1. Complex weapons such as the WMD/delivery systems include precise parts
2. Production of precise parts relies on subtractive processes
3. Which had overwhelmingly relied on the manual control even in 1991
4. But have been radically computerized since then
5. As the production of precise parts switched from the manual to computer control, the labor capable of producing precise parts (-> weaponry) manually was lost
6. The tactic knowledge has been lost, too
7. Which cements transition and makes it absolutely and 100% irreversible
8. No military industrial complex in the world can produce precise parts at a consistent quality other than based on the computer control
9. That includes every military industry including Russia, China, N. Korea, Iran
10. Iran may be the only one who even tries to obfuscate it
11. Supply chain is controlled by a handful of countries in Western Europe and developed East Asia
12. That includes machines produced (or “produced”) in Russia, etc
13. E.g. Russia-produced machines invariably operate with Siemens, Fanuc, or Heidenhain CNC, Siemens PLC etc
14. Domestic production = assembling machines from the European/Japanese components
15. There is almost zero Russian components in Russia-produced machines
16. (Except for beddings, casings, some non precision bearings, etc)
17. Everything requiring precision is imported
18. As the manual labor that the Soviet war production relied upon no longer exists, Russia ended up absolutely dependent upon the computer controlled equipment
2. Putin’s military buildup has been based upon the mass import of computer controlled equipment from the US allies
20. Consistently, the Russian military manufacturing base consists of:
First and foremost, Western European
Then, Japanese, Taiwanese and Korean
And to a far lesser degree North American equipment
These are the machines that secure Russian capacity to produce weaponry
21. Let's look at the top-20 machining centres suppliers 2000-2021. This is a not bad approximation for the Russian military manufacturing base structure. In other words, what machines does the Russian military industry work with
W. Europe + developed E. Asia
China is small
22. China is a catching development producer on an early stage of its learning progress. It is developing rapidly, but there is an awfully long road to go
23. Which cannot be passed otherwise than by learning from and cooperating with Europe + Japan
24. I will elaborate later
Q&A
Q: What are the practical implications of the Russian military manufacturing base consisting of the European + developed East Asian machines?
A: First, when you buy a machine you become permanently dependent upon the continuous supply of the spare parts and expendables
Consequently, your capacity to produce weaponry will be absolutely dependent upon your capacity to secure the timely and uninterrupted supplies of spare parts and expendables, primarily from the Western European and developed East Asian producers
And Russia *has* secured them
More specifically, your capacity to produce weaponry will be absolutely dependent upon the supply of spare parts and expendables of the *guaranteed quality*
Consistent quality of the hardware compensates for the very, very uneven quality of your labor
Every experiment creates a potential point of failure. Considering the very uneven quality of your workforce, any attempts for "creativity" will fuck up your production base in no time
Ergo, you cannot experiment. You *must* acquire parts & expendables of the guaranteed quality
For this reason, cutting the ongoing an uninterrupted supply of new machines as well as the spare parts and expendables for the existing machines from the U.S. allies is of primary importance for undermining the Russian war efforts and the capacities for the nuclear blackmail
Q: And how can we do it?
A: Sanction the entire Russian machine tool industry, including:
1) Producers 2) Distributors 3) Service & maintenance companies
In practical terms, it may be very difficult to distinguish between 1, 2 and 3. So there is no need to. Sanction them all
Q: Is there anything else we can do?
A: Yes. The Russian military production heavily relies upon the ongoing support and maintenance by the Western hardware producers/software providers. This is the major problem that has not been addressed anywhere adequately
Buying a machine tool is not like buying a pen. It is very often more like buying a Tesla. Which means that the consumer (Russian military plant) is not necessarily granted the full control over the machine. The producer very often keeps the back, or rather front, doors to it
As Russian capacity for producing weaponry is absolutely reliant upon the foreign CAD - CAM - CNC, it is necessary to cut the ongoing support, maintenance and updates by the Western companies
Start with abolishing this imbecile (or cunning) exemption in the EU sanction regime
To summarise:
- To produce/maintain weaponry you need precise parts
- That Russia can no longer produce manually
- Making it absolutely dependent upon the CAD-CAM-CNC technology
It is the ongoing Western supplies, support and maintenance that keeps Russia a "nuclear power"
If you think that the topic of military production, its bottlenecks and chokepoints is important, you can fund my work and accelerate my progress by:
“They” who “know better” do not exist as a coherent group. There’s no “them”
If I were to name the most underrated force in the world, I would choose the information asymmetry. We systematically and semis-consciously underestimate how great it is https://t.co/bRt4mSEHxH
“They can’t do something so obviously stupid/irrational”
Is usually wrong. They absolutely can. Why?
Because it is NOT obvious. You mistakenly think it is obvious because you ignore the elephant in the room - the information asymmetry
Which is more often than not a particular case of the worldview asymmetry and the asymmetry of conceptual frameworks. An even bigger elephant in the room
Soviet military doctrine was shaped by the WWII experience
Russian military doctrine was shaped by the Gulf War impression
The former felt the need to build a strong land army. The latter felt no need to. Very large missile forces + small expeditionary corps was deemed enough
The Russian military doctrine was built upon assumption that a small expeditionary corps will be enough to crush any rival on the post-Soviet space. Meanwhile, large missile forces will disincentivize external players from interfering
Strategic missiles were heavily prioritised
As a result, the Russian army was heavily lopsided. Very strong missiles, very weak land army. The former would compensate for the weakness of the latter
Much of what is usually referred to as "expertise" (believe the experts) is just infallibility ex cathedra ideology. It is based on a social convention and not on the objective reality. In contrast, the craftsman expertise is real, very difficult to pick and impossible to fake
One of the most destructive effects of the post-Soviet collapse on the Russian military production was the loss of craftsmanship -> tacit knowledge. Sometimes you can reverse engineer the technology later. Sometimes you can't. Anyway, much of it has been lost irreversibly
The vast qualitative gap in the machine tool production is of major strategic significance. First, catching development producers produce subpar equipment. Second, supply chain for their production starts in Western Europe or Japan for the lack of alternatives
See Russia (2015)
In 2015, the Russian gov saw itself as absolutely dependent upon the import of machine parts from the Western Europe and Japan. In no single category did it see a chance of substituting the European and the Japanese critical components with the Chinese production