When the mobilisation in Russia started, I wondered how they would train them all having only one modern training ground in the country?
That's the neat part. They won't
* Rheinmetall AG-built and supplied Mulino training ground which was used for training the army of invasion
PS and yes, Rheinmetall's awkward denial that they "did not supply the simulation technology" is a lie. Of course, you did. And the last shipment I have hard evidence of arrived on November 22, 2019. How do I know it? Well, it is designated in the customs documentation
КАТ. 18.2 ШАЙБЫ ПЛОСКИЕ, СТАЛЬНЫЕ, БЕЗ РЕЗЬБЫ, ПАЗОВ И ПРОТОЧЕК НЕТ, КОМПОНЕНТЫ ИЗ СОСТАВА МНОГОЯРУСНАЯ СКЛАДСКАЯ СИСТЕМА ПО ПЕРЕЧНЮ № 1: ДЛЯ СБОРКИ СИСТЕМЫ МОДЕЛИРОВАНИЯ И ИМИТАЦИИ
HS Code: 7318220009
Shipper: RHEINMETALL DEFENCE ELECTRONICS GMBH
Arrival Date: 2019-11-22
КАТ. 18.2 ИЗДЕЛИЯ БЕЗ РЕЗЬБЫ (ЗАКЛЕПКИ), СТАЛЬНЫЕ, ПАЗОВ И ПРОТОЧЕК НЕТ, КОМПОНЕНТЫ ИЗ СОСТАВА МНОГОЯРУСНАЯ СКЛАДСКАЯ СИСТЕМА ПО ПЕРЕЧНЮ № 1: ДЛЯ СБОРКИ СИСТЕМЫ МОДЕЛИРОВАНИЯ И ИМИТАЦИИ
HS Code: 8308200000
Shipper: RHEINMETALL DEFENCE ELECTRONICS GMBH
Arrival Date: 2019-11-22
КАТ. 18.2 КОНВЕЙЕРЫ РОЛИКОВЫЕ, ОБЛАСТЬ ПРИМЕНЕНИЯ - ДЛЯ СБОРКИ СИСТЕМЫ МОДЕЛИРОВАНИЯ И ИМИТАЦИИ, КОМПОНЕНТЫ ИЗ СОСТАВА МНОГОЯРУСНОЙ СКЛАДСКОЙ СИСТЕМЫ ПО ПЕРЕЧНЮ № 1: ДЛЯ СБОРКИ СИСТЕМЫ
HS Code: 8428392000
Shipper: RHEINMETALL DEFENCE ELECTRONICS GMBH
Arrival Date: 2019-11-22
Russian customs data designate the purpose of these shipments:
"for assembling the system of modelling and imitation" (ДЛЯ СБОРКИ СИСТЕМЫ МОДЕЛИРОВАНИЯ И ИМИТАЦИИ)
Receiver - JSC Garnison. The Russian company that was finishing Mulino after Rheinmetall "left" in 2014
NB: I chose just three examples from one single shipment that arrived on November 22, 2019. They are all designated as components for assembling modelling and "imitation" (=simulation) systems in customs declaration. Rheinmetall knew very well what they are shipping and what for
Let me get this straight. In 2011 Rheinmetall AG started building Mulino in strategic partnership with JSC Oboronservis, Russian Ministry of Defence daughter company. In 2014 JSC Oboronservis was renamed to JSC Garnison (they needed to distance from fallen minister Serdyukov)
In 2015 Rheinmetall "left" the Mulino project to the Russian JSC Garnison company. Notice that it is the *same* company that has been participating in this project from the very beginning as Rheinmetall's strategic partner. They just changed the name in 2014
As late as November 2019, Rheinmetall continued to supply JSC Garnison (which was completing Mulino) with components *specifically* designated "for assembling modelling and imitation (=simulation)" systems in customs declarations. They knew what they are shipping and why
In 2020 Mulino was completed. In 2021 they organised their manoeuvres West-2021, preparing the Russian army for invasion of Ukraine. And they're still training the troops (including Wagner mercenaries) there. It's just that one training ground cannot fit all the mobilised
I think Rheinmetall AG must be sued
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
1/ @the_ins_ru has obtained an archive of complaints made to the Russian military prosecutor's office, which provides some very interesting insights from various perspectives into the experiences of Russian soldiers in the Ukraine war. Here's a 🧵 highlighting some of them.
2/ The girlfriend of a Russian paratrooper, Anatoly Nikolaevich Taimanov, wrote that he had been reported killed in Hostomel near Kyiv on 9 March. He was supposedly burned to death. She and his parents were given a body to bury on 15 April. However, she doubted it was him.
3/ She saw her boyfriend listed as a Ukrainian captive and wanted to verify it. However, Anatoly's parents did not want to help as "they are unwilling to ... try to find their son among the prisoners or the seriously wounded. They are satisfied with monetary compensation."
Now we associate Gorbachev with Perestroika, which in its turn is interpreted as nice Gorbachev being nice. In reality, in the beginning of his rule Gorbachev continued Andropov's Neo-Stalinist policies. But then the oil price dropped and didn't bounce back. Hence, Perestroika🧵
Brezhnev's era is usually referred to as Застой, the Stagnation. If Khrushchev unironically aimed to build Communism, Brezhnev dropped any attempts to do so. High oil prices of the 1970s created illusion of prosperity, while in reality system was becoming less and less efficient
Khruchev saw Communism as a realistic goal. He even set a specific deadline - 1980. Brezhnev however, cut all the specific deadlines from the Party program. Future oriented paradigm (building Communism) died and the new, past-oriented one emerged. Worshipping the Great Victory
1/ An interesting insight into the dynamics of the so-called "Allied Forces" on the Russian side, which unsurprisingly turn out to be rather less than allied. Translation follows as a 🧵.
2/ "Information about indications of preparations for an offensive in the Kharkiv direction came from various sources - this was not a surprise. How it was assessed, how they reacted to it, how they managed to prepare and whether they were preparing is another question.
3/ But my observations say that there was no effective system of reaction, when on receiving signals some wheels started to spin, everything was in motion and the resource, whatever it was, was brought to maximum readiness.
1/ Did a culture of institutionalised lying contribute to Russia's recent disaster east of Kharkiv, by giving its senior commanders a distorted and false picture of the true situation on the ground? A 🧵 reviewing the evidence.
2/ While reading Russian soldiers' personal accounts from published intercepted phone calls and personal accounts (link ⬇️), I've seen one point mentioned repeatedly: Russian army officers frequently lie to their superiors about their unit's status.
3/ In his now-famous memoir, the former paratrooper Pavel Filatyev complains bitterly of "the system of photo reports [фотоотчетами] that is now so widespread in the army, when the command hides problems". So what is this system, and how does it work?
With everything. Police, National Guard, FSO, FSB. Everything centralised & obedient to Moscow. This year they disbanded the last governors' bodyguard services and put National Guard. Like, even few dozens armed guys responsible directly to the governor is too much. Must be zero
Russia has few millions Siloviki: an internal army which is *far* larger than the normal army and is focused on keeping control. It's all responsible to the Kremlin. Its true size is difficult to estimate, partially because it also consists from the "private military companies"..
... that have no legal status in Russia. We talk of "private military companies" such as Wagner, Redut, etc. but this category just does not exist in the Russian law. Some of them just don't exist in a legal sense. Other have a status of "Private security company" on paper
(Continuation - Ford vehicles for the mortar men, but in crypto)
BTC bc1qsksu2x0lnqs09yv3qtsdlxgxjsmqecdqrmjhvy
ETH 0x08447D07152d7E2d566ecD7462dC862262850636
These guys are collecting money for the deported Ukrainians in a certain Russian city (I don't name it, but I know them). They're buying clothes, medicine and helping them to leave to third countries (Europe mostly)
I disagree. I think this is not about "fascist rivals" (he deeply despises the public politics) but about the need to restore control over the ruling clique. Show them all he is still in charge, that he still commands obedience. Otherwise, why do his own henchmen need him?
I would also hypothesise that mobilisation may result from Putin's isolation in Samarkand. Why is Putin even special from the rest? In the past, he had special relations with the Western leaders. "Tony Blair talks with me"-style representation was a major factor of legitimisation
Then he lost it, but at least he had special relations with the leaders of great Asian powers. That's something. But Samarkand may have shown that he doesn't have it anymore. Even leaders of smaller Central Asian countries openly disrespect him. That's almost complete isolation
Sabotage and assault reconnaissance group "Rusich" posted on their Telegram channel an instruction for "recycling the Ukrainian POWs". I translated it in full as it is quite informative
That is Milchakov, commander of "Rusich" group
That's how he first got publicity in 2011 btw. Future commander of Rusich and then afootball fan Milchakov recorded killing and eating a puppy and uploaded it all in the internet
Regarding mobilisation, Putin can declare it, indeed. But it will be a risky decision. The USSR maintained a massive infrastructure for the total mobilisation which has been mostly dismantled in post-Soviet Russia. Mobilisation is more likely to trigger political chaos
short🧵
Imagine, the government declared a total mobilisation and millions of young males are drafted into the army. What next? Now you need to:
1) test & allocate them (who goes where) 2) train & arm them 3) quarter & feed them 4) place them under the capable officers and NCOs
In order to execute 1-4 in case of the war, you need to maintain massive *excessive* capacities in the peace time. And the Soviet Union, did. One reason why Soviet army was so horribly excessive is that it maintained enormous excessive capacities just in case of mobilisation
Under Putin Russian social structure has been turning more and more rigid. It is recruiting too few ambitious upstarts, mostly in its economic agencies. Putin increasing and increasing retirement age for high officials means that option of "joining the table" doesn't really exist
That is why a significant number of the ambitious endorsed the war with Ukraine wholeheartedly. They hoped that artificial crisis will create the window of opportunities. Imagine if much of the current elite is purged for corruption/lack of patriotism? So many new vacancies
There is a nice study (unpublished) on the diverging regional strategies regarding mobilisation. Some governors are mobilising for the war unironically. Others are bullshiting and faking it. And there's clear correlation between the age and the BS/non-BS approach to mobilisation