Wars are fought for the memes. And the Russian invasion gives us a classic example of a meme war. Consider this photo from a captured city with plaques changed from the Ukrainian "Марiуполь" to Russian "Мариуполь". It's about extirpating wrong memes and propagating right ones
Yeah, war is multidimensional. Those actors who launch it have various motivations. Some do it for cash, some for career, some for the sake of the personal vendetta. Some want to change (or maintain) the current power balance at home. The war is a tool for domestic policy-making
Some powerful actors interpret the war in non-meme terms. Consider this article by Vladislav Surkov actualcomment.ru/tumannoe-budus… published on February 15, 2022, just few days before Russian troops crossed the Ukrainian border. It's all about geopolitics, nothing about memes
- The character of the landscape determines the character of a nation. Coast-dwellers are different from the inland-dwellers
- The size of the territory determines the character, too
- The psychological landscape is just as important as the physical one
Both physical and psychological landscapes of Russia are destroyed by the Peace of Brest-Litovsk. In 1918 Bolsheviks agreed to transfer many territories to Germany and to allow self-determination on others. Even now that curve largely shapes the Western border of Russia
Unwillingly, Surkov refuted a favourite argument of the Russian propaganda about Ukraine, or ethnic republic system within Russian being "created by Lenin". That's simply false. Lenin didn't just "grant freedom" to minorities, dismantling the Empire. It was the other way around
The Russian empire collapsed in 1917-1918. The peripheries started proclaiming their autonomy or independence straight after the Tsar's abdication in March 1917, when Lenin was still in Switzerland. Lenin didn't intend to "give freedom". He intended to incorporate them back
The problem Bolsheviks faced in 1918-1924 was not "enfranchising" the minorities but rather incorporating them back after the imperial structure collapsed. That's why Brest-Litovsk self-determination borders still matter. Even upon his victory, Lenin had to take them into account
Quite a lot of people in the upper echelons of power, politicians and decision-makers think in terms of geopolitics. I would argue that the geopolitics bias in Russia (and in other cases) is largely a side-effect of the American cultural hegemony
In America an argumentum ad geographiam is largely considered legitimate, "objective" and safe for the one who uses it. With many other reductionist arguments being somewhat less safe, there is a certain evolutionary incentive to overuse the geographic and geopolitical argument
America being the main exporter of intellectual frameworks that shape the public discourse all over the globe, a specific structure of evolutionary incentives in American academia, think-tanks, media, etc has a huge impact on the global public discourse. Surkov is a good example
Geopolitical models are valid. That doesn't mean they're correct. They're all incorrect because every single model is incorrect. We are unable to comprehend the reality in all its complexity and thus have to rely on imperfect models. That's all we have
All models being incorrect, it doesn't make much sense discussing their accuracy. The question is whether they're useful or not. And them being useful or not largely depends on whether we use them within their limits of applicability
Being always incorrect, models also have limits beyond which they also become useless or worse. The question is - don't we overuse the geopolitical models simply because they're safe, unobjectionable and "scientific"?
I'll argue that we do. Overfocusing on geopolitical dynamics we tend to take too many phenomena as granted. Like a state with the well-defined (or even defined) border. I'll argue that we give too much importance to something very recent, fleering and temporary
Even more importantly, overfocusing on the geopolitics we miss some crucial elements of the conflict dynamics. Like what they're ultimately fought for. You tell, that you wanna expand "our territory" at "their" expense. Ok, but who are "us" and who are "they"?
The lines between "us" and "them" are much more temporary and fleeting than one could think. I could give some illustrations of the Russian-Ukrainian dynamics, but I won't. Instead I'll give an example from further south
In early 20th century, the Turkish state discouraged the naturalisation of Azeri immigrants. Chechens, Avars, Circassians were all ok. Azeri were not. Why? They're Shia and clearly descendants of our Qizilbashi arch nemesis. They have wrong memes. They're not us
By the 21th century however, the situation reversed. Previously undesirable "Azeri" were now probably the most desirable foreigners in Turkey. One nation, two states. They're basically us. They speak almost the same language, have almost the same culture and so on
Both in the 1930s and in 2010s lines between "us" and "them" were defined by memes. That's the constant. What changed then? Well, the focus did. Focus was shifted from the religious memes to the linguistic ones. Linguistics became way more important than Shia vs Sunni divisions
Paradoxically enough, the Turko-Islamic community between Turkey and Azerbaijan could be built only after the religion was de-actualized. It's so much easier to be a Muslim ecumenist when you never read the Quran. The same goes with Christianity and the Bible
Focus of attention on these or those memes unifies and divides. It unifies, because sharing the same memes we can work out the common identity and build an imagined community. We can imagine "Us" who should conquer or defend this or that land
Focus of attention on certain memes also creates division. If we really focus on a meme, it means that the smallest, the most minuscule differences in that exact super important meme become a source of the bitterest animosity
That might explain why it is the overwhelmingly Russophone East Ukraine is absolutely devastated by this war while the West Ukraine suffered much less. East Ukraine suffered exactly because it was viewed by Russia as "almost us"
East Ukraine being viewed as "almost Russia" it had to become just Russia. Russian authorities planned to do it quickly and easily. East Ukrainians memes are just a little bit different, so we need to correct them and bring them back into our ranks
Soon they faced the reality check. Consider this. Many children from the occupied territories shipped to Russia just don't know the Russian enough to study in Russian schools
Or this dialogue between a Russian military and a Ukrainian boy:
- When did the war start? The Great Patriotic War
- In 1939
- You see! The Great Patriotic one
We see a process of meme correction and the defiance against it
Russian atrocities in Ukraine are largely motivated by the benevolent intentions. They have somewhat wrong memes but they absolutely can be corrected and become fully "us". The Ukrainian defiance to being corrected is both shocking and devastating for the correctors
That's what proponents of giving Putin some territory to allow him to save face, miss completely. It's not that Russia will purposefully organise a hell there. It's just that guided by the most benevolent intentions (meme correction) it will turn them into the nightmare
Facing defiance, Russia will increase its efforts in extirpating the wrong memes and enforcing the right ones. That will trigger even more resistance, and thus Russians will escalate violence even more. Russia keeping a foothold of the conquered territory will spiral the violence
End of thread
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That's Mikhail Khodaryonok. Out of all people in the room he is the most sober one. Why? Well, may be because he's the only one with the substantial military experience. He's a career officer of the air defence who turned to a pundit career only after retirement (not a thread)
Khodaryonok used to be a senior operative officer in the Russian General Staff. Most Russian pundits judged the military capacity of the Russian army based on official propaganda. Khodaryonok - on his lived experience. Now wonder he is way more pessimistic about the war
Khodaryonok published a pessimistic prognosis about the Russian invasion of Ukraine back on February 3, long before it started. Many pundits expected a quick Russian victory. But the one who actually worked in the Russian General Staff didn't believe in it nvo.ng.ru/realty/2022-02…
On April 20, Russian MP from the Liberal-Democratic Party Sergey Leonov suggested forcing the Ukrainian POWs to donate their blood.
His exact framing is very interesting:
"There is an offer for the Ukrainian POWs to become the compulsory (в обязательном порядке) blood donours"
It's quite possible that the Liberal Democratic Party MPs are disoriented after the death of their leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky and try to keep relevance with the face of their party gone. Many perceived Zhirinovsky as "clown". And yet, Putin personally attended his funerals
Pretty much all of the Russian leadership attended his funerals. Putin, Medvedev, Kirienko, Shoigu, Naryshkin, etc. And yet, did you notice the difference between Putin and others? When Medvedev or Naryshkin approaches the body, the honorary guards are standing near the coffin
Invasion of Ukraine revolutionised the Russian symbolics introducing a new, previously unknown symbol Z. What does Z even mean? Neither Russians, nor foreigners have any idea. It is clearly a forced meme. And I have a guess on who forced it🧵
The choice of Z-letter looks weird. First, it doesn't look like anything Russian or Soviet propaganda used before, making it hard to understand. Second, it's not a Cyrillic, but a foreign looking Latin letter. Which makes its choice as a symbol for the "patriotic" war problematic
Unlike most European alphabets which are based on Latin, Russian alphabet evolved from the Greek, which makes it harder for Westerners to understand. Some of the Russian letters look alike their Western analogues - A, E, K, O, C, T. But Russian "З" (ze) looks nothing like "Z"
It may be worth outlining some general principle I use when making prognoses. Let me show it on example of this thread. On February 27 I predicted Russia gonna lose the war in Ukraine. How did I come up to this conclusion?🧵
Did I have the full information on how the war was going on, on February 27? Not at all. Information I had was often biased, misleading, incomplete or simply wrong. Even in those cases when I was pretty sure about the accuracy of my data, it would still be rife with holes
So how do you make prediction based on incomplete data? You extrapolate. The thing is - data we have is *always* incomplete, even if accurate. Yes, theoretically you could try to collect as much data as possible and try to verify it all. That's possible. But that gonna take years
First of all, saying that analysts failed to see the hollowness of the Russian military might be an overgeneralisation. Some noticed some aspects of that hollowness. Here is a brilliant analysis of a Russian westward invasion scenario from the Nov 2021
When discussing the future of Russia, many rule out this or that scenario as "impossible". But how do they know what is possible and what is not? The main reason why people are so bad in prognosing the future is that they can't conceive how different is the present from the past
Most people underestimate how different is the present from the (recent) past. And that lack of historical thinking leads to underestimating how different the things will be in the (near) future. That's why people presumptuously rule out possibility of sudden and abrupt changes
Consider the following. A Westerner X who knows post-Soviet space more deeply than many, expected the Russian army to crush Ukrainians in a few day. He wasn't ignorant or ill-informed. He travelled to Russia and Ukraine extensively, visited their military, etc