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Tsars and Generals
1. Delegating control over men and resources to someone = borrowing him power. That’s debtor vs creditor dynamics
2. As Balzac pointed out, the debtor is more than a match for the creditor
3. This is why regimes like Russian delegate as little as possible 🧵
1. Delegating control over men and resources to someone = borrowing him power. That’s debtor vs creditor dynamics
2. As Balzac pointed out, the debtor is more than a match for the creditor
3. This is why regimes like Russian delegate as little as possible 🧵
4. The entire Russian military doctrine aims to minimise the awful necessity of delegating power. This explains many “surprising” Russian setbacks
5. Still, not delegating power at all appears to be impossible
6. Which creates risks both for the creditor and for the debtor
5. Still, not delegating power at all appears to be impossible
6. Which creates risks both for the creditor and for the debtor
7. Creditor’s risk = debtor may use the borrowed power not in creditor’s best interests
8. Debtor’s risk = creditor may cleanse him up, now or later, to mitigate the damage of having borrowed power
9. Both are aware of their risk, creating an interdependence
8. Debtor’s risk = creditor may cleanse him up, now or later, to mitigate the damage of having borrowed power
9. Both are aware of their risk, creating an interdependence
10. The Tsar may see that his general has performed poorly. But he is also aware that the general could have performed very much worse. And the other generals can. Scaring them after having borrowed them power may be a suboptimal idea
11. One strategy could be: establish a minimal standard (non-betrayal basically) and never punish generals who met it. Show they will be ok as long as they don’t betray you
Downside of betrayal >>> Downside of poor performance
Downside of betrayal >>> Downside of poor performance
12. You are sending two signals:
Direct: Loyalty will be always awarded, even if you performed poorly
Indirect: There will be no cleanup after the war (This may not be your intent, but you still need to send it)
Direct: Loyalty will be always awarded, even if you performed poorly
Indirect: There will be no cleanup after the war (This may not be your intent, but you still need to send it)
13. Both signals are aimed to disincentivise the power debtors from betraying you. Unlike the “popular rebellion” or “opposition”, the power debtors do present a danger to you. In fact, any internal threat to your rule can come only from those you have borrowed power to
The end
The end
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