POSTCOLONIAL GRIEF

THE AFTERLIVES *of the* PACIFIC WARS *in the* AMERICAS

JINAH KIM

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· CONTENTS ·

Acknowledgments vii

INTRODUCTION. Mourning Empire 1

ONE. Melancholy Violence: Frantz Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth* and Hisaye Yamamato's "A Fire in Fontana" 23

TWO. Haunting Absence: Racial Cognitive Mapping, Interregnum, and the Los Angeles Riots of 1992 41

THREE. Transpacific Noir, Dying Colonialism 66

FOUR. Destined for Death: Antigone along the Pacific Rim 88

EPILOGUE. Watery Graves 110

Notes 115
Bibliography 153
Index 175

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· INTRODUCTION ·

MOURNING EMPIRE

We Americans are unhappy; we are not happy about America. We are not happy about ourselves in relation to America. We are nervous — or gloomy — or apathetic — as we look towards the future — our own and that of others.
— HENRY LUCE, "The American Century"

The dead in this story come to me not so that I can speak of distant sorrows. / They come to me so vividly because they are my own sorrow: / I am the sister whose hands were tied by fear.
— TERESA RALLI and JOSÉ WATANABE, *Antígona*

This book explores moments when the present is so bloated with dead bodies demanding mourning that their claims threaten to overtake life. I ask what kind of transformative politics is enacted when we name the deaths of those considered unworthy of mourning and remembering. Answering this question means finding out which lives count. Fundamentally, then, such mourning is potentially insurgent, challenging the liberal nation-state's claim to sole right to violence. *Postcolonial Grief: The Afterlives of the Pacific Wars in the Americas* directs this inquiry by focusing on narratives about Korean and Japanese diasporas across the Americas, as well as how they intersect with other displaced and marginalized peoples. Although they are surrounded by unexpressed deaths and losses, as Lisa Yoneyama argues in *Cold War Ruins*, "the necropolitics of Asia are occluded" within knowledge production and erased from Japanese, U.S., and Korean national histories.[1]

Cold War U.S. liberal governance, its disavowal of military violence and colonialism, narratives of rescue and liberation, and monopolies over justice are enabled by the interimperial confrontation, connection, and complicity between U.S. and Japanese imperialisms. This explains how the violence in the Pacific Arena is compelled to silence, despite the intimate and deeply embedded nature of U.S. imperialism there. Instead of disappearing, this violence emerges as a bloated, palimpsestic haunting. Rather than just a bad memory that cannot be shaken, this describes living with the fear that a future of violence is inevitable.

This book is part of a long tradition of critiques of colonialism and war, challenging the ways that mourning and melancholia are theorized. From Sigmund Freud's reshifting of his notion of melancholia to Fanonian anti-colonial psychoanalysis, which arises in the midst of insurrection against French colonialism in the 1950s, to feminist and queer anti-neoliberal reconceptualizations of mourning, loss, and trauma in the twenty-first century, I direct my inquiry into the long history of American militarism in the Pacific Arena. In the nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first centuries, the United States has been in a constant and accelerated state of opening markets, war making, and empire building in the Pacific Arena, spanning the continents of Asia, Australia, the Americas, and the islands in the Pacific, including Guam, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of Northern Marianas, Hawai'i, the Marshall Islands, Okinawa, and Pitcairn. America's transpacific empire is constituted by a "homogenizing force and collaborative alliance among various colonizers at different historical moments under shifting geopolitical configurations."[2] Judith Butler has argued that we are a "public created at the prohibition to mourn" those whose deaths implicate the nation-state.[3] This prohibition to mourn American empire building in the Pacific Arena is structured by historical amnesia and upheld by the ritualistic production of the Asian body as one in pain and in need of rescue.[4] The dead victims of American military violence in the Pacific Arena are rendered unmournable as "spectral being[s], between real and unreal."[5] However, this prohibition to mourn is occurring at the height of the signifying power of the Pacific in the U.S. geopolitical imaginary. The pressure of these spectral beings whose death is the condition of possibility for American prosperity in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries may cause an "insurrection at the level of ontology."[6] Their names, claims, and stories are at the center of the creative and political engagements and narratives on which *Postcolonial Grief* is based.

Given the interimperial and interracial entanglements I engage with in this book, I turn to the aesthetic and creative works of the Japanese and Korean diasporas in the Americas to map how they engage and contest postcoloniality and the deferment of decolonization.[7] The memories of those murdered come unbidden in Hisaye Yamamoto's short story "A Fire in Fontana" (chapter 1); grief threatens to turn into morbidity in Dai Sil Kim-Gibson's film *Sa-I-Gu* and Héctor Tobar's novel *The Tattooed Soldier* (chapter 2); colonial violence willed into disappearance haunts the American imaginary in the genre of noir (chapter 3); and the disappeared refuse burial in Teresa Ralli and José Watanabe's play *Antígona* (chapter 4). In these works, living closer to death also means living closer to statelessness, marked by the shifting of status from citizen to more liminal categories such as "enemy non-alien," "*kibei*," "*zanichi*," "refugee," and "undocumented." Mourning them makes the present feel risky and creates a sense of uncertain futures.

The epigraph from Henry Luce's "The American Century," with which I begin this book, captures how melancholy violence is constitutive to the American Century. This document seeks to direct U.S. consciousness away from Europe and toward the Pacific Arena. Through taking leadership over new markets and fallen empires, Luce argues, American lives will come to have value and matter over all other bodies. Luce was the head of a publishing empire and one of the most influential Americans of his time. "The American Century" sought to spur an American internationalism that urged a reluctant President Franklin D. Roosevelt to enter World War II.[8] This article foreshadows Luce's association of the American Century with the Pacific Century and his sense that the United States must step up to its destiny as the commander of Asia, which is only possible by dominating the Pacific world. "The American Century" is a cipher for an American colonialist vision, here particularly the lure of Chinese markets that would expand American power and might. A policy document and cultural text, this essay, along with Luce's lobbying, profoundly influenced U.S. priorities within the Pacific Arena during the Cold War and continues to inspire reflection in the neoliberal period. Published on February 17, 1941, just months before the bombing of Pearl Harbor by the Japanese Imperial Army would propel Americans into World War II, Luce begins his essay lamenting American unhappiness: "We Americans are unhappy; we are not happy about America. We are not happy about ourselves in relation to America. We are nervous—or gloomy—or apathetic.... As we look toward the future—our own future and the future of other nations."[9] His gloominess stems from the diagnosis

that Roosevelt's refusal to enter the war means the loss of an immense opportunity and possibility. He continues, "Now all our failures and mistakes hover like birds of ill omen over the White House, over the Capitol dome and over this printed page."[10] Racial anxieties expressed through the language of negative affect pervade the text. Here the image of hovering black birds threatening the white symbols of U.S. imperium heightens the sense of pathos that will define the American mind should the United States fail to take the helm as the new global arbiter. For Luce, the decline of European empires in the Pacific Arena means the Third World is threatened with a potentially dangerous interregnum in which Communism may take root. Roosevelt's failure to prime the nation for international involvement and global investment, especially in light of the opportunity provided by the decline of European empires, particularly the British in Asia, has created an America of mental ill health.[11] Repeatedly using the words *sickness* and *failure* as cognitive anchors throughout the article, Luce seeks to move a currently impotent people into leadership. Luce highlights that without entering the war and conquering Asian markets, the United States would decay in significance in the modern world.

Luce's American Century further develops the intractable idea that the future of the Pacific is meant to be an "American Lake," as termed by the nineteenth-century expansionist Whitelaw Reid. The Pacific's draw and luminosity as the oceanic extension of the American western frontier has been represented in fiction and in political and economic treatises by Robert Louis Stevenson, Mark Twain, Herman Melville, Henry Luce, and numerous American politicians. As a source of creative engagement and shoring up of national ideologies, the idea and image of the Pacific Ocean as an American Lake reemerges again and again in the American canon as an abstract space outside of history where American enterprise can flourish. The dominant U.S. representation of the Pacific is as the engine for a future of capitalism everlasting.[12] This has meant that the Pacific is forcefully evacuated of meaning for itself, existing only for others.[13] On Luce's account, for example, the entirety of the Pacific Ocean disappears under the lure of continental Asia. Ronald Reagan's declaration in a 1984 presidential debate that the Pacific Basin "is where the future of the world lies" is haunted by previous and future utterances.[14] Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton similarly situates the Pacific in the future in her 2011 statement that the "American future of prosperity lies in becoming a Pacific power."[15] In 1903 Theodore Roosevelt also envisioned the Pacific as a future site of American

capitalist rejuvenation, remarking that "the Mediterranean Era died with the discovery of America; the Atlantic Era is now at the height of its development and must soon exhaust the resources at its command. The Pacific era, destined to be the greatest of all, is just at its dawn."[16] In 1944, General Douglas MacArthur told a group of war correspondents, "The history of the world for the next thousand years will be written in the Pacific."[17] What is shared across these statements is that the Pacific must remain free in order for free-market capital to flourish and innovate, and, in order for the Pacific to remain free, it must be an extension of the U.S.

It is remarkable that Luce's brief opening paragraph, comprised only of two sentences, reveals the biopolitics and bioeconomics that will structure U.S. investments in the Pacific Arena in the period following World War II. Luce's article anticipates U.S. modernization programs and containment policy where the uplift of Asia was imagined as a necessary counter to an insidious Asian Communism led by Mao Zedong.[18] Christopher L. Connery argues that this uplift was a collusion between states' interests and that of U.S. financial markets, concluding that "the particularly Cold War ideologies of internationalism and containment theorized and practiced by Acheson, Kennan, Forrestal, Dulles, Rusk, Nitze, Harriman, among others, [has a] root in their own careers on Wall Street and in other institutions of U.S. financial capital that stood to benefit from an international economy free of trade barriers, anchored by strong regional economic powers." Central to the accompanying "Cold War geo-imaginary" was a psychologism that tended to pathologize Asian Communism and that was "shared by the psychic structures of the most developed stage of international capitalism. This kind of essentializing psychologism combined with the strategic character of nuclear warfare to de-spatialize the globe."[19]

This Manichean and binaristic Cold War psychic structure is anticipated by Luce, who manages to connect bodies across immense scales, starting from the American self to global others, and to demand a commitment to a world order–structure in which only the mental health of the American self ensures the future health of the world.[20] For the rarely mentioned Asian bodies in his essay, unhealthiness, illness, and brokenness define their experience of living through the violence of U.S. wars and the institution of capitalism in the region. The "others" referenced in this essay float variously between a Europe besieged by Hitler and an Asia that "will be worth to us exactly zero — or else it will be worth to us four, five, ten billions of dollars a year. And the latter are the terms we must think in, or else confess a pitiful

impotence."[21] Luce cannot imagine a space or quantity that is between nothing (down there) and infinite and ever-expanding fullness. The American self is forebodingly described as a person in deep depression and driven only by negative affect — unhappy, nervous, gloomy, apathetic — and only by finding its release for its frustrated desire for enterprise across the Pacific Arena can Americans regain happiness.

Asian diasporic literature is bloated with the pressure that the dead put on the living due to the afterlives of Japanese imperialism and American World War II–era war violence, ongoing war, settlement, and expanding U.S.-led militarism and capitalism in the Pacific Arena imagined as necessary for American survival. There are shared themes in how various U.S. wars in Asia and the Pacific Arena are represented in American popular culture as a rare opportunity for Americans to rejuvenate and gain new vitality. This rejuvenation is so tied to American hegemonic influence over the Pacific that, even when there is no one to rescue, an Asian figure in distress must be produced again and again, to be rescued or destroyed again and again. This Asian figure in need of rescue is not unique to the World War II era or Korean War but is a structure of feeling across the transpacific. In the context of the Vietnam War, for example, U.S. cultural politics fixates on the "figure of the Vietnamese refugee," whose imagined rescue by the U.S. military "has been key to the (re)cuperation of American identities and the shoring up of U.S. militarism in the post–Vietnam war era."[22]

The repeated destruction and rescue in popular cultural representations of war and Asian bodies function to affirm Ann Laura Stoler's argument that the colonizing presence is not automatically recognized as a colonizer but must be made into one through fantasy: "Their identity as a colonizer needs to be repeatedly affirmed in the *fantasized* situations of colonial encounter."[23] Elaborated and made into fantasy, most prominently through the medium of film, the "microphysics" of war — that is, the specific encounters that happen during the time and space of combat and occupation — shape the colonizers' sense of their dominance. These are national fantasies. These conditions make more salient the ways that literature, film, and the arts are a critical alternative archive for the recuperation of the forgotten, the unseen, and the unhealed. The analyses in *Postcolonial Grief* span the language of treaties and policies to literary and filmic archives because ruptures and abject subjects can only be seen and heard when disciplinary constraints are transgressed. This requires epistemological practices that reassemble places and meanings previously taken for granted.

Literature and film are central to building a national consciousness and are imagined to aid in the cultivation of a self who cares for an other, can feel for an other whose experience they do not share but with whose difference they can empathize and sympathize.[24] However, *Postcolonial Grief* reveals a desire not only to expand contacts with the Third World other, but also to set limits within what seems (as a result of the erosion of former boundaries) like an infinite and uncontrollable contact. This requires that neoliberal cultural politics "set the limit of *how much* otherness is required, as opposed to how much is excessive, disruptive, disturbing, in ways that damage us, rather than enhance our lives."[25] Under such conditions, unless contested, empathy finds its limits in narratives that enhance the life of the First World over all others.

In Luce's reflections on the American Century, obviously missing is the recognition that the American Century can only be built on the ruins of Japanese imperialism. By the time Japan bombed U.S. naval bases at Pearl Harbor on the island of Oahu on December 7, 1941, almost all French, British, and Spanish territories had come under Japanese control. In the period after Japan surrendered to the United States in August 15, 1945, the United States gained possession of Japan's former empire in the Pacific and Asia. Luce refuses to see the United States as absorbing Japan's dominion and represents the collective will that seeks to render the recognition of U.S. imperialism in the Pacific Arena verboten. But Naoki Sakai cautions that unless we recognize how "Japanese imperialism was grafted into American imperialism . . . we will remain enslaved to the legacies of past colonialism in East Asia."[26] Like the missing Asian bodies in his text, Luce's refusal enables empire to be reframed and energized as a matter for health and happiness, demonstrating the colonialist investment in narrating the history of empire and imperialism in affective terms.[27] Luce rhetorically positions colonies as necessary for the sublimation of American unhappiness. Only once these colonies have been established can Americans tend to the unhappiness of these Others, now under American dominance, by transforming the potential zero value of Asia to "four, five, ten billions of dollars a year,"[28] a positive effect for U.S. racial colonialism.

These closing sentences of Luce's essay are the most famous, but this triumphant tone comes only after much tortured treatise on the threats of decline and the emasculated future awaiting America: "[I envision] America as the dynamic center of ever-widening spheres of enterprise, America as the training center of the skillful servants of mankind, America as the Good

Samaritan, really believing again that it is more blessed to give than to receive, and America as the powerhouse of the ideals of Freedom and Justice. . . . It is in this spirit that all of us are all called, each to his own measure of capacity, and each in the widest horizon of his vision, to create the first great American Century."[29]

Luce describes colonialism in terms of universal human liberation. The American Century seeks to shape not only the biopolitical — bringing others the gift of freedom — but also the production of the bioeconomic and the raising of American human value as *homo oeconomicus* across the globe.[30] U.S. visions for the Pacific were always stated in terms of "capitalist rejuvenation," whether through capital from new markets and consumers or through the idea of "free enterprise and progress" (fundamental to U.S.-led capitalism).[31] However, as I explore in this book, this racial capitalism is anchored to a racial-colonial logic and to structures of white supremacy. There are moments in the U.S. colonial archive when the colonial project is codetermined, if not primarily determined, by the racial substructure of American "civilizing missions," of which capitalism is a component.[32] Here, the conquest period in the post-1898 years of the U.S. colonial invasion of the Philippines is instructive. It was generally the case that the archipelago was less important for its capitalist potentials than it was as a material template for the making of modern American racial civilization into a global work-in-progress.[33] Hence, the frequent destruction of ecology, land, and people was not centrally guided by the imperative of preparing the colony for capitalist relations, but was structured by both pacification and assimilation as violent — and empowering — racial-colonial logics.[34]

The power of Luce's call for war as an injunction against a feeble future forcefully demonstrates how narratives of wounds stand in danger of being co-opted to uphold military nationalism as well as a regressive rhetoric of therapy that encourages individuals to focus on themselves as opposed to addressing structural problems. The biopolitics and bioeconomics of neoliberalism fetishize vitality and flexibility, against which grief appears as a melancholic attachment and as an unhealthy hyperremembering of a past best forgotten.[35] However, this is premised on a temporality of neoliberal reason that ignores the "palimpsest" between the United States and the Pacific Arena. Colonial forms never die out but are adapted or go into fugitive mode.[36] The present time in the Pacific Arena is one in which postcolonialism, settler colonialism, military occupation, and liberal nation-state forms coexist concurrently. This palimpsest challenges a neoliberal tempo-

rality that fetishizes closure and linear progress, thus seeking to force a refusal to see how the past, present, and future exist simultaneously. [37] But that simultaneity is impossible to ignore when thinking of how past wars and the violence of colonialism shape the postcolonial present. Thus, although the political form and political imaginary encouraged by neoliberalism promise to secure freedom and reinvigorate the body politic, they end up undernourishing it and placing it in ever more precarious states.[38]

Postcolonial Grief

Mourning is described as occupying a spatiality and temporality of ambivalence because it is not a state that one is supposed to maintain. Mourning is meant to be a temporary journey, wherein the grieving self must learn to replace a loss. Grief, when thought about in the most liberal and positivist way, can be linked to the liberal humanist process of reconciliation — that is, the notion of letting go of the attachment to grief as like letting go of grievance, which is resolved through a new attachment to a proper replacement. However, as my turn to melancholia demonstrates, this replacement may be impossible, as some losses cannot ever be replaced, but rather are erased or lived as loss. It is, for instance, important for a state waging war that people do not replace their loss of loved ones or homeland with resentment for the nation-state.

My discussion of postcolonial grief, afterlives, and the related terms of mourning, loss, and melancholia emerges from several intellectual shifts and interventions. These revolve around a radical critique of liberal humanism and its attendant institutions through grief, grievance, loss, and injury as central rubrics. I follow two particular and related iterations of this critique that are connected in their emergence of a theory of grief and mourning. These are rooted against war, militarism, and colonial and liberal state's violence: Fanonian anticolonial psychoanalysis and twenty-first-century transnational feminist and queer challenges to neoliberal statecraft and escalating wars.[39] *Postcolonial Grief* covers new ground by offering a comparative look at mourning practices at different sites within the Pacific Arena. Politicizing the structure of grief simultaneously requires the recognition that the force of grief does not itself imagine or desire freedom. And yet it is impossible to think about grief and mourning without imagining freedom from loss and thus the impasses and the incommensurability facing the insurgent drive for freedom.

Engaging with mourning and loss means negotiating memory. It is through the terrain of both personal and cultural memory that survivors and others negotiate their traumatic past. I focus on how this unresolved violence and loss create a fear and dread of an uncertain future, in a sense drawing one's memory forward. Based on her sociological study of how the trauma of the Korean War is silenced within the Korean diaspora, Grace M. Cho terms this fear of an uncertain but violent future "dread forwarding": "Just as a new trauma can trigger an older one, inducing a flashback, it can also flash forward, projecting itself into a future haunting."[40] Dread as an orientation toward the future is painful. Dread creates intense anxiety and makes the future feel unbearable. Depending on the depth of dread and the nature of that which is dreaded, some people would do anything, even experience great pain, rather than have to live with dread of the thing they fear. Abating this dread forwarding requires addressing the conditions that caused this fear in the past. The narrative blocks, limits, and incommensurabilities I describe in the texts I study mirror the impasses found within transpacific redress movements in the 1990s and the twenty-first century. In their attempts to address the violent past, Korean comfort women and Korean forced workers, for example, have consistently encountered obstacles and the fact that war reparation issues against Japan and the United States have already been "settled."[41] As affective presences, the unmourned dead and the fear of a future return of violence make the particular memories held by the Japanese and Korean diaspora potentially insurgent. But the refusal of the dead to leave also makes the present melancholy.

David L. Eng and David Kazanjian's edited volume *Loss* exemplifies the shift in discourse and the kinds of intellectual and political communities that are forming around the reconceptualization of loss that I have been discussing.[42] Eng and Kazanjian identify a compulsion of the "regressive fate of historicism," which demands that subjects "resolve" their loss through the adoption of a new object of desire. This call for resolution sees "proper" mourning as leaving behind historical memory. Eng and Kazanjian's text is prescient in its intervention against a regressive rhetoric of therapy that we have seen in particular since 9/11, one that authorizes more violence. Arguing that the individual and the West are traumatized by the violent insertion of Others into the Self, this regressive rhetoric of therapy creates a value and hierarchy out of our trauma.[43] The wounded Western self is named as preemptive war is enabled. Preemptivity is a continuation of détente upheld by the stockpiling of a nuclear arsenal. Under certain conditions melancholic

subjectivity becomes a valued positionality for the U.S. military hegemon. This means that we are living in a time when we are encouraged to be in a state of melancholic attachment to our own sense of loss as opposed to the loss we cause others.

In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, defined by "historical traumas and legacies of, among other things, revolution, war, genocide, slavery, decolonization, exile, migration, reunification, globalization, and AIDS," the rendering of certain subjects as melancholic and affective means not only silencing the historical conditions that led to the loss, but also pathologizing that which "remains"—that is, the present and future shaped by the loss.[44] Defined in relationship to their loss and its unhealthiness, these melancholic subjects are also pushed toward the liminal borders of society as unfit. Eng and Kazanjian revise this dominant idea in politics and culture, which continues to render certain subjects and their losses inarticulable.[45] A critical lens situated around mourning is a rejection of the precepts that underlie psychoanalytic theory and neoliberal biopolitics.

Residing in loss is dangerous not only because it is imagined to lead to a state of melancholic, unending mourning, but also because of the proximity such a state allows between violence and insurgency, death and the living, the past and future. Thinking too much about loss generates a state of morbidity and grotesque attachment in which the dead are allowed to dictate present and future relations. This is what happens when grief is in and for itself, when it does not "seek," but sits in the morass of melancholia, or never-ending mourning. The dialectical temporality of historical materialism can also lead to what Wendy Brown cautions is "a certain narcissism with regard to one's past political attachments and identity that exceeds any contemporary investment in political mobilization, alliance, or transformation."[46]

Rather than engaging mourning and melancholia as a general condition of possibility for subjectivity, I focus on how the "politics and ethics of mourning lie in the interpretation of what remains—how remains are produced and animated, how they are read and sustained" in part by thinking about grief and loss temporally (as memories that return unbidden) and spatially (across different kinds of states and being).[47] Postcolonial grief is pathologized as a kind of mental and physical contagion that should be avoided because it is insurgent in the context of a postcolonial and settler colonial Pacific Arena that, in the twenty-first century, has remained "locked and loaded."[48]

Given America's variegated empire across the Pacific Arena, *Postcolonial Grief* analyzes the loss and its disavowal in the postcolonial period by putting the experiences and representations of Korean and Japanese diasporas in the Americas in conversation with a large constellation of actors and historical situations that are not obviously postcolonial. Throughout this project, postcolonialism refers to the complex processes through which decolonization is deferred after formal colonialism ends. Although they may not be populated by American racial others, Pacific Islanders, and the Korean and Japanese diasporas evenly or in the same way, when we start our inquiry with America's "empire of bases" and move toward the U.S. continent, we can see how military occupation, settler colonialism, and postcolonialism—as states and in terms of governance—operate palimsestically in the heterogeneous temporality that is the U.S. liberal nation-state.[49]

Drawing on a specific Third World postcolonial genealogy that insists on the "living on" of colonialism in all arenas, including the field of postcolonial studies, I treat "deferred decolonization" and postcolonialism as interchangeable terms. "Living on" describes the dialectic between the living on required of the survivor and the living on of colonialism in the postcolonial period. Addressing this dialectic requires a way of meaning making that generates "commensurabilities from incommensurability" in attempts to resolve the damages related to the violence of the past and ongoing violence.[50] This way of treating "what remains of loss" means that what is to come does not have to be defined solely by what was lost.

From the onset of the field in the 1970s, postcolonial studies was not concerned with the settler colonial states in the Americas, Australia, and the Pacific; it focused instead on British, Dutch, and other European franchise empires that sought to extract surplus value from their raw material–rich colonies in Africa and Asia.[51] Postcolonial theory is inherently fragmented, emerging from anticolonial and anti-imperialist struggles in the African continent and diaspora, on the one hand, and from the heritage of Western philosophy and of the disciplines that constitute the European humanities on the other.[52] Scholars from the global south, including Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Néstor García Canclini, and Sylvia Wynter, have continually critiqued how Euro-American humanities produce differential levels of humanity.[53] Within U.S. scholarship Anne McClintock's "Angel of Progress and Pitfalls of Postcolonialism" is fundamental to rejecting the

conservative consensus in postcolonial studies, arguing that "post" should not be temporalized as meaning "after," but to define an altered state of colonialism where colonial domination lives on. Otherwise colonial domination becomes replicated by the field's refusal to hear this criticism from Third World feminist and global south scholars.[54] Ann Laura Stoler terms this ongoing status "ruins."[55]

What is to be gained by starting from the premise of living on as a condition of resisting deferred decolonization in the Pacific Arena? For one, it is the recognition of a radical intimacy—due to the temporal heterogeneity and spatial dislocation that is a condition of shared being—between the postcolony and the U.S. liberal nation-state.[56] In describing the condition of contemporary South Korea as postcolonial Chungmoo Choi argues that the "actual landscape of the postcolonial space is a contestatory one" where postcolonial subjects understand the colony to be inferior to the metropole.[57] This is not to say that the postcolonial is not different from the colonial period, as U.S. Cold War liberal governmentality "relied on a new technology of governance that targets life and the bodies without territorial possession or coercive force."[58] But, this noncoercive force is upheld by territorial occupation that enables U.S. military dominance and unfettered access to Asian, Pacific, Oceanic, and Pacific Rim markets, revealing the intractability of old forms at the same time that new forms of domination are instituted.[59]

It is not enough to say that this living on of colonialism in the Korean and Japanese diasporas in the Americas and the Pacific Arena impacts American racial others and Pacific Islanders passively. Instead, these U.S. racial others, which include displaced peoples and descendants of slaves, were always imagined to have a role to play in the domination of native lands within the continental United States, as well as in the colonies. Candace Fujikane asks are, "[Migrants'] descendants are not settlers?"[60] For critics of Asian settler colonialism in Hawai'i, Asian migrants and their descendants "are beneficiaries of U.S. settler colonialism . . . and early Asian settlers were both active agents in the making of their own histories and unwitting recruits swept into the service of empire."[61] In Hawai'i, Asians and Asian Americans have often gained political and economic dominance due to their overwhelming population and the need for their labor by the capitalist leaders on the island and mainland. Their political and economic needs often, and sometimes deliberately, seek to erode native Hawaiian articulations for political sovereignty. The goal of settler colonialism is the total and complete

eradication of indigenous beings and total occupation of their land.[62] The native population is not necessary for producing surplus value; territorial occupation is most significant.[63] Eventually, memory of the people and the land should also ideally disappear. Not denying the important histories and legacies of interracial solidarities and alliances, I agree with Fujikane that "settler status is a mixture of both self-determination and structural contingency."[64]

The beginning of Craig Santos Perez's *From Unincorporated Territory [Guma']* describes Guam's necropolitical connection to the United States and highlights the ongoing expansion of its military dominion over the Pacific Arena: "Guam is 'Where America's Day Begins.' . . . Guam is a U.S. citizen ever since the 1950 Organic Act. . . . Guam is an acronym for 'Give Us American Military.' . . . Guam is America's front porch to Asia. . . . Guam is no longer 'Guam.'"[65] He powerfully illustrates how rethinking postcolonialism in the twenty-first century in the U.S. context requires taking stock of the breadth and scale of ongoing U.S. military occupation in the Pacific Arena into which almost all facets of American being is conscripted. Evoking where and how Chamorro culture and history is threatened throughout *From Unincorporated Territory* this ongoing U.S. aggression is always already positioned in relation to Guam's history before its entanglement with the U.S. This means that what came before Guam became a "U.S. citizen in 1950" is central to what Guam's future beyond the U.S. can be.[66] As with Guam, the installation of U.S. military bases throughout Asia and the Pacific Arena at the end of World War II means that other former Japanese colonies have "never had an opportunity to decolonize in the true sense of the word."[67]

U.S. and Japanese empire building in the Pacific are shaped by intertwined forces.[68] America's empire across the Pacific begins to consolidate after 1898: Hawai'i's monarchy is overthrown and the island nation made into a U.S. territory; additionally, seized from Spain after the Spanish–American War, Guam becomes an unincorporated territory.[69] Meanwhile, Japan's formal empire building began "in the wake of the Sino–Japanese War in 1894 and 1895 with its colonial expansion into Taiwan and Korea, building on Japan's annexation of Hokkaido (1869) and Okinawa (1879)."[70] Beyond territorial overlaps Takashi Fujitani compares the treatments of Koreans by the Japanese Empire and Japanese Americans by American Empire during the World War II era to argue that their treatment of racialized others becomes increasingly similar to that of the other.[71] This wartime racial management

cannot be seen as solely connected to the World War II era but as building on pre–World War II–era imperial entanglements between Japan and the West. Japan, for example justified its empire through the attempt to overcome the Euro-American empire in the Pacific under the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" and called for "pan-Asian solidarity." Starting in 1914, Japan formalizes its empire in the Pacific with the purchase or acquisition of former German colonies in Micronesia, which included the Caroline, Marshall, Palau, and Northern Mariana Islands. These territories are then seized during World War II and legally acquired by the United States through a successive series of defense- and security-geared treaties related to the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the division of the Korean peninsula, among others. This is what enables a South Korean citizen who is a resident of the United States (a Green Card holder) to live in South Korea but update their right to U.S. residency by stepping foot on the U.S. territory of Guam (rather than traveling to the continental United States). The American "empire of bases" has created specific and new conditions for deferment of decolonization.[72]

The culture of loss and mourning studied here demonstrates that this past violence requires addressing the impossibility of making up for what was lost. This is clearly the case with any kind of battle for reparations or restitution. However, what is to come does not have to be defined solely by what was lost. Jodi A. Byrd and Michael Rothberg argue for the need to "generate commensurabilities from incommensurability," as "decathecting from empire is a multi-levelled process that involves confronting head on the fact that the logics of colonization are often contradictory and even incommensurable."[73] By "incommensurable," they are pointing out how "both 'subaltern' and 'indigenous' name problems of translation and relationality; or, to put it slightly differently, subaltern/indigenous dialogue is, among other things, a dialogue within and about incommensurability."[74] When both sides recognize that the two sides do not share the same language—both in terms of that which is being referenced (variant genealogies) and the symbols used—there is potential to destabilize meaning and the system in which it is made. "Incommensurability" means recognizing that things will never quite be okay because of what happened and that something will always remain broken. Thus, the economy of incommensurability is drastically different from liberal humanist representations that see "proper" healing in terms of a moving on from the regrettable past by bringing the two communities together into a new collectivity.[75]

It is particularly urgent to think about incommensurabilities given the necessarily relational, comparative, and critical juxtaposing nature of decolonial and antiracist scholarship and activism that is required across the transpacific. The bitter history of Japanese imperialism and inter-Asian racisms, in addition to the immense physical distance between places, has proven a significant barrier in forming and sustaining transpacific movements in support of anti-base and decolonization movements. In light of this, Setsu Shigematsu and Keith L. Camacho argue that it is "imperative to understand local demilitarizing efforts *in relation to* other movements to decolonize Asia and the Pacific Islands," pointing specifically to President Barack Obama, who in 2010 authorized the move of 8,000 to 55,000 American military personal and hardware from Okinawa to Guam.[76] Since 2007, the growing majority of residents in the small village of Ganjeong in Korea's Jeju Island have maintained a relational movement with other antimilitary activists in Okinawa and Guam, as well as the United States, against the establishment of a naval base there—a global movement sustained in part by the refusal to allow the U.S. Navy to establish a foothold in the Korean peninsula.[77] Anticolonial alliances span Oceania that requires actively defying the U.S. formulation of the Pacific as an "American Lake." For example, on October 2012, when the Rapa Nui Council, a representative of the indigenous people of the island of Rapa Nui, also known as Easter Island, filed a lawsuit for independence and sovereignty from Chile, "they drew inspiration from similar movements elsewhere in Polynesia," identifying with the peoples and movements across Polynesia bearing the scars of competing European, New World, and Asian imperialisms.[78]

Stoler's edited volume *Haunted by Empire* is guided by her development of intimacies and comparisons as conceptual frameworks, arguing for an innovation in how we organize our archives of study and asserting that only by moving away from discrete cases to "lumpy comparative analytics" can we expose the links that may have been previously erased, as between the liberal nation-state and postcoloniality.[79] Yen Le Espiritu calls for a critical juxtaposing in her formulation of critical refugee studies: "Whereas the traditional comparative approach conceptualizes the groups, events, and places to be compared as already-constituted and discrete entities, the critical juxtaposing method posits that they are fluid rather than static and need to be understood in *relation* to each other and within the context of a flexible field of political discourses."[80] All three perspectives—relational, comparative, and critical juxtaposing—exhibit a utopic belief that the attempt

to make commensurability out of incommensurabilities does not have to be defined solely by what was lost.[81]

Postcolonial grief describes a structure of feeling across the Pacific Arena. The growing body of cultural products that attempt to reckon with state violence and military imperialism across the Pacific Arena cross-reference each other's histories and aesthetics, giving shape to postcolonial grief as a structure of feeling.[82] This is why the story of Antigone, the sister who defies the state to embrace and bury her brother's body—left publicly to rot by a despotic king (Creon) in order to terrorize—is resonant across the transpacific, including the United States, Peru, and South Korea.

Postcolonial Space: Perverse Archives and Dossiers

The question of terminology and terms of engagement over the study of the transpacific is neither settled nor neutral. In addition to the idea of the "American Lake," the "Pacific Rim" is another dominant powerful U.S. economic imaginary and utopic discourse that draws on the Pacific as a rejuvenating site for U.S. capitalism.[83] The term first emerged in the 1970s to try to describe a new capitalist global relation that includes formerly communist countries, most notably China, back into relationship with each other and the capitalist economies under free-market terms. The Pacific Rim discourse and idea is "a celebration of the end of the Cold War, but it is also an anxious discourse that attempts to rim in that which is unknown. It is anxious about third spaces and non-alignment."[84] Primarily an American idea, the cultural imaginary around the term also negotiates the rising anxiety in the seeming decline of U.S. hegemony globally faced at the end of the 1970s, connected to domestic racial unrest, loss of the Vietnam War, the Saudi Oil Embargo, and the end of the gold standard for the U.S. dollar.[85] The idea of the Rim soothed these anxieties. As Connery has described it "The Rim is a horizon, a thin line that connects spaces along the rim, but also implies a lack of center."[86] It appears as a homology for a "decentered unity" that enables an enlightened mode of capitalist relations that defies older models of colony/metropole and center/margin binaries. However, the centrality (geographically and geopolitically) of the United States also allows for new forms of hegemony over Asia, the Americas, and the Pacific.

To draw attention to this ongoing contested process, I develop the term *Pacific Arena*. *Arena* references the tendency to refer to zones of combat as *theaters of war*. Unlike a theater, however, an arena more accurately describes

the conditions of war and the ways that it is made into violent fantasy for consumption. Arena historically references the Roman Coliseum and is physically a large amphitheater with raised seats and a field in the center where sports games or large concerts are showcased. Figuratively, *arena* etymologically refers to a "place of combat" or "scene of contest,"[87] and the term's meaning is laden with histories of violence. One root of *arena* may be in Latin (*harena*) for the sand that cleaned up the blood of gladiators in the Roman Coliseum. The physical structure reinforces this relationship: the arena is circular, and the spectators not only watch, but encircle and bound the play happening on the field below. As a metaphor for the space and history I describe, *arena* seeks to make visible how the extant economic geoimaginaries like "American Lake" and "Pacific Rim" are a part of a larger discursive field that upholds Cold War knowledge production that forswears colonial atrocities and ongoing militarized occupations.

While taking a transpacific approach may make it appear that I treat the Pacific Islands, Asia, and the Americas evenly, this work is weighted toward processes that occur in the Americas and Asia. In the process of revealing the links between and across the transpacific, I hope to demonstrate how "Asia, Americas, and Pacific Islands are themselves problematic terms, whose boundaries and locales have been shaped by competing histories of colonialism and militarism."[88] Los Angeles is the critical node through which the book enters and engages the militarized Pacific Arena. Starting from Los Angeles enables exposing how militarized encounters exist not only across the Pacific Ocean, but also within the Americas and along the Pacific Rim.[89]

As I explore in chapters 1 and 2, Los Angeles is produced through encounters that invite comparisons between American militarism in the Asia-Pacific and in Latin America, comparisons that bring "into 'sharper resolution' the kinds of knowledge generated—and on which people might draw—across imperial terrains and within them."[90] In addition to studying the links between U.S. and Japanese empires, this book considers how U.S. military intervention in Latin America and Central America shapes the injunction to prohibit mourning that is linked to U.S. Cold War liberal governance and resistance to it in Asia, the Americas, and across the Pacific Islands. Theodore Roosevelt's vision of the Pacific as an American Lake free for American dominance by growth of the U.S. Navy is central to establishing U.S. dual geopolitical power in Latin America (as seen in the seizure of the Panama Canal Zone in 1903) and across the Pacific to Asia. The history

of covert wars in Latin America, like the American empire of bases across the Pacific and Asia, is denied and willed into invisibility. The Asian/diasporic literary and cinematic texts analyzed here make visible the centrality of the Pacific Arena to U.S. global hegemonic influence and a consistent and systematic erasure of this imperialism.

A key tension that arises in *Postcolonial Grief* is between the reassembly of the Pacific Arena into shared memories and desires for futures, defined by retribution, closure, and justice and my understanding of the productive nature of unresolved or unresolvable grief. The reassembly is not guided by my detection of a vindicated future within the archive, but by the political vision(s) we read and imagine through it.[91] The colonial archive is important not only in terms of its evidentiary value—for example, when it is used as evidence during special commissions and assemblies to assess the success of the colonial project—but also in terms of creating new colonial controls.[92] The archive is not a disinterested organizing of the past and present; it is a site through which colonialism attempts to gain control over the future of human relations and knowledge production. Thus, if the colonial archive functions to measure and assign place to the colonial subject, then the postcolonial archive has the double duty of unmooring and unsettling colonial common sense and making the future an a priori, contested project. Colonialism functions in part by not enabling the colonized to keep or maintain an archive.[93] This means that decolonization efforts have had to turn to the perpetrator's archive, what Rosanne Kennedy calls "perverse archives," in order to fill in gaps and produce evidence to support the reconstitution and rehumanization of the colonized.

The reconstituted dossier imagined by Fanon is an example of such a perverse archive and practice.[94] Fanon describes *Toward the African Revolution* as a dossier that emphasizes the "rottenness of man, of his dreadful failure" against which even the dead are exhorted to speak:

> I offer you this dossier so that no one will die, neither yesterday's dead, nor the resuscitated of today.
>
> I want my voice to be harsh, I don't want it to be beautiful, I don't want it to be pure, and I don't want it to have all dimensions.
>
> I want it to be torn through and through, I don't want it to be enticing, for I am speaking of man and his refusal, of the day-to-day rottenness of man, of his dreadful failure.
>
> I want you to tell.[95]

The dossier is a key component to state surveillance archives against insurgents and revolutionaries — a record that, in the case of the Algerian rebellion against the French (the context in which Fanon was writing), meant that a subject of a dossier was also someone likely marked for death or disappearance. While the surveillance and record may be detailed, they are not publicly available.[96] Fanon imagines the dossier as a record of the dead who sustain the living. Fanon's reconstituted dossier tells the stories of those who are supposed to be annihilated and only represented through the state's narrative. To tell is a dangerous refusal against the state injunction to look away from disappearances and violence. To tell is also a reminder of the responsibility of those who witnessed the event, those who might be considered bystanders to the "day-to-day rottenness of man, of his dreadful failure." Fanon describes insurrection as facing and managing death. His is an ethics of death that comes out of conditions of occupation and decolonization and challenges the legitimacy of a state grounded in genocide and ongoing occupation. The reconstituted dossier is an archive of insurrection that may prevent the future return of violence "so that no one will die, neither yesterday's dead, nor the resuscitated of today."

The Japanese and Korean diasporas in the texts I study seek to tell the violence of Japanese and American militarism in the Pacific Arena. Each chapter of *Postcolonial Grief* becomes progressively more transnational in its scope, moving outward from Los Angeles to Japan, Peru, and South Korea. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on Los Angeles. Chapter 1 argues that the cultural politics around redress for WWII-era Japanese American internment reveals who is considered redressible and who is not given the right to bear grievance. I start this chapter with a close reading of Fanon's "Colonial Wars and Mental Disorders" from *Wretched of the Earth*, to understand how melancholia becomes pathologized by the colonial state. I continue with an analysis of Hisaye Yamamoto's singular short story and memoir, "A Fire in Fontana," published in 1985 at the height of the Japanese American fight for reparations, to rethink the relationship between violence and postcolonial grief within a neoliberal context in which the state seeks to co-opt narratives of racialized injury.

Chapter 2 maps postcolonial grief through the Los Angeles Riots of 1992 and reveals the intersections of American military violence and neocolonialism in Guatemala and South Korea with Black struggles against deindustrialization and segregation in Los Angeles. Creative engagements with the

1992 LA Riots imagine the kind of political transformation enabled by melancholy violence that arises during an interregnum, when normal law and social order cease to exist. Through analysis of *Sa-I-Gu* and *The Tattooed Soldier* this chapter argues that making sense of the violence of colonialism and militarism in the Pacific Arena through the LA Riots requires racial cognitive remapping and a rethinking of Los Angeles's place in the world.

Chapters 3 and 4 focus on and illustrate afterlives as abject ghosts and conjured spirits. Chapter 3 turns to disruptive Koreans, who highlight the continuity between Japanese colonial domination and American military occupation of Korea. The grief and resentment they carry—their *han*—not only impact the Korean landscape, but also haunt the American popular imaginary. I focus on the margins, border zones, and minor subjects of noir—one of the most enduring and popular American genres—to reveal and remap the anxieties of modern noir and exhume the figures of colonial conflicts at the heart of the genre and its ordering of the world.

Following *Antigone* along the Pacific Rim, chapter 4 discusses the attempts to produce a "Pacific Rim imaginary" which positions the United States and Japan as psychic and economic centers of a transpacific partnership. This imaginary is contested by transnational feminist aesthetic projects that link this history to the genocidal history and decimation of Indigenous cultures connected to the colonialization of the Americas. Through analysis of Teresa Ralli and José Watanabe's *Antígona* (1999), set in the aftermath of Alberto Fujimori's right-wing terrorist Peru, this chapter considers how U.S. neoliberal regimes colluded and created conditions abetting the refusal to see state terrorisms in the Pacific Arena. In doing so, this chapter contributes to attempts at destabilizing the colonial grounds on which Asia, the Americas, and the Pacific are produced as sites to be known and studied.

The epilogue posits "watery graves" as a geopolitical and aesthetic challenge to militarist neoliberal accountings that have arisen to deal with hauntings. I moor the book's theoretical reach to a twenty-first-century context where U.S. militarization across the Pacific is expanding, occurring at the same time as a transpacific decolonial imaginary and aesthetic challenges this military dominion. My conceptual framework of watery graves is developed by considering how the protests against Barack Obama's historic visit to Hiroshima as well as accounts of bones that rise from the seas between Japan and Korea are parts of an unsettling and insurgent cultural force that is the undercurrent across the transpacific.

A new critical analytic is necessary for exposing and addressing how liberal nation-states silence the violent past and enable the return of violence in the future. However, this is not the only way this violence is silenced — there is a policing of speaking of loss that criticizes the colonial past and postcolonial present within diasporic communities.[97] I came to understand the idea of loss on multiple levels when I was an undergraduate English major at Columbia University in the 1990s. After a vigorous student-led strike to establish an Ethnic Studies Program, the university had a successful search for an Asian Americanist in literary studies, hiring David L. Eng. After the strike, one of the most public events that brought us together was when Eng spoke to a large room about what it meant that over a period of a year over six Asian and Asian American students and members of the community had died or committed suicide. No one in the administration or community reached out to us to recognize our collective pain or thought this was a problem to be addressed. The idea that for Asians there is no pain to overcome and that discussing our pain was ungrateful and unbefitting is what Eng has termed "racial scapegoating."[98] At the same time, liberal humanist models for reparations have made pain almost verboten to radical political positions because it brings up the positivist idea of recognition. American popular culture is replete with representations of dead Asians and Asian bodies in pain. That pain is sensationalized, aestheticized, and reproduced as a desired image in American popular culture and politics.

I wrote *Postcolonial Grief* because it is clear to me that death surrounds the Asian diasporas in the Americas and across the Pacific Arena. It is a past of deaths unaddressed and threatens a future of violence. However, this book is not for healing, at least not in the sense of closure. Grief and loss turned to melancholia challenge the idea that the past is closed, even as those who refuse to forget may be called crazy and unfit. If we refuse to deal with pain, then we are in danger of letting violence define our future relations with others. The temporality of pain — its recurring nature, resistance to being forgotten, the ways it takes over the body — should inform how we theorize political violence and transformation. Such a critical project means helping to ensure that all who died and disappeared have a name and identity.[99]

· NOTES ·

INTRODUCTION. Mourning Empire

Epigraphs: Henry R. Luce, "The American Century," *Life*, February 17, 1941, 61; Teresa Ralli and José Watanabe, *Antígona*, Performance, 2000.

1. Lisa Yoneyama, *Cold War Ruins: Transpacific Critique of American Justice and Japanese War Crimes* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2016), 23. See also Achille Mbembe, "Necropolitics," trans. Libby Meintjes, *Public Culture* 15, no. 1 (2003): 11–40; Yen Le Espiritu, *Body Counts: Vietnamese War and Militarized Refugees* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2016).

2. Leo T. S. Ching, quoted in Setsu Shigematsu and Keith L. Camacho, eds., *Militarized Currents: Towards a Decolonized Future in Asia and the Pacific* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), xvii.

3. Judith Butler, *Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence* (New York: Verso, 2004), 33. The 1991 U.S. State Department banning photos of caskets of dead U.S. soldiers to be made publically available as they are repatriated to the United States from the first Gulf War exemplifies this prohibition to mourn. This is because the military was afraid that the caskets would be politicized for an unpopular war and sought to silence it. In 2009 the ban is lifted, but lifting the ban upholds the security state by encouraging the production of a public sphere that is invested in energizing and supporting ongoing aggression.

4. For more on how popular culture participates in the process of the production of the Asian body in pain see Christina Klein, *Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945–1961* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003); Melanie McAlister, *Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interests in the Middle East Since 1945*, updated ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005); Karen Kuo, *East Is West and West Is East: Gender, Culture, and Interwar Encounters between Asia and America* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2012); Marita Sturken, *Tangled Memories: The Vietnam War, the AIDS Epidemic, and the Politics of Remembering* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997). 5. Butler, *Precarious Life*, 33.

6. Butler, *Precarious Life*, 34.

7. Ann Laura Stoler, *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), cited in Naoki Sakai, "On Romantic Love and Military Violence: Transpacific Imperialism and U.S.–Japan Complicity," in *Militarized Currents*, 205–31.

8. Luce was born in 1898 in a port city in the Shandong province in China to wealthy missionary parents. After World War II and the defeat of Japan, Luce would become increasingly aggressive in his lobbying for American intervention to stop the rise of Communist China. He lobbied heavily for Chiang Kai-Shek and established numerous other connections with China through charities and academic centers; see Alan Brinkley, *The Publisher: Henry Luce and His American Century* (New York: Knopf, 2010).

9. Luce, "American Century," 61.

10. Luce, "American Century," 61.

11. As with the United States, it is wrong to say that British, Dutch, and Japanese imperialism does not have an afterlife of its own. We see this in the 1997 turnover of Hong Kong to China from Britain, the ongoing civil wars in Indonesia and the Philippines, and the dominance of European and American culture across Asia.

12. For more on representations of the Pacific and Oceania in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries see Paul Lyons, *American Pacificism: Oceania in the U.S. Imagination* (New York: Routledge, 2005). For the role of Hawai'i in the U.S. imperial imaginary see Gary Y. Okihiro, *Island World: A History of Hawai'i and the United States* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009).

13. Haunani-Kay Trask historicizes the process through which native peoples in Hawai'i have continually resisted American occupation, despite the systematic silencing of this insurgent history. Trask, *A Native Daughter: Colonialism and Sovereignty in Hawai'i* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1999).

14. Ronald Reagan, during a presidential debate with Walter Mondale in 1984. "The Candidates Debate; Transcript of the Reagan–Mondale Debate on Foreign Policy," *nytimes.com*, October 22, 1984, accessed September 4, 2017, http://www.nytimes.com/1984/10/22/us/the-candidates-debate-transcript-of-the-reagan-mondale-debate-on-foreign-policy.html?pagewanted=all.

15. Hillary Clinton, "America's Pacific Century," Op-Ed for *Foreign Policy*, October 11, 2011, accessed January 28, 2012, http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/. Similar to Reagan, nowhere in this thorough and thoughtful accounting of U.S. involvement in the Pacific does she mention the history of U.S. wars in Asia in the twentieth century.

16. Theodore Roosevelt, cited by Bernard K. Gordon, "Pacific Futures for the USA," in *Moving into the Pacific Century: The Changing Regional Order in the Asia-Pacific*, ed. Tiek Soon Lau and Leo Suryadinata (Singapore: National University of Singapore, 1988), 3.

17. Douglas MacArthur, cited by Arthur Herman, *Douglas MacArthur: American Warrior* (New York: Random House, 2016), 560. Similarly, Fujioka, president of the Asian Development Bank in 1982, declared "the Pacific is the ocean of tomorrow. . . . We are witnessing the dawn of the Asia-Pacific era"; "Dawn of the Pacific Era,"

library.cqpress.com, last modified July 5, 1985, http://library.cqpress.com/cq researcher/document.php?id=cqresrre1985070500.

18. This is what Fukuyama describes as the "end of history" as the free-market capitalism accompanied by the liberal nation-state that has defeated other historical possibilities, such as communism; see Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Avon, 1992).

19. Christopher L. Connery, "Pacific Rim Discourse: The U.S. Global Imaginary in the Late Cold War Years," *boundary 2* 21, no. 1 (1994): 37. He is drawing from Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990).

20. Michel Foucault, *"Society Must Be Defended": Lectures at the Collège de France 1975–1976*, ed. Mauro Bertani and Alessandro Fontana, trans. David Macey (New York: Picador, 2003).

21. Luce, "American Century," 65.

22. Espiritu, *Body Counts*, 2.

23. Stoler, quoted in Sakai, "On Romantic Love and Military Violence," 212.

24. For an articulation of this position, see Martha Nussbaum, *Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Nussbaum, *Not for Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010).

25. David Palumbo-Liu, *The Deliverance of Others: Reading Literature in a Global Age* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012), 2.

26. He sees this most clearly in the case of the military sex camps for American soldiers as extensions of World War II–era Japanese Imperial "comfort women" or sex slave stations; Sakai, "On Romantic Love and Military Violence," 206.

27. Any kind of relief from American unhappiness that a single act of colonial domination can offer is at best a temporary one. As Sara Ahmed argues in the British imperial context, "To see happily is not to see violence, asymmetry, or force"; Ahmed, *The Promise of Happiness* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), 132.

28. Luce, "American Century," 65.

29. Luce, "American Century," 65.

30. See Nikolas Rose, *The Politics of Life Itself: Biomedicine, Power, and Subjectivity in the Twenty-First Century* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006).

31. As a time period, 1970–2000 is more popularly understood through neoliberal political, economic, and cultural frameworks, not militarism. Generally, the forces of neoliberalism between the 1970s and 1990s are understood as including post-Fordist economic structures, the intensification of communication and travel, the opening of national borders to capital, the closing of national inclusion to immigrants, and a challenge to the idea of a single language to define the nation. They create what Arjun Appadurai has called a "world of scapes" rather than a bounded nation-state; Appadurai, "Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy," *Theory, Culture and Society* 7, no. 2 (1990): 295–310. It has also become clear that in the twenty-first century we should add to Appadurai's fivescapes a religious scape and a military scape.

32. Reginald Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981).

33. Oscar V. Campomanes makes this argument in "1898 and the Nature of the New Empire," *Radical History Review*, no. 73 (1999): 130–46.

34. See Dylan Rodríguez, *Suspended Apocalypse: White Supremacy, Genocide, and the Filipino Condition* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010).

35. Tammy Clewell, "Mourning beyond Melancholia: Freud's Psychoanalysis of Loss," *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 52, no. 1 (2004): 44.

36. Saidya Hartman discusses the fugitive status of slave women as she tries to retrace the route her ancestor took as she became a part of the Atlantic slave trade in *Lose Your Mother: A Journey Along the Atlantic Slave Route* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007).

37. By invoking the palimpsestic as a coexisting of colonial and neoliberal states I am drawing from M. Jacqui Alexander's *Pedagogies of Crossing: Meditations on Feminism, Sexual Politics, Memory, and the Sacred* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005).

38. For discussions of how racial capitalism and neoliberal governance seek to turn all individuals into *homo oeconomicus*, see *Sylvia Wynter: On Being Human as Praxis*, ed. Katherine McKittrick (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015); Wendy Brown, *Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism's Stealth Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2015).

39. For Butler, the temporality of loss is connected to a fundamental loss that is connected to the unknown in the other, and thus death brings the threat of never knowing this loss in the other: "Freud says that we do not always know what it is in that person that has been lost"; Butler, *Precarious Life*, 21. This leads her to conclude that "mourning has involved knowing what was lost and melancholia to a certain extent not knowing" (22). Thus, "we are undone by each other; my narrative falters, as it must" (23). See also Diana Taylor, *Disappearing Acts: Spectacles of Gender and Nationalism in Argentina's "Dirty War"* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001); Chungmoo Choi, "The Politics of War Memories toward Healing," in *Perilous Memories: The Asia-Pacific War(s)*, ed. T. Fujitani, Geoffrey White, and Lisa Yoneyama (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001), 395–410.

40. Grace M. Cho, *Haunting the Korean Diaspora: Shame, Secrecy, and the Forgotten War* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 20. She borrows the term from literary scholar Lyndsey Stonebridge's work in "Bombs and Roses: The Writing of Anxiety in Henry Caught," *Diacritics* 28, no. 4: 25–43.

41. Lisa Yoneyama argues that they are imagined to be settled "by the San Francisco Peace Treaty and other state-to-state normalization treaties"; Yoneyama, *Cold War Ruins*, 154.

42. David L. Eng and David Kazanjian, eds., *Loss: The Politics of Mourning* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003).

43. Making value out of trauma has roots in the actuarial and insurance sciences that arise with industrialization and the rise in accidents and trauma in the factory and the city. For more on this, see Athena Athanasiou, "Technologies of Humanness,

Aporias of Biopolitics, and the Cut Body of Humanity," *differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies* 14, no. 1 (2003): 125–62; Gert Buelens, Sam Durrant, and Robert Eaglestone, eds., *The Future of Trauma Theory: Contemporary Literary and Cultural Criticism* (New York: Routledge, 2014).

44. Eng and Kazanjian, *Loss*, 3.

45. Their work is also in conversation with Anne Anlin Cheng's *The Melancholy of Race: Assimilation, Psychoanalysis, and Hidden Grief* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

46. Wendy Brown, "Resisting Left Melancholia," in *Loss: The Politics of Mourning*, ed. Eng and Kazanjian, 459.

47. Brown, "Resisting Left Melancholia," 459.

48. Walden Bello, "Conclusion: From an American Lake to a People's Pacific in the Twenty-First Century," in *Militarized Currents*, 309–21. For example, the state's investment in controlling how its population mourns is clear in the post-9/11 "War on Terror" begun by George W. Bush. The decision of some newspapers to print photographs of flag-draped coffins — thus connecting the dead bodies beneath to the metonym for the U.S. nation — caused an uproar and was condemned by the Bush White House. Defense Department redactions to obscure the faces and insignia of honor guard members in many of the war casualty images since 9/11 similarly disinvite the gaze. This demonstrates how the state seeks to surround death, and thus its recognition of mourning, with silence and shadows; see Dian Million, *Therapeutic Nations: Healing in an Age of Indigenous Human Rights* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2013).

49. See for example Nitasha Sharma's "Pacific Revisions of Blackness: Blacks Address Race and Belonging in Hawai'i," where she considers how the U.S. military mediates the relationship of Blackness in the Hawaiian islands: *Amerasia Journal* 37, no. 3 (2011): 43–60.

50. Jodi A. Byrd and Michael Rothberg, "Between Subaltern and Indigeneity: Critical Categories for Postcolonial Studies," *Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies* 31, no. 1 (2011): 5.

51. See Anne McClintock, "The Angel of Progress: The Pitfalls of the Term 'Postcolonialism,'" *Social Text* 31/32 (1992): 84–98; Ella Shohat, "Notes on the 'Post-Colonial,'" *Social Text* 31/32 (1992): 99–113. We can see the influence of Third World feminist scholarship in Ethnic Studies with the significance of *This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color*, ed. Cherríe Moraga and Gloria E. Anzaldúa, 2nd ed. (New York: Kitchen Table Press, 1983), to the critical ethnic studies canon. Their scholarship and activism also bridge anti-apartheid movements of the 1980s and the anti-Zionist movement in the 1990s, symbolized by Edward Said accused of stoning in South Lebanon, after he threw a rock over the Lebanon–Israeli wire fence border toward an Israeli watchtower while he was visiting the Lebanese border. See also Chandra Talpade Mohanty, "Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses," *Boundary 2* 12, no. 3/13, no. 1 (spring/fall 1984): 338–58.

52. Achille Mbembe, *On the Postcolony* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001). Collectively, this Third World postcolonialism shifted the postcolo-

nial modality from a static study of the Other to understanding how colonialism also changed the metropole through hybridity, subalterns, syncretism, and creolization — terms that came to influence the humanities and social sciences. See Néstor García Canclini, *Hybrid Cultures: Strategies for Entering and Leaving Modernity*, trans. Christopher Chiappari and Silvia López (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, [1995] 2005); Homi K. Bhabha, "Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse," in *The Location of Culture* (New York: Routledge, 1994), 121–31. Also see Kobena Mercer, "Cosmopolitan Contact Zones," in *Afro Modern: Journeys through the Black Atlantic*, ed. Tanya Barson and Peter Gorschluter (London: Tate, 2010), 40–48.

53. They have instead rerooted the field in decolonization movements of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, including the end of the African slave trade and decline of European colonies across the Americas and the Caribbean; Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?," from *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, ed. C. Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 271–313; García Canclini, *Hybrid Cultures*; Katherine McKittrick, ed., *Sylvia Wynter: On Being Human as Praxis* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015). This is exemplified by the Negritude movement (led by Aimé Césaire and Leopold Senghor) against French colonialism, as well as Alejo Carpentier and José Marti against Spanish colonialism.

54. McClintock, "Angel of Progress." We can see the influence of Third World feminist scholarship in Moraga and Anzaldúa's *This Bridge Called My Back* and its significance to the critical ethnic studies canon.

55. Ann Laura Stoler, *Imperial Debris: On Ruins and Ruination* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013). See also Soyang Park, "Silence Subaltern Speech and the Intellectual in South Korea: The Politics of Emergent Speech in the Case of Former Sexual Slaves," *Journal for Cultural Research* 9, no. 2 (2005): 169–206.

56. An illustrative example is how in the United States and South Korea the end of World War II is remembered as the "U.S. rescue of South Korea from Japan and communism." The history of American direct occupation when the U.S. military ruled South Korea between September 8, 1945, and August 15, 1948, coupled with direct American military intervention into the 1980s, when military dictator Park Chung Hee ruled with U.S. support, is denied and is dangerous knowledge to this day. The military dictatorship was not to be spoken of well into the 1980s; see Mark Caprio and Yoneyiku Sugita, *Democracy in Occupied Japan: The U.S. Occupation and Japanese Politics and Society* (New York: Routledge, 2007).

57. Chungmoo Choi, "The Discourse of Decolonization and Popular Memory: South Korea," in *The Politics of Culture in the Shadow of Capital*, ed. Lisa Lowe and David Lloyd (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997), 461.

58. As opposed to simply territorial expansion, the goal of hegemony is to enable the United States to dominate East Asian markets and get cheap labor for First World consumers. But even this can have disastrous results, as we saw in the Asian economic crisis in 1997, and can create completely new social and economic systems; see Jinah Kim and Neda Atanasoski, "Unhappy Desires and Queer Postsocialist

Futures: Hong Kong and Buenos Aires in Wong Kar-Wai's *Happy Together*," *American Quarterly* 69, no. 3 (2017): 697–718; Pheng Cheah, "The Crisis of Money," *positions: east asia cultures critique* 16, no. 1 (2008): 189–219.

59. See Byrd and Rothberg, "Between Subaltern and Indigeneity; Audra Simpson, *Mohawk Interruptus: Political Life across the Borders of Settler States* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2014); Candace Fujikane and Jonathan Y. Okamura, eds., *Asian Settler Colonialism: From Local Governance to the Habits of Everyday Life in Hawai'i* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2008); Aloysha Goldstein, ed., *Formations of United States Colonialism* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2014).

60. Fujikane, "Introduction: Asian Settler Colonialism in the U.S. Colony of Hawai'i," in *Asian Settler Colonialism*, 20.

61. While some places were more subject to displacement and resettlement—such as in Okinawa and Guam, where bases were made with bulldozers with the local population bullied off at gunpoint—other places, such as the Commonwealth of the Mariana Islands, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Palau, the goal is not settler colonialism, but to establish sites for launching and testing missiles.

62. Noenoe K. Silva in *Aloha Betrayed: Native Hawaiian Resistance to American Colonialism* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004) shows how this colonialism depended fundamentally on the degradation and erasure of native culture and language.

63. Patrick Wolfe, "Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native," *Journal of Genocide Research* 8, no. 4 (2008): 387–409.

64. See Thomas Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001); George Lipsitz, "'Frantic to Join . . . the Japanese Army': Black Soldiers and Civilians Confront the Asia-Pacific War," in *Perilous Memories*, ed. Fujitani, White, and Yoneyama, 347–77; T. Fujitani, "*Go for Broke*, the Movie: Japanese American Soldiers in U.S. National, Military, and Racial Discourses," in *Perilous Memories*, ed. Fujitani, White, and Yoneyama, 239–66; Penny M. Von Eschen, *Race against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937–1957* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997); Yukiko Koshhiro, *Trans-Pacific Racisms and the U.S. Occupation of Japan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999); Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003).

65. Craig Santos Perez, *From Unincorporated Territory [Guma']* (Richmond, CA: Omnidawn, 2014), 5.

66. Michael Bevacqua sees the Guam–U.S. relationship as structured by "banal imperialism," which is an imperialist fantasy that the colonialized desire to be colonized. Michael Bevacqua. "The Exceptional Life and Death of a Chamorro Soldier: Tracing the Militarization of Desire in Guam, USA." In Shigematsu and Camacho, *Militarized Currents*, 33–62.

67. Elaine H. Kim and Chungmoo Choi, eds., "Introduction," in *Dangerous Women: Gender and Korean Nationalism* (New York: Routledge, 1998), 3.

68. See Leo T. S. Ching, *Becoming "Japanese": Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of*

Identity Formation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); Gerald Horne, *Race War! White Supremacy and the Japanese Attack on the British Empire* (New York: New York University Press, 2004).

69. In 1898, Puerto Rico becomes a U.S. commonwealth at the same time as Guam, and in 1900, American Samoa is made into an unincorporated territory. For more on the Puerto Rican condition, see Christina Duffy Burnett, *Foreign in a Domestic Sense: Puerto Rico, American Expansion, and the Constitution* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001). See also Amy Kaplan, "'Left Alone with America': The Absence of Empire in the Study of American Culture," in *Cultures of United States Imperialism*, ed. Amy Kaplan and Donald Pease (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993), 3–21.

70. Shigematsu and Camacho, "Introduction," in *Militarized Currents*, xviii.

71. Takashi Fujitani, *Race for Empire: Koreans as Japanese and Japanese as Americans in World War II* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011).

72. For the specific term, see Chalmers Johnson, *The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic* (New York: Henry Holt, 2004). For a description of America's Pacific as a garrison state, see Bello, "Conclusion," in *Militarized Currents*, 309–21. For more global perspective on the rise in the number of U.S. military bases, see David Vine, *Base Nation: How U.S. Military Bases Abroad Harm America and the World* (New York: Metropolitan, 2015).

73. Byrd and Rothberg, "Between Subaltern and Indigeneity," 5.

74. Byrd and Rothberg, "Between Subaltern and Indigeneity," 4.

75. Peter J. Taylor, *Modernities: A Geohistorical Interpretation* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999); Lisa Lowe, *The Intimacies of Four Continents* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015); Grace Kyungwon Hong, "Consumerism without Means," in *The Ruptures of American Capital: Women of Color Feminism and The Culture of Immigrant Labor* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006), 107–42; Kumkum Sangari, "The Politics of the Possible," in *Theory of the Novel: A Historical Approach*, ed. Michael McKeon (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 900–922.

76. Shigematsu and Camacho, "Introduction," in *Militarized Currents*, xxiii, emphasis in the original.

77. See Nan Kim, "Ruins of Global Militarism, Embodiment of Dissent: Gangjeong Village's Culture of Peace and Life Movement" (presentation, LandBody: Indigeneity's Radical Commitments Conference, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, May 7, 2016).

78. Simon Romero, "Slow-Burning Challenge to Chile on Easter Island," *New York Times*, October 6, 2012. Accessed October 7, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/07/world/americas/slow-burning-rebellion-against chile-on-easter-island.html?pagewanted=all. Also known as the Easter Islands, Rapa Nui in the South East Pacific held an important place within Polynesian cultural and economic circuits. In the 1800s as European trade across the Pacific increased, the island was an unwilling outpost for European navies and pirates with tragic consequences for the Rapa Nui people and land. Rapa Nui formally became a part of Latin America in 1888 when

Chile, after winning the War of the Pacific with Peru and Bolivia, annexed the island and abolished its monarchy. Also see Bruce W. Farcau, *The Ten Cents War: Peru, Chile, and Bolivia in the War of the Pacific, 1879–1884* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000).

79. Stoler, *Haunted by Empire: Geographies of Intimacy in North American History* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006); see also Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010); Lowe, *Intimacies of Four Continents*.

80. Espiritu, *Body Counts*, 21, emphasis in the original.

81. See Fujitani, *Race for Empire*; Katharine H. S. Moon, *Sex among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S.–Korea Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).

82. See Bonnie Honig, *Antigone, Interrupted* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Judith Butler, *Antigone's Claim: Kinship between Life and Death* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).

83. See Rachel Lee, "Asian American Cultural Production in Asia-Pacific Perspective," *boundary 2* 26, no. 2 (1999): 231–54.

84. Lee, "Asian American Cultural Production in Asian-Pacific Perspective," 253. The encounters among Euro-Americans, Asians, and Latinos are circumscribed by neoliberalism's demand for the opening of borders and reorganization of national economies that, in the U.S. context, have depended on the United States' particular post–World War II relationship to Asia and Latin America. As I detail in chapter 2, the dependence on Asian and Latino labor, market, and production capacity imagines essential differences among Euro-Americans, Asians, and Latinos. Euro-American/Asian/Latin American subjects are expected to inhabit exclusive states such as: free/indentured/slave; interiority/exteriority/primal; creative/hardworking/criminal; native born/immigrant/undocumented; and owner/manager/worker.

85. See Connery, "Pacific Rim Discourse"; Arif Dirlik, "Asia Pacific Studies in an Age of Global Modernity," *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* 6, no. 2 (2005): 158–70. For an archive of print images that creates a sense of the space that is shared between these two "cultures of the periphery," see Erika Esau, *Images of the Pacific Rim: Australia and California, 1850–1935* (Sydney, Australia: Powerhouse, 2010).

86. Connery, "Pacific Rim Discourse."

87. See, for example, the *Oxford Online Dictionary*.

88. Shigematsu and Camacho, *Militarized Currents*, xxxiii.

89. Raúl Homero Villa and George J. Sánchez, "Introduction: Los Angeles Studies and the Future of Urban Cultures," *American Quarterly* special issue: Los Angeles and the Future of Urban Cultures, guest editors Raúl Homero Villa and George J. Sánchez, no. 3 (2004): 498–505. See also Paul Ong, Edna Bonacich, and Lucie Cheng, eds., *The New Asian Immigration in Los Angeles and Global Restructuring* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994), particularly the introduction, in which they argue that military connections first and foremost drive migration between East Asia and the United States.

90. Stoler, *Haunted by Empire*, 18.

91. The 1898 Spanish-American War and 1848 U.S.-Mexico War are two important

precursors to American attempts at battling Japanese colonialism in the Pacific and maintaining the lands grabbed from the Japanese since. See Rob Wilson, *Reimagining the American Pacific: From "South Pacific" to Bamboo Ridge and Beyond* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000); Keith L. Camacho, *Cultures of Commemoration: The Politics of War, Memory, and History in the Mariana Islands* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2011); Teresia K. Teaiwa, "Bikinis and Other S/Pacific N/Oceanism," in *Militarized Currents*, ed. Shigematsu and Camacho.

92. Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain*.

93. Rosanne Kennedy, "Indigenous Australian Arts of Return: Mediating Perverse Archives," in *Rites of Return: Diaspora Poetics and the Politics of Memory*, ed. Marianne Hirsh and Nancy Miller (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), 88–104.

94. According to Wikipedia, *dossier* comes from the French word for "back" (*dos*). As Fanon is describing, dossiers are central for profiling the colonial and racial subject. For example, the dossier has played a key role as a representation of espionage and is vital to the operations of the FBI's COINTELPRO.

95. Frantz Fanon, *Toward the African Revolution: Political Essays*, trans. Haakon Chevalier (New York: Grove, [1967] 1994), 49.

96. U.S. dossiers—for example, on COINTELPRO operations against the Black Panthers—are still difficult to access fully.

97. See David L. Eng and Shinhee Han, "A Dialogue on Racial Melancholia," *Psychoanalytic Dialogues* 10, no. 4 (2000): 667–700. See also the articles and artwork in the special issue on Asian American mental health edited by Mimi Khuc: "Open in Emergency: A Special Issue on Asian American Mental Health," *Asian American Literary Review* (2016); Min Hyoung Song, "Communities of Remembrance: Reflections on the Virginia Tech Shootings and Race," *Journal of Asian American Studies* 11, no. 1 (2008): 1–26, and Song, *The Children of 1965: On Writing, and Not Writing, as an Asian American* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013). The 1940s–60s U.S. Cold War rhetorical battle against Soviet Union racial liberalism represented the United States as liberators of all people. The institutionalization of antiracism in that period becomes a general national policy spanning "liberal multiculturalism" (1980–90) and neoliberal multiculturalism (2000s). It is this liberal humanism that has silenced the diaspora within U.S. national space. See Jodi Melamed, *Represent and Destroy: Rationalizing Violence in the New Racial Capitalism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011), 13–14; Marianne Hirsch and Nancy K. Miller, eds., *Rites of Return: Diaspora Poetics and the Politics of Memory* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011); Viet Thanh Nguyen, *Nothing Ever Dies: Vietnam and the Memory of War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016).

98. See Eng and Han, "Dialogue on Racial Melancholia." This essay is a result of the dialogue between the two authors, who were also impacted by the deaths of the students at Columbia. They write, "In the final analysis, this essay has been an exercise for us to mourn the various passings of Asian American students who no longer felt tied to our present world, such as it is" (698).

99. Jay Caspian Kang is doing interesting work on Asian American necropolitics. See Kang, *The Dead Do Not Improve: A Novel* (New York: Hogarth, 2013); Kang,

"That Other School Shooting," *New York Times Magazine*, March 28, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/31/magazine/should-it-matter-that-the-shooter-at-oikos-university-was-korean.html?mcubz=3; Kang, "What a Fraternity Hazing Death Revealed About the Painful Search for an Asian-American Identity," *New York Times Magazine*, August 9, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/09/magazine/what-a-fraternity-hazing-death-revealed-about-the-painful-search-for-an-asian-american-identity.html?mcubz=3.

ONE. Melancholy Violence

1. Yoneyama, *Cold War Ruins*, 15.

2. The short story was first published in the Christmas edition of the 1985 *Rafu Shimpo*, a English-language Japanese American newspaper in Los Angeles and also included in a reprint of *Seventeen Syllables and Other Stories*, ed. King-Kok Cheung (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1988, 2nd ed.).

3. King-Kok, *Seventeen Syllables*, 15.

4. Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, trans. Constance Farrington (New York: Grove, 1963).

5. Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 249–310.

6. Japanese American internment is regularly revived by white supremacists as an idealized state response to managing racial others during times of war. In November 2016 Carl Higbie, the head of the Great America Political Action Committee, suggested that the Korematsu decision could serve as a precedent for a registry of Muslim immigrants. In Virginia, Roanoke mayor David Bowers suspended local assistance for Syrian refugees and invoked mass internment as a response to the perceived threat. "I'm reminded that President Franklin D. Roosevelt felt compelled to sequester Japanese foreign nationals after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, and it appears that the threat of harm to America from ISIS now is just as real and serious as that from our enemies then," he said in a statement in November 2015; Matt Ford, "The Return of *Korematsu*," *Atlantic Magazine*, November 19, 2015, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/11/the-shadow-of-korematsu/416634/.

7. Williams, *Divided World*, 98.

8. Nigel Gibson, "Why Frantz Fanon Still Matters," October 8, 2016, http://readingfanon.blogspot.com/2016/08/why-frantz-fanon-still-matters.html.

9. For a discussion how psychiatry and politics intertwined in his thinking produces a "critical ethnopsychiatry based on a new concept of culture," see Nigel Gibson and Roberto Beneduce, *Frantz Fanon, Psychiatry and Politics* (London: Rowman and Littlefield, 2017).

10. Lewis Gordon also calls for the need for renewed study of Fanon's medical practice given how Blacks and other colonized people are pathologized within psychiatry and medicine overall. *What Fanon Said: A Philosophical Introduction to His Life and Thought* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2015).

11. In the World War I era the term *forward psychiatry* was coined by European psychologists, particularly in France and England, to explain the experiences by sol-