Red Flags and Choke Points
Investigating procurement networks behind Islamic State's improvised weapon programmes
Investigating Islamic State
From 2014 to 2017, Islamic State (IS) forces in Iraq and Syria established one of the most sophisticated production capabilities for improvised weapons and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) of any non-state group to date. Coordinated across IS-held territory, production became increasingly technically advanced and quasi-industrialised as it drew on the bulk procurement of goods and raw materials through international supply chains.
Goods moved remarkably rapidly though IS forces’ supply chains. Security units fighting against IS forces during this period recovered improvised weapons and IEDs, which incorporated components and explosive precursors that had been manufactured in Europe and Asia as little as six months earlier. IS forces were not simply looting goods from the territories that they had occupied; at least until 2016, they relied heavily on effective resupply from outside the territories they held.
Conflict Armament Research (CAR) is an independent investigative organisation, based in the UK. Since 2014 CAR's field investigators have documented more than 40,000 weapons , ammunition, and traceable IED components that were recovered from IS forces in Iraq and Syria. These illicit weapons and ammunition items can be viewed on CAR's EU-funded iTrace portal: the world's most powerful public access weapon-tracking database.
IS improvised weapons documented by CAR field investigators in Al Arij, Iraq, March 2017. © CAR
CAR's investigations since 2019 have tried to determine how key items were moved from unwitting regional distributors to IS forces' weapon productions facilities. ' Red Flags and Choke Points' , published in December 2020, details the human, financial and logistical networks that comprised IS procurement efforts. It looks at two key questions:
- How did IS procurement networks operate?
- How did IS procurement efforts appear to unwitting suppliers?
This storymap presents two cases from the report, mapping procurement mechanisms that represented 'choke points' in the IS supply chain.
Designer: Lindsay Horner
Choke Points: Aluminium paste
A 'choke point' is a key junction en route where enforcement action could have disrupted the supply of multiple commodities, had authorities identified them earlier in the conflict.
CAR's investigations show that IS forces' procurement of various commodities, while initially appearing unconnected, in fact involved the same individuals and businesses: family-owned companies and individuals located near key border crossings into IS-held territory, primarily based in the Turkish border town of Akçakale and the nearby city of Şanlıurfa.
These family groupings helped to procure multiple commodities - often unrelated to their primary business - and in some cases arranged their movement into Syria. There is no evidence that they were witting accomplices to IS procurement efforts or were guilty of any wrongdoing. By acting as consignees or purchasers that consolidated multiple shipments for onward distribution however these groupings constituted clear 'choke points' in IS forces' supply chains.
Below you can follow the story of CAR's investigation into one such choke point: a single family in Şanlıurfa, Turkey, who acted as the purchaser or consignee of aluminium paste, UAV components, and surveillance equipment.
Family groupings at border crossing
Between 2015 and 2017, CAR field investigation teams documented more than a hundred drums of Chinese-manufactured leafing aluminium paste.
These drums were found at six separate explosive production sites set up by IS forces, located across central Iraq.
Each of the production sites was at least 70 km apart from the other, suggesting widespread dispersion of the product among IS facilities.
IS used aluminium paste to produce home-made explosives for IEDS.
Scroll on to read how these explosive precursors reached Islamic State.
Video Design: Linday Horner
All of the drums had been manufactured by Hefei Sunrise Aluminium Pigments Co Ltd, within an eight-month production period, between 9 June 2014 and 18 January 2015.
Hefei Sunrise is a Chinese company that produces aluminium powders, pigments and pastes for use in commercial products like paint.
Hefei sells these products to its distributors around the world.
All of the drums that CAR documented in Iraq bore labels indicating that a single Istanbul-based chemical distributor had sold them. There is no suggestion that this distributor was in any way complicit in supplying IS forces, or that it engaged in any other wrongdoing.
Before 2018, the Istanbul-based distributor did not record sales by lot or batch number. Following its engagement with CAR, the distributor stated that it had introduced batch-level sales tracking.
Looking at its list of customers that had purchased aluminium paste since 2013, the distributor noted one particular sale as unusual: a large order in late 2014 or early 2015 for six tonnes of aluminium paste, placed by a trader called Tevhid Bilişim, based in Şanlıurfa, some 50km from the Turkish border with Syria.
This was the first and only order that this company placed with the distributor. The value of this sale was estimated by the producer as around USD 18,000.
This was the listed address of Tehvid Bilişim, on the first floor of a small shopping centre in the Yusufpaşa area of Şanlıurfa.
It listed its business as the import and export of mobile phones. Tevhid Bilişim was thus an atypical purchaser for a large and expensive order of leafing aluminium paste.
Tevhid Bilişim was dissolved on 21 October 2019.
Tevhid Bilişim also provided its Şanlıurfa address as the consignee address for international shipments of components for IS forces’ weapon programmes in 2014–15. Click on each case on the map to read further details.
For each order, the company representatives instructed the suppliers to send goods to:
- an individual with the same name and address as the owner of Tevhid Bilişim,
- an individual sharing the same surname, at the same address in Şanlıurfa, or
- arranged for a UK employee to collect the goods and then re-dispatch them to the owner of Tevhid Bilişim in Şanlıurfa.
A UK resident called Siful Haque Sujan organised these purchases. Criminal trials in the US and Spain have since established that Sujan was associated with IS forces. The US Air Force claims that a coalition airstrike killed Sujan in Syria on 10 December 2015.
Sujan and his brother ordered a range of UAV and counter-surveillance components using two UK-registered companies to make the payments (Ibacstel Electronics and Advance Technology Global Ltd). They used fictitious names for the company directors and stakeholders.
On 18 November 2019, the US Treasury sanctioned two individuals with the same names as the owner of Tevhid Bilişim and his relative, as well as an associated company, ACL İthalat İhracat. Evidence that CAR has gathered suggests that the individuals listed for sanctioning are not the same as those who operated Tevhid Bilişim, but are instead a cousin and an uncle with the same names who were not involved with Tevhid Bilişim.
This suggests some confusion in the US sanctions designations over the identities of the different individuals in this family grouping, which may have led to two individuals closely connected to IS supply chains remaining unsanctioned.
Red Flags
- New or one-time customer: Tevhid Bilişim placed a first and only order for aluminium paste.
- Business type unrelated to purchase: Tevhid Bilişim, a small mobile phone dealer, placed an order for a bulk shipment of leafing aluminium paste.
- Unusually large purchase: (especially for new clients).
- Consignee unconnected to client or payor: A UK-based company bought surveillance detection kits and other items, but asked suppliers to ship them to unrelated companies and individuals in Turkey.
Red Flags: Sorbitol
Islamic State's efforts to acquire explosive precursor chemicals and electronic items involved the centralised purchase, receipt, and onward transfer of multiple different commodities by family networks along the Turkish-Syrian border.
Product orders and payments made by these networks presented multiple irregularities in the way that customers presented themselves, the methods used to pay for products or services, and the 'fit' between customers or payors and the products.
These irregularities can be seen as 'red flags'. Governments, companies and individuals involved in cross-border supply chains may use these red flags to assess the risk that items might be diverted.
The Tehvid Bilişim case highlights several such warning signs. This second case demonstrates other examples of red flags that a potential transfer party might be working outside their standard course of business and may require additional due diligence.
Tracking sorbitol supply-lines
CAR field investigation teams documented more than 100 sacks of sorbitol in captured IS forces' weapon production facilities in Qaraqosh and around Mosul, Iraq, between November and May 2017.
Sorbitol is a sugar alcohol with a sweet taste, widely used in food, health and cosmetic properties.
IS forces used sorbitol as a fuel component in the production of rocket propellant.
This sorbitol was manufactured in France by the company Tereos in March and April 2015.
In a reply to CAR's trace request, Tereos confirmed that the bags documented by CAR had been sent to a Turkish distributor called Sinerji Gida Kimya Tekstil.
Sinerji confirmed that it then transferred the sorbitol in two shipments to Ale Cemal Elsavi, a company based in Aleppo, Syria. Sinerji transported the sorbitol to the Öncüpınar border crossing, just north of Aleppo.
There is no suggestion that either Tereos or Sinerji had any knowledge that their products were destined to IS forces, or that they engaged in any other wrongdoing.
Click on the map to read more about the transfer history of the sorbitol as it reached the Turkey/Syria border.
Combined, the two shipments were conspicuously large in relation to previous sorbitol trade deals between Turkey and Syria.
They constituted around 40 per cent of all registered Turkish sorbitol exports to Syria in 2015.
A trade that itself had greatly increased: from around 16.5 tonnes in 2014 to nearly 187 tonnes in 2015.
The transfer was carried out under an export declaration dated 1 September 2015.
Turkey’s Öncüpınar border crossing lies just to the north of Aleppo, where the company Ale Cemal Elsavi was based. Aleppo at the time was contested by several armed groups.
Sinerji told CAR that from the border, the recipient, Ale Cemal Elsavi, organised collection and transfer of the goods to its facility in Aleppo, Syria. Sinerji could not confirm if the goods were sold to a third party after it delivered the items to the Öncüpınar border.
These two shipments were both paid for by individuals based near a different border crossing at Akçakale, nearly 160 km away.
On 20 August 2015, an individual based in Akçakale (Payor 2) paid USD 28,500 from his bank account to the distributor, Sinerji Gıda Kimya Tekstil, for sorbitol, on behalf of Ale Cemal Elsavi.
Then, in December 2015 and January 2016, the same Akçakale-based individual made two payments totalling USD 114,000 for sorbitol shipments to a company named Ali Salah Edin Muhyiy (a sister company to Ale Cemal Elsavi, also based in Aleppo).
On 31 August 2015, another individual with a registered address in Şanlıurfa city (Payor 1) paid Sinerji USD 55,800 from his bank account for the purchase of a large shipment of sorbitol. These payments were also made on behalf of Ale Cemal Elsavi.
It is not clear why two individuals who were based near the border crossing at Akçakale paid for goods that were to be shipped through a border crossing 160 km away.
Payor 1 shared the same name and registered address as one of the owners of a company in Şanlıurfa city, 20 km north of the Akçakale border gate (Company I, see the network diagram). This large fertiliser producer and distributor is owned by members of a family who live in Siverek, around 50 km north-east of Şanlıurfa city. There is no obvious explanation why an individual involved in the fertiliser and agricultural products business would pay for large shipments of food additives such as sorbitol.
Between March and May 2015, Company I also purchased over 2,500 tonnes of ammonium nitrate (AN) fertiliser with a high nitrate content manufactured by a company called Vitagro. Islamic State used high-nitrate AN in the production process for homemade explosives, and CAR documented Vitagro high-nitrate AN in an IS explosives production facility in Ramadi, Iraq, in February 2016.
Widely publicised photographs taken at the Akçakale border gate show local porters transporting several hundred sacks of Vitagro AN fertiliser to the then Islamic State-controlled town of Tal Abyad on the Syrian side of the border. Following these reports, local authorities in Akçakale reportedly closed the border gate to these goods, although CAR has obtained photographs showing smuggling efforts in the local area continuing in April 2015. CAR's analysis shows that Company I was by far the biggest buyer of Vitagro AN 33 fertiliser in the province, receiving invoices almost every other day during April 2015. On 29 May 2015, its purchases ended.
Only one other company in Şanlıurfa province purchased quantities of Vitagro high-nitrate fertiliser prior to April 2015 that were large enough to account for the volumes trafficked over the border in April. This company (Company III in the diagram on the right) is owned by cousins of the owners of Company I.
Both the individuals who financed the sorbitol shipments deny knowing one other, as does the co-owner of Company III. In fact, social media records indicate that the first sorbitol financier is a social media acquaintance of the co-owner of Company III, the chairman of the board of Company I, and other members of this extended family (see network diagram).
Social media records indicate that the Akçakale-based individual is a social media acquaintance of the co-owner of Company III, the chairman of the board of Company I, and other members of this extended family (see network diagram).
There is no suggestion that either Company I or Company III were aware of, or complicit in, the diversion of their products to Islamic State forces, or that either is responsible for any other wrongdoing. The co-owners of Company I state that their company has made no sales of AN fertiliser to customers in Iraq or Syria; that their sales of AN 33 stopped in late 2015 due to the changes in Turkish government regulations governing its sale; that since the 1990s they have notified all their fertiliser sales to the Turkish Ministry of Agriculture; but that they were unable to identify sales and customers for 2015.
Likewise the co-owner of Company III states that they have no links to Islamic State forces, that they sell fertiliser products only in Turkey, but that they have not retained sales records for the period in question to determine the onward sale of their Vitagro AN 33 purchases.
The co-owner of Company I told CAR that he had no knowledge of the sorbitol transactions, and had never dealt in sorbitol.
The Akçakale-based individual who co-financed these shipments confirmed to CAR that he had purchased sorbitol on behalf of the Syrian companies on several occasions, but stated that he had no knowledge of its intended use, could not recall how he came into contact with these companies, and could not remember the names of the individual company representatives with whom he did business.
Red Flags
CAR has no evidence that this family grouping, or the companies they own, knowingly supplied IS forces or engaged in any other wrongdoing. However, their position (however unwitting) in IS procurement chains underlines how tight family groupings have been central to the cross-border trade that IS forces exploited to sustain military production.
The sorbitol and AN fertiliser supply chain highlights several key red flags, including:
- Sensitive location: The purchasers of unusually large quantities of sorbitol were based in Aleppo, Syria, then contested by several armed groups.
- Unusually large purchase: Two Syrian companies in two 2015 transactions purchased more than four times the total amount of sorbitol exported from Turkey to Syria in the whole of 2014.
- Payor unconnected to consignee: Turkish individuals made bank transfers for sorbitol shipments to Syrian companies; the co-owner of a fertiliser dealership paid for a bulk order of food additive (sorbitol).
- Sensitive route for logistics: Unusually large sorbitol shipments were delivered to the Öncüpınar border crossing, destined for Aleppo customers - the shipment would have had to pass through IS-controlled territory around Al Bab.
Stopping IS Supply Chains
CAR's reporting shows how small groups of individuals and companies connected by family ties acted as conduits for goods within multiple supply chains which IS forces accessed. These groupings therefore represented particularly vulnerable points in IS forces’ procurement networks. Had industry and law enforcement authorities identified these choke points earlier in the conflict, they may have been able to interrupt the conflict-sustaining quantities of materiel acquired by IS forces, particularly during 2015.
Crucially, however, these connected purchasers and consignees were not fully visible to the international producers and suppliers of these goods. In most cases they were only visible to national or regional distributors, one step down the supply chain.
Thus, even if major producers or suppliers had shared information globally about suspicious purchases, they may not have been able to identify these family groupings and their interlinkages. ‘Red flags’ in illicit procurement chains are often visible only at the distributor level, rather than at the manufacturer level.
Red flags in supply chains detailed in CAR's report
As well as private-sector due diligence, government customs and trade departments may be able to detect anomalies in aggregate cross-border trade of the kind described in this report for commodities like aluminium paste or sorbitol: particularly if exports or imports of several precursor chemicals spike simultaneously.
Importantly, the supply chains described in this report were not reliant on territorial control or on capturing commercial goods or facilities. Although IS forces may no longer hold territory, remaining IS cells in Iraq and Syria became increasingly active in 2020. Disrupting their procurement efforts by spotting transactional red flags will therefore remain an important tool against the resurgence of IS forces and their successors.
Islamic State improvised weapons documented at a production facility in Hawija, Iraq, in November 2017. © CAR
