarkand.9eanwhile, Death met the disciple0s teacher, and they talked of this and that. *&nd where is your disciple, so'and'so?* asked Death.*I suppose he is at home, where he should be, studying,* said the $ufi.*%hat is surprising,* said Death, *for here he is on my list. &nd I have to collect him tomorrow, in $amarkand, of all places.*
*he disciple seeks to eade his $ate! but it oertakes him all the same. *he story o$ the $utile $li%ht resonates &orld&ide. )n Sophocles7 tra%edy
Oedipus %ex,
:in% ;aius o$ *hebes &as told that his son &ould murder his $ather and marry his mother. (hen he $a'thers a son! Oedipus! ;aius seeks to aoid his prophesied doom by cripplin% the baby! and leain% it to die on a hillside. Oedipus is saed by a shepherd and %ro&s up in orinth! beliein% himsel$ to be the son o$ the kin% o$ that city. 9e learns rumours o$ his destiny! and consults the oracle at elphi! &ho con$irms it. So he $lees in the opposite direction $rom orinth! &here he takes his $ather to be. 8nd thus! at a place in the
ad
&ilderness &here three roads meet! he encounters ;aius. . . *he t&o$old attempts at th&artin% destiny are e4actly &hat make the doom un$old. <y $riend7s soldiers thou%ht that takin% precautions &as as pointless as Oedipus7s $li%ht $rom his doom. But there is a crucial di$$erence. Oedipus is supposed to kno& his $ate! but seeks to aoid it in any case. On the other hand! the soldiers did not kno& &hether they &ould die that day or not. *his leaes them open to the proper reply! &hich is that &hether a bullet has your number on it or not may ery &ell depend on &hether you choose to &ear a helmet. 8 bullet that &ould
other(ise
hae had your number on it may be kept un&ritten'on by this simple precaution. 8nd since you do not kno& &hether any bullet has your number on it! and you &ould like none to hae it! you had better take the precaution. oin% nothin% '' $ailin% to put on a helmet! puttin% on an oran%e sha&l and sayin% "Om" '' represents a choice. *o hae your choosin% modules set by the lay sophism is to be disposed to&ards that kind o$ choice. *he lay sophism can be represented as this ar%ument $or a course o$ actionG
The future will be what it will be. Its events are already in time-s womb.
$o
, do nothing.
But &hy is it better to be impressed by this ar%ument than by this oneH
The future will be what it will be. Its events are already in time-s womb.
$o
, get cracking.
*he $irst mi%ht be a better ar%ument i$ &e kne& that! as eents un$old $rom time7s &omb! human actions make no di$$erence. )t &ould be as i$ &e &ere &atchin% a %ame! behind one'&ay %lass &alls! spectatin% eents in &hich &e can neer participate! and &hose players are dea$ and blind to us. But it is not normally like that. Eents do un$old $rom time7s &omb! but in #uite predictable se#uences. *he eent o$ someone eatin% an omelette is al&ays preceded by the eent o$ someone breakin% an e%%. *he eent o$ reachin% the top o$ the mountain is al&ays preceded by the eent o$ startin% out. oin% nothin% is inariably $ollo&ed by no omelette! or no summit. (hich eents un$old $rom time7s &omb depends on &hat &e decide to do '' this is &hat the
inside
control o$ a person or a thermostat means. Our choosin% modules are implicated in the process! unlike those o$ mere spectators.)s this response to the "lay sophism" $inal and conclusieH) think it is! i$ the lay sophism is taken as an ar%ument $or actin% one &ay or another. *here is no conceiable reason $or pre$errin% the "do nothin%" conclusion to the "%et crackin%" conclusion. 1uttin% it another &ay! in this practical sphere! acceptin% one ar%u'ment is e#uialent to admirin% or desirin% to be someone &hose modules hae a certain shape. *he shape &ould be achieed by acceptin% this adiceG on thinkin% about the $uture and the &omb o$ time! do nothin%. But &hy should one admire anyone &ho %en'uinely $ollo&s that adiceH *hey are simply %ood'$or'nothin%sG people &ho do not make omelettes and do not reach summits! nor een set out $or them.But perhaps the line o$ thou%ht bears a di$$erent interpretation. Fatalism is usually thou%ht o$ as
dissol)ing
choice rather than recommendin% one kind o$ choice oer another. )t is supposed to sho& that choice is an illusion.But &hat! in turn! is that supposed to meanH (e hae already ar%ued that one conception
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o$ choice is an illusion. *his &as interentionist choice! or the $ull'scale uncaused interention o$ the -eal <e into the physical and neurophysiolo%ical order o$ eents. (e hae retreated into thinkin% o$ the $le4ible choosin% modules that are implicated in our doin%s. 9o& could thou%hts about the passa%e o$ time sho& that their operations are unreal or illusoryH )t seems no more plausible than su%%estin% that because o$ the passa%e o$ time! the operations o$ computers! or thermostats or chainsa&s are illusory.(hen you don7t kno& &hat &ill happen! and you think eents &ill respond to your doin%s! you deliberate about &hat to do. (e hae seen that $atalism a$$ords no ar%ument $or conductin% that deliberation one &ay or another. 8nd it a$$ords no ar%ument that the process itsel$ is unreal! unless the process is construed in the outside &ay &e hae considered and reected.But suppose you don7t kno& &hat is %oin% to happen! but it is kno&n! perhaps to 2od. Or ustG it is kno&able. (e think! as &e deliberate! that the $uture is open! but the past $i4ed. But suppose the $uture is as $i4ed as the past is. *hus &e think like thisGR>>C'' &here the arro&s represent open possibilities! spreadin% out $rom no&. But perhaps this&ay o$ thinkin% is illusory. 1erhaps the truth is only seen $rom a "2od7s eye ie&"! or &hat has been called the "ie& $rom no&hen". From this perspectie! time is laid out likea celluloid moie $ilmI a $rame o$ the $ilm corresponds to the eents at any one time. 2ien the &ay the &orld &orks! &e can be a&are only o$ past $rames @sometimes people think that prophets can 7see7 $uture $ramesA. But there is no metaphysical asymmetry be't&een past and $utureGR>>)$ that7s the truth! &e mi%ht think! surely it is as useless tryin% to in$luence the $uture as it &ould be to try to in$luence the past. )$ 2od has this ie&! he must be lookin% at our e$$orts! and lau%hin%. *his is the implication o$ the Su$i story. eath has already &ritten his list. 8nd this is &hy my $riend7s soldiers used the metaphor o$ a bullet "hain% a number on it"! &hich implies "already hain% a number on it" '' re%ardless! that is! o$ &hat &e do.But &hy is 2od or eath lau%hin%H Suppose 2od has the timeless ie&. 9e still does not see omelettes at one date! &ithout people breakin% e%%s at a sli%htly earlier date. 9e kno&s &hether &e &ill hae an omelette in one $rame o$ the $ilm. But then he also kno&s &hether &e &ill set about preparin% the omelette in a sli%htly earlier $rame. *here is no reason $or him to kno& that the $uture &ill be &hat it is &hateer &e do! any more than he kno&s that the tree &ill blo& do&n &hateer the &ind does. From the timeless anta%e'point! all that is seen is the &ind! and the destruction. 2od is
not,
as $ar as this %oes! like a medical practitioner &ho kno&s that a cancer &ill kill us &hateer &e do. *hat &ould mean that there &ould be $rames in &hich people behae in a &hole ariety o$ &ays! but die $rom the cancer anyho&. *he "ie& $rom no&hen"! $rom outside time! sees our doin%s! and their upshots! but it doesn7t see upshots &ithout doin%s. 2od sees us eatin% omelettes! because our choosin% modules set us to break e%%s. 8nd he only sees useatin% omelettes &hen he sees! in the preious time $rame! us breakin% e%%s.
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*he implication o$ the Su$i story is that eath had the disciple on the list
+efore
the disciple decided to $lee. So! it seems! it &ould hae come $or him &hereer he had been '' in Ba%hdad! or in Samarkand. *his is &hy his $li%ht &as $utile. But perhaps eath onlyhad him on his list because o$ his $li%ht '' i$ he ran under a bus! hain% arried in Samarkand! $or e4ample. -unnin% then brou%ht him to his $ate! but this does not tell us &hether the disciple behaed reasonably. )$ eath &as hain% a $ield day in Ba%hdad! $or instance because there &as a pla%ue there! then the $li%ht mi%ht hae been #uite rational! althou%h unlucky in the eent. )t
could
hae been that eath did not hae him on his list! ust because o$ his $li%ht.(hat about the asymmetry bet&een past and $utureH )$ they are symmetrical in 2od7s eyes! &hy is it rational to try to chan%e the $utureH 9o& can it be any more rational than tryin% to chan%e the pastH (ell! as ) hae said! een 2od does not see us settin% about makin% omelettes! &ith a sli%htly
pre)ious
eent o$ eatin% one @unless he sees us %reedily preparin% and deourin% second omelettesA. So in $act! it is useless to try to in$luence the past. *hat ho&eer leaes open a hu%e and intractable philosophical problem. For is it ust a matter o$ $act! a contin%ency that mi%ht hae been other&ise! or mi%ht be other&ise in di$$erent re%ions o$ space and time! that &e cannot in$luence the pastH )$ it isonly a matter o$ the patterns seen $rom the timeless point o$ ie&! it seems that it should be. <i%ht the patterns be di$$erent else&hereHFor the moment ) leae this is an e4ercise @an e4tremely di$$icult oneA. But returnin% to $atalism! the truth! then! is that there is no %eneral philosophical or rational usti$ication $or it. )t corresponds to a mood! a state o$ mind in &hich &e $eel out o$ control! and $eel that &e are indeed ust spectators o$ our o&n lies. *his is not
al(ays
unusti$ied. 1eople are sometimes lar%ely po&erless! politically! or een psycholo%ically @because &e are not$le4ible! but are indeed brain&ashed! or in the %rip o$ stran%e obsessions that &e cannot shakeA. (hen &e are po&erless! $atalism may be a natural $rame o$ mind into &hich to relapse. )$ our best e$$orts come to nothin% o$ten enou%h! &e need consolation! and thou%hts o$ un$oldin%! in$inite destiny! or
'arma,
are sometimes consolin%.But not appropriate &hen &e are actin%. (e cannot sa$ely think! &hile driin% a car! that it makes no di$$erence &hether &e turn the &heel! or hit the brake. Our best e$$orts do not come to nothin%.
.&E3IBI&IT1 AN( (I'NIT1
*he ideolo%y o$ mind'body dualism runs ery deep. By an ideolo%y! ) mean not a speci$ic ar%ument or set o$ ar%uments! but rather a $rame&ork o$ thou%htG a re$erence point or a %uidin% idea. ualism is o$ten supposed to make possible $reedom! di%nity! human e4perience itsel$. )t under&rites the bi% &ordsG the kinds o$ &ords that %et on banners. )n the last t&o chapters ) hae tried to disconnect these thin%s $rom dualism. But people $ear the alternatie. 8re &e reducin% people! in all their liin% colour$ul comple4ity! to drab monochrome machines! conditioned into bein% this &ay or that! or &orse! passie ehicles $or our sel$ish %enesH 8bsolutely not.*he problem here is that the alternaties are posed as i$ they e4haust the $ieldG either a $ree spirit! bliss$ully $loatin% apart $rom the natural order! or a determined machine like a bus! or een a tram. (e shall meet this $allacy o$ misrepresentin% the alternaties a%ain
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in subse#uent chapters. )t is not the philosophy o$ compatibilism that deni%rates human nature! but this &ay o$ puttin% the alternaties. *his &ay o$ puttin% the matter supposes that nature is so a&$ul that it takes a ma%ical moment! a diine spark struck $rom the %host in the machine! to make it sin%. )t is either clock&ork @PombiesA or 2hosts. But that is the ie& that deni%rates nature! includin% human nature. (e must learn to think &ith (itt%enstein &hen he &roteG
It is humiliating to have to appear like an empty tube, which is simply inflated by a mind.
*he key &ord to catch hold o$ is "$le4ibility" @remember those in$le4ible! pro%rammed! Pombies a%ainA. 8nd you cannot tell a priori ho& $le4ible human behaiour is. Our biolo%y! let us say! %ies us the modules. But then! ho& the modules turn out '' ho& they are pro%rammed i$ &e like! di$$erently in di$$erent enironments '' is another thin%. By comparison! biolo%y %ies us the structures! &hateer they may be! &e need to learn lan%ua%e. (e hae themI no other animal has them to any remotely similar de%ree. But &hich lan%ua%e &e then learn is not determined by biolo%y! but by enironment! as in$ants imitate the lan%ua%e o$ their mothers and their kin.Similarly our a&arenesses! our capacities to think o$ alternaties! our ealuations o$ them! and our eentual behaioural routines
might
hae been hi%hly in$le4ible. But the eidence su%%ests that they are the reerse. 1eople can #uite naturally %ro& up carin% about a &hole ariety o$ thin%s. )t is #uite di$$icult to detect any uniersal pattern at allG $le4ibility rules. 9uman bein%s can %ro& to make killin% $ields! and they can %ro& to make %ardens.*heorists and %urus like to make a patternG people are all sel$ishI people are only in$luenced by class interestsI people hate their parentsI people can be conditionedI men are a%%ressieI &omen are %entleI people cannot help themseles! and so on. But this is not so much a matter o$
follo(ing
the eidence! as o$
imposing an interpretation
on it. ;ike all stereotypes! such interpretations can be dan%erous! $or people can be caused to con$orm to them! and o$ten become &orse as a result than they mi%ht hae been other&ise. *he ob o$ conceptual en%ineerin%! here! is to supply a clearer outline o$ alternatie structures o$ thou%ht! and there are many.
Cha"ter .ourThe !e$f
(
E
98VE
;OO:E
8*
consciousness o$ the contents o$ our o&n minds. 8nd &e hae looked at a%ency and $reedom '' our actiities in the &orld. But &hat about the sel$ itsel$Gthe ")" that ) amH (e sa& that escartes sala%ed this alone out o$ the &recka%e o$ uniersal doubt. ;ichtenber%! &e also sa&! #ueried his ri%ht een to do that. (ho &as ri%ht and ho& are &e to think about the sel$H
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AN I**ORTA& !OU&
9ere are some actual thin%s &e think about ourselesG
1 4
IST
:I was once very small.$arring accident or bad luck, I will become old. When I get old, I will probably lose &uite a lot of my memories. I will also change, for instance in wanting to do different things. %y body will change too.The organic material of my body except my brain" changes roughly every seven years.If my body suffered as a result of an accident, for example by losing some parts, I would have to cope with the result.
No& here are some possible thin%s to think about ourseles. (hen ) say that they are possible! ) only mean that &e seem to
understand
them! not necessarily that &e beliee them. *he possibilities may strike us as #uite
outlandish,
but that is not at present to the pointG
1 4
IST
>
I might have been born at another time and place.I might survive my bodily death, and live another kind of life as a spirit.I might have been blessed or cursed with a different body.I might have been blessed or cursed with different mental capacities 11 a different mind.I might have been blessed or cursed with both a different body and a different mind.I might be the reincarnation of some historical personage.I might have to live life again, e.g. as a dog, unless I behave well.
)n $act! there are people &ho beliee! or say that they beliee! such thin%s! and indeed &hole reli%ions may hold some. hristianity holds the second on this list to be actually true! and 9induism holds the last. 8nd een i$ &e don7t accept any! still! &e seem to kno& &hat is meant.*he di$$erence bet&een these t&o lists is this. *he $irst list is compatible &ith a strai%ht$or&ard ie& o$ &hat ) am. ) am a lar%e! human animal. <y bio%raphy is like thato$ other animals! be%innin% &ith a natural birth! includin% natural chan%es! and endin% &ith a natural death. ) am $irmly located and bounded in space and time. ) surie arious natural chan%es! such as a%ein%. But that is all.*he second list su%%ests that ) am somethin% much more mysterious! somethin% that is only contin%ently "$astened to a dyin% animal". 8ccordin% to the possibilities on the second list! ) am somethin% that can chan%e shape and $orm! body and mind! and that could e4ist een &ithout a body at all. *he bio%raphy o$ the ")" could span centuries! andit could span endless chan%es o$ character! rather like an actor.8s &e sa& in the $irst t&o chapters! escartes thou%ht &e had a "clear and distinct" perception that the sel$ &as distinct $rom the body. 8nd the possibilities &e contemplate! $rom the second list! may seem to support him. )t is as i$ there is somethin% '' my soul! or sel$! or essence '' that
does
endure throu%h #uite a lot o$ chan%es @;ist >A and
couId
endure throu%h een more remarkable eents @;ist 5A. But &hat then is this sel$H 9ere is aid 9ume a%ainG
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(or my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception. /hen my perceptions are removed for any time, as by sound sleep, so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist. &nd were all my perceptions removed by death, and could I neither think, nor feel, nor see, nor love, nor hate, after the dissolution of my body, I should be entirely annihilated, nor do I conceive what is further re-uisite to make me a perfect nonentity.
9ume is pointin% out that the sel$ is elusie. )t is
uno+ser)a+le.
)$ you "look inside your o&n mind" to try to catch it! you miss because all you stumble upon are &hat he calls particular perceptions! or e4periences and emotions. ou don7t also %et a %limpse o$ the ")" that is the subect o$ these e4periences. et &e all think &e kno& ourseles &ith a #uite peculiar intimacy. 8s &e sa&! escartes thou%ht that this sel$'kno&led%e suried een "hyperbolic" doubt. *his nu%%et o$ the sel$ has seemed to many philosophers to hae another remarkable property. )t is
simple.
*he sel$ is not
composite.
9ere is one o$ 9ume7s contemporaries! the "common'sense" Scottish philosopher! *homas -eid @>>0'?6AG
& part of a person is a manifest absurdity. /hen a man loses his estate, his health, his strength, he is still the same person, and has lost nothing of his personality. If he has a leg or an arm cut off, he is the same person he was before. %he amputated member is no part of his person, otherwise it would have a right to part of his estate, and be liable for a part of his engagements. It would be entitled to a share of his merit and demerit, which is manifestly absurd. & person is something indivisible. . . 9y thoughts, and actions, and feelings change every moment# they have no continued, but a successive existence# but that self or I, to which they belong, is permanent,
and has the same relation to all the succeeding thoughts, actions and feelings which I call mine.
*his simple! endurin% ")" is the thin% &hich 9ume complained he could neer stumble upon. -eid ban%s the table! and announces its e4istence.*he simplicity o$ the soul coneniently opens the door to a traditional ar%ument $or its immortality.
#ll change and decay is the coming together or falling apart of composite things.
$o,
anything that is not composite cannot change and decay. The soul is not composite.
$o,
the soul cannot change or decay.
8s it stands! the $irst premise mi%ht not look all that compellin%. )t &ould re#uire some kind o$ de$ence. *he idea &ould be that in any natural @physicalA chan%e! &e can detect somethin% that is
conser)ed.
)$ you break a biscuit! the matter o$ the biscuit is consered.)t used to be thou%ht that atoms are consered! so that chemical chan%e &ould be simply the rearran%ement o$ atoms in a substance. No& &e mi%ht think &e hae to di% deeperG perhaps it is ener%y that is consered! or sub'atomic particles &hose rearran%ements are responsible $or chan%es in composite stu$$. )n either eent! it is only the compositions that chan%e. *he real "stu$$" @$undamental particles! ener%yA ust keeps on.)$ you could really de$end the $irst premise as an a priori truth! and i$ you think -eid has %ien %ood %rounds $or the second premise @the soul is not compositeA! then the ar%ument looks pretty %ood. O$ course! it is e#ually an ar%ument $or the e4istence o$ my
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