Prigozhin's mutiny looks shady. And that is fine. Many coup stories sound shady even in retrospective, as they often included some elements of 4D chess by the political leadership. Still, their consequences were real.
So let's talk of the consequnces🧵
Raising a mutiny in the south, far off from the capital may sound like a dumb plan. Unless this was not a plan at all. My hypothesis: it looks like a false start
23 June - Wagner mutiny
24-25 June - "Scarlet Sails" in St Petersburg
Both Putin and Medvedev were expected to come
The ruling gang is first and foremost a St Petersburg gang. The core of the Russian leadership including Putin, Medvedev and many others including Prigozhin were originally an extensive crony network from St Petersburg. With Putin's succession in 2000 they became the regime
Raising a mutiny in the south is a suboptimal plan for a coup
Seizing both the emperor and his heir apparent (seen as such by the elites) is the best plan ever
I don't have any evidence for it. It is just what makes sense. This is what any reasonable person would think of
A somewhat suboptimal plan to march from Rostov-on-Don to Moscow makes more sense if this was not a plan at all, but rather a backup solution once the Plan A did not work out
The best Plan A for a coup in a hypercentralised country would be seizing both the ruler and his heir
The Scarlet Sails is the yearly celebration culminating the White Nights Festival in St Petersburg. Its symbolism is based on the Alexander Grin's novel everyone in Russia knows
Putin usually *does* visit it. He came in 2022. In 2023, he was expected to come with Medvedev
Long story short, this looks like a false start operation that had to be launched earlier than planned. Perhaps, just one day earlier
At least that is what I think of
This mutiny could involve elements of 4D chess. Events like these often do. In this case, Putin could have a motive to stage an internal conflict to justify getting out of the external one
But 4D chess like this is extremely risky. Everything can go wrong and it very often does
It is highly probable that Kornilov's rebellion in September 1917 involved 4D chess play by Alexander Kerensky. It worked out in a sense they suppressed Kornilov. And by doing so, they paved the way to the Bolsheviks
September 1917 - 4D chess
November 1917 - October Revolution
Interestingly enough, Putin himself is drawing the parallels with 1917 :
"Actions undermining our unity constitute the apostasy of the nation... This is a backstab of our country and our people. Exactly this kind of backstab happened in 1917, when our country fought in the WWI"
These parallels are no accidental. What is happening is Russia is much alike 1917 than 1991. While most observers discuss the potential fall of Putin's regime, it would have been more accurate to frame it as the end of Lenin's regime. Or even better, of Lenin's assabiyah
According to Ibn Khaldun, an assabiyah typically lives for four generations: from the conquest to the downfall. It very, very rarely outlives this span. If I remember correctly, Ibn Khaldun himself could name only one single exception to the rule
Four generations, and that's it
For the current Russian regime its founding conquest happened in 1917. Revolution was a radical break, in a sense that it fully replaced the pre-existing elites. The old ruling classes were persecuted into the oblivion and often physically exterminated
A feth accompli
What followed next was again the typical assabiyah dynamics. The initially democratic assabiyah, once a broad coalition of heterogenous forces, consolidates into a centralised, hierarchical structure with the codified dogma headed by a semi-divine Supreme Ruler
Supreme ruler usurps all the glory of the conquest just for himself and gets rid of his old comrades
Very, very typical
But with all the countless old party members slaughtered, 1937 does not constitute a break anywhere comparable with the 1917. Elites massacred, but not fully replaced. So once the usurper dies, you may have a successful attempt of an aristocratic restoration
I would even say that the public discourse on Stalin and Stalin's repressions has a strong aristocratic flavour. Much of it is just the aristocratic criticism of an absolute monarchy. Hence the exaggerated focus on purges against specifically the Old Bolsheviks, etc
Putin may be critical of Lenin and his legacy. But the origins of the current regime derive from 1917. Lenin's regime has organically evolved into Stalin's, Stalin's into the Khruchev's and all the way to Putin with no radical breaks or replacement of the elites
Evolution
Consider this video of 1998. Prime Minister Kirienko introducing the newly appointed FSB director Vladimir Putin to the Federal Security Service he is now to lead
(Btw: He did not just introduce Putin. According to Yumashev, Kirienko had actively lobbied Putin's candidature)
Putin was grateful. He has a reputation for being grateful (an exceedingly rare quality). That is why he was chosen in the first place
Kirienko now effectively became a czar both for the domestic policy and for Ukraine
The closest we have to the Prince-Caesar Romodanovsky
What you should know, but probably did not:
46/85 of the Russia's governors graduated from the Kirienko-led "school of governors". More than half of Russian regions are directly managed by his men
Regional elites hate them all, of:
"Damn zombies" is a very typical feedback
"Zombies" should be read as a metaphoric description. Zombies (in this context) = people so brainwashed with a certain pseudo-scientific teaching and so trained into the meodologiya practices, that you just cannot deal, communicate or even negotiate with them
So what do:
a) Putin
b) the guy who promoted Putin in 1998 and whose appointees control more than half of the Russian regions in 2022
share their origins and genealogy-wise?
The work in Gorki. Gorki was Lenin's country residence in Moscow region
Putin's grandfather worked at Lenin's canteen as a cook
Kirilenko's great-grandfather headed this canteen
In a country like Russia they had the highest privilege one can have. The Access to the Body
If you do not fully comprehend what does the Access to the Body mean, then you should:
a) take yourself by the hair and smash your head on the table. Repeat 3 times
b) read this poem, especially focusing on stanza 3
"My grandfather did not sell the pancakes,
Did not blacken the Tsar's shoes,
Did not sing in the court chorus,
Did not jump into princes from the khokhols...
... So how can I be an aristocrat?"
Very accurate description of how does the social mobility work in the empire
Putin and Kirienko descend from the Lenin's assabiyah. Their ancestors were minor, servant-status members of the assabiyah, serving food to the Lenin's table. But the members nonetheless. Serving at the table = recipe for the upward social mobility
That's how it works
The assabiyah evolved from 1917 to 2023 largely uninterruptedly. There was no major replacement. And by now it is really old
Putin is the third generation
Kirienko is the fourth
And most likely, there will be no fifth one
What awaits Russia is the radical replacement of elites
Discussing the political developments in Russia as "the fall of Putin's regime" is spoiling the frame. It is not about the fall of Putin. It is about a demise of the entire assabiyah
Post-1917 replacement of elites was limited in scale. Post-1953, it was largely cosmetic. The 1990s to a significant extent were just the Komsomol leadersh changing a sign on their office door: "community-owned" NTTM -> private owned AMK
Same people, different circumstances
It is highly probable that in the coming years we will see a radical replacement of the ruling classes far exceeding anything we saw in the 1990s. The 1990s did not interrupt the continuity of the Soviet era elites. But the 2020s most probably will
The Western policy community used to discuss whether the fall and collapse of the Russian regime would be advantageous or risky. What they probably should be discussing however, is whether they are ready for this scenario if it just materialises without prior notice. The end🧵
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The mutiny is real. It is also unlikely to succeed. Most probable outcome is:
1. The mutiny fails 2. The regime stands (for a few months) 3. Upon its suppression, regime becomes increasingly dysfunctional -> falls
In other words, Kornilov putsch🧵
Let's start with the "real" part. A sizeable force of Wagner troops have left their positions in East Ukraine and entered the Russian region of Rostov Oblast. This is a real mutiny
It is also likely to fail. Not because there is few of them, but rather because they are far away
Russia is a hypercentralised country. Control over Moscow is the only thing that matters. And it is unlikely these fellows will be able to reach it, let alone occupy it
"Only those deserve to be called Communists who understand that it is impossible to build or implement socialism without learning from the [corporate] trust founders"
(Vladimir Lenin. On the Left-Wing Childishness. May 1918)
"For socialism is not a figment of the imagination, but the implementation and application of what had been created by the [corporate] trusts by the proletarian vanguard, which has seized power"
"We, the party of the proletariat, have no other way of acquiring the ability to organise large-scale production ... except by acquiring it from the first-class capitalist experts"
IF there are unprecedentedly wide sanctions imposed on Russia
BUT Russia is able to increase its production of cruise missiles
THEN the implementation and especially targeting of sanctions are wrong. Like actually, wrong
Military production base is not targeted
@McFaul you are doing it wrong. Your focus is wrong. You are not alone in doing it wrong, but it does not make your work any less wrong
To do it in a correct way, you must be targeting the production base. Not only the components, but the production processes themselves. Disincentivizing the U.S. allies-based companies to supply the metal-cutting, especially machining equipment would be a good start
Very good thread, I actually mostly agree with what is said here. Still, I will outline my own perspective on it:
First, it is of crucial importance to understand that the "popular uprising", generally speaking, is not a category of politics. It is a category of *theology* 🧵
We often see the debates on whether this or that upheaval constituts an "uprising" or a "coup". But the truth is that a successful uprising usually has at least an element of a military coup in it. If the military/paramilitary stands united for the regime, the regime will stand
In the popular perception a revolution is a miracle, a magic, when the impossible happens: the people defeat the regime. Hence, its theological significance. Credo quia absurdum
The element of absurdity is very important. If it is not absurd, it won't make a miracle
You unironically have some logical reasoning capabilities. Yes, that is exactly what happened. If in the 1960s the USSR still tried to compete, by the 1970s it essentially gave up. Consequently, Western imports comprised the ever increasing share of its high end consumption
By the 1970s Soviets could machine precise parts -> produce sophisticated weaponry either:
a) conventionally = essentially manually
b) on imported NC/CNC tools
That's it basically
And "manually" is not nearly as sexy as it sounds. First, supply of machinists that can do precision machining manually is highly inelastic. There's simply no way to train more in the short term perspective. At any given moment their quantity is given and you can't increase it