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DECEMBER 24, 1999 VOL. 25 NO. 51 Red Flag Over Macau Many eyes are on China's re-absorption of Europe's last Asian colony. Not least the enclave's gangsters and, further afield, the people of Taiwan, who know Beijing considers this a dress rehearsal By YULANDA CHUNG and CLARA GOMES
As the red flag of China goes up over the new special administrative region on Dec. 20, Beijing inherits an economy that will be lucky to grow 1% this year and is largely dependent on gambling and tourism, both in the doldrums, owing in part to a murderous turf war between rival gangs. Job one for Macau's new administration: restoring order to lure back gamblers and maybe even some more traditional investors. But it will need Beijing's assistance to do so. And China may be leery of overt involvement; it wants to show Taiwan - the ultimate prize, after all - that the "one-country, two-systems" formula implemented in Macau and Hong Kong equals real autonomy.
Koi got 15 years in a purpose-built facility. But some fear the trial set a bad precedent for post-handover jurisprudence. "Some of the fundamental principles of law, like the search for truth, were disregarded in a trial with a strong political component," says lawyer Ana Soares. "Every time the law is over-stepped, there will be a repercussion in the future." She notes that because Portugal waited too long to localize the civil service and judiciary, post-handover judges will be necessarily inexperienced. Many Macau residents, however, don't care about the niceties of a fair trial, certainly where gangsters are concerned. They just want China to make the city safe for the tourists and for themselves. Much cheering greeted Beijing's decision to deploy troops in Macau. Yet as in Hong Kong, the People's Liberation Army has no jurisdiction over civilian criminal matters. A more effective deterrent may be the notion that gangsters will be caught in Macau - and shot on the mainland. If Chinese police abduct alleged criminals, Macau cops may look the other way; they already ignore a lot as it is. Incoming Chief Executive Edmund Ho Hau-wah says he'll request help from mainland police if necessary. For his part, casino mogul Stanley Ho Hung-sun echoes the popular perception that Beijing is the only power the gangs respect. Ho expects things to be quieter from now on. Which brings us to another quandary facing the new administration: what to do when Ho's gambling monopoly expires in 2001. Ho favors keeping things just the way they are, thank you very much. He says changing the status quo will increase organized crime, not subdue it. The casino magnate is hedging his bets, however, by investing elsewhere, including the Philippines. It is easy to see why. Chief executive Ho (no relation) has vowed to impose more supervision over gambling and eventually to open the industry to competition. He plans to set up a special commission, comprising local and international experts, to determine what direction the casino industry should take. At the same time, Ho acknowledges the need to diversify the economy; currently gambling and tourism comprise 43% of GDP and contribute more than 50% of government revenue. Ho is vague on how he plans to shift away from gambling, beyond a stated desire to tie Macau more closely to the Pearl river delta and, like Hong Kong, become a trade funnel to the world. Whatever policies Ho enacts in the coming months, nothing will be allowed to sully Macau's relationship with Beijing. Ho reckons the city has a major stake in convincing Taiwan that the one-country, two-systems formula works. Macau is unlikely to feature the controversies that have flared in post-handover Hong Kong, among them the government's decision to ask Beijing to effectively overrule a court decision allowing in mainland migrants. Indeed, the mainland has played a relatively active role in Macau since 1975, when Portugal failed to convince Beijing to take the enclave back. In fact, mainland cadres who have moved to Macau in recent years, hold senior positions there. "We hire mainland experts to come in and consult on a range of issues," says Lidia da Luz, director of the civil service. "They usually occupy high-level posts, and some will stay to serve the SAR government." Nor will there be much fuss over democracy, although eight directly elected legislators of 23 will increase to 12 of 29 in 2009. "The legislature is not politicized," says legislator Cheong Vai-kei. "We have largely arrived at a consensus before a bill reaches the floor." Ng Kuok-cheong is the only oppositionist. "When Ivote in the legislature," he says, "the result is always 20 versus one." Ng is pessimistic about the chances of local autonomy taking hold. "Just look at the community's response to the PLA marching into Macau," he says. "We welcome them to interfere when it should be our domestic matter." Amnesty International has called on Ho to guarantee citizens "the right not to be extradited for political reasons or for crimes punishable with death," among other matters it says are not spelled out in Macau's mini constitution. In truth, Macau has been a backwater for so long it can probably do much as it likes without attracting international opprobrium or praise. As China continues to open up economically, Macau will be drawn inexorably into the motherland. Perhaps the most realistic voice on the enclave's future comes from Stanley Au Chong-kit, who lost out to Ho in the race to become chief executive. "My guess is that 20 to 30 years after the handover, one country, two systems will become just one country." Sounds like a good bet. Quick Scroll: More stories and related stories Asiaweek Newsmap: Get the week's leading news stories, by region, from Newsmap | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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