

NETWORKS OF HATE

*QATARI PAYMASTERS, SOFT POWER
AND THE MANIPULATION OF DEMOCRACY*

2023

ISGAP

THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF
GLOBAL ANTISEMITISM & POLICY

The Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy (ISGAP) is committed to fighting antisemitism on the battlefield of ideas.

ISGAP is dedicated to scholarly research into the origins, processes, and manifestations of global antisemitism and of other forms of prejudice, including various forms of racism, as they relate to policy in an age of globalization.

On the basis of this examination of antisemitism and policy, ISGAP disseminates analytical and scholarly materials to help combat hatred and promote understanding.

For further information contact:

The Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy Email:
info@isgap.org www.isgap.org

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ISBN number - 978-1-940186-23-8

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Background

In July 2019 at the Department of Justice (DOJ) in Washington, D.C., Dr. Charles Asher Small, The Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy (ISGAP) Director, presented the findings of an ISGAP research project which began in 2012, entitled “Follow the Money.” The ongoing research project examines the illicit funding of United States (U.S.) universities by foreign governments, foundations and corporations that adhere to and promote anti-democratic and antisemitic ideologies, with connections to terrorism and terror financing.¹

The project revealed, for the first time, the existence of substantial Middle Eastern funding (primarily from Qatar) to U.S. universities, which had not been reported to the Department of Education (DoED), as required by law. In fact, ISGAP’s research uncovered billions of dollars of unreported funds, which, in turn, led to the launch of a Federal Government investigation in 2019.

ISGAP has uncovered and established that foreign donations from Qatar, especially, have had a substantial impact on growing levels of antisemitic discourse, as well as growing support for anti-democratic values within institutions of higher education. With the explosion of campus antisemitism in recent weeks, there additionally remain security concerns which hold potential domestic and global implications.

Please view ISGAP Report, “The Corruption of the American Mind” [here](#).

For decades, Qatar has strategically positioned itself as an international funder of education, finance, science, health, sports, art and culture, communications and development. As part of this positioning, since 9/11, Qatar has become the largest foreign donor to U.S. universities.²

Despite its close ties to the United States and other Western countries, Qatar has also built an extensive network of Islamist partners dedicated to expanding its influence.³ Qatar is home to numerous Islamist inspired proscribed terrorist entities. For example, for decades it has continued to host, support and represent the Muslim Brotherhood (MB); maintains ties with Iran; hosts the Taliban; supports and maintains an office for Hamas and its exiled leadership; and has backed militias

¹ “VOLUME II Examining Undocumented Foreign Funding of American Universities: Implications for Education and Rising Antisemitism,” ISGAP (2020), <https://isgap.org/post/2020/09/volume-ii-examining-undocumented-foreign-funding-of-american-universities-implications-for-education-and-rising-antisemitism/>.

² Sophie Shulman, “Tuition of terror: Qatari money flowed into U.S. universities - and now it's fuelling violence,” CTECH (2023), <https://www.calcalistech.com/ctechnews/article/jwhsqhrt>.

³ Here we refer to Islamism the political ideology and not the religion of Islam as practiced peacefully by Muslims worldwide. John Jenkins, Dr Martyn Frampton and Tom Wilson, “Understanding Islamism,” *Policy Exchange* (2020), <https://policyexchange.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Understanding-Islamism.pdf>.

in Syria and Libya.⁴ Qatar hosts other radical spiritual Islamist leaders—including the late Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood. Qaradawi was banned from entry into the United States,⁵ France,⁶ the United Kingdom,⁷ the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Tunisia (and others), yet gained refuge in Qatar.⁸

On October 7, 2023, Hamas, funded extensively by Qatar,⁹ carried out a pogrom, murdering 1,200 Israelis and kidnapping more than 230 people. The pogrom also included the torture and rape of many of its victims. This was the largest massacre of Jewish people since the Holocaust. It is also the latest attack committed by Qatari-funded terrorists. Indeed, it comes after Qatar had funded, protected and disseminated Islamist extremist ideology and organizations around the globe.¹⁰

This report examines the vast network of Qatari financial investment that aims to exert its soft power influence on a global audience.

ISGAP's forensic accounting team has, for the first time, uncovered a selection of the organizations, institutions and mechanisms that are being used by the Qatari paymaster to manipulate Western democracies.

⁴ David B. Roberts, "Reflecting on Qatar's 'Islamist' Soft Power," *Policy Brief* (2019): 1, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/FP_20190408_qatar_roberts.pdf.

⁵ "Yusuf al-Qaradawi," *Counter Extremism Project*, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/yusuf-al-qaradawi>.

⁶ "The 'global mufti' Sarkozy barred from entering France," *France 24* (2012). <https://www.france24.com/en/20120328-sarkozy-bars-global-mufti-entering-france-sheikh-yusuf-qaradawi-toulouse-shooting>

⁷ "Muslim cleric not allowed into UK," *BBC News* (2008). <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7232398.stm>

⁸ *Counter Extremism Project*. <https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/yusuf-al-qaradawi>

⁹ Doron Peskin, "Cash flow: 16 years of Qatari money to Hamas has created a monster," *CTECH* (2023). <https://www.calcalistech.com/ctechnews/article/1retnzx9l#:~:text=The%20Qatari%20government%20began%20financing.and%20through%20real%20estate%20companies>

¹⁰ "Written evidence submitted by Steven Merley" (2018). <https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/87421/pdf/>

Executive Summary

Qatar is home to a relatively small population (2.6 million), only 11.6 percent of which is Qatari.¹¹ However, it is a wealthy emirate country, with a GNP of 229.007 billion USD in December 2022, in the Gulf that gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1971.¹²

Qatar positions itself as a critical mediator in regional disputes between various Arab and Muslim countries, and it aligns with the United States as a key Gulf partner in several defense pacts and agreements.¹³ Perhaps most significantly, Qatar hosts thousands of U.S. forces, as well as the regional headquarters for the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) in Doha and at various other military facilities.¹⁴

Islamism developed in Qatar between the 1960s and 1980s,¹⁵ and it was influenced by the writings of significant Muslim Brotherhood (MB) scholars/ideologues such as Sayyid Qutb.¹⁶ A group of Muslim Brotherhood members gradually re-developed strategies, and started thinking in terms of 'human rights' and 'civil society' for its proselytizing [*da'wah*] system.¹⁷

Qatar is ruled by the Al Thani Royal Family, who have embraced and promoted Islamist thinking and activism worldwide for many years.¹⁸

Global support for groups affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood became important with Qatar's major foreign policy shift, beginning in 1995 with the coup that brought Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa to power. Sheikh Hamad's goal was to overcome Qatar's small size and to make the emirate not only a regional player but also a global actor, utilizing its significant resources.¹⁹

¹¹ *The World Factbook* <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/qatar/>

¹² "Qatar Gross National Product (GNP)," CEIC. <https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/qatar/gross-national-product> "A Guide to the United States' History of Recognition, Diplomatic, and Consular Relations, by Country, since 1776: Qatar," *Office of the Historian*. <https://history.state.gov/countries/qatar#:~:text=Qatar%20had%20previously%20been%20a,of%20treaties%20with%20Great%20Britain.>

¹³ Bernd Kaussler, "Tracing Qatar's Foreign Policy Trajectory and its Impact on Regional Security," *Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies* (2015): 4. [https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/lists/ACRPS-PDFDocumentLibrary/Kaussler on the Development of Qatari Foreign Policy.pdf](https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/lists/ACRPS-PDFDocumentLibrary/Kaussler%20on%20the%20Development%20of%20Qatari%20Foreign%20Policy.pdf)

¹⁴ "CENTCOM Commander Visit to Qatar Highlights Focus on 'People, Partners, and Innovation,'" *U.S. Central Command* (2023), <https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3293580/centcom-commander-visit-to-qatar-highlights-focus-on-people-partners-and-innova/>

¹⁵ Here we are referring to Islamism the ideology and not Islam the religion.

¹⁶ David Roberts, "Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood: Pragmatism or Preference?" *Middle East Policy* 21 no. 3 (2014): 88, <https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12084>.

¹⁷ Al-Nafisi, "The Islamic situation in Qatar," *Islam Today* (2007), www.islamtoday.net/bohooth/artshow-19-8828.htm.

¹⁸ Roberts, "Reflecting on Qatar's 'Islamist' Soft Power," 3.

¹⁹ David Roberts, "Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood: Pragmatism or Preference?," 92.

The emirate developed its ‘soft power capabilities,’ which included the advancement of its *Al Jazeera* network broadcasting reach across the Middle East (in addition to extending this reach to include English-speaking audiences), as well as the *IslamOnline* portal.²⁰

Furthermore, Qatar made broad investments in Western countries, and affiliated with civil society bodies through semi-official agencies and foundations controlled by the royal family.²¹

Finally, Qatar supported the activist, political and ‘civilian’ structures of Arab and Islamist non-state actors—especially those affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood,²² some of which were designated terrorists by the United States for their ties to Hamas and other terror groups around the world.²³

As part of an aggressive foreign investment strategy, the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) was established in 2005 to develop, invest and manage the state reserve funds and other assets assigned by the Supreme Council for Economic Affairs and Investment (SCEAI).²⁴

QIA’s total assets are estimated to be between 500 billion USD and 1 trillion USD, including assets in Qatar.²⁵

Over the years, the QIA has made investments in the United States across a range of industries, especially high-profile assets, including a number of iconic landmarks in New York City, such as the Empire State Building, Plaza Hotel and St. Regis Hotel.²⁶

²⁰ Uriya Shavit, “The Postmodern Reconstitution of an Islamic Memory: Theory and Practice in the Case of Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s Virtual *Umma*,” in *Islamic Myths and Memories: Mediators of Globalization*, ed. Itzchak Weismann, Mark Sedgwick, and Ulrika Martensson (Surrey: Ashgate, 2014), 175.

²¹ “Qatar Investment Authority (QIA),” *SWFI*, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://www.swfinstitute.org/profile/598cdaa60124e9fd2d05bc5a>.

²² “How is Qatar supporting the Muslim Brotherhood global network? Follow the money,” *Alarbiya News* (2018). <https://english.alarabiya.net/features/2019/08/07/Qatar-s-history-using-banks-to-aid-Brotherhood-terror-groups-in-other-countries>

²³ “Written evidence submitted by Steven Merley,” *UK Parliament* (2018), <https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/87421/pdf/>.

²⁴ “Qatar Investment Authority,” *International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds*, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://www.ifswf.org/member-profiles/qatar-investment-authority#:~:text=QIA%20was%20established%20by%20Emiri,legal%20personality%20and%20a%20budget>.

²⁵ “Top 100 Largest Sovereign Wealth Fund Rankings by Total Assets,” *SWFI*, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://www.swfinstitute.org/fund-rankings/sovereign-wealth-fund>; “Shareholder Structure,” *Volkswagen Group*, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://www.volkswagen-group.com/en/shareholder-structure-15951>.

²⁶ “50 Years of Partnership: The State of Qatar and the United States of America,” *US-Qatar Business Council* (2022), <https://www.usqbc.org/public/documents/upload/50%20Years%20of%20Partnership%20-%20The%20State%20of%20Qatar%20and%20the%20United%20States%20of%20America.pdf>.

In a 2022 publication by the US-Qatar Business Council, the QIA announced a pledge to invest a total target of 45 billion USD into the United States market, spanning a variety of sectors including energy, real estate and technology.

According to this publication, the primary Qatari investments in the United States are as follows:²⁷

- Hospitality
- Real Estate
- Energy
- Food and Beverage

In Europe, the initial investments have been in the United Kingdom, especially in high-profile and prestigious assets within London. These include Harrods department store, London Heathrow airport, London Stock Exchange, Sainsbury's, Barclays Bank, Canary Warf, Savoy Hotel, Grosvenor Hotel, The Shard (the tallest building in London) and many other real estate and development assets.

In addition, two Qatari entities have a combined stake of close to 10 percent in Deutsche Bank,²⁸ and 12 percent in Hapag-Lloyd AG, the international cargo shipping company.²⁹

QIA's investments in France primarily focus on the hospitality industry, with notable acquisitions including the Accor group and its 5,500 hotels and 850,000 rooms spanning across 110 countries.³⁰

A further significant investment is the Lagardère group, a prominent publishing and travel retail giant. In both companies, the former French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, is a director, on behalf of the QIA.³¹

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ "Shareholder Structure," *Deutsche Bank*, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://investor-relations.db.com/share/shareholder-structure>.

²⁹ "Shareholder Structure," *Hapag-Lloyd*, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://www.hapag-lloyd.com/en/company/ir/share/shareholder-structure.html>.

³⁰ "Dividends," *Accor*, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://group.accor.com/en/finance/accor-share/dividends>.

³¹ Jeune Afrique, "Qatar: Nicolas Sarkozy, Samuel Eto'o... Al Thani's ambassadors," *The Africa Report* (2019), <https://www.theafricareport.com/21711/qatar-nicolas-sarkozy-samuel-etoo-al-thanis-ambassadors/>; *Market Screener*, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://www.marketscreener.com/quote/stock/LAGARDERE-S-A-4668/company/>.

Other areas of investment/influence:

Media and Narrative

Alongside commercial investments, and to further their influence operations, *Al Jazeera* Media Network was founded by the Qatari Government in 1996 and is headquartered in Doha, Qatar.³²

In early 2013, *Al Jazeera* purchased American cable television news network *Current TV* from its former Vice President Al Gore in a 500 million USD deal,³³ and established *Al Jazeera* International Limited as a British company (reg: 05233333).³⁴

Al Jazeera argues that it is not “owned by Qatar” and that “its reporting is not directed or controlled by the Qatari Government, nor does it reflect any government viewpoint.” Even though the owner of the company is the Emir of Qatar. Therefore, *Al Jazeera* argues that FARA registration was not required.³⁵

Education

The Qatar Foundation for Education, Science and Community Development (Qatar Foundation, “QF”) was a non-profit organization established in 1995 by the Emir of Qatar. Include status of the QF changed to that of “private institutions for public benefit” in accordance with Decree Law No. (21) 2006.³⁶

This shift signifies that the QF could now identify itself as a private organization without any restrictions tied to a governmental entity, while the Emir of Qatar retains ownership. Therefore, Qatar was given the ability to mask state funding as private sector giving.³⁷

Through substantial investments, QF has developed into a major force, shaping academic programs and research priorities both domestically and internationally.

³² “About Us,” *Al Jazeera*, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://www.aljazeera.com/about-us#:~:text=When%20Al%20Jazeera%20launched%20from,the%20right%20to%20be%20heard.>

³³ Jeff Bercovici, “Current TV Sold To Al Jazeera; \$500 Million Deal For Al Gore and Co. [UPDATED],” *Forbes* (2013), <https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffbercovici/2013/01/02/current-tv>.

³⁴ “Al Jazeera International Limited,” *Gov.uk*, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/05233333>.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Qatar Ministry of Justice, *Al Meezan*, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://almeezan.qa/LawPage.aspx?id=2697&language=ar>.

³⁷ “Reference Form: Banco Santander (BRASIL),” *Santander* (2011), https://www.santander.com.br/document/wps/Formulario_de_referencia_2011.pdf; “Qatar Holdings to sell 80 mln units of Santander Brasil in offering,” *Reuters* (2017), <https://www.reuters.com/article/bco-santander-br-stocks-idUSE6N1G601N>; “Yale Financial Report 2010–2011,” accessed November 16, 2023, https://your.yale.edu/sites/default/files/2010-2011_annual_financial_report_0.pdf.

The organization funds several universities and schools offering curricula for primary to higher education.³⁸

At the time of writing, the State of Qatar contributes more funds to universities in the United States than any other country in the world, and raw donation totals omit critical, concerning details about the nature of Qatar’s academic funding. For instance, Qatar concentrates its donations within a contained number of elite U.S. universities to maximize its influence.³⁹ This targeted approach suggests that strategic motivations—for instance, to advance Qatari state interests—influence the Qatari strategy, rather than pure philanthropy.

Furthermore, as ISGAP has exposed on numerous occasions, billions of USD are being donated to higher education without being declared as funding from Qatar by universities.⁴⁰

Other Methods of Transferring Funds without Reporting:

Collaboration on joint projects between different U.S. universities utilizing foreign companies—including Spain—to transfer money from Qatar into various universities. Notably, evidence indicates that the Spanish energy company, Iberdrola, and its American subsidiary, Avangrid, were utilized as conduits to indirectly channel Qatari money into partnerships with U.S. universities without proper disclosure.

Using conferences and initiatives that are sponsored by institutions that are owned by Qatar. For instance, WISH and WISE organize conferences and educational programs which are sponsored by entities such as Santander Bank.

The Qatari, National Priorities Research Program (NPRP) Program:

The Qatar Foundation holds numerous registered patents, originating from U.S. universities. These patents appear to represent the appropriation of U.S. technology by Qatar (please view ISGAP Report “Hijacking Higher Education: Qatar, The Muslim Brotherhood and Texas A&M” [here](#))

Significant Qatari funding has been provided to Texas A&M, Georgetown, Cornell, Carnegie Mellon, Northwestern and Virginia Commonwealth, as well as University

³⁸ “Qatar’s Unreported Donations to American Universities May Feed Campus Anti-Zionism,” *Mosaic* (2020), <https://mosaicmagazine.com/picks/politics-current-affairs/2020/02/qatars-unreported-donations-to-american-universities-may-feed-campus-anti-zionism/>.

³⁹ “Foreign countries send billions of dollars to top US Universities: 'Not a surprise we're seeing anti-Israel protests on college campuses,’” *The National Desk* (2023), <https://wpde.com/news/nation-world/foreign-countries-send-billions-of-dollars-to-top-us-universities-not-a-surprise-were-seeing-anti-israel-protests-on-college-campus-ivy-league-middle-east-qatar>.

⁴⁰ “VOLUME II Examining Undocumented Foreign Funding of American Universities: Implications for Education and Rising Antisemitism,” *ISGAP* (2020).

College, London and HEC Paris, some of which maintain campuses in Qatar and relationships that are subsidized by the Qatar Foundation (with which the Qatari royal family maintains a relationship). ISGAP has been informed by University College (UCL) that “UCL’s campus in Qatar was closed down in 2020” and according to UCL’s website “UCL Qatar closes this year, in line with the shift in UCL’s approach to global engagement to focus on partnerships of equivalence rather than bricks and mortar campuses.”⁴¹

- Qatar Charity (QC)
- Qatar Foundation for Education, Science and Community Development (QF)
- Qatar Investment Authority (QIA)
- Qatar Fund for Development (QFFD)

⁴¹ <https://www.ucl.ac.uk/global/news/2020/dec/ucl-qatar-celebrating-10-years-academic-excellence#:~:text=UCL%20Qatar%20closes%20this%20year,consultation%20with%20staff%20and%20partners.>

Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood (MB)

It is important to note that when Hamas was created, it designated itself as “one of the wings of Moslem Brotherhood in Palestine (sic).”⁴² Qatar has provided a safe haven for Hamas’ political leadership since 2012. In January 2015, then-Qatari Foreign Minister referred to then-Hamas politburo chief Khaled Meshaal as the country’s “dear guest.”⁴³

Qatar is home to a relatively small population (2.6 million), only 11.6 percent of which is Qatari.⁴⁴ However, it is a wealthy emirate country, with a GNP of 229.007 billion USD in December 2022, in the Gulf, which gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1971.⁴⁵ It has two key neighboring countries, Saudi Arabia and Iran, with which it shares the largest natural gas field in the world.⁴⁶

Qatar positions itself as a critical mediator in regional disputes between various Arab and Muslim countries, and aligns with the U.S. as a key Gulf partner in several defense pacts and agreements.⁴⁷ Perhaps most significantly, Qatar hosts thousands of U.S. forces as well as the regional headquarters for the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) in Doha and at various other military facilities.⁴⁸

Qatar is ruled by the Al Thani Royal Family, who have embraced and promoted Islamist thinking and activism worldwide for many years.⁴⁹

The Qatari establishment’s commitment to Islamism runs deep. Their political, cultural, and social establishment has been profoundly influenced by MB activists who fled Egypt in the 1950s.⁵⁰ These activists played an essential part in founding

⁴² “Hamas Covenant 1988,” *The Avalon Project*, Yale University, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hamas.asp.

⁴³ “Hamas,” *Counter Extremism Project*, <https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/hamas/report>.

⁴⁴ “Qatar,” *The World Factbook*, updated November 14, 2023, <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/qatar/>.

⁴⁵ “Qatar Gross National Product (GNP),” *CEIC*, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/qatar/gross-national-product>; “A Guide to the United States’ History of Recognition, Diplomatic, and Consular Relations, by Country, since 1776: Qatar,” *Office of the Historian*, <https://history.state.gov/countries/qatar#:~:text=Qatar%20had%20previously%20been%20a,of%20treaties%20with%20Great%20Britain>.

⁴⁶ “Factbox: Qatar, Iran share world's biggest gas field,” *Reuters* (2010), <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northfield-qatar-idUSTRE66P1VV20100726>.

⁴⁷ Bernd Kaussler, “Tracing Qatar's Foreign Policy Trajectory and its Impact on Regional Security,” *Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies* (2015): 4, [https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/lists/ACRPS-PDFDocumentLibrary/Kaussler on the Development of Qatari Foreign Policy.pdf](https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/lists/ACRPS-PDFDocumentLibrary/Kaussler%20on%20the%20Development%20of%20Qatari%20Foreign%20Policy.pdf).

⁴⁸ “CENTCOM Commander Visit to Qatar Highlights Focus on “People, Partners, and Innovation,” *U.S. Central Command* (2023), <https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3293580/centcom-commander-visit-to-qatar-highlights-focus-on-people-partners-and-innova/>.

⁴⁹ Roberts, “Reflecting on Qatar’s ‘Islamist’ Soft Power,” 3.

⁵⁰ David Roberts, “Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood: Pragmatism or Preference?,” 88.

Qatar's Ministry of Education and helped establish Islamism in the emirate between the 1960s and 1980s.⁵¹

At this time, Qatar was an emerging state with a population of only approximately twenty-five thousand and little governmental structure. They made use of *Salafi* imams, judges and bureaucrats with Saudi training and began to promote a fusion of *Salafi* and MB thinking in periodicals such as *Majallat al Umma*.⁵² Oil and natural gas gradually replaced its traditional industries like pearling and fishing, which increased the profits of the ruling family. The combination of this newfound wealth, along with an influx of educated members of the MB, allowed Qatar to develop the Ministry of Education and an education system where MB members were essential on all levels.⁵³

Islamism mainly developed in Qatar between the 1960s and 1980s, and was influenced by the writings of significant Muslim Brotherhood scholars/ideologues such as Sayyid Qutb.⁵⁴ A group of Muslim Brotherhood members gradually re-developed strategies, learning from the Egyptian experience, and started thinking in terms of 'human rights' and 'civil society' for its proselytizing [*da'wah*] system.⁵⁵

In 1999, the Qatari branch of the MB was officially disbanded by a vote amongst its members. The primary explanation provided was that the Muslim Brotherhood's formal structure in places like Qatar became "an irrelevant matter," as the group can easily offer the same services without any defined structure.⁵⁶ Despite this, the Muslim Brotherhoods' ideology, network and influence remain prominent in Qatar today, as a result of the group's mutually beneficial relationship with the royal family.⁵⁷

Over the decades, Qatar has become a 'safe haven' for Islamist and antisemitic scholars, such as the (late) Yusuf al-Qaradawi.⁵⁸

⁵¹ Abdullah Al-Nafisi, "The Islamic situation in Qatar," *Islam Today* (2007), www.islamtoday.net/bohooth/artshow-19-8828.htm.

⁵² Andrew Hammond, "Qatar's leadership transition: like father like son," European Council on Foreign Relations, (2014), https://ecfr.eu/archive/page/-/ECFR95_QATAR_BRIEF_AW.pdf.

⁵³ Andrew Lipp, "The Muslim Brotherhood: Exploring divergent views in Saudi Arabia and Qatar," *Iowa State University* (2019): 24, <https://dr.lib.iastate.edu/entities/publication/a215209c-330e-4f0e-b54b-37a190efea0a>.

⁵⁴ David Roberts, "Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood: Pragmatism or Preference?," 88.

⁵⁵ Al-Nafisi, "The Islamic situation in Qatar," *Islam Today* (2007), www.islamtoday.net/bohooth/artshow-19-8828.htm.

⁵⁶ Courtney Freer, "Rentier Islamism in the absence of elections: the political role of Muslim Brotherhood affiliates in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 49 (2017): 487-488.

⁵⁷ Roberts, "Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood: Pragmatism or Preference?,"

⁵⁸ "Yusuf al-Qaradawi: A controversial voice for moderation in the Muslim World," *The New Arab* (2022), <https://www.newarab.com/news/yusuf-al-qaradawi-controversial-voice-moderation>.

Qaradawi was banned from entry into the United States,⁵⁹ France,⁶⁰ the United Kingdom,⁶¹ the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Tunisia (and others) but gained refuge in Qatar.⁶²

Some of the views held by Qaradawi's are the following:

- "I will shoot Allah's enemies, the Jews, and they will throw a bomb at me, and thus I will seal my life with martyrdom."⁶³
- Qaradawi lashed out at Jews, even calling on God to "kill them, down to the very last one."⁶⁴
- Qaradawi declined to participate in the eighth annual conference organized by the Doha International Center for Interfaith Dialogue because of the participation of two Jews. In a statement released by Qaradawi's office, he reportedly said, "How can we conduct a dialogue in a time when they seize lands, shed blood, burn farms and demolish houses? Palestine's conundrum has to be resolved first before we sit together at the same table."⁶⁵
- In 2013, Qaradawi repeated his call to boycott the tenth annual Doha interfaith conference held in Qatar for including Jews. He addressed the issue in his April 26 Friday sermon at the Omar Bin al-Khattab Mosque in Doha. "No way I will put my hand in their hands," Qaradawi said. He added "Their hands are soiled with blood. Their hands are the hands of killing, the hands of tyranny and the hands of injustice. I cannot contaminate my hands by putting it in their hands."⁶⁶
- Qaradawi often repeated his "teaching" that "the last punishment [upon the Jews was] carried out by Hitler . . . the next time will be at the hand of the believers."⁶⁷

Global support for groups affiliated with the MB became important with Qatar's major foreign policy shift, beginning in 1995 with the coup that brought Sheikh

⁵⁹ "Yusuf al Qaradawi," *Counter Extremism Project*.

⁶⁰ "The 'global mufti' Sarkozy barred from entering France," *France 24* (2012), <https://www.france24.com/en/20120328-sarkozy-bars-global-mufti-entering-france-sheikh-yusuf-qaradawi-toulouse-shooting>.

⁶¹ "Muslim cleric not allowed into UK," *BBC News* (2008), <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7232398.stm>.

⁶² "Yusuf al Qaradawi," *Counter Extremism Project*.

⁶³ During a sermon that aired on the Arabic satellite channel Al-Jazeera TV on January 28, 2009.

⁶⁴ During a sermon that aired on the Arabic satellite channel Al-Jazeera TV on January 9, 2009.

⁶⁵ "Sheik Yusuf al-Qaradawi: Theologian of Terror," *Anti-Defamation League* (2013), <https://www.adl.org/sites/default/files/documents/assets/pdf/anti-semitism/arab-world/Sheik-Yusuf-al-Qaradawi-2013-5-3-v1.pdf>.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ "Sheik Yousuf Al-Qaradhawi: Allah Imposed Hitler upon the Jews to Punish Them - 'Allah Willing, the Next Time Will Be at the Hand of the Believers,'" *Memri TV* (2009), <https://www.memri.org/tv/sheik-yousuf-al-qaradhawi-allah-imposed-hitler-upon-jews-punish-them-allah-willing-next-time-will>.

Hamad Bin Khalifa to power. Sheikh Hamad's goal was to overcome Qatar's small size, and to make the emirate not only a regional player but also a global actor, utilizing its significant resources.⁶⁸

The emirate developed its 'soft power capabilities,' included the advancement of its *Al Jazeera* network broadcasting reach across the Middle East (in addition to extending this reach to include English-speaking audiences), as well as the *IslamOnline* portal.⁶⁹ Furthermore, Qatar made broad investments in Western countries, and affiliated with civil society bodies through semi-official agencies and foundations controlled by the royal family.⁷⁰ Finally, Qatar supported the activist, political and 'civilian' structures of Arab and Islamist non-state actors—especially those affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood,⁷¹ some of whom were designated terrorists by the United States for their ties to Hamas and other terror groups around the world.⁷²

Although Qatari support for the MB antagonized its Gulf neighbors through the 1990s and the first decade of the 2000s, Qatar was "able to stay in good graces in the GCC by carefully balancing its foreign policy, all the while remaining a staunch ally of the Muslim Brotherhood."⁷³

⁶⁸ Roberts, "Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood: Pragmatism or Preference?," 92.

⁶⁹ Shavit, "The Postmodern Reconstitution of an Islamic Memory," 175.

⁷⁰ "Qatar Investment Authority (QIA)," *SWFI*, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://www.swfinstitute.org/profile/598cdaa60124e9fd2d05bc5a>.

⁷¹ "How is Qatar supporting the Muslim Brotherhood global network? Follow the money," *Alarbiya News* (2018), <https://english.alarabiya.net/features/2019/08/07/Qatar-s-history-using-banks-to-aid-Brotherhood-terror-groups-in-other-countries>.

⁷² "Written evidence submitted by Steven Merley," *UK Parliament*.

⁷³ "Follow the Money: Examining Undocumented Foreign Funding of American Universities: Implications for Education and Rising Antisemitism," *ISGAP* (2019), <https://isgap.org/book/follow-the-money-examining-undocumented-foreign-funding-of-american-uni> <https://www.qatar.tamu.edu/versities-implications-for-education-and-rising-antisemitism/>.

Qatar Investment Authority (QIA)

QIA was established by Emiri Decision No. 22 of 2005,⁷⁴ to develop, invest and manage the state reserve funds and other assets assigned by the Supreme Council for Economic Affairs and Investment (SCEAI).

QIA's total assets are estimated to be between 500 billion and 1 trillion USD, including assets in Qatar.⁷⁵

QIA is a sovereign wealth fund (SWF) of the Government of Qatar,⁷⁶ and has no legal or fiduciary requirement to disclose information to the public. Instead, its board of directors maintains discretion over the frequency and extent of public disclosure.⁷⁷

Over the years, the QIA has made investments in the United States across a range of industries, especially on high-profile assets, including a number of iconic landmarks in New York City like the Empire State Building, Plaza Hotel and St. Regis Hotel.⁷⁸

Qatar Investment Authority Advisory (USA) is a wholly owned subsidiary of QIA. It is located on the 38th floor of 9 West 57th Street.⁷⁹

In a 2022 publication by the US-Qatar Business Council, the QIA announced a pledge to invest a total target of 45 billion USD into the United States market, spanning a variety of sectors including energy, real estate and technology.

⁷⁴ "Qatar Investment Authority," accessed November 16, 2023, *International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds*. <https://www.ifswf.org/member-profiles/qatar-investment-authority#:~:text=QIA%20was%20established%20by%20Emiri,legal%20personality%20and%20a%20budget.>

⁷⁵ "Top 100 Largest Sovereign Wealth Fund Rankings by Total Assets," *SWFI*, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://www.swfinstitute.org/fund-rankings/sovereign-wealth-fund>; "Shareholder Structure," *Volkswagen Group*, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://www.volkswagen-group.com/en/shareholder-structure-15951>.

⁷⁶ "Qatar Investment Authority," *International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds*, accessed November 16, 2023, [https://www.ifswf.org/member-profiles/qatar-investment-authority#:~:text=The%20Qatar%20Investment%20Authority%20\(QIA,a%20respected%20professional%20global%20investor.](https://www.ifswf.org/member-profiles/qatar-investment-authority#:~:text=The%20Qatar%20Investment%20Authority%20(QIA,a%20respected%20professional%20global%20investor.)

⁷⁷ Shanthi Divakaran et al., "Strategic Investment Funds," *International Bank for Reconstruction and Development* (2022), <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/43cbba76-fb58-5c3d-b148-c857cac2be5d/content>.

⁷⁸ "50 Years of Partnership: The State of Qatar and the United States of America," *US-Qatar Business Council* (2022), <https://www.usqbc.org/public/documents/upload/50%20Years%20of%20Partnership%20-%20The%20State%20of%20Qatar%20and%20the%20United%20States%20of%20America.pdf>.

⁷⁹ *Qatar Investment Authority Advisory*, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://www.qiaadvisory.com/>.

QIA – U.S.A.

The following are the primary Qatari investments in the United States:⁸⁰

Selected Hospitality:

- Plaza Hotel – Katara Hospitality has acquired full ownership for about 600 million USD.
- St. Regis New York – QIA acquired the 238-key property in Midtown Manhattan from Marriott International for 310 million USD.
- St. Regis Bal Harbour Resort (Miami, Florida) – acquired by Al Rayyan Tourism Investment Company (“ARTIC”) for 213 million USD.
- QIA and Brookfield Property Partners L.P. have entered into a joint venture for a 8.6 billion USD mixed-use Manhattan West development project, which involves a five-building, 7-million-square-foot development in New York City.
- QIA has partnered with real estate investment trust Douglas Emmett to buy a 1.7 million-square-foot portfolio in Los Angeles for 1.34 billion USD. This marks QIA’s first purchase in California.

Selected Real Estate Investments:

- Qatari Diar has contributed 650 million USD to the redevelopment of the old convention center site in Washington D.C., now transformed into City Center DC.
- QIA has acquired a 10 percent minority stake for 622 million USD in the Empire State Realty Trust Inc., the owner of the Empire State Building.
- QIA and Douglas Emmett have acquired a 365 million USD real estate development in California.
- QFB, now known as Leshia Bank, completed a 117 million USD off-market acquisition of 90 North, a four-building, 262,000-square-foot office campus in Bellevue, Washington.

Selected Energy Investments:

- Qatar Energy and ExxonMobil Corp have jointly invested in a 10 billion USD project to expand a liquefied natural gas (LNG) Golden Pass export facility in Sabine, Texas.
- Qatar Energy and Chevron Phillips Chemical are developing a 8 billion USD petrochemical plant along the U.S. Gulf Coast. In this partnership, Chevron

⁸⁰ “50 Years of Partnership: The State of Qatar and the United States of America,” *US-Qatar Business Council* (2022), <https://www.usqbc.org/public/documents/upload/50%20Years%20of%20Partnership%20-%20The%20State%20of%20Qatar%20and%20the%20United%20States%20of%20America.pdf>.

Phillips Chemical holds a majority share of 51 percent, while Qatar Energy has a 49 percent share in the project.

- QIA has invested 740 million USD in Avangrid, an energy services and delivery company for approximately 3.7 percent of the company's common stock.
- QIA has invested 550 million USD in Oryx Midstream Services (Midland), the largest privately held midstream crude operator in the Persian Basin.
- QIA has invested 125 million USD in the energy provider Fluence. Fluence represents a joint venture between the Arlington-based energy company AES Corp. and the industrial manufacturing giant Siemens.⁸¹

Selected Food and Beverage investments:

- QIA has invested 250 USD million in Califia Farms, a plant-based dairy brand based out of California. This transaction ranks among the largest private capital raising within the natural foods sector.
- QIA has invested 200 USD million into EatJust, a San Francisco-based vegan food startup specializing in plant-based alternative products.

QIA in Europe

QIA's initial investments primarily focused on the United Kingdom, especially in high-profile and prestigious assets within London. These include Harrods department store, London Heathrow airport, London Stock Exchange, Sainsbury's, Barclays Bank, Canary Warf, Savoy Hotel, Grosvenor Hotel, The Shard (the tallest building in London) and many other real estate and development assets.⁸²

QIA's investments in Germany have made it the largest shareholder in Volkswagen automaker, while also holding a 3 percent stake in the industrial giant Siemens.⁸³

⁸¹ *Simply Wall St*, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://simplywall.st/stocks/us/capital-goods/nasdaq-flnc/fluence-energy/ownership>.

⁸² "Our Projects," *Qatari Diar*, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://www.qataridiar.com/projects>.

⁸³ *Simply Wall St.*, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://simplywall.st/stocks/us/capital-goods/nasdaq-flnc/fluence-energy/ownership>; "Pandemic Continues to Drive QIA's Investment in Healthcare and Tech Innovation," *SWF* (2021), <https://globalswf.com/news/pandemic-continues-to-drive-qia-s-investment-in-healthcare-and-tech>.

In addition, two Qatari entities have a combined stake of close to 10 percent in Deutsche Bank⁸⁴ and 12 percent in Hapag-Lloyd AG, the international cargo shipping company.⁸⁵

QIA's investments in France primarily focus on the hospitality industry, with notable acquisitions including the Accor group and its 5,500 hotels and 850,000 rooms spanning 110 countries.⁸⁶

Another significant investment is the Lagardère group, a prominent publishing and travel retail giant. In both companies, the former French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, is a director, on behalf of the QIA.⁸⁷

The QIA also made the following investments in France:

- the Luxury Department stores Printemps Group⁸⁸
- The PSG football club (Owned Outright)⁸⁹
- Vinci Construction company⁹⁰
- Veolia Environmental company⁹¹

QIA has also made investments in Spain, including the El Corte Ingles SA Department Stores by Primefin vehicle,⁹² Colonial real estate company,⁹³ and the

⁸⁴ "Shareholder Structure," *Deutsche Bank*, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://investor-relations.db.com/share/shareholder-structure>.

⁸⁵ "Shareholder Structure," Hapag-Lloyd, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://www.hapag-loyd.com/en/company/ir/share/shareholder-structure.html>.

⁸⁶ "Dividends," Accor, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://group.accor.com/en/finance/accor-share/dividends>.

⁸⁷ Jeune Afrique, "Qatar: Nicolas Sarkozy, Samuel Eto'o... Al Thani's ambassadors.," *Market Screener*, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://www.marketscreener.com/quote/stock/LAGARDERE-S-A-4668/company/>

⁸⁸ "Printemps opens new department store in Doha, Qatar," *CPP-Luxury* (2022), <https://cpp-luxury.com/printemps-opens-new-department-store-in-doha-qatar/>; Dow Jones, "Qatari investor to acquire Printemps, French department-store chain," *Gulf News* (2013), <https://gulfnews.com/business/retail/qatari-investor-to-acquire-printemps-french-department-store-chain-1.1168465>.

⁸⁹ Andreas Blichfeldt Olsen, "A global map of Qatar's sponsorships in sports," *Play the Game* (2022), <https://www.playthegame.org/news/a-global-map-of-qatar-s-sponsorships-in-sports/>; Robin Bairner, "Who is the PSG chairman? Nasser Al-Khelaiifi's net worth & Qatar ownership," *Goal* (2019), <https://www.goal.com/en-us/news/who-is-the-psg-chairman-nasser-al-khelaiifis-net-worth--qatar-ownership/1qceaqzo6n54t1wuvslnt0xbg1>.

⁹⁰ "Vinci," *Market Screener*, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://www.marketscreener.com/quote/stock/VINCI-4725/company/>.

⁹¹ Archana Narayanan and Carla Canivete, "Qatar Wealth Fund to Sell Entire Veolia Stake Worth \$640 Million," *Bloomberg* (2018), <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-13/qatar-wealth-fund-to-sell-entire-veolia-stake-worth-640-million?leadSource=uverify%20wall>.

⁹² Carles Huguet, "Qatar suffers a hole of 140 million with its investment in El Corte Inglés," *Economia Digital* (2022), <https://www.economiadigital.es/empresas/qatar-sufre-un-agujero-de-140-millones-con-su-inversion-en-el-corte-ingles.html>; "El Corte Inglés buys back 5.53% of its capital from the Qatari fund Primefin," *Euronews* (2022) <https://es.euronews.com/next/2022/06/21/corteingles-participacion-qatar>

⁹³ "INMOBILIARIA COLONIAL, SOCIMI, S.A.," *Annual Corporate Governance Report of Listed Spanish Companies*, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://www.inmocolonial.com/sites/default/files/uploaded-files/2022-03/2019%20Annual%20Corporate%20Government%20Report.pdf>; Ana Tavares, "Qatar becomes Colonial's largest shareholder with 20% of the shares," *Iberian Property* (2018),

Iberdrola renewable energy company. With the substantial backing of Qatari resources, Iberdrola has become a global leader, acquiring the American utility and energy company Avangrid, among other assets.⁹⁴

QIA Globally

The QIA maintains substantial holdings in various industries and countries.

Selected examples below:

Country	Company	Stake in %	Industry
Hungary ⁹⁵	QPR Properties Kft.	100	Hospitality
India ⁹⁶	Adani Electricity Mumbai Limited (AEML)	25	Electricity
China ⁹⁷	Luckin Coffee	3	Coffee Stores
China ⁹⁸	WuXi AppTec Co., Ltd.	2	Biotechnology and Chemistry
China ⁹⁹	Agricultural Bank of China	8	Banking
Italy ¹⁰⁰	St. Regis Hotel Rome	100	Hospitality
Oman ¹⁰¹	Al-Hosn Investment SAOC	50	Private Equity Fund

[Qatar becomes Colonial's largest shareholder with 20% of the shares - Iberian Property.](#)

⁹⁴ Katherine Tweed, "Iberdrola USA and UIL Merge to Form Utility Giant Avangrid" (2015),

<https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/iberdrola-usa-and-uil-merge-to-form-utility-giant-avangrid>.

⁹⁵ *Magyare Pitok*, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://magyarepitok.hu/mi-epul/2017/01/luxusszalloda-nyilik-a-balettintezet-egykori-epuleteben>.

⁹⁶ "Adani Transmission Announces Completion Of Qatar Investment Authority Investment In AEM," *Adani* (2020), <https://www.adanitransmission.com/newsroom/media-releases/adani-transmission>; "Qatar wealth fund to invest \$450 million in India's Adani Transmission unit," *Reuters* (2019),

<https://www.reuters.com/article/adani-trans-investment-qatar-idINKBN1YF0LK>.

⁹⁷ "Luckin Coffee, Inc.," *Securities and Exchange Commission*, accessed November 16, 2023,

<https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1441449/000156761920000963/formsc13ga.htm>.

⁹⁸ "Form 2 - Corporate Substantial Shareholder Notice," *HKE News*, accessed November 16, 2023,

<https://di.hkex.com.hk/di/NSForm2.aspx?fn=CS20200806E00269&sa2=cs&sid=226513&corp=WuXi+AppTec+Co.%2C+Ltd.+-+H+Shares&sd=23%2F04%2F2020&ed=23%2F04%2F2021&cid=2&sa1=cl&scsd=23%2F04%2F2020&sced=23%2F04%2F2021&cn=1&srchCorpName=WuXi+AppTec+Co.%2C+Ltd.+-+H+Shares&src=Main&lang=EN&>.

⁹⁹ Zhou Jing, "Qatar to invest US\$2.8 bln in Agricultural Bank's IPO," *China.org.cn* (2010),

http://www.china.org.cn/business/2010-06/21/content_20310975.htm.

¹⁰⁰ Cynthia Martens, "Qatar Group Buys St. Regis Hotel in Rome," *WWD* (2014), <https://wwd.com/feature/qatar-group-buys-st-regis-hotel-in-rome-7993698-997832/>.

¹⁰¹ "About Us," *Al Hosn Investment Company*. <https://alhosninvestment.com/>

Singapore ¹⁰²	Asia Square Tower 1 Pte. Ltd.	100	Real Estate
Indonesia ¹⁰³	PT Indosat Tbk	41	Telecommunication
Russia ¹⁰⁴	Rosneft	18	Oil
Argentina ¹⁰⁵	Adecoagro SA	14	Farming and agricultural products
Turkey ¹⁰⁶	Alternatif Bank	74	Banking

Qatar Airways (QA) is recognized as one of the world’s leading airlines. QA has expanded its portfolio by acquiring additional aircraft and airports worldwide.

Some notable examples:

<u>Country</u>	<u>Company</u>	<u>Stake in %</u>	<u>Industry</u>
Qatar ¹⁰⁷	Qatar Airways	100	Airliner
Hong Kong ¹⁰⁸	Cathay Pacific	10	Airliner
UK ¹⁰⁹	International Airlines Group (British Airways, Iberia, Vueling and Aer Lingus)	25	Airliner
Rwanda ¹¹⁰	RwandAir	49	Airliner

¹⁰² Ann Williams, “Sovereign wealth fund Qatar Investment Authority buys Asia Square Tower 1 for record \$3.4b,” *The Straits Times* (2016), <https://www.straitstimes.com/business/property/asia-square-tower-1-goes-to-qatar-investment-authority-for-s34b>; Sarmad Khan, “Qatar to buy \$2.5bn Singapore tower,” *Meed* (2016), <https://www.meed.com/qatar-to-buy-2-5bn-singapore-tower/>.

¹⁰³ Hala Abdallah, “Qatar’s Ooredoo Group, CK Hutchison ink ‘landmark’ \$6bn Indonesian merger,” *Doha News* (2021), <https://dohanews.co/qatars-ooredoo-group-ck-hutchison-ink-landmark-6bn-indonesian-merger/>.

¹⁰⁴ Hazar Kilani, “Qatar Investment Authority holding onto its Russian assets for now,” *DohaNews* (2022), <https://dohanews.co/qatar-investment-authority-holding-onto-its-russian-assets-for-now/>.

¹⁰⁵ “Adecoagro,” *Market Screener*, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://www.marketscreener.com/quote/stock/ADECOAGRO-S-A-7281924/company/>.

¹⁰⁶ “About Us,” *Alternatif Bank*, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://www.alternatifbank.com.tr/en/about-us/alternatif-bank/who-we-are>.

¹⁰⁷ “Qatar Airways Group Consolidated Financial Statements,” *Qatar Airways* (2022), <https://www.qatarairways.com/content/dam/documents/annual-reports/2022/financial-statement-en.pdf>.

¹⁰⁸ “Cathay Pacific Airways Ltd.,” *Market Screener*, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://www.marketscreener.com/quote/stock/CATHAY-PACIFIC-AIRWAYS-LI-1412641/company/>.

¹⁰⁹ “International Consolidated Airlines Group Ltd.,” *Market Screener*, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://www.marketscreener.com/quote/stock/INTERNATIONAL-CONSOLIDATE-7233512/company/>.

¹¹⁰ Rémy Darras, “Qatar Airways confirms purchase of 49% stake in RwandAir,” *The Africa Report* (2020), <https://www.theafricareport.com/23179/qatar-airways-confirms-purchase-of-49-stake-in-rwandair/>.

Rwanda ¹¹¹	Bugesera airport	60	Airport
Chile ¹¹²	Latam	10	Airliner
Qatar ¹¹³	Hamad International Airport	100	Airport
Israel ¹¹⁴	Freightos	10	Shipping

¹¹¹ “Qatar Airways to take 60% stake in new Rwandan airport,” *ch-aviation* (2019), <https://www.ch-aviation.com/portal/news/84211-qatar-airways-to-take-60-stake>.

¹¹² “Ownership Structure,” *Latam*, <https://www.latamairlinesgroup.net/ownership-structure>

¹¹³ “The Qatar Airways Group,” *Qatar Airways*, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://www.qatarairways.com/en-us/about-qatar-airways/group-companies.html>.

¹¹⁴ “Freightos’ shareholders unveiled: does transparency really matter?” *Supply Chain and Logistics* (2022), <https://supplychainandlogistics.org/2022/05/27/freightos-shareholders-unveiled-does-transparency-really-matter/>.

Al Jazeera Media Network

Al Jazeera Media Network was founded by the Qatari Government in 1996 and is headquartered in Doha, Qatar.¹¹⁵

In early 2013, *Al Jazeera* purchased American cable television news network *Current TV* from its former Vice President Al Gore in a 500 million USD deal.¹¹⁶

The network is 100 percent owned by the State of Qatar.¹¹⁷

Six GOP senators and two GOP representatives sent a letter to the Justice Department in 2019, to ask the Department of Justice to review whether the network should register as a foreign agent, alleging “*Al Jazeera* is a messaging tool for the Qatari Government” and requested that the DOJ take action in enforcing the Foreign Agents Registration Act.¹¹⁸

Al Jazeera Media Network responded in a statement to the *Washington Examiner*, claiming that *Al Jazeera* “is not owned by Qatar” and that “its reporting is not directed or controlled by the Qatari Government, nor does it reflect any government viewpoint.” Therefore, *Al Jazeera* argued that FARA registration was not required.¹¹⁹

Al Jazeera International Limited:

ULTIMATE CONTROLLING PARTY

The directors consider that with effect from 10 March 2018, Al Jazeera Network, the registered address of which is at Television Roundabout, PO Box 23123, Doha, Qatar is the ultimate controlling party. Prior to that HH Emir of Qatar was the ultimate controlling party.

Al Jazeera International Limited is a British company (company registration number 05233333).¹²⁰

According to the Companies House registrar, on July 11, 2016, the Emir of The State of Qatar signed as a person with significant control in the company until March 10, 2018. The criteria for disclosure control is having ownership of 75 percent or more of the shares.¹²¹

¹¹⁵ “About Us,” *Al Jazeera*, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://www.aljazeera.com/about-us#:~:text=When%20Al%20Jazeera%20launched%20from,the%20right%20to%20be%20heard.>

¹¹⁶ Jeff Bercovici, “Current TV Sold To Al Jazeera; \$500 Million Deal For Al Gore and Co. [UPDATED].”

¹¹⁷ Vivienne Walt, “All eyes on Qatar, Al Jazeera’s money machine,” *Fortune* (2013), <https://fortune.com/2013/08/21/all-eyes-on-qatar-al-jazeeras-money-machine/>.

¹¹⁸ Jerry Dunleavy, “Al Jazeera pushes back on GOP effort to force it to register as a foreign agent,” *Washington Examiner* (2019), <https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/al-jazeera-pushes-back-on-gop-effort-to-force-it-to-register-as-a-foreign-agent>.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ “Al Jazeera International Limited.,” *Gov.uk*, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/05233333>.

¹²¹ “Al Jazeera International Limited,” Companies House.

Following this, *Al Jazeera's* legal status was transformed into a "Private Corporation for Public Utility" (PFPU) by Royal Decree, a change which intended to establish its alleged independence from the Government of Qatar.¹²²

In 2018 financial statements, the ultimate controlling authority for Al Jazeera International Limited is Al Jazeera Media Network in Doha, as opposed to the Emir of Qatar.¹²³

However, later in the statement, the United Kingdom-based company declared that it "*is financed by the Qatari Government.*"¹²⁴

The network has over twenty channels: Al Jazeera Arabic, Al Jazeera English, Al Jazeera Balkans, Al Jazeera Sport, Al Jazeera Mubasher, Al Jazeera Documentary, the Al Jazeera Media Training and Development Center and the Al Jazeera Center for Studies.¹²⁵

The Chairman of the Boards of Directors is Sheikh Hamad bin Thamer Al Thani, a member of the Qatari royal family.¹²⁶

Today, his purview encompasses all of the channels under the *Al Jazeera* umbrella, in addition to his leadership role at the Qatar Media Corporation.¹²⁷

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ "Al Jazeera International Limited," *Gov.uk*, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/05233333/filing-history>.

¹²⁵ "Corporate Profile," *Al Jazeera* (2012), <https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2012/4/16/corporate-profile>

¹²⁶ "Sheikh Hamad bin Thamer Al Thani," *Al Jazeera Network*, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://network.aljazeera.net/en/profile/leadership/sheikh-hamad-bin-thamer-al-thani>.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

Qatar Foundation and U.S. Universities

The Qatar Foundation for Education, Science and Community Development (Qatar Foundation, “QF”) is a non-profit organization established in 1995 by the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani. Headquartered in the capital Doha, the Qatar Foundation oversees numerous educational and research institutions within Qatar and beyond.

The articles of incorporation for Re-establishing the Qatar Foundation for Education, Science, and Community Development (QF) was officially published on January 22, 2007.¹²⁸ The founder, the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, is still head of the organization. With these articles, the status of the QF changed to that of "private institutions for public benefit" in accordance with Decree Law No. (21) 2006.¹²⁹

This shift seems to signify that the QF can now identify itself as a private organization without any restrictions tied to a governmental entity, while the Emir of Qatar retains ownership.

Through substantial investments, QF has developed into a major force which shapes academic programs and research priorities both domestically and internationally. The organization funds several universities and schools offering curricula, from primary to higher education.¹³⁰ QF also operates research centers like the Qatar Science & Technology Park¹³¹ and Qatar Computing Research Institute,¹³² which engage in advanced studies across science, technology and other fields.

¹²⁸ “The Instrument for Re-establishing Qatar Foundation for Education, Science and Community Development,” *Al Meezan*, accessed November 16, 2023,

<https://almeezan.qa/ClarificationsNoteDetails.aspx?id=6159&language=en>.

¹²⁹ Qatar Ministry of Justice, *Al Meezan*, accessed November 16, 2023,


<https://almeezan.qa/LawPage.aspx?id=2697&language=ar>.

¹³⁰ “Qatar’s Unreported Donations to American Universities May Feed Campus Anti-Zionism,” *Mosaic* (2020), <https://mosaicmagazine.com/picks/politics-current-affairs/2020/02/qatars-unreported-donations-to-american-universities-may-feed-campus-anti-zionism/>.

¹³¹ “About Qatar Science & Technology Park,” *Qatar Science & Technology Park*, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://qstp.org.qa/about/>.

¹³² “About Qatar Computing Research Institute (QCRI),” *Hamad Bin Khalifa University*, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://www.hbku.edu.qa/en/qcri/about>.

In the following diagram, it is evident that the State of Qatar contributes more funds to universities in the United States than any other country in the world:



Importantly, raw donation totals omit critical and concerning details about the nature of Qatar's academic funding. For instance, Qatar limits its donations to several elite U.S. universities to maximize its influence.¹³³ This targeted approach suggests that strategic motivations—for instance, to advance Qatari state interests— influence the Qatari strategy, rather than pure philanthropy. Ultimately, Qatar arguably aims to delegitimize justifiable analysis of its questionable academic funding as criticism of its generosity.

Qatar utilizes opaque channels, such as QF, to mask state funding as private sector giving.¹³⁴ This deliberate non-disclosure implies motives to evade transparency around the extent of its influence.

¹³³ “Foreign countries send billions of dollars to top US Universities: 'Not a surprise we're seeing anti-Israel protests on college campuses,” *The National Desk* (2023), <https://wpde.com/news/nation-world/foreign-countries-send-billions-of-dollars-to-top-us-universities-not-a-surprise-were-seeing-anti-israel-protests-on-college-campuses-ivy-league-middle-east-qatar>.

¹³⁴ “Reference Form: Banco Santander (BRASIL),” *Santander* (2011), https://www.santander.com.br/document/wps/Formulario_de_referencia_2011.pdf; “Qatar Holdings to sell 80 mln units of Santander Brasil in offering,” *Reuters* (2017), <https://www.reuters.com/article/bco-santander-br-stocks-idUSE6N1G601N>; “Yale Financial Report 2010-2011,” *Yale University*, https://your.yale.edu/sites/default/files/2010-2011_annual_financial_report_0.pdf.

Qatar's disproportionate focus on funding Middle Eastern Studies programs perhaps implies that the state desires to influence academic discourse.¹³⁵ Such efforts deface the critical principles of objective, apolitical scholarship.

The Qatar Foundation aims to form partnerships between Qatari institutions and leading overseas universities in order to bring campuses into Qatar's Education City in Doha. This includes agreements with U.S. universities including Texas A&M, Carnegie Mellon and Northwestern, with the intention to establish local branches.¹³⁶ QF holds significant influence over academic activities at these universities, regarding curriculum design to faculty hiring.¹³⁷

It is believed that QF intends to nurture future leaders and align educational priorities with the Qatar National Vision of 2030 (the development blueprint of the state).¹³⁸ The Vision emphasizes the state's desire to adapt to emerging needs in technology, healthcare and sustainability, among other objectives. This highlights QF's role in guiding Qatar's social transformation and establishing its reputation as a global leader in education, research and innovation.

Notably, statements from QF officials arguably demonstrate how it serves as a vehicle for Qatar to cultivate soft power influence through higher education partnerships.¹³⁹ For instance, foreign students often defend Qatar because of their gratitude to QF and its role in funding their university experience.¹⁴⁰

This illustrates how Qatar successfully harnesses its educational institutions to boost its global power and reputation, while muting overseas critics. In short, QF launders

¹³⁵ Raymond Ibrahim, "Hidden Saudi and Qatari Funding Distorts Middle East Studies," *Middle East Forum* (2020), <https://www.meforum.org/61807/foreign-funds-subvert-american-universities>.

¹³⁶ "QF and HBKU announce education and research partnerships with U.S.," *Qatar Foundation* (2020), <https://www.qf.org.qa/stories/qf-and-hbku-announce-education-and-research-partnerships-with-u-s>.

¹³⁷ "Qatar is 'waging influence operations' across US education system: Legal organization," *Alarabiya News* (2020), <https://english.alarabiya.net/News/gulf/2020/05/15/Qatar-is-waging-influence-operations-across-US-education-system-Legal-organization>; "Qatari influence on American education system," *The Lawfare Project* (2020), <https://www.thelawfareproject.org/campus-discrimination/2020/5/15/qatari-influencing-american-education-system>; Adam Kredo, "Qatar Waging Stealth Influence Operations Across U.S. Academic System, Documents Show," *The Washington Free Beacon* (2020), <https://freebeacon.com/national-security/qatar-waging-stealth-influence-operations-across-u-s-academic-system-documents-show/>.

¹³⁸ "Qatar National Vision 2030," *Government Communications Office, State of Qatar*, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://www.gco.gov.qa/en/about-qatar/national-vision2030/>.

¹³⁹ "Lecture on QF's Role in Promoting Qatar's Image in Global Diplomacy," *Qatar News Agency* (2023), <https://www.qna.org.qa/en/News-Area/News/2023-01/19/0031-lecture-on-qf-s-role-in-promoting-qatar-s-image-in-global-diplomacy>.

¹⁴⁰ "25 Years of Impact: How QF's Unique University Model Has Shaped Lives, and Helped Shape a Nation," *LinkedIn* (2023), <https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/25-years-impact-how-qfs-unique-university-model-has-shaped/>; "Student Loans, Scholarships, and Financial Aid," *Qatar Foundation*, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://www.qf.org.qa/education/higher-education/financial-aid>.

Qatari state image through grooming sympathetic student populations at prestigious foreign universities.

Importantly, this informal ambassador corps seemingly serves to project state interests abroad. Indeed, QF proudly boasts that its graduate class volunteers for Qatar's diplomatic corps.¹⁴¹ The willing graduates' promotion of Qatar's interests seemingly demonstrates the success of this image management.

Several prominent U.S. universities that are hosted under the umbrella of the Education City Development (Qatar Foundation) initiative have established campuses in Qatar, these include:

- Texas A&M University
- Virginia Commonwealth University
- Georgetown University
- Weill Cornell University
- Northwestern University
- Carnegie Mellon University

These institutions operate under the governance of QF through formal agreements.¹⁴²

The State of Qatar has appeared to surreptitiously exert improper influence over academic activities at U.S. universities by concealing the full terms of contractual partnerships.¹⁴³

Qatar claimed that it could not reveal the details of university contracts due to "confidential commercial information."¹⁴⁴ When legally compelled, universities only

¹⁴¹ Fazeena Saleem, "QF's accessibility volunteers to play key role during World Cup," *The Peninsula* (2022), <https://thepeninsulaqatar.com/article/06/11/2022/qfs-accessibility-volunteers-to-play-key-role-during-world-cup>; "QF volunteers support Afghan refugees in Qatar" (2021), <https://www.qf.org.qa/stories/qf-volunteers-support-afghan-refugees-in-qatar>.

¹⁴² Examples of agreements between QF and U.S. universities: "Qatar Contract," *Scribd*, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://www.scribd.com/doc/303148835/Qatar-contract>; "VCUQ Operating Agreement With Qatar Foundation," *Scribd*, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://www.scribd.com/document/292402939/VCUQ-Operating-Agreement-with-QF>.

¹⁴³ "QF Objections To TAMU Public Information Request – REDACTED," *Scribd*, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://www.scribd.com/doc/294583790/QF-Objections-to-TAMU-Public-Information>.

¹⁴⁴ "QF Objections To TAMU Public Information Request – REDACTED," *Scribd*, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://www.scribd.com/doc/294583790/QF-Objections-to-TAMU-Public-Information-Request-REDACTED>.

published two redacted contracts.¹⁴⁵ What is more, this minimal disclosure was forced by the U.S. Department of Education initiating proceedings.¹⁴⁶

Initially, QF rejected requests to publish agreements with Texas A&M, falsely asserting that the contracts contained proprietary commercial details.¹⁴⁷ Under legal pressure, Qatar eventually disclosed limited contextual information, along with generic contractual language.¹⁴⁸

Such secrecy perhaps indicates Qatar's intention to suppress evidence of improper academic influence, rather than a professional effort to protect commercial secrets. Qatar's reluctance to publish contractual agreements only serves to augment suspicion over the states illicit influence over academic matters.

Texas A&M and Qatar Agreement

Texas A&M and Qatar share an agreement that involves one billion USD of funding and hundreds of research projects.¹⁴⁹ Click [here](#) to see the full agreement. It is suspected that many of the projects and some of the funding have not been reported to the Federal Government as required by U.S. legal requirements.¹⁵⁰ To view ISGAP's Report on "Hijacking Higher Education: Qatar The Muslim Brotherhood and Texas A&M," please click [here](#).

We have identified the following clauses as problematic:

- Article 1.1.3 states that the Qatar Foundation must fund TAMUQ at "levels sufficient to ensure that TAMUQ maintains the quality standards required by this Agreement." *This implies that Qatar can leverage funding to shape academic standards to fit its preferences.*

- Article 2.2.1.2 asserts that changes to curriculum require "advance consultation with Qatar Foundation if there are "significant budgetary or academic impact[s]." *This consultation clause gives Qatar sway over course offerings.*

¹⁴⁵ "QF Objections To TAMU Public Information Request – REDACTED," *Scribd*. <https://www.scribd.com/doc/294583790/QF-Objections-to-TAMU-Public-Information-Request-REDACTED>; "Qatar Contract," *Scribd*. <https://www.scribd.com/doc/303148835/Qatar-contract>; "VCUQ Operating Agreement With Qatar Foundation," *Scribd*. <https://www.scribd.com/document/292402939/VCUQ-Operating-Agreement-with-Qatar-Foundation>

¹⁴⁶ "QF Objections To TAMU Public Information Request – REDACTED," *Scribd*, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://www.scribd.com/doc/294583790/QF-Objections-to-TAMU-Public-Information-Request-REDACTED>.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid*.

¹⁴⁸ "Qatar Contract," *Scribd*; "VCUQ Operating Agreement With Qatar Foundation," *Scribd*.

¹⁴⁹ "Documents Show Texas A&M Appeared to Receive Almost \$500 Million in Grants from Qatar Regime," *Judicial Watch* (2023), <https://www.judicialwatch.org/texas-am-grants/>.

¹⁵⁰ "VOLUME II Examining Undocumented Foreign Funding of American Universities: Implications for Education and Rising Antisemitism," *ISGAP*.


- Article 2.3.2 sets targeted percentages for Qatari student enrollment. *This gives Qatar the ability to override normal admissions based on merit alone.*
- Article 2.7 mandates that TAMUQ "shall cooperate" with Qatar Foundation affiliates on matters like joint faculty appointments, programs and degrees. *This subjects academics to Qatar's strategic interests.*
- Article 2.13 prohibits TAMU from establishing any competing engineering program in the Middle East without Qatar's approval during the agreement term. *This restricts TAMU's academic freedom.*
- Article 3.3 establishes a Joint Advisory Board, half Qatar-appointed, which reviews budgets, plans and academic assessments. *This inserts Qatar into academic governance.*
- Article 5.2.1 transfers TAMUQ property rights to Qatar Foundation. *This risks appropriation of academic work.*
- Article 6.3 states Qatar Foundation has final authority over annual budgets. *This enables financial pressure regarding unwanted programs or research.*
- Article 11.10 requires TAMU faculty and staff to adhere to Qatar's laws. *This includes restrictions on political expression, sexuality and other matters that conflict with norms of academic freedom.*

In summary, the agreement appears to grant Qatar ultimate control over academic standards, faculty, students, curriculum and budgets—thus, subordinating educational priorities to Qatar's national interests and severely compromising institutional autonomy.

Most importantly, Qatar gains ownership of the intellectual property of the outcomes of all projects, including sensitive nuclear and scientific research.

Qatar Foundation and Donations to Universities

The following diagram illustrates the financial flow of donations from Qatar to U.S. universities, totaling approximately 3 billion USD:¹⁵¹



According to the U.S. Department of Education, under Section 117 of the Higher Education Act (HEAA) 1965, colleges must disclose any foreign gifts or contracts

¹⁵¹ "Qatar Donations to Universities." <https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/>

exceeding 250,000 USD.¹⁵² This law aims to increase transparency around foreign money entering into U.S. higher education.

However, ISGAP's research has found that universities continuously fail to adequately report significant financial sums that are granted to universities. In fact, millions of Qatari funds were omitted from mandatory disclosures.¹⁵³

This violates Section 117 of the HEA, and is symptomatic a Qatari pattern to resist calls for transparency around university funding.¹⁵⁴

Other Methods of Transferring Funds Without Reporting:

Another way in which Qatar has been able to transfer funds is through collaboration on joint projects between different U.S. universities. To demonstrate, professors were paid salaries from joint projects with a U.S. university that received direct funding from the State of Qatar, through the NPRP Qatar National Research Fund (QNRF) program.¹⁵⁵ We have shown several examples of such cases at [Yale University](#).

Another method in which Qatar can transfer funds without reporting is by utilizing foreign companies to transfer money from Qatar into various universities. For example, funds were transferred to Yale University through Iberdrola and its subsidiary Avangrid.¹⁵⁶ Additionally, Santander Bank was involved in channeling funds to different faculties to support collaborative study programs with QF.¹⁵⁷

Notably, evidence indicates that the Spanish energy company, Iberdrola, and its American subsidiary, Avangrid, were utilized as conduits to indirectly channel

¹⁵² "College Foreign Gift and Contract Report," *College Foreign Gift Reporting*, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://sites.ed.gov/foreigngifts/>.

¹⁵³ "VOLUME II Examining Undocumented Foreign Funding of American Universities: Implications for Education and Rising Antisemitism," *ISGAP*.

¹⁵⁴ https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Yale_Non_Compliance_V8.pdf

¹⁵⁵ Wael Khedr, "Texas A&M at Qatar awarded 11 grants by QNRF that address Qatar's needs," *Qatar National Research Fund* (2018), <https://www.qnrf.org/Newsroom/Success-Stories/texas-am-at-qatar-awarded-11-grants-by-qnrf-that-address-qatars-needs-2>.

¹⁵⁶ "Iberdrola and Qatar sign agreement to strengthen their strategic alliance in innovation," *Iberdrola* (2022), <https://www.iberdrola.com/press-room/news/detail/iberdrola-qatar-sign-agreem>; "AVANGRID Strengthens Support for Energy Innovation by Extending Collaboration With Yale," *Business Wire* (2023), <https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20230515005763/en/>; Luther Turmelle, "Yale, Orange-based Avangrid announce innovation partnership," *CT Insider* (2019), <https://www.ctinsider.com/business/article/Yale-Orange-based-Avangrid-announce-innovation-14515683.php>.

¹⁵⁷ "QIA to sell 40% stake in Santander Brasil bank," *Qatar Tribune* (2017), <https://www.qatar-tribune.com/article/56632/BUSINESS/QIA-to-sell-40-stake-in-Santander>; "Reference Form – Banco Santander" (2011), https://www.santander.com.br/document/wps/Formulario_de_referencia_2011.pdf; "Yale University and Banco Santander expand partnership," *YaleNews* (2013), <https://news.yale.edu/2013/02/07/yale-university-and-banco-santander-expand-partnership>.

Qatari money into partnerships with U.S. universities without proper disclosure.¹⁵⁸ For example, Iberdrola appears to have routed payments from Qatar into joint clean energy research initiatives between Yale University and Avangrid.¹⁵⁹ This ultimately permits Qatar to surreptitiously fund academic programs at prestigious U.S. institutions through intermediary corporations.

Through failing to report these third-party transfers, Qatar is able to avoid scrutiny over its academic influence. The use of foreign corporate partners obscures the origin of funds from the Qatari state and circumvents the requirements to disclose foreign donations under Section 117 of the HEA. This suggests a deliberate intent to deny regulators insight into Qatar's academic investments.

Similarly, evidence suggests that the Spanish banking group, Santander enabled Qatar to surreptitiously channel payments into U.S. universities, including Yale, without proper disclosure.¹⁶⁰ For example, Santander financed academic initiatives and scholarships at Yale University in partnership with Qatari organizations.¹⁶¹ This indirect arrangement allows Qatar to support Yale University programs behind the guise of a multinational bank.

This lack of transparency raises concerns about the extent of Qatari ideological influence over academia. The scheme suggests that Qatar strategically exploited Santander to disguise its academic funding as generic corporate philanthropy. In essence, there appears to be intentional obfuscation as a means to prevent scrutiny over Qatar's educational agenda.

WISH and WISE.¹⁶²

The World Innovation Summit for Health (WISH) and World Innovation Summit for Education (WISE) initiatives of the Qatar Foundation enable Qatar to shape academic activities at U.S. universities through conferences and exchanges. The influence of QF over leadership programs within university faculties, aimed at

¹⁵⁸ "Main academic agreements," *Iberdrola*, accessed November 16, 2023,

<https://www.iberdrola.com/careers/students/iberdrola-u-university-program/main-agreements>.

¹⁵⁹ "AVANGRID Strengthens Support for Energy Innovation by Extending Collaboration With Yale," *Business Wire* (2023), <https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20230515005763/en/>.

¹⁶⁰ "Reference Form," *Santander* (2011),

https://www.santander.com.br/document/wps/Formulario_de_referencia_2011.pdf; "Yale Financial Report 2010 – 2011" (2011), https://your.yale.edu/sites/default/files/2010-2011_annual_financial_report_0.pdf.

¹⁶¹ "Leadership programs in Africa and Middle East created via Yale-The Santander Group partnership," *Yale News* (2014), <https://news.yale.edu/2014/06/05/leadership-programs-africa-and-middle-east-created-yale-santander-group-partnership?page=7>.

¹⁶² "The 2014-15 WISE Learners' Voice Program Concludes its First Residential Session," *Qatar Foundation*, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://www.press.qf.org.qa/the-2014-15-wise-learners-voice-program-concludes-its-first-residential-session/>; "31 take part in WISE session in Madrid," *The Peninsula Qatar* (2021), <https://thepeninsulaqatar.com/article/13/06/2017/31-take-part-in-WISE-session-in-Madrid>.

shaping future leaders, raises grave concerns about the potential dissemination of Islamist ideologies.

WISH and WISE organize conferences and educational programs which are sponsored by entities such as Santander Bank.¹⁶³ Through third-party involvement—and thus an illusion of impartiality—they are able to influence the development of curricula. What is more, the Summits fund U.S. university faculty members to visit Qatar for conferences and workshops, seemingly with the intent to manipulate their support.¹⁶⁴

For instance, WISH and WISE organize U.S. university faculty visits which are indirectly funded by Qatar, through third-parties like Santander Bank.¹⁶⁵ This allows Qatar to select prominent academic influencers to participate in sponsored Doha conferences.

As a result, Qatar gains faculty advocacy for pro-Qatari perspectives on campus. Indeed, academics are ultimately incentivized to incorporate pro-Qatari advocacy into their syllabi. Thus, Qatar is seemingly able to normalize its ideological imprint on American classrooms. This would seem to constitute inappropriate foreign pedagogical interference, masked by superficial academic engagement.

Whilst WISH and WISE present themselves as thought leadership forums, they actually appear to serve as influencer marketing tools, which allow Qatar to incentivize academics to embrace its ideology. Crucially, any manipulation of curriculum, or hiring through engineering faculty allegiances, violates principles of academic integrity.

It can be argued that Qatar's sway over campus discourse through WISH and WISE-sponsored faculty stifles critical analysis of Qatar.

National Priorities Research Program (NPRP) Program:¹⁶⁶

Qatar National Research Fund's (QNRF) National Priorities Research Program (NPRP) funding initiative sponsors academic research, integrating industry partners

¹⁶³ *Yale Jackson School of Global Affairs*, <https://worldfellows.yale.edu/>.

¹⁶⁴ “Speakers – WISE,” *Qatar Foundation*, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://www.wise-qatar.org/wise-2019/speakers-2019/>; “Marcus Alexander,” *Yale School of Medicine*, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://medicine.yale.edu/profile/marcus-alexander/?tab=bio>.

¹⁶⁵ “Salvador Medina,” *Qatar Foundation*, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://www.wise-qatar.org/biography/salvador-medina/>; “Dr. Michael Cappello,” *Qatar Foundation*, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://www.wise-qatar.org/biography/michael-cappello/>.

¹⁶⁶ “Qatar National Research Fund,” <https://www.qnrf.org/en-us/>.

that are aligned with Qatar's interests.¹⁶⁷ This collaboration essentially transfers technologies from the United States into Qatar, benefiting the Qatari state.

The NPRP constitutes another vehicle for Qatar to exert influence over U.S. universities under the pretext of collaborative scientific research.

The NPRP initiative sponsors projects that align with Qatar's national development goals and integrate Qatar-approved corporate partners into the state.¹⁶⁸ This allows Qatar to incentivize research that serves its economic and technological objectives.

In effect, the NPRP program mobilizes U.S. academia for Qatari benefit, through joint studies that often result in intellectual property transfers to Qatar.¹⁶⁹ Rather than pure scientific cooperation, asymmetrical agendas which favor the strategic priorities of the Qatari state are established.

The NPRP projects facilitated with U.S. universities provide Qatar with exclusive access to high-end research and development talent and technologies. Qatar's role in steering research toward areas like cybersecurity, IT and energy seems intended to uplift national industries.¹⁷⁰ This would constitute an inappropriate distortion of academic priorities to advance the economic interests of a foreign country and state-driven agendas.

For further information, please see ISGAP's Report on "[Hijacking Higher Education: Qatar, The Muslim Brotherhood and Texas A&M](#)" [here](#).

Patents:¹⁷¹

Public records reveal extensive patent registrations have been filed by QF, which originate from research partnerships with U.S. universities.¹⁷² These patents appear to represent Qatar's appropriation of U.S. technology. This suggests the systemic

¹⁶⁷ Qatar National Research Fund (QNRF), *FundIt*, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://fundit.fr/en/institutions/qatar-national-research-fund-qnrf>.

¹⁶⁸ "Qatar National Research Fund," *FundIt*.

¹⁶⁹ "Intellectual Property Policy," *Qatar National Research Fund*, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://www.qnrf.org/Funding/IP-Policy>.

¹⁷⁰ "Qatar National Research Fund," *Tasmu Digital Valley*, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://tdv.motc.gov.qa/Research-and-Development/Qatar-National-Research-Fund>.

¹⁷¹ Boeing & Qatar Foundation Patents – US 11,511,882 B2 IBERDROLA – US 2022/0103353 A1; "Patents Assigned to Qatar Foundation," *Justia Patents*, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://patents.justia.com/assignee/qatar-foundation>;

"How many patents does Qatar Foundation have?," *How Many Patents*, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://www.howmanypatents.com/reports-companies/qatar-foundation/>.

¹⁷² "Texas A&M at Qatar Graduate Named Co-Inventor for Patent," *Texas A&M University at Qatar* (2023), <https://www.qatar.tamu.edu/news-and-events/news/2023/08/02/texas-a-and-m-at-qatar-graduate-named-co-inventor-for-patent/>.

exploitation of U.S. academic resources, so that the Qatari state may reproduce U.S. intellectual property.

For instance, QF holds patents credited to prominent universities—including Yale—which do not appear to be intended for purely scientific purposes.¹⁷³ Rather, Qatar may utilize these institutional alliances to harvest innovation, technology and expertise, developed with U.S. funding and resources.

Significantly, Qatar gains exclusive rights to commercialize and reproduce U.S. academic discoveries. This gradual siphoning of intellectual capital violates norms of equitable academic cooperation, constituting a parasitic financial relationship.

The outflow of patented intellectual property from the United States into Qatar raises alarming concerns around the loss of competitive advantage across strategic sectors. Unfettered access enables Qatar to gain from decades of U.S. research and development.

¹⁷³ “David Katz, MD, MPH, FACPM, FACP, FACLM,” *Weill Cornell Medicine-Qatar*, accessed November 16, 2023, <https://qatar-weill.cornell.edu/event/certificate-in-population-health-and-well-being/faculty/profile/david-katz>.

Policy Recommendations

ISGAP, based on the research findings present in this Report, contends that it is urgent that a Federal Government investigation and intervention take place, and recommend the following actions be undertaken immediately:

1. All institutions where the ruling family of Qatar have a controlling interest. For instance, Al Jazeera Media Network and Al Jazeera International, and all subsidiaries, should be registered under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) 1938.
2. FARA requires certain agents of foreign principals who are engaged in political or other activities, specified under the statute, to make periodical public disclosure of their relationship with the foreign principal, as well as activities, receipts and disbursements in support of those activities.
3. Congressional Hearings should be convened to fully understand the impact of Qatar's aggressive investment strategies and assess their influence on Western democratic values and potential security implications.
4. Investigate universities that take funds from Qatar, and assess the impact on education and curriculum, scholarship, and discourse. Is this a cause of the explosion of antisemitism in higher education that has placed Jewish students and faculty in difficulties?
5. Financial records must be disclosed regarding all WISH and WISE expenditures related to U.S. academia, including grantees and conference attendees. This should reveal the extent of Qatar's shadow influence over U.S. campuses, facilitated through these entities.
6. The contracts and communications which underlie collaboration with WISH and WISE must be published to ascertain the extent of this infringement on critical inquiry.
7. Full transparency regarding contract terms between Qatari entities and universities is needed to ascertain the full extent of Qatar's influence.
8. Qatar's NPRP funding and its influence over research collaboration with U.S. academia should be uncovered. Any manipulation of science to serve foreign policy interests violates principles of objective inquiry and academic freedom.
9. Full public disclosure of the entirety of QF's patent registrations derived from U.S. academia is necessary to ascertain the full extent of this transfer of innovation. Good-faith research collaboration cannot be a pretense for one-way transfer of discoveries to a foreign entity. Any facilitation of this harmful exploitation could potentially damage United States interests.

10. Close U.S. university campuses in Education City, Qatar. This includes Texas A&M University, Carnegie Mellon University, Northwestern University, Virginia Commonwealth University, Cornell University and Georgetown University campuses. Their operations enable Qatari soft power infiltration into U.S. academia, both ideologically and scientifically.
11. Prohibit any further direct Qatari Government funding to U.S. universities operating in Qatar or in the United States. Require full disclosure under the Foreign Agents Registration Act of any Qatar-linked funds already received by U.S. universities.
12. Open a Federal Government investigation into the non-reporting of foreign donations to U.S. universities, and take criminal action against systematic underreporting by U.S. universities and individuals of financial donations received directly or indirectly from Qatar. The investigation should explore the impact of Qatari funding on the increase of antisemitism in higher education.
13. Quash indirect funds that circumvent reporting requirements.
14. Add a provision to Section 117 of the Higher Education Act 1965 which mandates the disclosure of grantees who have any connection to Qatar directly or indirectly.
15. Establish ethics review boards at U.S. universities to monitor foreign funding sources and block unacceptable donations or partnerships compromising academic integrity and national security.
16. Enact further transparency laws requiring full public disclosure of any foreign contracts, grants or donations received by U.S. universities, including itemized reporting on collaborative projects, travel sponsorship, endowed faculty chairs and other benefits.