I think you're both right and wrong. You're right in a sense that all influential groups are:
1) identified by regime 2) forced into submission & cooperation
But that's totally normal. And many of them can and should become nuclei of new political order(s)
There's no one else
Your observation is right, you're just making wrong implications out of it. If you study history of most anti-colonial movements, both successful (USA) and failures, you'll see that local notables well-integrated into a previous regime were very prominent in almost all of them
I would even say that popular imagination tends to exaggerate the "people's rebellion" factor and simultaneously underrate "notables changing colours" factor when studying most political changes, either anti-colonial and not
Notables who had been well integrated into the previous regime changing colours factor may be one of the most underrated driving forces of political change. And any, literally any, political changes on the Russian/post-Russian space will include this at least as an element
Notables changing colours is how political change happens, for the most part. These changes can be positive or negative depending on yr perspective. They may bring fundamental transformation of political order or not. But almost all of them will include notables changing colours
Reasons for notables changing colours may vary: from well-calculated move to petty personal vendetta (X chooses this side, so Y chooses opposing one). Usually it's combination of many pragmatic considerations, rationalised later with some convoluted rhetorics
That's also normal
Normalise notables changing colours and rationalising it later with some mental gymnastics (usually done by paid hirelings, notables are not very good in that)
That has been normalised in reality for millennia, now we just need to normalise it in our Netflix-spolied brains
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Daily reminder that as a rule Western Academia has great contempt towards public imagination of non-Western countries. They misrepresent their internal debates ignoring whatever doesn’t fit to their preconceptions
Galkovsky is wildly more impactful than Dugin for example
Galkovsky has been the most influential Russian nationalist thinker of the recent decades and Sputnik and Pogrom - the most influential media. They largely shaped the worldview of young Russian nationalists
Meanwhile they’re almost totally ignored by most “Russia experts”
Why? Well, for the same reason they love Dugin. Once they established Russia is so Mystic and Irrational, they’ll look for whatever fits into their preconceptions and ignore the rest
Every Russian with half a brain knows how to use it for their own advantage
In this thread I am going to cover some of the more common misconceptions about the current state of affairs in Russia and potential scenarios of its breakup. I am going to start with the most common objection:
"Isn't Russia like 80% ethnic Russian?"🧵
Both honest sceptics (mostly foreigners) and more biased critics (mostly Moscow literati) love pointing to the official census results. Indeed, official censuses picture Russia as almost homogenous country with 77% pop being ethnic Russian
How reliable are these results though?
Much of aggregate data from Russia/China etc. looks very appealing. That's until we start disaggregating it. Aggregate figures can be just as reliable as the raw data they're based upon. Therefore, Russian/Chinese statistics too often have the "Garbage in, Garbage out" problem
For context: that's how the most popular Russian ethnonationalist media of the recent decades "Sputnik and Pogrom" pictured their dream - "Russia for Russians". Very decolonizing, indeed
Honestly, I am appalled to see what can pass for expertise in modern Western academia
NB: This is not only about Russia. That's about absolute contempt of too many Western intellectual circles towards the public imagination of non-Western countries, Russia included. This problem lies so deep that I am not sure whether it can be fixed or not
If you have just a bit of empathy towards the Russian ethnonationalists, the idea that they want to make their empire *smaller* would strike you as absolutely improbable. Even when they all agree that certain regions are a liability in each and every respect, the idea of ...
With may be a single exception of North Caucasus (specifically "ДИЧ" - Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia) this is just false. There are *some* Russian ethnonationalists who argue for letting these three regions out. There is about zero who want general decolonisation
"ДИЧ" abbreviation which stands for Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia is indeed popular in the Russian far right discourse. It refers to these three mountainous regions whom some want to see out, and some want to see under a régime du sabre
While there is limited support for "solving the ДИЧ question", one or another way, there is exactly zero support for letting out anyone else. In fact Russian ethnonationalists are very suspicious of either ethnic and "Russian" regionalism, seeing them as a separatist threat
Barely any Slavs before Slavic invasions, barely any Indo-Europeans before Indo-European invasion
The problem with your argument is not that it is wrong. The problem is that it is so universally true that it can be arbitrarily weaponised against anyone
Arguments are overrated. "Fighting the invader" argument is universally true -> can be used against anyone -> is being successfully used by victors against losers
Should Greek win, they're gonna cleanse Turkish invaders
Should Turks win, they're gonna cleanse Greek invaders
If you don't see it, it just means that you're clueless about the agenda of the "other side". Turks weaponised Anatolian nativism against the Greeks just as successfully as Greeks theirs. One could even say that Anatolian nativism was just mirroring (and copying) the Greek one
I noticed that the American discourse tends to hugely exaggerate the role of ethnolinguistic factor as the driving force of state/nation-formation. Which is kinda ironic, considering how the US emerged in the first place
And since American internal debates largely shape the global discourse, these Wilsonian lenses become the default way to look at the state/nation formation all around the world
I would say that contemporary American way to look at the state/nation formation is a blend of Wilsonian inertia and externalisation of modern American identity politics. A projection of internal American political games to the outer world