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Medvedev's diatribes make sense if we consider that from Putin's standpoint the real threat must be coming from those already in power, rather than from the cartoonish & powerless opposition. And among those already in power, his own courtiers are by far the most dangerous
Like where else the threat may be coming from? From nowhere. People can never beat the army
1. Street protests? Well, they can't beat the army
2. Rebels (e.g. Caucasus). Same story. They can't beat the army
3. Regional barons. Same story, unless they have their own armies
1. Street protests? Well, they can't beat the army
2. Rebels (e.g. Caucasus). Same story. They can't beat the army
3. Regional barons. Same story, unless they have their own armies
4. Army itself. YES! Absolutely, yes. And that is a major reason for the Russian military setbacks. The army in Russia is not optimised for winning a foreign war. It is optimised for presenting as little threat to the regime as possible. At cost of the fighting power, of course
People can never beat the army -> You are secure from every internal threat possible, as long as you keep your grasp over the army. Now how do you do that?
(a) Direct control. Make your sons generals
(b) Political control. Fill it with commissars
(c) State security control.…
(a) Direct control. Make your sons generals
(b) Political control. Fill it with commissars
(c) State security control.…
4. Which brings us to the control over state security. FSB, FSO and SVR are the keystone in the Russian system of power. State security controls the army -> army can (and will) crush any internal threat. Control Siloviki and you are absolutely and 100% secure. Or are you?
In reality the Siloviki agencies which constitute the true keystone in the Russian power (as they control the army) are not a monolith. It is a complex system of factions, each maximising their own benefit at the cost of everyone else. The ruler Kremlin may incite or encourage…
The problem with Siloviki however, is that they cannot speak in their own name. It is not impossible, it just doesn't really happen. Direct rule by Siloviki seems logical, but in reality it would be too illegitimate and therefore, too unstable for that to plausibly materialise
Illegitimacy of the potential direct Siloviki rule should not be understood as the lack of "democratic legitimacy" (that crap is intangible here), but as the lack of real, actual legitimacy in the eyes of the ruling class. Like imagine some FSB general made a coup and took power.…
If there is no good answer to this question, it means anyone could potentially take his place. Which means anyone around is a potential danger to the ruler. A very unstable construction. For a regime to be stable, it needs to exclude (or minimise) potential claims to the throne
Putin has an answer to this question. He has been personally chosen and appointed by the previous ruler. Consequently, Putin is the legitimate ruler. His claim for the throne is unique (official heir), nobody else can make as good one -> his rule is stable 
Now imagine if the legitimate ruler (Putin) is overthrown and some rando takes his place. The rando's power would be illegitimate. It could be this rando, it could be that rando, it could be any rando. The regime would be unstable as any rando could now potentially push a claim…
Now let's assume that
A. Those who have something to lose are afraid of instability. Destabilising the country has a huge downside for have gots
B. It is up to have gots to threaten/not to threaten the Putin's rule. Have nots do not have this chance even hypothetically
A. Those who have something to lose are afraid of instability. Destabilising the country has a huge downside for have gots
B. It is up to have gots to threaten/not to threaten the Putin's rule. Have nots do not have this chance even hypothetically
1. Now Siloviki are the main have gots in Russia
2. Their leadership has the most to lose under any instability
3. And it is up to them to decide whether to threaten Putin
Overthrowal/not-overthrowal of Putin depends upon people who have every reason to fear destabilisation
2. Their leadership has the most to lose under any instability
3. And it is up to them to decide whether to threaten Putin
Overthrowal/not-overthrowal of Putin depends upon people who have every reason to fear destabilisation
For this reason, should a Siloviki faction try to kill/overthrow Putin, it is highly unlikely they would try to put one of their own on the throne. Why? A rando problem. Could be this rando, could be that rando -> any rando can press a claim -> destabilisation
Terrifying
Terrifying
Should a dissatisfied faction kill or overthrow Putin, they would most likely seek for a *legitimate heir* to replace him. No randos. No nonames. No competing claims for the throne. Legitimacy, stability, order
That's what have gots would do, rationally speaking
That's what have gots would do, rationally speaking
In the imperial era, they could have killed a Tsar and replaced him with his son. Or wife. Or cousin. Or another close relative. They would seek for a legitimate candidature. It is up for have gots to make a coup and have gots seek for legitimacy which secures stability
Should an elite faction rise against Putin now, whom would they replace him with? From a have got's perspective, you must optimise for legitimacy as legitimacy secures stability of the political and thus socio-economic order. You need a candidate with a legitimate claim
Now nobody in Russia has as good claim as Medvedev. His claim is technically as good as Putin's. Putin was appointed by the previous Tsar and Medvedev was. Yeah, he was chosen as the proxy. But it is the formality that makes the difference here. And Medvedev has *far* better… 
Which makes Medvedev an obvious replacement for Putin from the have gots perspective. He has a strong legitimate claim -> no rando can challenge it -> His regime could be stable -> His candidature is acceptable for have gots
And it is for have gots to even try a coup
And it is for have gots to even try a coup
Irrespectively of what Medvedev thinks or wants or aspires to, he is the mortal threat to Putin. The legitimate heir that could replace him without destabilising the political and thus socio-economic order. An acceptable candidate for have gots (the only who could do the coup)
"Popularity among the masses" is irrelevant. How many Russians would vote for the newly appointed Prime Minister Putin on presidential elections, based on August 1999 opinion polls? 1,5%? It doesn't matter. Putin did not need popularity, he needed:
a) legitimate claim
b)…
a) legitimate claim
b)…
In all of Russia, Medvedev is the only person with anything close to the legitimate claim. If we focus on *formality*, his claim would be no worse than Putin's. And it is the formality that guides the return to normality. Medvedev is an obvious candidate to replace Putin, as his…
Medvedev is a danger because his succession has the least downside from the elite's perspective. Replace a legitimate ruler with another legitimate candidate (-> maximise stability) and make peace with the West as an upside
What can Putin do? Well, he can minimise the upside
What can Putin do? Well, he can minimise the upside
If Medvedev will be unable to make peace with the West, there is no upside in his succession. Meanwhile, the downside of replacing a legitimate ruler (Putin) with some rando can be too large. It may have a too strong destabilising effect -> would be unacceptable for have gots
In other words, Putin's personal security largely depends upon minimising the upside of Medvedev's succession. As his is the only living person with a legitimate claim, it is in Putin's best interest to secure that Medvedev would not be able to make peace with the West. Or at…
The end
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