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China often invokes historical narratives to justify its territorial claims. Beijing, for example, has said that the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands, which it claims under the name of the Diaoyu Islands, “have been an inherent territory of China since ancient times.” 
officials have used the same words to back China’s right to parts of the northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. The government also claims that its sovereignty over the South China Sea is based on its own historic maritime maps.
However, in certain periods since ancient times China has also held sway over other states in the region —Mongolia, North Korea, South Korea, and Vietnam. Yet Beijing is currently not laying claim to any of these.
Instead, Beijing has embraced a selective irredentism, wielding specific chapters of China’s historical record when they suit existing aims and leaving former Chinese territories be when they don’t.
“China’s national power has increased significantly, reducing the benefits of compromise and enabling China to drive a much harder bargain.”
In this context, the CCP has expanded its irredentist ambitions. After the discovery of potential oil reserves around the Senkaku Islands, and the United States’ return of the islands to Japan in the 1970s, Beijing drew on its historical record to lay claim to the islands, even though it had previously referred to them as part of the Japanese Ryukyu Islands. Similarly, though Beijing and Moscow settled a dispute over Heixiazi Island, located along China’s northeastern border, in 2004, the 2023 map of China depicted the entire island (ceded, along with vast Pacific territories, by the Qing Dynasty to the Russian Empire in 1860) as part of its domain, much to the ire of the Russian Foreign Ministry.
Chinese territorial intransigence in the maritime arena is more about a strategic shift in the value of the seas around China.
Although it may say otherwise, Beijing’s unwillingness to let up on its tenuous territorial maritime claims suggests that China is pursuing long-held ambitions and global aspirations rather than attempting to reverse past losses. So long as the CCP wields its historical record selectively and changeably to serve its aims — and is willing to back its claims up with military action — China’s neighbors will remain at risk.
foreignpolicy.com/2024/03/18/tai
officials have used the same words to back China’s right to parts of the northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. The government also claims that its sovereignty over the South China Sea is based on its own historic maritime maps.
However, in certain periods since ancient times China has also held sway over other states in the region —Mongolia, North Korea, South Korea, and Vietnam. Yet Beijing is currently not laying claim to any of these.
Instead, Beijing has embraced a selective irredentism, wielding specific chapters of China’s historical record when they suit existing aims and leaving former Chinese territories be when they don’t.
“China’s national power has increased significantly, reducing the benefits of compromise and enabling China to drive a much harder bargain.”
In this context, the CCP has expanded its irredentist ambitions. After the discovery of potential oil reserves around the Senkaku Islands, and the United States’ return of the islands to Japan in the 1970s, Beijing drew on its historical record to lay claim to the islands, even though it had previously referred to them as part of the Japanese Ryukyu Islands. Similarly, though Beijing and Moscow settled a dispute over Heixiazi Island, located along China’s northeastern border, in 2004, the 2023 map of China depicted the entire island (ceded, along with vast Pacific territories, by the Qing Dynasty to the Russian Empire in 1860) as part of its domain, much to the ire of the Russian Foreign Ministry.
Chinese territorial intransigence in the maritime arena is more about a strategic shift in the value of the seas around China.
Although it may say otherwise, Beijing’s unwillingness to let up on its tenuous territorial maritime claims suggests that China is pursuing long-held ambitions and global aspirations rather than attempting to reverse past losses. So long as the CCP wields its historical record selectively and changeably to serve its aims — and is willing to back its claims up with military action — China’s neighbors will remain at risk.
foreignpolicy.com/2024/03/18/taiポストを翻訳
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