I think Kremlin may view nuclear strike on Ukraine (with an American retaliatory strike) as a rational move. It may not make much sense in the context of foreign policy, but it does in the context of domestic policy. Meanwhile foreign policy is just domestic policy by other means
My argument is based on three premises:
1. Foreign policy serves domestic policy goals 2. Keeping power is *the* top priority of domestic policy 3. Kremlin is looking for a way out of the conflict
Launching a nuclear strike and getting a retaliatory one may be seen as a way out
If Putin is looking for a way out, that probably means he is looking for a way out that would allow him to keep the supreme political power. Which may be incompatible with suffering a humiliating military defeat from a supposedly inferior force. Like Japan in 1905 and Ukraine now
Many argued that Putin should be allowed to "save face". The thing is: it is nearly impossible for him to save face at this point. Inability to crush Ukraine is already a loss of face, no matter how you frame it. For a simple reason that Ukraine had been considered an inferior
The very idea that Ukraine can stand its ground against Russia would have been considered totally insane at the start of this year, both in Russia and outside of it. The fact that it does means that Putin has already suffered a major loss of face, and will continue suffering it
To keep power, you need to save face. And how can you save face? One obvious solution is: try to engage with the U.S. Make a nuclear strike that would inflict an American retaliatory strike. If you and your power survives that, that gonna be total win. Absolute victory
Russian public opinion considers Ukraine as absolutely inferior. That is why standards for not losing face in this conflict are pretty high. Since Ukraine is so ridiculous, inability to crush it is humiliating, no matter how you frame it. You can't defeat it, you lose your face
But Russian public opinion does not view the US as inferior, it's the other way around. That is why standards for not losing face in a conflict with the US are so much lower. I would say that inability of the US to crush Russia would be seen as American loss and Putin's win
Compare two scenarios:
1. Russia engages Ukraine. Then Russia not crushing Ukraine is Ukrainian victory. High bar 2. US engages Russia. Then the US not crushing Russia is Russian victory. (Seemingly) low bar
He absolutely may choose 2 as the bar for not losing face is lower
I would even say that provoking an American retaliatory strike may boost the regime. The US tried to defeat us, used the deadly force, but we still exist - that's the story of honour, heroism and stoicism. For the Putin's target audience I mean. That's a great and powerful myth
Meanwhile, mobilisation may stabilise the regime by simply getting rid of young males that could otherwise create problems. For example, if they were recruited by anti-regime forces, should the supreme power weaken. The less young males in the country, the stronger is Kremlin
Engaging with the US directly may sound suicidal foreign policy wise. At the same time it may sound totally rational domestic policy wise. Simply because the bar for saving your face (=keeping power) in this conflict would be much lower. They didn't destroy you = you win. The end
PS For example, the US destroying the Black Sea Navy as a response for a Russian nuclear strike absolutely may count as Putin's victory. It is very, very much easier to frame this scenario as honourable, than let's say an obvious military defeat from Ukraine
PPS Withdrawing before the US is very much preferable than withdrawing before Ukraine. In the first case, you can frame it correctly, save your face and prepare for a round 2. If you withdraw before Ukraine though, there may be no round 2
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When the mobilisation in Russia started, I wondered how they would train them all having only one modern training ground in the country?
That's the neat part. They won't
* Rheinmetall AG-built and supplied Mulino training ground which was used for training the army of invasion
PS and yes, Rheinmetall's awkward denial that they "did not supply the simulation technology" is a lie. Of course, you did. And the last shipment I have hard evidence of arrived on November 22, 2019. How do I know it? Well, it is designated in the customs documentation
КАТ. 18.2 ШАЙБЫ ПЛОСКИЕ, СТАЛЬНЫЕ, БЕЗ РЕЗЬБЫ, ПАЗОВ И ПРОТОЧЕК НЕТ, КОМПОНЕНТЫ ИЗ СОСТАВА МНОГОЯРУСНАЯ СКЛАДСКАЯ СИСТЕМА ПО ПЕРЕЧНЮ № 1: ДЛЯ СБОРКИ СИСТЕМЫ МОДЕЛИРОВАНИЯ И ИМИТАЦИИ
With everything. Police, National Guard, FSO, FSB. Everything centralised & obedient to Moscow. This year they disbanded the last governors' bodyguard services and put National Guard. Like, even few dozens armed guys responsible directly to the governor is too much. Must be zero
Russia has few millions Siloviki: an internal army which is *far* larger than the normal army and is focused on keeping control. It's all responsible to the Kremlin. Its true size is difficult to estimate, partially because it also consists from the "private military companies"..
... that have no legal status in Russia. We talk of "private military companies" such as Wagner, Redut, etc. but this category just does not exist in the Russian law. Some of them just don't exist in a legal sense. Other have a status of "Private security company" on paper
(Continuation - Ford vehicles for the mortar men, but in crypto)
BTC bc1qsksu2x0lnqs09yv3qtsdlxgxjsmqecdqrmjhvy
ETH 0x08447D07152d7E2d566ecD7462dC862262850636
These guys are collecting money for the deported Ukrainians in a certain Russian city (I don't name it, but I know them). They're buying clothes, medicine and helping them to leave to third countries (Europe mostly)
I disagree. I think this is not about "fascist rivals" (he deeply despises the public politics) but about the need to restore control over the ruling clique. Show them all he is still in charge, that he still commands obedience. Otherwise, why do his own henchmen need him?
I would also hypothesise that mobilisation may result from Putin's isolation in Samarkand. Why is Putin even special from the rest? In the past, he had special relations with the Western leaders. "Tony Blair talks with me"-style representation was a major factor of legitimisation
Then he lost it, but at least he had special relations with the leaders of great Asian powers. That's something. But Samarkand may have shown that he doesn't have it anymore. Even leaders of smaller Central Asian countries openly disrespect him. That's almost complete isolation
Sabotage and assault reconnaissance group "Rusich" posted on their Telegram channel an instruction for "recycling the Ukrainian POWs". I translated it in full as it is quite informative
That is Milchakov, commander of "Rusich" group
That's how he first got publicity in 2011 btw. Future commander of Rusich and then afootball fan Milchakov recorded killing and eating a puppy and uploaded it all in the internet
Regarding mobilisation, Putin can declare it, indeed. But it will be a risky decision. The USSR maintained a massive infrastructure for the total mobilisation which has been mostly dismantled in post-Soviet Russia. Mobilisation is more likely to trigger political chaos
short🧵
Imagine, the government declared a total mobilisation and millions of young males are drafted into the army. What next? Now you need to:
1) test & allocate them (who goes where) 2) train & arm them 3) quarter & feed them 4) place them under the capable officers and NCOs
In order to execute 1-4 in case of the war, you need to maintain massive *excessive* capacities in the peace time. And the Soviet Union, did. One reason why Soviet army was so horribly excessive is that it maintained enormous excessive capacities just in case of mobilisation