Illusions, objectivity, and non-reductive emergentism: Reply to Rose

Tony Cheng

doi:10.1177/03010066221127367

Illusions, objectivity, and non-reductive emergentism: Reply to Rose

Tony Cheng^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In the target article, David Rose makes an interesting and substantive case against a certain kind of sceptical view: “veridical perception is impossible in principle,” combined with a certain version of anti-realism. He proceeds by first illustrating several ideas from George Orwell’s seminal work, and then proposes that a certain kind of non-reductive, levelled emergentist metaphysics can help us respond to such scepticism. In this commentary, I join forces with Rose’s case, but will point out that we need to take seriously two discussions in contemporary philosophy in order to make the realist case stronger: the argument from illusion and hallucination, and the causal exclusion argument. Only then do Rose and his allies can have a more satisfactory case for objectivity and realism.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	847-852
Number of pages	6
Journal	Perception
Volume	51
Issue number	12
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1177/03010066221127367
Publication status	Published - 2022 Dec
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

causal exclusion
emergentism
illusion
non-reductive metaphysics
objectivity
realism
veridical perception

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
Ophthalmology
Sensory Systems
Artificial Intelligence

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10.1177/03010066221127367

Cite this

Cheng, T. (2022). Illusions, objectivity, and non-reductive emergentism: Reply to Rose. Perception, 51(12), 847-852. https://doi.org/10.1177/03010066221127367

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Illusions, objectivity, and non-reductive emergentism: Reply to Rose

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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