I really enjoyed Mel Andrews’ recent essay: "Philosophy in the Trenches and Laboratory Benches of Science" and its main point that “every laboratory needs a philosopher.” This point is made in the context of a concern about “the industrialisation of science”:

Not all of the shifts of recent history have constituted improvements to science, in either its truth-seeking capacity or its social responsibility. I allude to the industrialisation of science. To the corporatisation, the commodification, and the militarisation of science….

The so-called replication crisis has come about, in large part, because generations of behavioural scientists have been instructed in assembly-line procedures rather than modes of questioning and critical analysis.

This concern about the industrialisation of science reminded me of something that statistician Ronald Fisher wrote many years ago when he argued that the Neyman-Pearson approach to hypothesis testing is more suitable for “acceptance procedures” used during quality control on industrial production lines than for scientific research:

I am casting no contempt on acceptance procedures, and I am thankful, whenever I travel by air, that the high level of precision can really be achieved by such means. But the logical differences between such an operation and the work of scientific discovery by physical or biological experimentation seem to me so wide that the analogy between them is not helpful, and the identification of the two sorts of operation is decidedly misleading (Fisher, 1955, pp. 69–70).

As I’ve discussed elsewhere, the production line analogy assumes an inappropriate amount of knowledge and certainty on the part of scientists (Rubin, 2020). Unlike quality controllers on a factory production line, scientists don’t know the relevant and irrelevant features of their populations and testing conditions. Factors that they theorize to be essential for demonstrating an effect may turn out to be unimportant, and factors that they assume to be unimportant may turn out to be essential! Indeed, one of the key differences between scientific research and quality control is that scientists can learn what’s important and unimportant from their replication failures, whereas quality controllers merely consign their “bad batches” to the garbage. Hence, like Andrews, I see a clear link between the replication crisis and the industrialisation of science (e.g., Rubin, 2021, p. 5829).

Andrews also describes the industrialisation of science as a:

broad-sweeping prohibition against “theorising” – and by this it is meant any and all forms of sustained critical thought about or questioning of the scientific work

Again, this description rings true for me. In particular, it reminds me of Kerry Chamberlain’s (2000) description of “methodolatory,” which consists of:

1. An overemphasis on locating the ‘correct’ or ‘proper’ methods

2. A focus on description at the expense of interpretation

3. The avoidance of theory, and

4. Avoidance of the critical

As Chamberlain explained “methodolatry…works to prevent us looking at the assumptions behind our research.” Andrews’ proposal of a philosopher-in-the-lab should provide an important safeguard against methodolatory:

Every laboratory needs to have someone who understands broadly and intimately what is going on and who is empowered to ask questions, to stand back from the laboratory bench or the telescope or the command line and ask: What are we really trying to determine here, and to what end? Will it be of benefit or detriment to mankind? Are the assumptions and idealisations that we have made along the way warranted? Where do our driving theories, models, and representations of the phenomena under study stand in relation to rival or complementary conceptualisations? How are we best to interpret and contextualise the results of our modelling or experimental work? Are our instruments of measurement and analysis, our conceptual repertoire, up to the task at hand?

Andrews concludes that:

Every laboratory needs a philosopher. The philosopher’s role, however, is not only to philosophise on behalf of scientists, but to re-educate scientists in how to philosophise for themselves.

This seems like a good idea. In recent years, statisticians and methodologists have made excellent contributions to re-educating scientists in the wake of the replication crisis. Philosophers should be key members of this educational team!

The Article

Andrews, M. (2023). "Philosophy in the trenches and laboratory benches of science": An essay by Mel Andrews. The Philosopher, 111(1). https://www.thephilosopher1923.org/post/philosophy-in-the-trenches-and-laboratory-benches-of-science