United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948)
U.S. Supreme Court
United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948)United States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations
No. 695
Argued April 28-29, 1948
Decided June 21, 1948
335 U.S. 106
Syllabus
A labor organization and its president were indicted for violations of § 313 of the Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, as amended by § 304 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, which prohibits contributions or expenditures by corporations and labor organizations in connection with federal elections. The indictment charged that the labor organization made, and its president consented to, expenditures for the publication of a weekly periodical, in a certain issue of which appeared an article by its president urging members to vote for a particular candidate in a forthcoming congressional election, and that it made expenditures for the publication and distribution of extra copies of that issue in connection with the election, but it did not charge that free copies were distributed to nonsubscribers, nonpurchasers, or persons not entitled to receive copies as members of the union. The District Court sustained a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Act, so far as it related to expenditures by labor organizations in connection with federal elections, violated the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution. The Government appealed directly to this Court under the Criminal Appeals Act.
Held:
1. The indictment does not state an offense under § 313 of the Act. Pp. 335 U. S. 107-110, 335 U. S. 120-124.
2. The interpretation here placed on § 313 is supported by the history, the language, and the purpose of the section, and by the fact that grave doubt as to its constitutionality would arise were it construed as applicable to the acts charged in the indictment. Pp. 335 U. S. 113-122.
3. On review under the Criminal Appeals Act, this Court is not required to pass upon the constitutionality of § 313 when the indictment does not state an offense under it. P. 335 U. S. 110.
77 F. Supp. 355, affirmed.
Respondents, a labor organization and an officer thereof, were indicted for violations of § 313 of the Corrupt Practices Act, as amended by § 304 of the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947. The District Court dismissed the indictment on the ground of unconstitutionality of the challenged provision of the Act. 77 F. Supp. 355. The Government appealed directly to this Court under the Criminal Appeals Act. Affirmed on another ground, p. 335 U. S. 124.
U.S. Supreme Court
United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948) United States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations No. 695 Argued April 28-29, 1948 Decided June 21, 1948 335 U.S. 106 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Syllabus A labor organization and its president were indicted for violations of § 313 of the Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, as amended by § 304 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, which prohibits contributions or expenditures by corporations and labor organizations in connection with federal elections. The indictment charged that the labor organization made, and its president consented to, expenditures for the publication of a weekly periodical, in a certain issue of which appeared an article by its president urging members to vote for a particular candidate in a forthcoming congressional election, and that it made expenditures for the publication and distribution of extra copies of that issue in connection with the election, but it did not charge that free copies were distributed to nonsubscribers, nonpurchasers, or persons not entitled to receive copies as members of the union. The District Court sustained a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Act, so far as it related to expenditures by labor organizations in connection with federal elections, violated the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution. The Government appealed directly to this Court under the Criminal Appeals Act. Held: 1. The indictment does not state an offense under § 313 of the Act. Pp. 335 U. S. 107-110, 335 U. S. 120-124. 2. The interpretation here placed on § 313 is supported by the history, the language, and the purpose of the section, and by the fact that grave doubt as to its constitutionality would arise were it construed as applicable to the acts charged in the indictment. Pp. 335 U. S. 113-122. 3. On review under the Criminal Appeals Act, this Court is not required to pass upon the constitutionality of § 313 when the indictment does not state an offense under it. P. 335 U. S. 110. 77 F. Supp. 355, affirmed. Respondents, a labor organization and an officer thereof, were indicted for violations of § 313 of the Corrupt Practices Act, as amended by § 304 of the Labor Management Page 335 U. S. 107 Relations Act of 1947. The District Court dismissed the indictment on the ground of unconstitutionality of the challenged provision of the Act. 77 F. Supp. 355. The Government appealed directly to this Court under the Criminal Appeals Act. Affirmed on another ground, p. 335 U. S. 124. MR. JUSTICE REED delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal presents a problem as to the constitutionality of § 313 of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, as amended by § 304 of the Labor Management Act of 1947. Section 313 of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act now reads as stated in the margin. [Footnote 1] Page 335 U. S. 108 An indictment was returned at the January, 1948, term in the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia on two counts charging in count I the Congress of Industrial Organizations and in count II its President, Philip Murray, with violation of § 313 of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act because of the publication and distribution in the District of Columbia of an issue, Vol. 10, No. 28, under date of July 14, 1947, of "The CIO News," a weekly periodical owned and published by the CIO at the expense and from the funds of the CIO and with the consent of its President, Mr. Murray. The number of "The CIO News" in question carried upon its front page a statement by Mr. Murray as President of the CIO, urging all members of the CIO to vote for Judge Ed Garmatz, then a candidate for Congress in Maryland at a special election to be held July 15, 1947. The statement said it was made despite § 313 in the belief that the section was unconstitutional because it abridged rights of free Page 335 U. S. 109 speech, free press and free assemblage, guaranteed by the Bill or Rights. The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that § 313, as construed and applied and upon its face, abridged as to the CIO and its members and Mr. Murray freedom of speech, press and assembly and the right to petition the government for a redress of grievances in violation of the Constitution; that the classification of labor organizations was arbitrary and the provisions vague in contravention of the Bill of Rights; and that the terms of the section were an invasion of the rights of defendants, protected by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. The District Court sustained the motion to dismiss on the ground that, as "no clear and present danger to the public interest can be found in the circumstances surrounding the enactment of this legislation," the asserted abridgment of the freedoms of the First Amendment was unjustified. [Footnote 2] 77 F. Supp. 355, 358. In the order granting the motion to dismiss, the District Court defined its ruling as follows: ". . . that that portion of Section 313 of the Corrupt Practices Act, as amended by Section 304 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, which prohibits expenditures by any labor organization in connection with any election at which Presidential and Vice Presidential electors or a Senator or Representative in, or a Delegate or Resident Commissioner to Congress are to be voted for, or in connection with any primary election or political convention or caucus held to select candidates for any of the foregoing offices, is unconstitutional." We accepted jurisdiction of the Government's appeal under the Criminal Appeals Act. 18 U.S.C. § 682 Page 335 U. S. 110 . The briefs and arguments submitted to us support and attack the constitutionality of § 313 of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act on its face -- at least so far as unconstitutionality is declared in the above order. We do not admit any duty in this Court to pass upon such a contention on an appeal under the Criminal Appeals Act except in cases of logical necessity. United States v. Petrillo, 332 U. S. 1. Although the case turned below on the constitutionality of the provision, the Criminal Appeals Act does not require us to pass upon the constitutionality of a federal statute where the indictment does not state an offense under its terms. United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 225 U. S. 81, 225 U. S. 88, 225 U. S. 97. Compare United States v. Carbone, 327 U. S. 633. Our first obligation is to decide whether the indictment states an offense under § 313. As we hereafter conclude that this indictment does not charge acts embraced within its scope, this opinion is limited to that issue. Indictment. -- The presently essential parts of the indictment are set out in the margin. [Footnote 3] It will be noted Page 335 U. S. 111 that paragraph (3) does not allege the source of the CIO funds. The paragraph indicates on its face that "The CIO News" was a regularly published weekly periodical of which the challenged issue was Vol. 10, No. 28. The funds used may have been obtained from subscriptions of its readers or from portions of CIO membership dues, directly allocated by the members to pay for the "News," or from other general or special receipts. We do not read the indictment as charging an expenditure by the CIO in circulating free copies to nonsubscribers, nonpurchasers or among citizens not entitled to receive copies of "The CIO News," as members of the union. The indictment, count I, paragraph (3), charged the CIO with making expenditures from its funds for "the cost of distribution" of the paper, in paragraph (6)(a), with paying approximately $100 for postal charges for the challenged issue and "causing said article to be distributed in the Third Congressional District of the State of Maryland and elsewhere in connection with the special election held in that Congressional District on the fifteenth day of July, 1947." In paragraph (6)(b), there are allegations about certain extra copies. These are set out in the marginal note 3 supra. The extras, we assume, were published pursuant to the order of Mr. Murray in the article. [Footnote 4] We conclude that the indictment charges nothing more as to the extras than that extra copies of the "News" Page 335 U. S. 112 were published for distribution and were distributed in regular course to members or purchasers, and that no allegation has been made of expenditures for "free" distribution of the paper to those not regularly entitled to receive it. Scope of Section 313. -- The construction of this section as applied to this indictment turns on the range of the word "expenditure," added to the section by § 304 of the Labor Management Act of 1947, as indicated in note 1 supra. "Expenditure," as here used, is not a word of art. It has no definitely defined meaning, and the applicability of the word to prohibition of particular acts must be determined from the circumstances surrounding its employment. The reach of its meaning raised questions during Congressional consideration of the bill when it contained the present text of the section. Did it cover comments upon political personages and events in a corporately owned newspaper? 93 Cong.Rec. 6438. Could unincorporated trade associations make expenditures? Id., 6439. Could a union-owned radio station give time for a political speech? Id., 6439. What of comments by a radio commentator? Id., 6439. Is it an expenditure only when A is running against B, or is free, favorable publicity for prospective candidates illegal? Id., 6440. What of corporately owned religious papers supporting a candidate on moral grounds? The Anti-Saloon League? Id., 6440. The purpose of Congress is a dominant factor in determining meaning. [Footnote 5] There is no better key to a difficult problem of statutory construction than the law from which the challenged statute emerged. Remedial laws are to Page 335 U. S. 113 be interpreted in the light of previous experience and prior enactments. [Footnote 6] Nor, where doubt exists, should we disregard informed congressional discussion. [Footnote 7] Section 304 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 is not a section without a history. Its earliest legislative antecedent was the Act of January 26, 1907, which provided: "That it shall be unlawful for any national bank, or any corporation organized by authority of any laws of Congress, to make a money contribution in connection with any election to any political office. It shall also be unlawful for any corporation whatever to make a money contribution in connection with any election at which Presidential and Vice-Presidential electors or a Representative in Congress is to be voted for or any election by any State legislature of a United States Senator. . . ." 34 Stat. 864-65. This legislation seems to have been motivated by two considerations. First, the necessity for destroying the influence over elections which corporations exercised through financial contribution. [Footnote 8] Second, the feeling that corporate officials had no moral right to use corporate funds for contribution to political parties without the consent of the stockholders. [Footnote 9] The next important legislation was The Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 1925. This statute was the legislative Page 335 U. S. 114 response to the decision of this Court in Newberry v. United States, 256 U. S. 232. Cf. United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299. The Newberry case held that federal limitation upon expenditures by candidates was unconstitutional as applied to expenditures made in the course of a primary election for the Senate. [Footnote 10] While that case did not directly concern itself with the Act of 1907, it was widely construed to have invalidated all federal corrupt practices legislation relating to nominations. Therefore, the 1925 Act reenacted the earlier prohibitions against corporate contributions for political purposes with two significant changes. The phrase "money contribution" of 1907 was changed to read "contribution," [Footnote 11] and primaries and conventions were expressly excluded from the scope of the legislation. [Footnote 12] The statute immediately preceding § 304 in time was the War Labor Disputes Act of 1943. [Footnote 13] This Act extended, for the duration of the war, [Footnote 14] the prohibitions of Page 335 U. S. 115 the Act of 1925 to labor organizations. Its legislative history indicates congressional belief that labor unions should then be put under the same restraints as had been imposed upon corporations. It was felt that the influence which labor unions exercised over elections through monetary expenditures should be minimized, [Footnote 15] and that it was unfair to individual union members to permit the union leadership to make contributions from general union funds to a political party which the individual member might oppose. [Footnote 16] When Congress began to consider the Labor Management Act of 1947, it had as a guide the 1944 presidential election, an election which had been conducted under the above amendment to the Act of 1925. In analyzing the experience of that election, a serious defect was found in the wording of the Act of 1925. The difficulty was that the word "contribution" was read narrowly by various special congressional committees investigating the 1944 and 1946 campaigns. [Footnote 17] The concept of "contribution" was thought to be confined to direct gifts or direct payments. [Footnote 18] Since it was obvious that the statute, as construed, could easily be circumvented through indirect contributions, § 304 extended the prohibition of § 313 to "expenditures." [Footnote 19] The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 was the subject of extensive debates in Congress. Embracing as Page 335 U. S. 116 it did a number of controversial issues, the discussion necessarily covered a wide range. It is not surprising therefore, to find congressional explanation of the intended scope of the specific provision of § 304, in issue here, scanty and indecisive. We find, however, in the Senate debates definite indication that Congress did not intend to include within the coverage of the section as an expenditure the costs of the publication described in the indictment. As we have stated above, there are numerous suppositional instances of acts by corporations or unions that approach the border line of the expenditures that are declared unlawful by § 313 of the Corrupt Practices Act. As we are dealing on this appeal with the scope of § 313 as applied to an indictment that charges certain allegedly illegal acts, we propose to confine our examination of legislative history to the statements that tend to show whether the congressional purpose was to forbid the challenged publication. For example, Senator Taft, the Chairman of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, and one of the conferees for the Senate, answered inquiries as follows (93 Cong.Rec. 6437, 6438, 6440): "MR. BARKLEY. Suppose the particular publication referred to by the Senator from Florida is published and paid for by subscriptions paid to the publication by the membership of that railway labor organization?" "MR. TAFT. That will be perfectly lawful. That is the way it should be done." "MR. BARKLEY. And suppose it is not paid for by union funds collected from the various labor unions?" "MR. TAFT. That will be perfectly proper." "* * * *" "MR. BARKLEY. The Senator from Ohio referred to the law prohibiting the making of direct or indirect Page 335 U. S. 117 contributions by corporations as a justification for making the same provision in the case of labor unions. Let us consider the publication of a corporation which, day after day, takes a position against one candidate and in favor of another candidate, and does so in its editorials. The editorials occupy space in that newspaper or publication, and the space costs a certain amount of money. Is that a direct or an indirect contribution to a campaign, and if it is neither, what is it?" "MR. TAFT. I would say that is the operation of the newspaper itself." "MR. BARKLEY. That is true; it is the operation of the newspaper. But I gathered the impression that, in referring to the present law prohibiting the making of contributions, directly or indirectly, by corporations, the Senator inferred that, if a corporation publishes a newspaper -- as most of them do -- and uses the editorials in that publication in advocacy of or opposition to any candidate, at least that is a direct contribution to the campaign. It could not be anything else." "MR. TAFT. I do not think it is either a direct or an indirect contribution. I do not think it is an expenditure of the sort prohibited, because it seems to me it is simply the ordinary operation of the particular corporation's business." "* * * *" "MR. BARKLEY. Mr. President, let me ask the Senator this question: let us suppose a labor organization publishes a newspaper for the information and benefit of its members, and let us suppose that it is published regularly, whether daily or weekly or monthly, and is paid for from a fund created by the payment of dues into the organization it represents. Let us assume that the newspaper is not sold Page 335 U. S. 118 on the streets, and let us assume further that a certain subscription by the month or by the year is not charged for the newspaper. Does the Senator from Ohio advise us that, under this measure, such a newspaper could not take an editorial position with respect to any candidate for public office without violating this measure?" "MR. TAFT. If it is supported by union funds, I do not think it could. If the newspaper is prepared and distributed and circulated by means of the expenditure of union funds, then how could a line be drawn between that and political literature or pamphlets or publications of that nature? It is perfectly easy for a labor union to publish lawfully a bona fide newspaper and to charge subscriptions for that newspaper, either by itself or as a corporation." "* * * *" "MR. BALL. In the case of most union papers, as I understand, the subscriptions from the union members are collected along with the dues, but they are an earmarked portion of the dues which the union collects and remits to the paper in the form of subscriptions. I take it that would be in a different category from the case where the union makes a blanket subscription and an appropriation out of union dues." "MR. TAFT. I think if the paper is, so to speak, a going concern, it can take whatever position it wants to." "* * * *" "MR. MAGNUSON: Teamsters' unions publish newspapers dealing with matters in which such unions are interested. The same is true of many other unions. If the pending measure becomes a law, from now on, such unions will be prohibited from advocating Page 335 U. S. 119 in their newspapers the support of any political candidates." "MR. TAFT. That is correct, unless they sell the papers they publish to their members, if the members desire to buy them. In such a case, there would be no expenditure for such a purpose of union funds." "* * * *" "MR. MAGNUSON: Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, let me ask him another question. All the funds of labor unions come from dues paid by their members. All the activities of the unions are based upon expenditure of funds provided by dues. That money is in the union's treasury. If the pending bill should become law, it would mean that all labor organs which are now in existence would, from now on, be prohibited from participating in a campaign, favoring a candidate, mentioning his name, or endorsing him for public office?" "MR. TAFT. No; I do not think it means that. The union can issue a newspaper, and can charge the members for the newspaper, that is, the members who buy copies of the newspaper, and the union can put such matters in the newspaper if it wants to. The union can separate the payment of dues from the payment for a newspaper if its members are willing to do so, that is, if the members are willing to subscribe to that kind of a newspaper. I presume the members would be willing to do so. A union can publish such a newspaper, or unions can do as was done last year, organize something like the PAC, a political organization, and receive direct contributions, just so long as members of the union know what they are contributing to, and the dues which they pay into the union treasury are not used for such purpose. " Page 335 U. S. 120 Senator Ellender, also one of the conferees made this statement: "May I say to the Senator from Florida, it is only in the event that union funds are used for political contributions that a union becomes liable. Mr. Green can talk all he wants to, if he pays for his own time or if the members of the union desire to make individual contributions for such a purpose. For another thing, most unions operate and manage newspapers, and the most of them are maintained by advertisements or by subscriptions from members of the union and from other sources. The proceeds from such newspapers are not union funds. In such cases, these newspapers can print anything they desire, and they will not violate the law so long as union funds are not used to pay for the operation of those newspapers for political purposes." 93 Cong.Rec.6522. Application. -- With this summary of the development of and quotation of excerpts from discussion in Congress concerning § 313, we turn to its interpretation and a determination as to whether it covers the circumstances charged in the indictment. Some members of the Court, joining in this opinion, do not place the reliance upon legislative history that this opinion evidences, but reach the same conclusion without consideration of that history. From what we have previously noted, it is clear that Congress was keenly aware of the constitutional limitations on legislation, and of the danger of the invalidation by the courts of any enactment that threatened abridgment of the freedoms of the First Amendment. It did not want to pass any legislation that would threaten interferences with the privileges of speech or press or that would undertake to supersede the Constitution. The obligation rests also upon this Court, in construing congressional enactments, to Page 335 U. S. 121 take care to interpret them so as to avoid a danger of unconstitutionality. [Footnote 20] If § 313 were construed to prohibit the publication, by corporations and unions in the regular course of conducting their affairs, of periodicals advising their members, stockholders or customers of danger or advantage to their interests from the adoption of measures or the election to office of men, espousing such measures, the gravest doubt would arise in our minds as to its constitutionality. [Footnote 21] Insofar as some of the many statements made on the floor of Congress may indicate the thought, at the time, by certain members of Congress that the language of § 313 Page 335 U. S. 122 carried a restrictive meaning in conflict with that which we have adopted, we hold that the language itself, coupled with the dangers of unconstitutionality, supports the interpretation which we have placed upon it. When Congress coupled the word "expenditure" with the word "contribution," it did so because the practical operation of § 313 in previous elections showed the need to strengthen the bars against the misuse of aggregated funds gathered into the control of a single organization from many individual sources. Apparently "expenditures" was added to eradicate the doubt that had been raised as to the reach of "contribution," not to extend greatly the coverage of the section. [Footnote 22] One can find indications in the exchanges between participants in the debates that informed proponents and opponents thought that § 313 went so far as to forbid periodicals in the regular course of publications from taking part in pending elections where there was not segregated subscription, advertising or sales moneys adequate for its support. Of course, a periodical financed by a corporation or labor union for the purpose of advocating legislation advantageous to the sponsor or supporting candidates whose views are believed to coincide generally with those deemed advantageous to such organization is on a different level from newspapers devoted solely to the dissemination of news, but the line separating the two classes is not clear. In the absence of definite statutory demarcation, the location of that line must await the full development of facts in individual cases. It is one thing to say that trade or Page 335 U. S. 123 labor union periodicals published regularly for members, stockholders or purchasers are allowable under § 313, and quite another to say that, in connection with an election, occasional pamphlets or dodgers or free copies widely scattered are forbidden. Senator Taft stated on the Senate floor that funds voluntarily contributed for election purposes might be used without violating the section, and papers supported by subscriptions and sales might likewise be published. [Footnote 23] Members of unions paying dues and stockholders of corporations know of the practice of their respective organizations in regularly publishing periodicals. It would require explicit words in an act to convince us that Congress intended to bar a trade journal, a house organ or a newspaper, published by a corporation, from expressing views on candidates or political proposals in the regular course of its publication. It is unduly stretching language to say that the members or stockholders are unwilling participants in such normal organizational activities, including the advocacy thereby of governmental policies affecting their interests, and the support thereby of candidates thought to be favorable to their interests. It is our conclusion that this indictment charges only that the CIO and its president published with union funds a regular periodical for the furtherance of its aims, that President Murray authorized the use of those funds for distribution of this issue in regular course to those accustomed to receive copies of the periodical, and that the issue with the statement described at the beginning of this opinion violated § 313 of the Corrupt Practices Act. We are unwilling to say that Congress, by its prohibition against corporations or labor organizations making an "expenditure in connection with any election" of candidates for federal office, intended to outlaw such a publication. Page 335 U. S. 124 We do not think § 313 reaches such a use of corporate or labor organization funds. We express no opinion as to the scope of this section where different circumstances exist and none upon the constitutionality of the section. Our conclusion leads us to affirm the order of dismissal upon the ground herein announced. It is so ordered. [Footnote 1] § 304, Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 159, enacted June 23, 1947: "Sec. 313. It is unlawful for any national bank, or any corporation organized by authority of any law of Congress, to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any election to any political office, or in connection with any primary election or political convention or caucus held to select candidates for any political office, or for any corporation whatever, or any labor organization to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any election at which Presidential and Vice Presidential electors or a Senator or Representative in, or a Delegate or Resident Commissioner to Congress are to be voted for, or in connection with any primary election or political convention or caucus held to select candidates for any of the foregoing offices, or for any candidate, political committee, or other person to accept or receive any contribution prohibited by this section. Every corporation or labor organization which makes any contribution or expenditure in violation of this section shall be fined not more than $5,000, and every officer or director of any corporation, or officer of any labor organization, who consents to any contribution or expenditure by the corporation or labor organization, as the case may be, in violation of this section shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both. For the purposes of this section 'labor organization' means any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work." The additions of 1947 are italicized. [Footnote 2] Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88; West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, and Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, were cited. [Footnote 3] "(3) That at all the times hereinafter mentioned, the said defendant CIO owned, composed, edited, and published a weekly periodical known as 'The CIO News', and the said defendant CIO paid all of the costs and made all of the expenditures necessary and incidental to the publication and distribution of said periodical, 'The CIO News', from the funds of the said defendant CIO, including the salaries of the editors and contributors and other writers of texts set forth in said periodical, including also the cost of the printing of the said periodical and the cost of the distribution of the said periodical, and all such payments and expenditures, including those representing the cost and distribution of the issue of said 'The CIO News' under date of July 14, 1947, and designated as Volume 10, No. 28, were made by said defendant CIO at Washington, in the District of Columbia, and within the jurisdiction of this Court." "(6)(b) That the defendant CIO also caused one thousand copies of the issue of the publication, 'The CIO News', dated July 14, 1947, and designated as the issue known as Volume 10, No. 28, to be specially moved and transported from Washington, District of Columbia, into the Third Congressional District of the State of Maryland, by mailing the said one thousand extra copies to the Regional CIO Director at Baltimore, Maryland, and caused the funds of the said defendant CIO to be expended in printing, packaging and transportation of said extra copies of the periodical, 'The CIO News', in connection with the aforesaid special election." [Footnote 4] The direction was in this form: "I therefore have directed and requested the editor of the CIO News to publish this statement, including the following paragraphs, and to give to this issue of the CIO News proper circulation among the members of CIO unions in the City of Baltimore, and particularly within the Congressional District in which this election is scheduled to take place." [Footnote 5] United States v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 482, 74 U. S. 486-487; Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U. S. 197, 190 U. S. 211; Fort Smith & W.R. Co. v. Mills, 253 U. S. 206, 253 U. S. 209; United States v. Katz, 271 U. S. 354, 271 U. S. 359; United States v. Guaranty Trust Co., 280 U. S. 478, 280 U. S. 485; Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 306 U. S. 381, 306 U. S. 391, note 4; United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U. S. 534, 310 U. S. 544. [Footnote 6] Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U. S. 103, 287 U. S. 108; Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U. S. 41. [Footnote 7] Harrison v. Northern Trust Co., 317 U. S. 476, 317 U. S. 479. [Footnote 8] See 40 Cong.Rec. 96; 41 Cong.Rec. 22. [Footnote 9] See Hearings before the Hous Committee on the Election of the President, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1906); 40 Cong.Rec. 96. In 1909, the Criminal Code of the United States, which codified, revised and amended the penal laws of the country, was passed. 35 Stat. 1088. The Act of 1907 was reenacted as § 83. 35 Stat. 1103. [Footnote 10] 36 Stat. 822, as amended by 37 Stat. 25. [Footnote 11] 43 Stat. 1074. "Contribution" was defined to include "a gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit, of money, or anything of value, and includes a contract, promise, or agreement, whether or not legally enforceable, to make a contribution." 43 Stat. 1071. [Footnote 12] 43 Stat. 1070. [Footnote 13] 57 Stat. 167. "It is unlawful for any . . . labor organization to make a contribution in connection with any election at which Presidential and Vice Presidential electors or a Senator or Representative in, or a Delegate or Resident Commissioner to Congress are to be voted for, or for any candidate, political committee, or other person to accept or receive any contribution prohibited by this section." [Footnote 14] 57 Stat. 168. "Except as to offenses committed prior to such date, the provisions of this Act and the amendments made by this Act shall cease to be effective at the end of six months following the termination of hostilities in the present war, as proclaimed by the President, or upon the date (prior to the date of such proclamation) of the passage of a concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress stating that such provisions and amendments shall cease to be effective." [Footnote 15] See Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Labor on H.R. 804, and H.R. 1483, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 4; S.Rep.No.101, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 24. [Footnote 16] See Hearings on H.R. 804 and H.R. 1483, supra, n 15, 117-18, 133; 89 Cong.Rec. 5334, 5792; 93 Cong.Rec. 6440. [Footnote 17] See H.R.Rep.No.2093, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 11; S.Rep.No.101, supra, n 15, 57-59; H.R.Rep.No.2739, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 39-40; S.Rep.No.1, Part 2, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 37, 38-39. [Footnote 18] See note 17 supra. [Footnote 19] This point was repeatedly emphasized in the Senate debates. See 93 Cong.Rec. 6436-39. [Footnote 20] United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366, 213 U. S. 407-408. "It is elementary when the constitutionality of a statute is assailed, if the statute be reasonably susceptible of two interpretations, by one of which it would be unconstitutional and by the other valid, it is our plain duty to adopt that construction which will save the statute from constitutional infirmity. Knights Templars Indemnity Co. v. Jarman, 187 U. S. 197, 187 U. S. 205. And unless this rule be considered as meaning that our duty is to first decide that a statute is unconstitutional, and then proceed to hold that such ruling was unnecessary because the statute is susceptible of a meaning which causes it not to be repugnant to the Constitution, the rule plainly must mean that, where a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter. Harriman v. Interstate Commerce Comm., 211 U. S. 407." Federal Trade Commission v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U. S. 298, 264 U. S. 307; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Boone, 270 U. S. 466, 270 U. S. 471-472; cf. Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U. S. 142, 275 U. S. 147. [Footnote 21] Compare "Free discussion of the problems of society is a cardinal principle of Americanism -- a principle which all are zealous to preserve." Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U. S. 331, 328 U. S. 346. "The case confronts us again with the duty our system places on this Court to say where the individual's freedom ends and the State's power begins. Choice on that border, now as always delicate, is perhaps more so where the usual presumption supporting legislation is balanced by the preferred place given in our scheme to the great, the indispensable democratic freedoms secured by the First Amendment." Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 323 U. S. 529-530. "For the First Amendment does not speak equivocally. It prohibits any law 'abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.' It must be taken as a command of the broadest scope that explicit language, read in the context of a liberty-loving society, will allow." Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 314 U. S. 263. [Footnote 22] 93 Cong.Rec. 6436, 6437, 6439. [Footnote 23] See 93 Cong.Rec. 6437-40. MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, concurring. In a government operating under constitutional limitations, there are obvious advantages in knowing at once the legal powers of the government. The desire to secure these advantages explains the strong efforts of some of the ablest members of the Philadelphia Convention to associate the judiciary through a Council of Revision in the legislative process. [Footnote 2/1] The efforts failed because the disadvantages of such a role by the judiciary were deemed greater than the advantages. And it cannot be too often recalled that the first Chief Justice and his Associates felt constrained to withhold even from the Father of his country answers to questions regarding which Washington was most anxious to have illumination from the Supreme Court, pertaining as they did to the President's powers during the Napoleonic conflict. See 3 Johnston, Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay (1891) 486-89, and 10 Sparks, Writings of Washington (1847) 542-45; and see Thayer, Legal Essays (1908) 53-54. Accordingly, the fact that it would be convenient to the parties and the public to know promptly whether a statute is valid has not affected "rigid insistence" on limiting adjudication to actual "cases" and "controversies." To that end, the Court has developed, "for its own governance Page 335 U. S. 125 in the cases confessedly within its jurisdiction, a series of rules under which it has avoided passing upon a large part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for decision." Mr. Justice Brandeis, concurring, in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 297 U. S. 345-346. See also, more recently, Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U. S. 450; Alma Motor Co. v. Timken-Detroit Axle Co., 329 U. S. 129; United Public Workers of America v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75; Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U. S. 549. A case or controversy in the sense of a litigation ripe and right for constitutional adjudication by this Court implies a real contest -- an active clash of views, based upon an adequate formulation of issues, so as to bring a challenge to that which Congress has enacted inescapably before the Court. The matter was thus put by an authoritative commentator: "The determination of constitutional questions has been associated with the strictly judicial function and so far as possible has been removed from the contentions of politics. These questions have been decided after full argument in contested cases, and it is only with the light afforded by a real contest that opinions on questions of the highest importance can safely be rendered." Charles Evans Hughes, The Supreme Court of the United States (1928) 32. Time has not lessened the force of the reason for this requirement of abstention as indicated by Chief Justice Marshall: "No questions can be brought before a judicial tribunal of greater delicacy than those which involve the constitutionality of a legislative act. If they become indispensably necessary to the case, the court must meet and decide them; but if the case may be determined on other points, a just respect for the legislature requires that the obligation of its laws should not be unnecessarily and wantonly assailed." Ex parte Randolph, 20 Fed.Cas. page 242, at 254, No. 11558, 2 Brock, 447, 478-79 (C.C.D.Va. 1833). Page 335 U. S. 126 In order that a contest may fairly invite adjudication, it is not necessary that the parties should be personally inimical to one another. On the other hand, the fact that the outward form of a litigation has not been contrived by pre-arrangement of the parties does not preclude want of a real contest which is essential to this Court's exercise of its function, one of "great gravity and delicacy," in passing upon the validity of an act of Congress. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, supra, at 297 U. S. 345, and cases cited in footnote 3. This prerequisite may be lacking though there be entire disinterestedness on both sides in their desire to secure at the earliest possible moment an adjudication on constitutional power. It may be lacking precisely because the issues were formulated so broadly as to bring gratuitously before the Court that for which there is no necessity for decision, or because they invite formulation of a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts of the situation or the terms of the assailed legislation. See Liverpool, N.Y. & P. S.S. Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration, 113 U. S. 33, 113 U. S. 39; see also Statement of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in Burco, Inc. v. Whitworth, 297 U.S. 724; Government's Brief in Landis v. North American Co., 299 U. S. 248. We are concerned here not with derogatory implications of collusion, nor have we a case of mootness with its technical meaning of a nonexistent controversy. The circumstances bring the present record within those considerations which have led this Court in the past "for its own governance of cases confessedly within its jurisdiction" to avoid passing on grave constitutional questions because the questions involving the power of Congress come before us not so shaped by the record and by the proceedings below as to bring those powers before this Court as leanly and as sharply as judicial judgment upon an exercise of congressional power requires. Page 335 U. S. 127 This case is here under the unique jurisdiction of the Criminal Appeals Act of 1907, as amended, whereby decisions of District Courts raise almost abstract questions of law regarding the invalidity or construction of criminal statutes, in that they do not come here in the setting of normal adjudications on the merits of a controversy. Compare United States v. Petrillo, 332 U. S. 1, with the subsequent adjudication on the merits in United States v. Petrillo, 75 F. Supp. 176. It is most important that such a decision result from due weighing of the considerations which alone can justify the invalidation of an Act of Congress. This implies that there be presented to a District Court the most effective and the least misapprehending legal grounds for supporting what Congress has enacted, while at the same time constitutional adjudication is sedulously resisted by presenting to the District Court alternative constructions of what Congress has written so as to avoid, if fairly possible, invalidation of the statute. The decision of the District Court in this case comes to us wanting in both respects. According to the District Court, the Government conceded that § 304 of the Taft-Hartley Act is an abridgment of "rights guaranteed by the First Amendment," but contended that "Congress has power under Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution to abridge First Amendment rights if it considers such a course necessary in maintaining the purity and freedom of elections." This representation of the Government's argument below is made in the opinion of the District Court not once, not twice, but thrice. [Footnote 2/2] At the bar of this Court, it was urged on behalf of the Government that the District Court misconceived the arguments of the Government, that what Page 335 U. S. 128 the District Court attributed to the Government is not what the Government argued below. But ordinary English words have lost all meaning if the District Judge does not say unequivocally and three times that that is what the Government has argued. It cannot be whistled away as a gauche manner of saying that, inasmuch as utterance may, under certain circumstances, be restricted, § 304 is not in violation of the First Amendment. That may have been the argument put to the court below, but, plainly enough, that court did not so understand it. Who is to say how the lower court would have dealt with the problem of constitutionality before it if the argument had been pitched differently than in the way in which it reached the court, or if the court's misapprehension had been corrected? No effort was made, by the familiar process of a petition for rehearing or for a clarification of the court's opinion, to see to it that the lower court manifested an understanding of the Government's contentions by not attributing an erroneous position to the Government. See, for instance, petition for rehearing in Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. 1, 304 U. S. 23. Again, the defendants did not urge below, as is ordinarily the way of defendants, a construction of the statute Page 335 U. S. 129 which would afford them the rights they claim -- but would secure those rights not by declaring an Act of Congress unconstitutional, but by an appropriate restriction of its scope. On its own motion, this Court now gives a construction to the statute which takes the conduct for which defendants were indicted out of the scope of the statute without bringing the Court into conflict with Congress. Who can be confident that such a construction, which salvages the statute and at the same time safeguards the constitutional rights of the defendants, might not have commended itself to the District Court and eventually brought a different case, if any, before this Court for review? I cannot escape the conclusion that, in a natural eagerness to elicit from this Court a decision at the earliest possible moment, each side was at least unwittingly the ally of the other in bringing before this Court far-reaching questions of constitutionality under circumstances which all the best teachings of this Court admonish us not to entertain. But since my brethren find that the case calls for adjudication, I join in the Court's opinion. I do so because of another rule of constitutional adjudication which requires us to give a statute an allowable construction that fairly avoids a constitutional issue. See my dissenting opinion in Shapiro v. United States, ante, p. 335 U. S. 36, decided this day. [Footnote 2/1] See 1 Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (1911) 21, 28, 94, 97 et seq., 105, 107, 109, 110, 111 et seq., 131, 138, 141, 144-45; 2 id. 71, 73 et seq., 294-95, 298 et seq. [Footnote 2/2] 1. "The government concedes that rights guaranteed by the First Amendment are abridged by the prohibition against expenditures by labor organizations in connection with elections; but it says that Congress has power under Article I, Section 4, of the Constitution to abridge First Amendment rights if it considers such a course necessary in maintaining the purity and freedom of elections." "Thus, the Court is confronted with the necessity of passing on the validity of Section 304 of the Act, insofar as it relates to expenditures by labor organizations in connection with federal elections." 2. "It is insisted by the government that Congress could abridge the freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment (which the government concedes was done here) because of its constitutional control over the manner of holding elections, and its consequent power to prevent corruption therein, and to secure clean elections." 3. "In support of its argument that congressional control over elections may be exercised in abridgement of rights protected by the First Amendment, the government points to the case of United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75." MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACK, MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS and MR. JUSTICE MURPHY join, concurring in the result. If § 313 as amended [Footnote 3/1] can be taken to cover the costs of any political publication by a labor union, I think it comprehends Page 335 U. S. 130 the "expenditures" made in this case. By reading them out of the section, in order not to pass upon its validity, the Court in effect abdicates its function in the guise of applying the policy against deciding questions of constitutionality unnecessarily. [Footnote 3/2] I adhere to that policy. But I do not think it justifies invasion of the legislative function by rewriting or emasculating the statute. This, in my judgment, is what has been done in this instance. Accordingly I dissent from the construction given to the statute and from the misapplication of the policy. I also think the statute patently invalid as applied in these circumstances. I The Court's interpretation of the section and the indictment are not entirely clear to me. But, as I understand the ruling, it is only that § 313 does not forbid labor unions to take part in pending elections, [Footnote 3/3] by publishing and circulating newspapers in regular course among their membership, although the costs of publication are paid from the union's general funds regardless of their source, i.e., whether from subscriptions, advertising revenues and returns from per copy sales, or from union dues and other sources. The line of coverage is marked without reference to the source from which the union derives the funds so Page 335 U. S. 131 expended, [Footnote 3/4] but by whether others than members of the union receive free copies of the publication; and by whether the publication is "in regular course," or only in casual or occasional distributions. Apparently, in the latter event, circulation limited to the membership would fall within the prohibition as well as free (and perhaps also paid) distribution outside that circle. The construction therefore comes down to finding that Congress did not intend to forbid these expenditures, though made from union funds, since they were made: (1) to sustain the publication of the union's political views; (2) in the regular course of publishing and distributing a union newspaper; (3) with distribution limited substantially [Footnote 3/5] to union members and not including outsiders. It is because applying § 313 to this type of expenditure would raise "the gravest doubt" of the section's constitutionality that the Court holds the section inapplicable. If such an interpretation were tenably supportable on any other basis, I should be in accord with this happy solution. But neither the language of the section nor its history affords such a basis, unless indeed it may be Page 335 U. S. 132 that the wording is so broad, comprehensive, and indefinite that any possible construction which would apply to a union's publication of its political views would be subject to equally grave constitutional doubt, and therefore was not intended to be covered. Indeed, so far as the present opinion concludes, that may be the case. For it does not hold that distribution outside the circle of membership, even in regular course, is forbidden, or, if so, the prohibition would be constitutionally permissible. Neither does it rule that either consequence would follow from casual or occasional distribution within or without that circle. At the most, it is indicated that the section more probably or possibly covers those situations than the one now eliminated. But there seems to be no corresponding intimation that the section would be valid in such coverage. In fact, the opinion points to no situation, relating to a union's expression of political views, which certainly could be taken as included, and validly so. This, of course, comes down to excluding the present circumstances, not to save the statute because there are other applications clearly and validly covered, but because there are such applications which may or may not be covered and which, if covered, may be equally or nearly as doubtful constitutionally. Such a course of construction, if followed in each instance of indictment on particular facts, would mean that the section could not apply in any instance of publication, because each would present "the gravest doubt" of constitutionality, and therefore would be excluded. The language of § 313, as amended, is sweepingly comprehensive. Insofar as presently pertinent it forbids labor unions as well as corporations ". . . to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any election at which . . . [the designated federal officers] [Footnote 3/6] are to be Page 335 U. S. 133 voted for," including primaries, conventions or caucuses held to select such candidates. (Emphasis added.) The crucial words are "expenditure" and "in connection with." Literally, they cover any expenditure whatever relating at any rate to a pending election, and possibly to prospective elections or elections already held. The broad dictionary meaning of the word "expenditure" takes added color from its context with "contribution." The legislative history is clear that it was added by the 1947 amendment expressly to cover situations not previously included within the accepted legislative interpretation of "contribution." [Footnote 3/7] The coloration added is therefore not restrictive; it is expansive. SeeHaven, Kansas Lawyers
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